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BALTIC SECURITY

LOOKING TOWARDS THE 21TH CENTURY

Edited by

GUNNAR ARTÉUS & ATIS LEJIŅŠ

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CONTENTS

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FOREWORD

This book is essentially a product of Latvian-Swedish cooperation. Or more specifically: of cooperation between the *Latvijas Ārpolitikas Institūts* (*LĀI*, The Latvian Institute of International Affairs), represented by its director Atis Lejiņš, *Försvarshögskolans strategiska institution* (*FHS/SI*, The Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defence College of Sweden), represented by the director of its research program. "Security in the Baltic Sea region (BSS)," Professor Gunnar Artéus.

This cooperation has manifested and is manifesting itself in various forms and ways. One major event was an international conference at Jūrmala (near Riga) in June 14–16, 1997. The papers presented and discussed at this conference provide – in slightly revised shape – the bulk of the contents of this book.

Both the *LĀI* and the *FHS/SI* and its BSS program are briefly described on the inside of the back-cover, and we see no need to add anything here to that presentation. Nor will we comment here on the theme of the book since this has been **admirably** done by Professor Bo Huldt, Director of the *FHS/SI*, in his introduction to the book. However, we will not abstain here from expressing our gratitude to our principal co-workers in the organizing of the Jūrmala conference and in the production of this book, namely Ms Signe Sole, assistant to Atis Lejiņš, and Dr. Daina Bleiere, research fellow of the *LĀI*. And during the final stages of the book's delivery process, valuable assistance has been cheerfully given by Ms Eila Lindman, the new principal assistant of the *FHS/SI*.

Stockholm and Riga in March, 1998.

Gunnar Artéus *Atis Lejiņš*

INTRODUCTION

Bo Huldt

The Baltic Sea region has emerged as a new component in the budding of a new European security order. The Cold War was a dark interlude in Northern European history not least because it broke the unity of what had been for a very long time a region of trade and cultural exchange, with the Baltic Sea bringing the peoples together.

All had certainly not been togetherness and harmony prior to the Cold War. On the contrary, the region had been the scene of bitter rivalries and much bloodshed between great powers as well as smaller states. Three types of actors had dominated the stage. First, there had been the **permanent powers**, i.e., "Germany" and "Russia," or perhaps better, "Germania" and "Slavia," which in different shapes had ruled the southern and eastern shores of the Sea. Second, there were the *some time powers*, i.e., Denmark during the middle ages, 16th and early 17th centuries, Poland in the late middle and early modern ages, and Sweden during the so called "Swedish century" from the capture of Riga in 1621 to the end of the Great Nordic War in 1721, which at various times had held mastery in the Baltic region. The third category was made up of the so called **maritime powers** of the West who had strategic and economic interests in the Baltic Sea region and thus from time to time intervened in the local power struggle to protect these interests and to prevent any one single local power from overwhelming all the rest. Thus acted the Dutch in the mid-1600's, supporting first the Swedes against the Danes, then the Danes against the Swedes when the latter seemed intent on making the Baltic a Swedish lake. After the Dutch came in British, who sought through similar balancing policies first to cut down the Swedes to size and thereafter, over a rather a long time, tried to hold back Russia and protect Russia's smaller neighbours, occasionally supported by another Western power, France.

Still, despite these repeated rounds of great power confrontation over the control of the Russian market, over ports, coast line and hinterland, the regional system and unity was not threatened for any longer period of time. Trade went on, the ships would sail between

the Baltic cities, and the region was never quite closed. The Cold War, on the contrary, implied a full black out, the realization of a "continental system" beyond even the wildest dreams of Napoleon. The Baltic Sea effectively divided East from West; also from a neutral Swedish perspective, the other side of the Baltic was a different world, and, above all, *one* different world. The end of the Cold War thus brought the realization, also to the Swedes, that there existed something which one had conveniently forgotten for some fifty years: the Baltic peoples.

The changes since 1989 on the strategic map of the Baltic Sea region have been revolutionary. Germany has been re-unified, Poland has re-emerged as an independent European actor of substance and even greater promise, the Baltic states have been reclaimed like land rising from out of the sea, and the Soviet Union has ceased to exist – or, perhaps rather, retreated into Russia, again the single largest European power but also the most problem ridden. From having held mastery over the Baltic Sea only a few years ago, Russia now maintains only what must be described as a rather tenuous hold on the sea through the ex-clave of Kaliningrad and the St Petersburg region. In the mid-80's, almost 70 percent of all naval tonnage in the Baltic Sea was Soviet and Warsaw Pact; today, there exists a triangular "balance" of sorts between the German, Swedish and Russian fleets and, given the present lack of resources and the low priority given to the Russian Baltic Fleet, Russia hardly looks the strongest of the three.

The Russian "bridgehead" is strategically a difficult one: Kaliningrad is exposed, with an open coast and with land communications available only through Baltic and Belarussian territory. The Kronstadt–St Petersburg area, on the other hand, is located at the very bottom of the Finnish Gulf – far away from the Baltic Sea, also to some extent dependent on good neighbour relations.

The Baltic Sea is now also a NATO sea, something that will be further underlined once Poland joins the Alliance. The NATO Command structure is being changed; today, the Baltic Sea is the responsibility of both the Central Command and of the North Western Command (for air and naval operations). NATO presence, however, to a very large extent equals Partnership for Peace exercises, which thus involves all shore states including Russia, although Russian participation has so far been restrained.

The Baltic Sea region today is a meeting place for many different organizational and national interests: NATO, European Union,

WEU, Nordic, Baltic, Russian and Polish (thus also, Central European) interests. In this context, security cannot be seen but as a "wide" concept, involving "hard" security – arms control, security and confidence building measures, "deterrence" and defence – as well as "soft" security problems – environmental challenges, economic and trade concerns, but also narcotics, smuggling, and organized crime, refugees and human rights issues. The most obvious challenge common to all Baltic Sea states is posed by the environment, the threats to the Sea itself.

It was also these last issues that first brought the Baltic Sea states together – at a summit in 1991 at Ronneby in southern Sweden, called by the Swedish then Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson. Concerns over the environment provided the stepping stone to a wider agenda for cooperation and in 1992 the Council of Baltic Sea States was founded in Copenhagen, upon a joint Danish and German initiative. Step by step, efforts have since then been made to enlarge the field of cooperation in the region. In the spring and summer of 1996, with Sweden as chair nation of the Council and initiator, an agenda was formulated involving the building of a new regional "infrastructure," with economic, environmental, cultural, and political components. A specific programme for the joint combatting of international crime was identified.

An important element at the Visby and Kalmar meetings in 1996 was the image effect created by the presence and strong showing of leading EU statesmen, including Chancellor Kohl, and by the European Commission itself. Even though Visby did not quite become a northern counterpart to the Barcelona meeting and programme with similar institutionalization, significant steps were nevertheless taken in the direction of the establishing of the Baltic Sea area as a Region of Europe – and of future dynamic development.

The major importance of the Baltic Sea cooperation in terms of high politics lies in the fact that this area – from the Kola and Murmansk in the north to Kaliningrad in the south – is where Russia is in direct contact with Western Europe. What to Peter the Great was once a "window to the West" is no less important to his heirs today – but, as has been observed by strategists, this is also a laboratory for Europe, a litmus test on how Russia will be able to build and develop its relationship with the Europeans. Herein lie both great opportunities and considerable risks.

The Nordic countries identified these challenges already in 1991/1992 when they recognized, both individually and jointly within

the Nordic Council, special responsibilities actively to support the development of the economies, and the social and political systems of the three Baltic states. The relationship between the Baltics on the one hand and Russia, the former imperial power, on the other was here understood to be of crucial importance.

The Nordics have also risen to the occasion, throwing themselves into confidence and security building in the region in a way that has not characterized Nordic policies since Napoleonic days. The most immediate challenge, once political recognition had been granted, was the evacuation of the ex-Soviet armed forces from Baltic territories, which very strongly engaged the Swedish government led by Mr Carl Bildt during 1991–94. Here, the gradual demilitarization of the new relationships between Russia and the Baltic states was clearly a Swedish security interest – as well as a key Baltic concern. The full evacuation had also been achieved by 1993–94 (with the exception of the Skrunda radar base in Latvia). While thus being steadfast supporters of Baltic sovereignty, the Nordic states have at the same time pursued a "balanced" policy vis-à-vis Russia and the three Baltic states on issues related to the Russian speaking minorities. As chair country of the CSCE in 1993, Sweden was instrumental in securing the establishment of civil rights missions to Estonia and Latvia, thus engaging the CSCE actively on an issue which because of the tense relations between these states and Russia clearly belonged to the confidence and security building area. Subsequently, this presence would also serve as a legitimizing instrument for the minority policies gradually decided upon by the Baltic governments themselves.

A central theme, a "must" from the security point of view, for the Nordic states thus remains the "engagement" of Russia in European affairs. The Nordic states, regardless of whether they are NATO members or remain militarily nonaligned, tend to identify themselves as "Atlanticists," strong supporters of a continued US presence and active participation in European security building, which also has a direct bearing upon the Baltic Sea region. At the same time, Russia will have to be an European partner and policies towards the Baltic states will also be conditioned by this factor.

The means to security in the region, both in Nordic and a more specific Swedish perspective, is offered by the enlargement of the European Union and here the Nordic Union members have been strong advocates of Baltic (as well as, of course, Polish) membership to be granted as soon as possible. "A larger European Union will

mean a safer Europe" – as stated in a recent Swedish government report (*Större EU – säkrare Europa*. SOU 1997: 143. Stockholm). While there have been some disagreement among the Nordics about how this enlargement is to be shaped, there is no lack of unity about the goal: the three Baltic states as members of the European Union.

The role of the EU is thus central for stability and security in the Baltic Sea region. In fact, it may even be argued that a strong strategic argument for the Swedish and Finnish membership applications to the Union was the very reemergence of the Baltic Republics as small states in need of support on the western boundaries of Russia. In the 1930's, they had all succumbed to the combined pressures of Germany and the Soviet Union and the small Nordic states had no means on their own to try to counteract this. An important difference between then and today, however, is the Union, which provides a "back up" for the Nordics in their active Baltic policies. This argument was never made publicly in the Finnish and Swedish debates over EU membership but must have been at the back of the insiders' minds.

The role of NATO in the region has been a more controversial issue. Both Finland and Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace programme in May 1994 – as the first of the neutral and nonaligned states, but the debate in both countries on NATO enlargement tended to be sceptical until well into 1996, when Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, on visiting Latvia, publicly supported the ambitions of the Baltic states to join NATO – if such was their choice. By the summer of 1997, when NATO reached its decision in Madrid to enlarge, the positions of the Nordic nonaligned states were fully in tune with the outcome: NATO enlargement would enhance security in Europe in general, but also in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region in particular. The agreement on May 27 1997 between NATO and Russia, as well as the balanced outcome of the Madrid meeting with three Central European candidates identified, no doubt influenced Nordic perceptions of the decision as reflecting a controlled, long term process with further enlargement decisions to be taken.

Today, it seems less likely that a second wave of enlargement, with a new batch of candidate states being identified, will come soon; rather than in 1999, such a decision might now be expected for the early 2000's, say between 2003 and 2007. In the meanwhile, the European Union enlargement process will be all the more important for security building in the Baltic Sea region – as will the further

development of the NATO "Enhanced" Partnership programme and of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area.

Realizing that a speedy enlargement of NATO including the Baltic states (and perhaps also the Nordic nonaligned states) was not on the cards, the strategic community, academics and practitioners, became busy in 1996 in devising interim solutions. British former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and analysts at the Rand Corporation (Ronald Asmus, Stephen Larrabee and Robert Nurick) came up with similar ideas of a Nordic-Baltic subsystem for security and confidence building with the Nordics acting as "escorts" to the Baltic States in the development of Baltic political and defence systems (with democratic and stable government as well as control), in moving them closer to the Union and NATO, and also in improving their relations with Russia. The enthusiasm over those proposals among both Nordic and Baltic states was, however, very limited – the Nordics refusing to provide any "guarantees" to the Baltics, and the latter rejecting a Nordic affiliation as a substitute for NATO membership.

With NATO's decision now taken, and presumably on the way to be adopted by Czechs, Hungarians and Poles as well as by the ratifying parliaments in the NATO member countries, we will be left with a situation in the Baltic Sea region where the interim will last for some time. Considerable expectations will thus also be placed on the Nordics acting for confidence and security building in the region – along the line of their special responsibilities acknowledged already in 1991–92. This will not involve security guarantees to the Baltic states but it will certainly involve active regional policies pursued by the Nordics, such as we have seen being done since the end of the Cold War.

When discussing NATO membership for the Baltic states, we must also recognize the connection between Baltic and nonaligned Nordic NATO relations. It is likely to be difficult to mobilize support within NATO for Baltic membership unless Finnish and Swedish NATO relations have brought these countries closer to NATO than they are today.

There remain two strategic uncertainties in the region: a smaller one related to Germany's future interests in the region, a larger one involving Russia. Today, the role of Germany seems low profile politically, despite investments and trade in the region and participation in, i.a., major demining operations as well as in Baltron, the Baltic joint naval force to be established. There is more concern with the

Germans "not doing enough" than with the possibility of "too much." German focus seems to be fixed on Central Europe and the combined enlargement of NATO and the Union. The future policy chosen in Berlin/Bonn will be of significance for how security building will develop in the region. In this connection, attention should be paid to the link already being forged between Germany and Poland. Chancellor Kohl's proud proclamation that the German relationship with Poland will be as deep as that already existing with France has strategic implications for the region.

Russia is, of course, the greater uncertainty. Regardless of what government will rule Russia, it is certain to maintain an image of Russia as the major power in the Baltic Sea Region, also regardless of whether the Baltic Fleet sails or is rusting away in the ports of Baltijsk and Kronstadt. Economic imperatives now force the Russians to make deep cuts in their decaying military organization and, over the longer term, to fundamentally reorganize what will be left of air force (in the future including the rocket troops), army and navy.

For the time being, there is thus military impotence. This will not be a permanent state but for the immediate future, more important than military matters will be a pragmatic Russian understanding of a more realistic balance between Russian interests and those of its Baltic Sea partners. There is already a very substantial element of mutual interdependence developing with ports such as Ventspils, Liepāja and Riga now being among the most important places on Earth for Moscow: Through these ports a very large portion of Russia's exports (primarily energy products) to the West as well as imports therefrom is now being shipped. No doubt, there is a parallel dependence on the Baltic side since much revenue comes from this transit (as does the energy that the Balts themselves need). Again, both opportunities and risks are created by this new situation – but one is tempted to see the former as more relevant than the latter to long term development. That, however, presupposes a Russian willingness to accept that the sovereignty of the Baltic states is also what makes these states useful to the Russians as well as interesting to the West, whose economic partnership Russia still seeks. Despite all the noise made by Mr. Zhirinovsky and others, the basic guideline laid down in 1985 by Mr. Gorbachev, that the future of Russia (then the Soviet Union) lies in cooperation with the West, still stands.

When visiting Stockholm in December 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered a "Confidence Pact" to the states in the Baltic

Sea region. To those with good memory this may recall the Gorbachev Murmansk speech in 1987 – when a similar offer was made to the "Arctic states" (including the Nordics and Canada), and resolutely turned down *in toto*. Scepticism has again been voiced – and the "Pact" idea was also turned down in Stockholm – but there has not been the outright rejection of 1987 and new initiatives on the regional cooperation theme will undoubtely come from Moscow. The somewhat less than sensitive approach used by Russian diplomacy when proposing "pacts" (or, as earlier in the case of a request to Poland, a "corridor" via Grodno to Kaliningrad) should not divert our attention from the fact that there is an urgent Russian interest in developing relations with the regional states. How this can be achieved will ultimately be of crucial importance for the security in the Baltic Sea region. Regional cooperation has many benefits; one of them is that such arrangements in Europe tend to overlap the boundaries between the major Euro-organizations, and thus also brings the outsiders into central political and economic processes. Obvious regional (or subregional) concerns to the Russians involve both the development of the Kaliningrad oblast, Murmansk, Karelia and Pskov. The potential of the St Petersburg area – one of the population centres in the region – is enormous but the realization of this potential also depends on Western interest and investment.

One may assume that the Moscow leadership is weighing possibilities and what it also sees as dangers against the background of the declining ability of the "centre" to control the periphery and the regions generally, but that one is fully aware of the necessity to open up – lacking other options. Again, Western responses to this will have to be based on a cool calculus of interest, of "security" and of "power." A market potential comparable to the Russian one is not likely to present itself in Europe in time foreseeable but the relationship between Russia and the West is still a strategic one. "Russia *in* Europe" is a necessity, but Russia as "European partner" will take time to develop, also because of its present state of weakness.

If "regionalism" thus implies some concern for the Russians it becomes a complex issue also for the smaller states of the region. To them, Macchiavelli's dictum – that a small state should never align itself with a more powerful one, unless it has to! – may serve as a reminder that regional cooperation between small states and great powers involves asymmetries which the smaller state may want to avoid by instead appealing to a larger framework within which balance may be provided by other great powers. In the present case, a

consistent Swedish line has been to refer all issues related to "hard security" to a larger European context, rather than to discuss regional arrangements. Still, regional problems will require regional responses and the challenge today seems to be how to build in the Baltic Sea region a security community which is also directly connected with the larger community already existing in Western Europe and which we now want also to include the former East. Some arrangements, also in the field of "security," may thus have to be developed also in the Baltic Sea area – but with the international status of the Baltic Sea still intact.

As the situation is today, Baltic security is the result of a combination of networks, organizations, multi- and bilateral arrangements as well as national efforts. The United States, the most recent of the "maritime powers," has contributed a Baltic Charter with the three republics, not giving any guarantees but nonetheless laying down a political marker both for their self-confidence and as information intended for others. There is NATO enlargement coming, but also PfP upgraded. The EU has, ponderously but still in a determined way, plotted a course towards enlargement. Even the WEU planted its flag on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea under the former Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen. There is the all-encompassing OSCE; there is Nordic-Baltic cooperation in many shapes.

Neither should we forget the role that national defence efforts will continue to play for the self-confidence of the smaller states in the region as well as for stability as such during a period of transition from Cold War to common and cooperative security. In the case of the three Baltic states there is an obvious need for the building of such limited defence capabilities, which could not honestly be seen as provocation by major powers. The right to self-defence is written into the UN Charter, and the choice of each state to go about its own defence, nationally or collectively, is also recognized in repeated "European" documents since Paris 1990.

All in all, one must recognize how successfully we have moved into the post-Cold War era in Northern Europe – strikingly so when comparing with the situation in the Balkans. The North, which during the New Cold War of the late 1970's and early 1980's seemed heading for rapidly rising tension and grave dangers, now again presents an image of stability, for the time being. In this, there is no reason for complacency about the future – but it is encouraging.

When the agenda for research at the Department of Strategic Studies was established in 1994–95, one of our main ambitions was to launch a program on "Security in the Baltic Sea region" that would look – in a multitude of ways, soft as well as hard – at how a security community might be built in the region. An important element of this was the gathering of a "community" of scholars from the region together in weaving a network of insight and foresight to help us all in moving towards this security community. It is our sincere hope that this study may be seen as a stepping stone in that direction.

ESTONIA'S SECURITY POLICY PRIORITIES

*Toivo Klaar**

Estonia has three broad security-policy priorities, all mutually complementary: NATO membership, EU membership and a strong, dynamic and friendly relationship with Russia. In addition to these broad priorities one can also identify regional interests, such as a strong inter-Baltic relationship, strong ties with our Nordic neighbours, a strengthened Council of Baltic Sea States and a close relationship with Ukraine.

This paper will focus only on the first three priorities. It will attempt to provide an understanding of the history connected with each of these policy directions and to give some ideas on how these strands might evolve in the future. To put these aspirations into perspective the paper will start with a quick look back to identify the origins of Estonia's political aspirations.

1. National independence a means to an end

The restoration of Estonia's independence in 1990-91 was never seen as a goal in itself by those involved in the liberation movement. It was rather an important step on the path from being a colony of the USSR to becoming an equal partner in an integrated Europe. Already in the late nineteenth century the intellectual movement "Young Estonia" called on the nation to become Europeans (while remaining Estonians). In fact, Estonia was one of the first participants in the "Pan-European Movement" of Count Coundenhove-Callergi in the 1920s. The leaders of the late 1980s-early 1990s also followed this same philosophy. Thus the goal of integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures was (and is) seen as a logical path for Estonia as a (western) European nation and a continuation of the philosophy underlying the liberation movement.

2. NATO

Applying for NATO membership is an integral part of this process. It has been sought as a means to provide Estonia a seat at the table of European security-policy decision making and as a

means to alleviate a perceived security shortfall in the Baltic region. Estonian decision-makers have never approached the question of NATO membership from an anti-Russian perspective. Russia's military posture and Russia's political attitudes may have contributed to the important background of the discussions on NATO enlargement in general and Baltic NATO membership in particular. However, the reasons for seeking NATO membership have been and are to be found in the generally integrationist approach of successive Estonian governments' foreign policy.

After all, if NATO is the premier security and defence organisation today, and if its importance as a provider of security and stability both within and outside the territory of its member states is likely to rise even further, why not be part of the decision making process? If Estonia is likely to participate not only as now in Bosnia but also in future NATO-led operations it seems logical to join the organisation that "calls the shots."

2.1. Reasons for applying early

Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that Estonia would have pushed for NATO membership at such an early stage of its military development if NATO had not in 1994 declared itself to be open to new members from Central and Eastern Europe. As it was, Estonia (and its two Baltic neighbours) had no alternative to applying for admission into the Atlantic Alliance.

Unlike in the case of its neighbours Sweden and Finland, no one at that time seriously considered Estonia to be a neutral country. Therefore, had Estonia not applied for NATO membership, it is highly unlikely that the public mind would have made a linkage between such an Estonian policy and that of either Sweden or Finland. Rather, Estonia would have run the risk of being (re-) placed in the public perception among "the former Soviet states, none of which has applied for NATO membership."

Considering Estonia's north-central European vocation this was obviously a possibility that could not be accepted. Thus the application for NATO membership at this early stage was a product at least as much of external circumstances as of domestic Estonian politics.

2.2. NATO membership a challenge

However, whether Estonia would have applied for NATO membership at such an early stage, or whether it would have done so

later and focused initially on Partnership for Peace (PfP) is in essence a moot point. It would have applied at some stage anyway.

This was never thought to be an easy task, as the point of departure was far from ideal. Estonia, like its two Baltic neighbours, could not boast of large armed forces. Furthermore, the past lay heavily over the aspirations of the three Baltic countries. Many policy makers in Russia, from the President on down, were (and are) making noises about "no former Soviet republic" being able to join NATO. Regardless of the fact that no NATO member ever recognised the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, numerous decision-makers in NATO countries have picked up this Russian argument. Some officials also questioned the ability of the Baltic countries to contribute to the security of the Alliance. Others, including former UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd have claimed that the Baltic states were 'indefensible,' thus making them ineligible for NATO membership.

2.3. The road to Madrid

Considering the complexity of the matter it was clear early on in the game that membership for the Baltic states would not be a viable possibility in 1997. It would have been too radical a step for NATO decision-makers to take at that time. Thus the emphasis fell on making sure that the Madrid Summit would adopt language which would guarantee the continuation of the enlargement process and which would accept the real prospects of the Baltic states in this process. The Estonian embassy in Brussels, which served also as the liaison with NATO, became a veritable publishing house, churning out proposal after proposal on wordings that could be used by NATO for this purpose. The idea being that only this active approach would allow Estonia's views to be heard, as obviously Estonia did not possess a seat at the table where NATO's enlargement strategy was being formulated.

2.4. The July 1997 Madrid Summit: a success for Estonia

As we now know, the enlargement discussions came to a head at the heads of state and government meeting in Madrid which ended, if not in acrimony, at least with several important noses bent. As far as enlargement was concerned only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to join with Romania and Slovenia accorded

a separate paragraph as serious future candidates. For the Baltic states the important result of Madrid was that Baltic aspirations were recognised in a very similar manner to that of Romania and Slovenia, thereby placing the Baltics in a very good position for the enlargement debate before the 1999 Washington summit.[1] In fact, Estonian decision-makers saw the outcome of Madrid as a victory, especially considering the unfavourable position of departure.

2.5. A view to Washington

Following the Madrid Summit and building on the Declaration language Estonia's NATO policy has adopted a more urgent tone. Now decision-makers in Tallinn seriously consider Estonia's chances of being included in a second round of NATO enlargement, as also reflected in Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves' speech to the North Atlantic Council on 28 February 1998. There he tackled head-on the thorny issues of defensibility and of the contribution that the Baltic countries could (or could not) make to the security of the Alliance. He refuted claims about the indefensibility of the Baltics by refering to the accession of Iceland, Norway and Denmark, when similar statements were made. As Minister Ilves said, "whether a country is defensible or not depends very much on whether the population is willing to defend it. And Estonia's population is willing to defend Estonia."[2] Estonia's aim, much like that of its Nordic neighbours, is to be able to make the cost of aggression unbearably high, thus being able to preempt an attack.

In the same speech Minister Ilves addressed the contribution Estonia could make to European security :

"Our input to the security and stability of the continent is crucial in a sensitive part of Europe. We provide this contribution by being a stable country with a booming economy and a willingness to assume international commitments. We provide our contribution by building up a small, but well organized army, an army that is based on professional branches, such as air defense, but mainly on massive popular resistance."[3]

In effect, the Estonian aim is to keep the discussions on the military capabilities of the Baltic states in perspective. Small countries are of necessity unable to provide as extensive a military contribution as large countries can. Therefore it is essential that the Baltic states be judged by the right criteria when their membership of NATO is discussed.

Based on the above arguments there are several additional political reasons why the next round of enlargement could very well include the Baltics:

- NATO enlargement should appear geographically balanced in order to respect the differing interests within the Alliance. This would mean including the Baltic states if an enlargement to southern Europe were initiated;
- Not inviting the Baltic states may send a wrong signal. NATO would appear to be shying away from its own commitment of openness to all countries;
- The United States Congress, as the key factor in any NATO enlargement, is familiar with and sympathetic to the Baltic states. Attempting an enlargement without accepting in principle the inclusion of the Baltics might be difficult.
- Whether these factors will be decisive remains of course to be seen. Especially an announcement by Austria that it would seek NATO membership might mix up the whole deck of cards. Although Russian attitudes to this process will also play in the background, NATO needs, to quote US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "to keep Russia's objections in perspective. They are the product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to concentrate on encouraging Russia's more modern aspirations."[4]

It remains for Estonian diplomats, together with their Baltic colleagues, to build on the generally more favourable basis to make their case in 1999 as strong as possible.

3. EU

The European Union accession process has been much more dependent on the individual performance of applicant countries and, in the end, less on political criteria than the NATO enlargement process. The invitation of Estonia to the enlargement negotiations has been the result of Estonians' own hard work, a fact that appeals very much to the Estonian Lutheran psyche.

3.1. The difficult road to membership negotiations

This does not mean that the road to membership negotiations was easy either. In fact, the European Union in 1991 initially included the

three Baltic states in the "Tacis" program of technical and financial assistance to the (former) Soviet Union. While the political implications of this decision were quickly noted and the Baltic states were moved over to the "Phare" portfolio (of assistance to Central Europe), it took considerable time for EU members to accept the possibility of Baltic EU membership. The initial cooperation and later free trade agreements offered to Estonia and its two Baltic neighbours did not foresee this possibility. It was not until the autumn of 1994 that the EU agreed to negotiate Europe Agreements with the three Baltic states (Association agreements with a perspective of future membership).

The start of the Europe Agreement negotiations in December 1994 also marked the beginning of the Baltic states' more individualised approach to the EU. Estonia early on in the negotiations surprised the Commission representatives by pushing for a more liberal treaty than the EU itself was willing to agree on. Estonian representatives' call for 'no transition periods' (in the implementation of key Agreement provisions) became a serious bone of contention and put the EU in the curious position of being more reluctant to open up its markets than was the applicant country. No other Central European country had demanded this; in fact all the four 'more advanced' Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) had asked for and received long transition periods in the implementation of treaty provisions.

Estonia was able to push its case backed up by the proof provided by its ultra-liberal economic approach. In the end, the Commission did in June 1995 agree to sign a Europe Agreement with Estonia which included almost no transition period, thereby giving prominence to Estonia's achievements in the economic field.

However, the Europe Agreement was a means, never an end in itself. The key goal of Estonia's EU policy was now to ensure that Estonia would be able to hook up with the "Vishegrad four," the front runners for future EU membership. This undertaking was again hampered by the wide-spread preconceptions among EU decision-makers that Estonia could not possibly aspire to belong to the same club as 'advanced' Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia. The Estonian Foreign Minister saw himself placed in the role of a modern-day Cato forced to repeat the same message over and over and over again: objective criteria must be applied when judging the suitability of individual candidate countries and no associated country should be excluded from this consideration. With few interruptions this was the message delivered in every Estonian EU-related

speech between June 1995 and December 1997. While the harping of the same tune day out and day in may not always have made Estonian officials into popular speakers, it did achieve its desired effect: the European Commission when presenting its proposals for EU enlargement in June 1997, did judge all ten Central European applicant countries[5] by the same objective criteria. As a result, Estonia was included among the Commission's front runners, a recommendation confirmed at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council.

To which extent the Estonian rhetoric had an influence on the EU's decision is of course open to debate. It is likely, however, that without such pressure parties within the European Union that advocated a group-by-group approach, leaving the 'Baltic group' for last, would have had a stronger voice in the final decision-shaping process.

As it is, Estonia will start accession negotiations for EU membership in March 1998, and more optimistic observers predict a two-year negotiating period ending in 2000. This would make Estonian membership possible by 2002.

3.2. Estonia will not make EU membership negotiations difficult

Whatever the final length of the negotiations, they ought to be neither long nor difficult, as Estonia does not wish to join the EU for material gain. This is a fact often emphasised by Estonian officials. Membership of the EU is more about "belonging to the club" and having a seat at the table than it is about getting a share of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) funds. Whereas it is undoubtedly true that Estonian negotiators will wish to protect what are seen as Estonian interests, the number of these items will be strictly limited. After all, as Estonia at present already affords EU (and all other) exporters unlimited access to its markets, becoming a Union member will change very little in this regard. In fact, Estonian producers will enjoy more, not less, protection from competition by Estonia joining the Common Market as non-EU products will have less access to Estonia's domestic market than they have now.

Therefore the negative aspects of the European Union are of necessity less emphasised in the Estonian press than perhaps in some other applicant countries' (or member states') media. EU membership will open up avenues for export, for education, for movement

which have been closed to Estonians till now. Producers will not lose domestic subsidies (which, if they exist at all, are very limited in size), but will rather gain considerable benefits from the EU's policies. Most of all, Estonians will vote for EU membership because it is more about 'belonging' to Europe than it is about anything else.

3.3. Security interests in background

Underlying these considerations is also the importance of the security dimension of the EU. Naturally, this dimension is not explicit, the EU does not have a truly operative security policy. But nonetheless the fact of membership does provide a certain reassurance to a prospective member state. This was an important consideration in the Finnish vote on EU entry, and it will be an important factor in the Estonian voters' decision. After all, member states of the Union include the strongest economic and military powers on the continent, and it is inconceivable that they could permit a military attack on an EU member to take place. It is unlikely that the European Union members could even accept the threat of use of force against one of their own, because even such a gesture would put in question the authority of the EU.

Thus Estonian negotiators will have very little incentive to prolong accession negotiations. The length of time these negotiations will take will depend more on the EU's internal readiness, and on whether countries will be accepted on an individual basis or whether a certain 'critical mass' (number) of countries will have to be reached before the EU decides to accept new members.

4. Russia

Estonian-Russian relations, despite the generally negative reputation they enjoy, have been improving. Whereas it is undoubtedly true that numerous Russian policy makers still publicly oppose Baltic NATO membership, Russian strategists have been at work thinking of policies to accommodate a situation where the Baltic countries are members of the Alliance.[6] As for EU enlargement, Russia has publicly supported Baltic EU membership and Russian officials congratulated Estonia on it being invited to start accession negotiations. On a bilateral level, the number of cooperation projects has been increasing and the intensity of official contacts looks set to grow.

4.1. A historical legacy accompanied by insecurity

The present state of relations is a far cry from the situation that existed in the summer of 1993 when Russian nationalists in north-eastern Estonia threatened to have the area secede from the country. At that time western nations were forced to warn Russia in strong terms to ensure that Russian border guards would prevent Zhirinovsky supporters from crossing the border. A cross-border incident, if not a cross-border conflict, did not seem impossible.

The origins of this crisis lay of course in the 50-year occupation and subsequent colonisation of Estonia by the Soviet Union. Especially during the 1970-s a large number of mainly Russian manual labourers were enticed to move to Estonia to man the heavy industries set up in the north-eastern part. This was part of a concerted Soviet policy to reduce the percentage of Estonians in the country and to strengthen the status of the Russian language. By the end of the 1980-s, Estonians made up only two-thirds of the population and Russian was the lingua franca. Estonians had to know Russian, but Russians did not have to learn Estonian, leading to parts of the country – especially the cities in the northeast – being almost exclusively Russian speaking.

Thus the Government of Estonia saw itself faced in August 1991 not only with a defunct Soviet-style economy and rampant inflation, but also with a large Soviet army presence and almost 500 000 resident ex-Soviet citizens. These persons in general spoke little Estonian, had a difficult time to accept life in an independent Estonia, and to a large extent did not want to be integrated into Estonian society.

Reforming the economy has been the easy part; getting the ex-Soviet troops to leave was also achieved by August 1994, thanks largely to extensive pressure put on the Russian government by western leaders. Integrating the large ex-Soviet population into Estonian society has proven to be the most complicated issue and one that created – and still creates – considerable tension between Tallinn and Moscow.

This is a question which has much less to do with the actual situation of ex-Soviet citizens in Estonia than it has to do with the difficulties faced by Moscow in finding a new role for Russia in a changed world. While certain Estonian authorities certainly could have done more to facilitate the integration of ex-Soviet citizens, it is generally agreed that the relevant legislation on this issue is on par with west-

ern standards.[7] In fact, ethnic Russian politicians from Estonia have called on the Russian Duma not to approach this issue in such an aggressive manner, as this simply does not correspond to reality. However, the apparent difficulty faced by many Russian decision-makers to approach international relations in a different way from their Soviet predecessors has left a mark here as well. It is reflected in unwillingness to accept internationally agreed norms as a benchmark in Estonian-Russian relations and in a subsequent replacement of those norms by criteria drawn up in Moscow.[8]

Both Estonian reticence and Russian attempted 'power politics' are a product of a shared and violent history. Estonians remember fifty years of occupation and the forced russification campaign; Russian officials remember the might of the Soviet Union and its ability to determine other countries' policies.

Whereas Estonian policy towards ex-Soviet citizens residing in Estonia was at times marked by an unnecessary inflexibility, the past year saw a marked shift on this issue and a concerted effort to deal with the situation as it has been left by history.[9] Unfortunately, Moscow has not reciprocated in a similar way. Until Moscow publicly denounces the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union and acknowledges that the Baltic states were in fact occupied (by the USSR – not by Russia), a considerable element of insecurity will remain in Estonian-Russian relations. As we know, the rapprochement between Germany and France, or in fact between Germany and any of its neighbours, could only come about because of the German policy of 'Vergangenheits-Verwaltigung'; Russia needs a similar policy. In fact, this should be easier for Russia as it can push all the guilt off on the non-existent USSR and its leadership. All it needs to do is to accept the primacy of international law in its relations with Estonia. It may not mean much in substance, but this is a necessary element in the full normalisation of Estonian-Russian relations.

4.2. But even so, life goes on

Nonetheless, there has been a shift in Russian-Estonian relations for the better. It may not reflect a fundamental meeting of minds, but it does represent a certain infusion of normality in bilateral contacts. The border guards of Estonia, Russia and Finland have by now a well-establish cooperation born out of the necessity to control common borders. Ministries of Culture, Ministries of the Interior, Ministries of Transport and other state institutions have strengthened

contacts. Also the Ministries of Foreign Affairs also hold consultations, although much remains to be done in this field.

An Intergovernmental Commission, headed by Estonian Prime Minister Mart Siimann and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Syssuev, has been formed and is due to start work shortly. Also, very importantly, the level of rhetoric between the two countries has decreased considerably.

5. QUO VADIS?

Whereas Estonia's aspirations to join the European Union receive support also from Russia, the desire to become a member of NATO is not welcomed in Moscow. How then can Estonia achieve its triple goals of becoming a member of the EU and of NATO while further developing its relationship with Russia so that one-day Estonian-Russian relations may be on the level of, say, Russian-Swedish or Russian-Polish relations? While this may be a tricky project it is not impossible to achieve.

5.1. The Importance of consistency

One essential prerequisite for the success of these three strands of policy is consistency. Whereas Estonia's foreign policy has been consistent on all the three aims outlined above, this may not always be said of the policy of its friends and allies. It was stated earlier in this paper that Estonian aims to join the European Union initially received very little comprehension, not to mention the goal of joining the Atlantic Alliance. Whereas the European Union member states eventually did accept the legitimacy of Estonia's aspirations and rewarded its economic progress with a seat in the first round of enlargement negotiations, not all NATO members have shown such support. In fact, NATO policy as regards enlargement has been marked by a distinct difference between words and deeds. There is a discrepancy between the text of the Enlargement Study of September 1995, which states that NATO membership is open to all European countries,[10] and the unwillingness by several member countries to see the Baltic states among the new members. This discrepancy has encouraged Russian opponents of Baltic NATO membership to speak up and has at times contributed to unnecessary harsh words being exchanged between Tallinn and Moscow.

5.2. EU

The aim of Estonia's security policy, as already stated above, is a stable and peaceful region and thus also a more stable and peaceful Europe. This can only be achieved through the integration of Estonia into both NATO and the European Union.

EU enlargement is already well underway and Estonia has the good fortune of being part of the first wave. While there undoubtedly will be some tough bargaining ahead and Estonia's EU membership will not come without sweat and maybe even tears being shed, the essential, political, decision has already been taken. When the European Council in Luxembourg decided to open negotiations with Estonia it took care of the 'whether' question. Thus it made a political decision that Estonia would be a member of the European Union. The 'how' and 'when' questions are left to be resolved, but this is a technical rather than a political issue. Even if the European Union would run into serious difficulties over the internal reforms that need to be undertaken, thus delaying Estonian accession, it would seem highly unlikely that this accession would be cancelled altogether.

5.3 NATO

NATO enlargement is a different issue, as nothing has been decided on this front as yet. Estonia and its two Baltic neighbours will have to push very hard to convince NATO countries that they deserve to be members. They will have to counter the notion of indefensibility and the allegation that they will not be able to contribute significantly to the Alliance.

While Zbigniew Brzezinski's claim that Baltic NATO membership would in fact support Russian reformers[11] may to many seem somewhat far-fetched if not totally incredible, the suggestion that a NATO 'no' could in fact spur on Russian hardliners may be somewhat more acceptable. Above all, a situation where NATO would seem to be backtracking on its own commitment to an open door policy would be very bad indeed. NATO would loose credibility, and Russian hardliners would be encouraged in their opinion that they are in fact able to fundamentally influence NATO decision-making.

NATO, if it does not wish to risk sending the signal of its deliberately assigning the Baltics to a Russian sphere of influence, must in a not too distant future accept them as members. As Estonian

Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves said at a meeting with the North Atlantic Council on 28 January 1998:

"The Baltic issue will have symbolic and political importance far exceeding the size of our countries. Their inclusion in NATO will be the final recognition that Europe does not have zones with different levels of security, or that parts of Europe cannot be used as buffer zones."[12]

5.4. Baltic solidarity

This remark ties in with the need to ensure that the Baltic countries are treated jointly on the NATO enlargement issue. While EU enlargement is mostly about individual countries being assessed on their individual economic performance, NATO membership is about military security. It would not be a good idea to divide the Baltic countries on this question, especially considering their already strong military ties with each other.

Estonian policy has to be to make as strong a case as possible for its inclusion in a second round of enlargement of NATO, but together with its Baltic neighbours. The Baltic states have to pursue a concerted policy which makes of them the best possible candidates and ensures that when an enlargement decision is taken they will be accepted as a group. Dividing the Baltic countries on the question of NATO enlargement would send a dangerous message. This is especially important with regard to Latvia which, considering its geographic location, would be an unlikely candidate to be accepted on an individual basis and in such a case might 'fall between the cracks.'

5.5. Russia

The decision to include the Baltic countries in NATO will also provide a powerful impetus for the final normalisation of Estonian-Russian relations. The Estonian authorities have by now done about as much as is possible, from a domestic political point of view, in this regard. It is now up to the Russian Federation to take steps in the right direction. As long as some circles in Moscow sense that they are able to push Estonia around and to exert pressure on Estonia, this is unlikely to happen. However, it will not be easy to push around an Estonia that is both an EU and a NATO member. Such a situation will contribute considerably to the desired normalisation of relations between Tallinn and Moscow, since the bilateral relationship will at this point of necessity be that of equals. This will be a much better

point of departure than the present relationship between an ex-colonial power and its former colony.

Notes

[*] The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent official Estonian policy.

[1] Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation states that "We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.

The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members."

[2] Statement by H.E. Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia at the Meeting with the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 28 January 1998

[3] Ilves (note 2).

[4] Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K.Albright before the New Atlantic Initiative Conference, Washington, D.C. 9 February 1998

[5] The ten Central and Eastern European applicant countries were Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

[6] See, for example, Dmitri Trenin, *Baltic Chance: The Baltic States, Russia, and the West in the Emerging Greater Europe* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Moscow, 1997).

[7] As indicated by Resolution 1117 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly of 30 January 1997 deciding to close the procedure monitoring Estonian compliance with obligations and commitments undertaken when joining the organisation.

[8] As exemplified by the refusal by Russia to sign an already agreed border treaty and by the continued application of tariffs on goods imported from any of the Baltic states to Russia (the Baltic states being the only countries in the world thus discriminated against).

[9] In fact, the recent decision by the Government to submit a change in the citizenship law to allow children born in Estonia to stateless parents the automatic right to Estonian citizenship marked the acceptance by Estonia of all thirty recommendations on the citizenship issue made by OSCE High Commissioner Max van der Stoel.

[10] The NATO Study on Enlargement states that "NATO enlargement would proceed in accordance with the provisions of the various OSCE

documents which confirm the sovereign right of each state to freely seek its own security arrangements, to belong or not to belong to international organisations, including treaties of alliance. No country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions."

11. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Managing NATO Enlargement," Speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, First Session of European Security Working Group Convened by the United States Institute of Peace, *Baltic Studies Newsletter,* no. 83, September 1997, p. 4.
12. Ilves (note 2).

LATVIA – THE MIDDLE BALTIC STATE

Atis Lejiņš & Žaneta Ozoliņa

Introduction

The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the main security concerns of Latvia six years after independence was restored in 1991. The main question that we will attempt to answer is how far the Latvian state has succeeded in fulfilling its goal of securing the "irreversibility of restored independence" as defined in Latvia's foreign policy concept.[1] In the opinion of the authors, the Baltic states form one security space and no single Baltic country can be differentiated from the other in the security debate. However, each country has its specific characteristics, and we will attempt to bring forth those pertaining to Latvia.

The means that successive governments in Latvia have chosen to achieve security are several and varied. Foremost among are membership in the EU and NATO and close political, economic, and military cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania. Active participation in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, and the UN, and at the same time pursuing a policy leading to membership in such non-security organizations as the WTO and OECD, are also regarded as important.

Although good relations with Russia are vital, these cannot be made hostage to Latvia's general thrust towards integration in European and Transatlantic institutions. Russia formally offered security guarantees to all three Baltic states in October 1997 but these were declined. Although Russia professes strong opposition to the desire of all three Baltic states to join NATO, there are, however, signs that this obstructionist policy is now being questioned by Russian analysts,[2] particularly so since the NATO Madrid declaration clearly referred to the Baltic states as "aspiring members."[3]

A particularly interesting dimension of Latvia's search for security are the developing relations with the USA as formalized by the Baltic-American charter, signed by President Clinton and the three Baltic presidents on 16 January 1998.

These external factors of security are intrinsically linked to developments in Latvian society, which must be reorganized completely so as to resemble the Western democratic welfare state based on market economy. This is nothing less than a revolution, placing great strain on the people, resources, and leadership of the young state in overcoming the legacy of fifty years of communist rule and Russian occupation.

Internal developments, however, will not be scrutinized here other than in as much as they facilitate or retard Latvia's foreign and security policy efforts as described above. Though the decision by the EU Commission in July not to recommend that accession negotiations be begin with Latvia in 1998, is largely also a political decision tied to the EU institutional reform impasse, Latvia's 1995 bank crisis and resultant devastating blow to the country's economic growth nevertheless played a decisive role in favouring only one Baltic country – Estonia – to be included in the first EU enlargement round.

The Latvian bank crisis – or rather bank swindles since most of the bank leadership involved fled to Moscow while the leading figure in the biggest collapsed bank was arrested and awaits trial in 1998 – was unmatched in either Estonia or Lithuania; one third of Latvia's savings were wiped out and caused a negative growth rate by the end of 1995. Latvia had been able to arrest the sharp decline in industrial production the previous year when, for the first time since breaking away from the Soviet Empire in 1991, the GDP increased by 0.6 percent. The economy recovered only in 1996 with a growth rate of 2.8 percent, which rose to 6 percent in 1997, with an inflation rate of 7 percent.

Latvia has also placed more emphasis on social issues (except health services) than Estonia or Lithuania. For example, a total reform of the state pension system in collaboration with Sweden and the World Bank was carried out and implemented in 1996. However, Latvia made the strategic mistake of leaving privatization in the hands of the sectoral ministries – a mistake rectified only in 1994, when privatization was placed in the hands of a specially established privatization agency modelled on the German (and Estonian) privatization schemes. In addition, sale of land to foreigners was also permitted in 1996. Consequently, privatization went forward quickly and investments started to pour into Latvia. By the end of 1996, Latvia overtook Estonia in FDI's per capita by a factor of $23 which surpassed, for example, also that of Poland.[4]

A mix of these and other internal problems – the biggest being the huge industrial "white elephants" that Moscow built in Latvia as

part of her russification programme and which handicapped privatization, as well as inadequate diplomatic initiatives and public relations on the part of Latvia, worked against Latvia in the Commission's avis.

Although Latvia officially has professed eagerness to join the EU and NATO, the political elite nevertheless was too preoccupied with domestic politics to be able to mobilize the necessary resources needed to match Latvia's foreign policy and security aspirations. The "no" from the EU Commission, despite the governmental reshuffle in the summer, jolted the political leadership into a frenzy of diplomatic activity and efforts to overcome the shortcomings highlighted by the Commission.

The compromise decision of the EU Luxembourg summit in December was received with great relief by the Latvian government and hailed as a success. Latvia, though it would start accession negotiations at a later date than the first six countries recommended by the Commission, nevertheless was included in the accession process. This precluded any perception that Latvia would be left to an uncertain future in a grey security zone between the EU and Russia.

Latvian-Russian relations

The citizenship issue

Any discussion about Latvia's security must begin, at least for the foreseeable future, with an assessment of the state of affairs between Russia and Latvia. In addition to sharing a common border with Russia and Belarus, Latvia, indeed all three Baltic states, occupies a sensitive area in the East-West relations: on the one hand, it is quite clear that the Baltics were brutally incorporated by the Soviet Union in 1939–40, an act never recognized as legal by the Western democracies but, on the other hand, they are, nevertheless, popularly regarded as "former republics of the USSR" while Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, still regards the 1939–40 annexation as legitimate.

For Russia, the Baltic states are "newly independent states" and this has led Russia to regard the Baltics differently from, for example, Finland and even the former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Whereas the latter are viewed as legitimate foreign states, and Yeltsin has apologized to Warsaw for the Katyn massacre and to the Czech government for the

suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, no similar reconciliation moves have been put forth in the case of the Baltics.

Instead, in the first five or so years of restored independence, one saw the rise of concepts such as "the near abroad" in Moscow, with the concomitant uncertainty as to what this implied for the Baltic states. This was accompanied by a vigorous campaign by Russia in various international fora accusing the Baltic states, in particular Estonia and Latvia (at one point in the early stages of the campaign, no distinction was made between the three Baltic states), of human rights violations.[5]

Russia suffered a diplomatic setback in that neither the UN, OSCE, or Council of Europe found fault with the Balts, and Russia eventually dropped her demand for automatic citizenship for all "Russian speakers" and began instead to utilize the recommendations that the OSCE and the EU have made to fasten the process of naturalization in Latvia and diminish the number of professions denied non-citizens. The latter have now been reduced to seven professions where citizenship is required, for example airline pilots, lawyers, new police members (non-citizens already serving are excepted), government officials (also with exceptions), etc. Firemen and pharmacists need not be citizens, as previously stipulated, and it seems that as Latvia moves closer to the EU the number of professions restricted to citizens will be further reduced.

The question of citizenship for Russians – as distinct from "Russian speakers," a term that Russia also apparently dropped as recently as 1997, is the most vexing legacy from the long years of occupation: Latvia is home to the largest number of Russians in the Baltic states. These people were settled in Latvia by the Soviet authorities throughout the post-war period, a policy which was, in effect, a continuation of the Russification policy initiated by the Tsarist government at the close of the previous century. Interrupted by Latvia's independence in 1918–40, it was renewed with greater force by Moscow during the fifties after the defeat of the Latvian national guerrillas and the collectivization of agriculture.

The West – and Latvia – has accepted the consequences of occupation in that little effort has been made to help resettle Russians who wish to return to their homeland. Instead, the Latvian government, aided by such bodies as the UN, is trying to integrate not only Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians (and other ethnic groups that came to Latvia during the Soviet occupation) into Latvian society through a process of naturalization.However, there is a misconception in the West about the actual size of the Russian population in Latvia and their citizenship status. Even quality newspapers keep referring to the number of Russians as "1/3" in Estonia, and "almost half" the population in Latvia. More often than not, it is said that Russians have no Latvian citizenship, thereby misleading even well-educated parts of the population in Europe and the USA.[6]

In 1997, Russians made up 30.4 percent of the total population, i.e. out of a total population of 2 475 300, Russians number 741 900. Ethnic Latvians make up 56.5 percent of the population, up from 52 percent in 1989, and number 1 398 500.[7] Other minorities in Latvia are Poles, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Lithuanians, Estonians, etc., which form the remaining 13.1 percent of the total population.

The reasons for the increase of the Latvian part of the population is the departure of the Russian army and imperial administration, emigration of Russians returning to their homeland, a falling birth rate in the Russian population (which is even lower than that of the Latvians) and assimilation.

In 1996, 68 percent of all children beginning school attended Latvian schools even though the Latvian share of the population is just over 56 percent (in 1990 54 percent of school beginners attended Latvian schools). However, 7 percent of Latvian children still receive their schooling in Russian because of lack of Latvian schools in eastern Latvia.[8]

It is estimated that by the year 2005 Latvians will reach 60 percent of the total population, and that this trend will continue beyond that year.

Before the war, the Latvian share of the total population was 76 percent (1 472 600) and Russians numbered 206 000. Latvians thus have still not recovered from the effects of the Second World War and the communist rule, and it is not clear today whether the present negative birth-rate of the Latvian people that began after the restoration of independence and resultant economic and social upheaval can be reversed. However, if the growth of the economy that began in 1996 continues, and with it a rapid rise in the welfare of the people, then the possible "dying out" of the Latvian nation in the next century can be reversed.

Latvia renewed citizenship to all pre1940 citizens and their descendants which meant that the majority of settlers that came to Latvia during the occupation must undergo a naturalization process not unlike that existing in the Western democracies. Consequently, 289 000 Russians became automatically citizens, or 38.92 percent of

all Russians in Latvia. This does not mean, however, that all these people know Latvian; unlike their parents who lived in Latvia before the war, the younger generation who received citizenship because their parents were citizens usually do not understand Latvian. This is felt particularly in the armed forces, and this phenomena illustrates that Russification also effected Russians with long roots in Latvia.

There are, however, no Russian parties represented in the Latvian parliament, which shows that these people vote according to their political persuasion and not their ethnic belonging. According to the Russian embassy in Riga, some 50–60 000 Russians in Latvia are Russian citizens. No precise figure is available because a number of these people have migrated back to Russia.[9] The Latvian Immigration and Citizenship Authority (PID), however, has records of only 7975 Russian citizens who have legally registered themselves in Latvia as permanent residents as of 1 July 1997.

A question that has arisen in Latvia and has become a subject for investigation on the part of the government, is why so few Russians have applied for Latvian citizenship since the naturalization process began in 1995. In the two years period 1995–96, only a little more than 7000 of the 124 000 persons who were eligible for naturalization applied for citizenship (of whom, however 93 percent successfully passed the naturalization testing).[10] These 7000 are not all Russians, but a mix representing also other minorities.

The question is particularly perplexing because of the 124 000 eligible for naturalization, 70 000 were not subject to the age bracket limits (i.e. they could apply irrespective of age) and could, depending on various criteria, could more easily gain citizenship. Beneficiaries are, for example, those who have secondary education in Latvian language schools, those who have been married to Latvian citizens for ten years and have lived in Latvia at least five years, citizens of Estonia and Lithuania, etc.

Altogether there are seven categories of people who can receive citizenship with less difficulty and who fall outside the strictly set age limit. By the end of 1997, the government had responded to this unexpected result by simplifying naturalization procedures and reducing the fee for naturalization from 30 to 15 lats, and even lower for various social categories, while the Naturalization Board may on administrative grounds reduce it to one symbolic lats.

The low numbers applying for citizenship have given rise to a debate on whether Latvia is evolving into a two-community state.[11] Whatever the outcome of this debate and future developments in the

naturalization and integration of Latvia's non-citizens, their number is sufficiently large – a quarter of the total population – to mark this as a major domestic factor for Latvia, becoming perhaps an election issue in the 1998 elections. Only one major party opposes changes in the naturalization law, for example, doing away with the age-bracket system and simply introducing quotas irrespective of age to attract more candidates for Latvian citizenship.

One therefore can predict that until 2003, when all non-citizens will have the opportunity to apply for citizenship irrespective of age, citizenship for Russians in Latvia will remain an issue on Russia's Latvian agenda. However, it must be remembered that even during the worst attacks by Russia against Latvia in the years immediately after the restoration of independence transit trade was not effected. Indeed, it has been and is increasing steadily, accounting for the bulk of the rise in the GDP of Latvia in 1996, and Russia remains a major investor in Latvia.

The big battles between Latvia and Russia in international fora over alleged human rights abuses in Latvia have come to an end, and Russia in the summer of 1997, after an initial period of procrastination, recognized the non-citizen passports that Latvia began issuing in 1996. Most governments had already done so, and Denmark has taken one step further allowing holders of these passports visa-free entry. The violet passports – citizens' passports are dark blue – printed in Canada and of better quality than the latter – will gradually phase out the present "red" Soviet Union passports held by the majority of non-citizens in Latvia.[12]

Russian security guarantees

The Russian package offer of security guarantees and cooperation, presented to all three Baltic states on the occasion of the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas' visit to Moscow on 23–24 October 1997, is a logical outcome of a major revision of Russian foreign policy towards the Baltic states. The shift away from what may be called, for want of a better term, the Karaganov doctrine of a "partial restoration of the empire" (which implied that Russian minorities residing in the "near abroad" were to be used as a means to further the aims of Russian foreign policy) and the new – "carrot" – approach was signalled by the announcement of President Yeltsin's Office in February 1997 of a set of foreign policy guidelines with regard to the Baltic states.[13]

The official proposal of security guarantees was preceded by a series of "trial balloons" from Russia in the international mass media, almost directly after the Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki summit in March 1997 when Yeltsin first made a unilateral offer of security guarantees to the Baltic states at a press conference. Since multilateral guarantees were also offered, these became known as "chequered" or "cross" guarantees.

The package proposal by Viktor Chernomyrdin to the Baltic states soon after at the Vilnius presidential summit in September, offering specific military-related confidence-building measures linked with security guarantees was the final signal of Russia's intent to come forth with its formal diplomatic initiative to the Baltics in October. In his speech Chernomyrdin said that "Russia is ready to provide a substantial contribution to the process of solving security problems in the Baltic region both within the framework of regional security measures and by offering security guarantees, which has been stated by President Yeltsin in Helsinki."[14]

The question that must be raised is why Russia came across the idea of offering security guarantees to the Balts? Clearly, Moscow knew well in advance that the Balts would politely refuse while, at the same time, accepting cooperation in trans-border schemes, trade, environmental and social matters, and the development of economic ties. The latter have been high on the Latvian agenda since the withdrawal of Russian troops. Specifically, these are the subject of the Russian-Latvian Intergovernmental Commission established at the end of 1994 though only one meeting has been held on the highest delegation level so far. Working groups of the commission, have, however, held regular talks on a variety of issues, the most important of which are payment of pensions for the elderly who choose to return to either country, abolishment of double taxation, and custom duties. The final touches to the Latvian-Russian border agreement were sorted out in the last week of October, almost coinciding with Brazauskas's visit to Moscow. Technically it is ready for the signatures.

In proposing bilateral security guarantees Russia must have been aware of the terrible memories such guarantees would recall among the Baltics: in 1939 the Soviet Union held talks with Great Britain and France to gain security guarantees for the Baltic states even in the case of indirect aggression against them. Still, a pact was signed with Hitler which sealed the fate of the Baltics.

This is recognized by the Russian analyst Dr. Dmitry Trenin who described Yeltsin's proposal in Helsinki as impulsive but done with

the best of intentions even though his advisors surely were aware of the effect it would have in the Baltic capitals.[15] Clearly, the Chernomyrdin and October offers of security guarantees were no longer impulsive and were perhaps aimed more for the trans-Atlantic governments – as noted on several occasions by the Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis – than for the Baltics.

If the aim of the Chernomyrdin proposal was to stop the Baltics from becoming members of NATO by the "maintenance of block-free status for the Baltic states, followed by the policy of non-alliance of Finland and Sweden" as proposed, then clearly the October diplomatic initiative must have the same motive.

Why Russia chose to sign a border treaty first with Lithuania and not first with Estonia, which had been ready to sign for almost a year, ever since the breakthrough in October 1996 when Estonia and Russia agreed in principle on the border issue does raise questions whether Russia is not playing a power politics game in the Baltics. Russia linked the border treaty in Estonia with the "human rights" issue in Estonia; Lithuania, which has only 8 percent Russians, granted the option of automatic Lithuanian citizenship to its non-citizens, including Russians. But, in the case of Latvia, Russia has never formally coupled "human rights" with the border talks, instead it has preferred to do so indirectly. However, Estonia was the country recommended to begin accession negotiations with the EU and it would have been logical – if Russia was eager for the Baltics to join the EU – that the signing of the border treaties would have been in the reverse order.

The US State Department, while greeting the Lithuanian-Russian border agreement, expressed its hope that similar treaties would be signed with Estonia and Latvia.[16] If this happens, then Russia's border treaties with the Baltic states would follow the pattern of the Russian troop withdrawal: first from Lithuania in 1993, then from Estonia and Latvia in 1994.

It is the thesis of this paper that improving Baltic-Russian relations is a function of the West's readiness to integrate the Baltic states in its institutions. The EU position that an unsigned border agreement with Russia would not stop any Baltic country to be admitted to the EU, something which was translated into action by the recommendation to begin accession negotiations with the country most "disfavoured" by Russia – Estonia – may have induced Russia to start signing border agreements with the Baltics – starting with Lithuania, the Baltic state that Moscow has lauded on

many occasions as the model for Estonia and Latvia to follow in the citizenship issue.

The EU chose to disagree with Russia in linking the border issue with internal political factors in Estonia and Latvia. But the price the Estonians and Latvians had to pay for this was, as noted above, the renunciation of their claims to territory that, according to international law (peace treaties between Soviet Russia and Estonia and Latvia in 1920) undoubtedly did belong to them. This was particularly difficult for Estonia since the new border meant dividing in half a distinct Estonian ethnic group, the Setu people. The Latvian and Estonian renunciation of claims to their pre-war territory can be compared to the southern Kurile islands issue between Russia and Japan. The concession by Latvia and Estonia cleared away the main obstacle blocking border agreements with Russia.

Latvia and the EU

The general context

The hot 1997 summer was a good opportunity for Latvia to realistically evaluate to what extent the state and society have been successful in moving closer to the EU. The EU Commission's recommendation to begin accession negotiations only with Estonia was initially regarded as a signal that Latvia had mobilized society and the state administration insufficiently.

At the same time, the negative EU recommendation did afford the opportunity to critically evaluate achievements and shortcomings. This approach allowed Latvia to concentrate efforts on the main "soft spots" with the view that in the next evaluation round she could quite possibly overtake the states which had started accession negotiations earlier.

There are two main problems in Latvia's relations with the EU that effect Latvia's security, viz. the EU's internal reforms and the rather unclear accession criteria for the candidate states. The first problem may be characterized as the "hidden" EU position on enlargement. After the Amsterdam summit, the EU Commission President Jacques Santer said: "I don't want to see a situation where on the eve of enlargement we are forced to say to our future members, 'You have done everything to prepare yourselves for entering the EU. Unfortunately, the EU hasn't been able to get ready to receive you'."[17] One must therefore draw the conclusion that the

pace of enlargement will be dependent on the ability of the EU to resolve its internal reforms.

Secondly, the EU itself has expressed inconsistent opinions on the candidate states' shortcomings, including those of Latvia. Before Amsterdam, EU representatives said that one of the main weak points of Latvia was the large group of non-citizens and the unsettled relations with Russia.[18]

However, in the July *avis* Estonia, which has identical problems with Latvia, was picked as ready for negotiations. Economics was used as the main argument why Latvia was put in the "pre-in" category. Yet as we have mentioned earlier, economical statistics do not show that Estonia is much ahead of Latvia. The sharp rise in foreign investments noted in 1996 has continued in 1997 and by the year's end Latvia will have attracted a total of USD1 billion in FDI's.[19]

A few months later, on 30 November Jacques Santer visiting Latvia said the Latvia's main problem was a political one – harmonization of laws in line with the *acqui communitaire* and the inability of the state administration to absorb and apply EU directives in society.

This is, of course, true just as it is for any CEE state but irrespective of the somewhat differing signals on the part of the EU, the EU position does bring to the fore those criteria on which Latvia must work especially hard in the coming years.

Latvia's specific problems

Firstly, integration into the EU and NATO was almost solely the domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which made the EU preaccession strategy the business of this, and no other, ministry. Other governmental structures were "pushed aside." After July, this state of affairs also made it very easy to blame the MFA for the debacle.

Secondly, the branches of the government other than the MFA on both the national and lower levels did not harmonize their everyday work with Latvia's strategic movement to gain entrance to the EU. This began in earnest only in the beginning of 1996, but was not easy to achieve. We can take customs, which did not meet EU standards, as an example. A new Customs Law was put into effect on 1 July 1997, yet the State Revenue Service and the government itself made this an ineffective measure by stating that 133 additional directives and decisions were needed to make it fully functional.

Thirdly, when Latvia began its course towards the EU, several specific institutions were established for this purpose: the European

Integration Bureau, the European Affairs minister, the European Integration Council. However, quantity did not automatically mean quality in the integration process. Even though Andris Šķēle, the former Prime Minister launched the European Affairs Council, this body remained passive, and the the MFA remained the main political actor in European affairs.

The situation changed after the governmental reshuffle in the summer of 1997, when the fundamental EU strategy was incorporated into the new government's declaration. Subsequently, in quick succession, this Declaration was broken down into specifics in the *Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Latvia on Agenda 2000 – European Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the European Union* and the *Action Plan* which detailed how Latvia might overcome the shortcomings listed by the EU. The work of the government in the closing months of 1997 shows that it is reforming the pertinent state institutions commensurate to the needs of the EU strategy but this should have been done two or three years ago.

Fourthly, Latvia's endeavours to enter the EU were mainly of a political nature – the goal was to get into the first enlargement wave and not so much a continuous evaluation of the pre-accession process, the selection of appropriate political means, and an analysis of internal EU politics.

Fifthly, because EU affairs were concentrated in the MFA, only a part of the political elite was engaged, and society at large was perhaps alienated. The EU's popularity in Latvia has dropped from 45 percent in 1991 to 26 percent in 1997 while a negative image of the EU rose from one percent to 12 percent in the same period. Even worse, while 80 percent would have voted "yes" in a referendum on whether to join the EU in 1996, only 34 percent would have done so in 1997.[20]

Sixthly, Latvia's EU aspirations were not matched by an effective public relations campaign. Such a campaign was certainly an important factor for Estonia. Even though some circles in the Latvian political elite hold the opinion that successful public relations was the only reason why Estonia distinguished itself from the other two Baltic states, nevertheless, as remarked by a member of the EU Commission, if Estonia puts so much effort into projecting a positive image of itself, then it must be a strong indication that it has a greater political will to join the EU.

The image that a state projects is much more that just a product-selling advertisement. It also shapes a state's identity leading to the

initial stereotype of the state in the development of inter-state relations. Here Estonia has been better than Latvia; it has been able to project an image of itself as a small, flourishing, and economically strong state, thus gaining for itself the title of the "Baltic tiger."

This image is upheld by a consequent policy of radical domestic reform, based not so much on foreign aid but rather a help-yourself approach in building up the state. In other words, Estonia's message to the world has been "trade, not aid." The reform of secondary education, called the "tiger's leap," enabled the computerization of all schools through an extensive state investment programme.

Of the three Baltic states, Estonia most realistically calculated its chances for membership in the EU and NATO. She chose the EU and mobilized all resources for attaining this goal, and in 1995, when the Associate agreements were signed between the EU and the Baltic states, Estonia opened her market to Europe by skipping a transition period in most areas.

Efforts towards joining the EU were redoubled by Estonia after the statement made by US Secretary of Defence William Perry in September in Bergen that the Baltic states were not ready for NATO membership. Lithuania chose the very opposite by trying to achieve membership in NATO already in the first enlargement round. Lithuania subsequently developed a strategic partnership with Poland and began building up an image of herself as a Central European state.

Latvia has lagged behind in the design of her basic foreign policy. One of the main elements in this has been the upholding and fostering of cooperation between the three Baltic states. This approach has both its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it has helped the West to view the Baltic states as one entity where three states have demonstrated their ability to cooperate on the subregional level. Clearly, Latvia's geographical position has facilitated this policy. On the other hand, though this regional approach has very promising possibilities, we look at patterns that are emerging in global politics, it did not help very much to bring Latvia closer to the EU and NATO.

Clearly Latvia needs to reformulate her image. By advocating the Amber Gateway, whereby Latvia would be a central element in East-West trade in a "new Hansa," stretching from Washington to Moscow, Latvia can achieve the same standing as Holland. Latvia – the Baltic states (the Benelux model of cooperation) – the Nordic-Baltic region – the EU would seem to be the framework or formula whereby Latvia's international identity could be firmly anchored.

Latvia and NATO

The NATO Madrid summit in 1997 was the second challenge to Latvia which compelled it to adapt to the new circumstances and make the necessary changes in her foreign and security policy. The Madrid declaration, as noted earlier, was, given the circumstances that the first enlargement round would include only three countries, the best outcome for Latvia.

This is due to three reasons: Firstly, the enlargement of the alliance has begun, and there is no reason any more to doubt that in order to assure the coherence and credibility of NATO, no new members can be admitted. Secondly, even though the Baltic states were not included in the first round, nevertheless the fact that enlargement has become a process with the door open to future members is vitally important. Thirdly, the Baltic states have not been excluded from the process.

The debate about the future of NATO has already marked the direction in which Latvia must turn its security policy. NATO's evolving strategy to meet the security needs of the 21st century reflects a shift from defence against external sources of threats to upholding international security by means of crisis and conflict prevention and resolution in close cooperation between NATO member and partner states.

This new feature of the alliance is important to Latvia since NATO already has become an integral part of the international security system, having received UN mandates for peace enforcement missions in the Persian Gulf War and in Bosnia. NATO, by closely cooperating with partner states, allows the latter to establish and develop national military units commensurate to international needs. Through this practical arrangement, Latvia has been able to change its status from that of an observer and consumer of security to that of a provider of security in the international community.

By adapting to new threats and in its search for means to deal with them, NATO also offers new cooperation possibilities for her partners. The new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is an institution where both member and partner states can find solutions to threats by working closely together.

A very important development affecting Latvia's security interests is the signing of the NATO and Russian Founding Act which established the NATO-Russian Cooperation Council. Although this has been greeted with a good dose of scepticism because the motives

of both sides differ – Russia would like to influence decision-making in NATO while NATO would like to influence Russia's political decisions with regard to political processes in the Western world. Nevertheless, the significance of this organization for Latvia's security cannot be overestimated.[21]

Russia's inclusion in the debate about the future of European and international security will certainly diminish her, at times, aggressive rhetorical reaction to decisions that are not to her liking. An integrated Russia with international obligations will be more stable and constructive. The strengthening of partnership between Russia and NATO might also lessen mutual suspicions, especially with regard to public opinion in Russia and the domestic political debate there.

Despite the overall positive effect of NATO enlargement on Latvia's security, one should nevertheless define the main problems facing Latvia at the turn of the millennium.

The first problem is the contradiction between national and international security needs. From the viewpoint of the state, the most effective means leading to security guarantees is membership of a traditional alliance. But the present transformation of the international system is leading to the fading away of traditional threats and the corresponding traditional means (an alliance) to meet these threats.

This implies that the enlargement process will be dominated by efforts to harmonize national and transnational interests. This seeming contradiction will apply equally both to the alliance member states and the candidate countries. For example, Latvia sees participation in NATO as primarily a means to guarantee her national security.

The second problem stems from the Euro-Atlantic community's policy that future security is not possible without Russian participation. However, at present Russia is neither economically, politically nor ideologically ready to participate fully in the search for new security solutions. Russia's response to the PfP programme has been very weak, and it remains to be seen what fruits the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and the NATO-Russian Cooperation Council will produce.

The third problem derives from NATO's unclear notion about how the enlargement process should actually evolve. It is clear that enlargement will take place, and that it will differ from previous enlargements because now states from the previously antagonistic

bloc will be admitted. But many questions remain to be answered – *how* will this process be implemented. It appears that the initial enlargement will prepare the ground for the admission of the "former republics of the USSR," i.e. the Baltic states.

In the not too distant future, however, the Alliance will have to deal with pressure from Romania and Slovenia and their respective protectors France and Italy, which are interested in strengthening their southern flank and increasing their influence in this region. Strong lobbying for these two candidate states may delay the inclusion of the Baltic states in the second enlargement round.

The fourth and final problem stems from the structural and functional aspects of NATO after the Madrid summit. The essence and work of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is dependent in equal measure on both the Alliance and the partner countries. Could a situation arise whereby NATO will lack the necessary financial and human resources on the one hand, while the partner states lack a realistic understanding and strategy on the other hand, in getting what they would like from the EAPC? If so, a promising institution may become simply a debating and consultation forum.

Even today the candidate states are compared to a Soviet officer who bids his time by waiting for orders from above, in this case, from NATO. But commands will not be forthcoming and therefore the effectivity of the EAPC is also dependent on the activity of the candidate and partner countries. If both sides can contribute in equal measure to the EAPC, then it can develop into a body that integrates NATO non-member states fully in the work of NATO except in the area covered by Paragraph 5.

Conclusion

After seven years of restored independence we can conclude that Latvia's security is developing in two directions, which in general correspond to the transformation of states in adapting their security policy to the needs of the 21st century.

First, Latvia is concentrating on domestic security matters. It is clear that after Amsterdam, Luxembourg, and Madrid, integration in European and Transatlantic institutions will be possible only after the consolidation of a stable state and the rise of a civic society able to control internal processes. Latvia is aware of potential sources of conflict, and is able to mobilize institutions and the public in averting and possibly resolving conflicts.

Second, there is a gradually growing understanding in Latvia that national, subregional, regional, and international security is indivisible. The radical reform of Latvia's armed forces begun in 1997 is confirmation of the need to adapt to the requirements of international security: the strengthening and professionalization of the border guard as an autonomous body under the Ministry of Interior, the professionalization of the Air and Naval forces, which also participate in border control (protection of Latvia's economic zone), search and rescue missions, and the professionalization of infantry units (Latvian company in BALTBAT, and LATBAT: the planned Latvian Peacekeeping battalion). The Air and Naval forces, after becoming fully professionalized, will be better equipped to contribute to international security through BALTNET and BALTRON respectively, as will BALTBAT and LATBAT. At the same time, they serve as significant components in the development of Latvia's total defence, the backbone being the National Guard and a reserve contingent. The theoretical underpinnings of the State Defence Plan based on the Nordic model which is being developed together with Swedish consultants was adopted by the government in January 1998.

These two directions correspond to the security interests of the EU and also meet NATO criteria. However, in order to become a member of NATO, it is also important to satisfy a number of political criteria, mainly a market economy, democratic institutions and values – in addition to interoperability between the armed forces of Latvia and those of NATO.

The first three countries to be admitted to NATO – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – appear to satisfy all criteria. Rumania perhaps less so with regard to political criteria. Latvia probably now or in a very short time can satisfy the political criteria but with an annual military budget of 0.67 percent of the GDP, will find it hard to meet NATO's interoperability standards. The present reform, however, will make the armed forces more cost-effective since more money will be available for training and equipping armed personnel. The emphasis will be on quality, not quantity. Less soldiers will be called up for military service, and considerable savings have been accrued by dropping one third of the military objects inherited from the Soviet area – upkeep of military infrastructure has been reduced from a total of 116 to 76 objects.

The aim of the present government in Latvia, is that after the completion of reform and rise in the credibility of the armed forces to

absorb increased military spending in a rational manner, the military budget will be increased to one percent of the GDP in 1999. Latvia, however, unlike Estonia and Lithuania, has not and does not plan to borrow money for the build-up of her armed forces.

Latvian security policy in the near future, taking into consideration that she will not soon be a member of the EU or NATO, will be influenced by developments in her neighbouring environment and Latvia's reaction to these. This means that Russia will continue to be one of the most important factors determining Latvia's security. The October offer of security guarantees was a clear manifestation of this factor. Latvia's security policy must accordingly be rational and pragmatic, including a readiness to uphold a dialogue with Russia so that no barriers and problems arise in political processes that would deflect Latvia from attaining its strategic goals of membership in the EU and NATO.

Notes

1. *Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Latvia*, adopted by the Saeima (parliament) in April 1994.
2. See, for example, Trenin, D., *Baltic Chance: The Baltic States, Russia, and the West in the Emerging Great Europe* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Moscow, 1997).
3. "At the same time, we recognize the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members." – *Madrid Declaration on Euro–Atlantic Security and Cooperation,* Heads of State and Government, North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 8 July 1997
4. FDI per capita in 1996 for Latvia was USD 68 and Estonia USD 45. The cumulative FDI inflow per capita for 1989—96 in USD are: Estonia 459, Latvia 234, Lithuania 83. For Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary they were respectively 128, 642, and 1.288. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report Update* (Apr. 1997), p. 12.
5. For an analysis of Russia's diplomatic campaign against the Baltic states see Lejiņš, A., "Latvia in a Post-Cold War Europe," eds. Brundtland, A. O. and Snider, D. M., *Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective* (The Center for Strategic Studies: Washington, D.C./ The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 1994), pp. 31–55. For a broader analysis of Baltic-Russian relations see Stranga, A., "Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995 –Beginning of 1997," eds. Lejiņš, A. and Ozoliņa, Ž., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective*, (Latvian Institute of International Affairs: Riga, 1997), pp. 184–237.

6. See, for example, "Nach Gruppen- und Startlinien- jetzt ein Stadionmodell," *Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung*, 18 Oct. 1997, p. 8: "In Estland hingegen stellt die russische Minderheit etwa ein Drittel, in Let-tland fast die Haelfte der Bevoelkerung."
7. *LATVIA: Human Development Report* (UNDP: Riga, 1997), p. 49.
8. See Trenin (note 2), p. 59 and p. 62.
9. Shvedov, A., "Vot tebe, babushka, i vid na zhitelstvo!" (See, old woman, that's your Residence Permit), *SM*, 8 Aug. 1997. *SM* is a Russian daily published in Latvia.
10. *Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Latvia's Application for Membership of the European Union*, DOC/97/14, 15 July 1997, p. 16. The Opinion gives the incorrect figure of 93 000 who were eligible for naturalization.
11. Lorencs, J., "Vai divkopienu valsts ir neizbēgama nākotne?" (Is a two-community state inescapable in the future?), *Diena*, 24 Oct. 1997; Pabriks, A., "Nacionālisms un uzdrīkstēšanās" (Nationalism and daring), *Diena*, 1 Nov. 1997. Both authors argue against the system of age brackets whereby certain age groups beginning with the youngest are eligible for naturalization over a period of time until 2003. This system was devised, as pointed out in the EU Commission Opinion on Latvia, to prevent the administration from being overwhelmed by a flood of applications.
12. The Latvian non-citizens passports will replace Soviet passports as valid travel documents to foreign countries on 1 January 1998. They will still be valid for internal use until 2000.
13. See Lejiņš (note 5) for a more detailed analysis of the "Karaganov doctrine." It stated "Russians should not be allowed to return to Russia from the other parts of the empire. They have to stay in the independent states because through them Russia can fulfil its foreign policy objectives," p. 41. Although it cannot be substantiated that Russia officially ascribed to this doctrine, Russia's unreasonable demands on Estonia and Latvia for immediate citizenship for all "Russian-speaking" people in these countries and the vigorous international campaign waged by Russia in the international fora indicates a certain resemblance to the doctrine.
14. Address by Viktor Chernomyrdin, presented at the International Conference*Coexistence of Nations and Good Neighbourly Relations – The Guarantee of Security and Stability in Europe*, Vilnius, 5–6 September, 1997. The specific measures were: A "hot line" between the military headquarters in the Kaliningrad region and the Baltic countries for the efficient solution of the issues of security in sea navigation and aviation flights; exchange of information concerning major military exercises in the Baltic countries and in the border regions of Russia, including exercises at any level with participation of non Baltic armed forces and observers; exchange visits of warships and establishing specific regions in the Baltic sea where the parties would abstain from holding military exercises; holding military exercises solely for defensive purposes in the Kaliningrad region. Atis Lejiņš participated in the conference.

15. Trenin, D. V., "Uz Briseli, uz Briseli!" (To Brussels, to Brussels) *Diena*, 31 May 1997. Dr. Trenin is also author of the report *A Baltic Chance: The Baltic States, Russia, and the West in the Emerging Great Europe* (see note 2). As described in the English summary, it offers a set of recommendations for Baltic, Russian, and Western decision-makers with a view toward turning the Baltic problem into a Baltic chance, i.e. a recommendation that Russia develop a positive policy toward the Baltics.
16. "Security guarantees for the Baltic states," US State Department, Office of the Spokesman, Press Statement, 31 Oct. 1997.
17. Interviews with EU Commission, Council and Parliament representatives, Žaneta Ozoliņa, Brussels, 16–24 March 1997.
19. Kaža, J., "Kopējās ārvalstu investicijas pārsniegšot miljardu USD" (Total foreign investments will exceed one billion USD), *Dienas Bizness*, 7 Nov. 1997. By the end of 1997 Norway will have become one of the largest investors in Latvia.
20. *Eiropas Dialogs* (European Dialogue), no. 3 (May/June 1997), pp. 26–27.
21. At a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 7 Oct. 1997 Senator Jesse Helms made known his doubts about Russia's possibility to influence NATO decisions on enlargement, deployments, or utilization of forces. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright replied: "You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme decision making body. Let me say clearly – it does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay, or block NATO decisions(...) It also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members." Secretary Madeleine K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. 7 Oct. 1997, p. 6.

AT THE CROSS-ROAD OF ALTERNATIVES: LITHUANIAN SECURITY POLICIES IN 1995 – 1997

Gediminas Vitkus

Introduction

In 1995, Lithuania celebrated the fifth anniversary of its restored independence. The last five years were very significant for the strengthening of the state and the consolidation of its security policy. However, they certainly did not and could not resolve all problems related to Lithuania's security. Many of these problems must undoubtedly be classed as insoluble. They are determined both by the military and economic capabilities of Lithuania as a small state and the geopolitical situation of the country. External circumstances not directly dependent on the will of the Lithuanian government always were and will remain a very important and often decisive factor for Lithuanian security.

Despite the pressure of external circumstances, the entire political elite of Lithuania, its political orientation notwithstanding, regarded the problem of ensuring national security with sufficient responsibility to ensure its continuity through successive changes in government. A case in point is the complete withdrawal of an alien army from Lithuania. In September of 1992, when Lithuania and Russia signed a schedule for the Russian army's withdrawal from Lithuania, the *Sąjūdis* government was still in power. A month later, however, power was transferred to the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP), which had previously been in opposition but won an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections. It was this party's burden to manage the timely withdrawal of the entire Russian army by 31 August 1993.

Secondly, the ruling party and other parties quite easily reached a consensus in 1993 and adopted a common memorandum stating that Lithuanian security would be best ensured if Lithuania should strive to join Western defence, political and economic institutions, first of all NATO, EU and WEU. On this basis Algirdas Brazauskas,

President of Lithuania, could submit a membership application to NATO at the beginning of 1994.

Apart from the political consensus reached in the area of the most important issues of the national security policy, many other steps of practical significance were taken during the first five years. A new permanent Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania adopted in 1992 helped to regulate the mechanism of formation and implementation of security policy. A regular army was created virtually from zero. The new military units started active participation in various international programmes: NATO's PfP, UN peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, formation of the joint peacekeeping battalion BALTBAT, etc.

On the other hand, the process of formation of Lithuanian security policy was still not complete. In the period of 1990-1994, effective coordination of individual governmental structures was obviously lacking; neither a law on national security nor an official defence doctrine was adopted. Due to the economic situation of the transitional period, the Lithuanian army constantly experienced an acute shortage of armaments and other military equipment. At the same time, Lithuanian diplomats could see for themselves that both NATO and EU membership would not be easily attainable and that considerable long-term efforts were needed for the realization of these two goals.

Taking into account that the concerns of Lithuanian security and policy developments in 1990–1994 have already been quite exhaustively discussed in another publication,[1] attention will be focused on the period from 1995 to 1997, analysing Lithuanian security policy from two aspects: 1) foreign policy directed towards the ensuring of security, i.e., Lithuanian policy regarding NATO and EU membership and relations between Lithuania and her neighbouring states; 2) the international and domestic dimensions and problems related to Lithuanian defence policy.

Aspects of economic and ecological security, the problems of ensuring safety for the Ignalina nuclear power station, illegal migration from impoverished Asian states are also security issues but cannot be discussed here due to lack of space.[2]

1. Foreign Policy Aimed at Ensuring Security

The Lithuanian Constitution prescribes in a general way that Lithuania's foreign policy should ensure the security and independence of Lithuania.[3] Chapter 5 of the Basics of National Security

(henceforth BNS), an annex to the Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania adopted in 1996, is more specific:

> The main goal of Lithuanian foreign policy shall be to develop Lithuania's integration into the European and transatlantic structures and acquire international security guarantees. Lithuania shall seek to establish and maintain good neighbourly relations with all countries based on the principle of justice and equality, as well as on universally accepted norms and principles of international law.[4]

In this part of the paper, I will address the question of how well Lithuanian politicians succeeded in attaining these aims in 1995-1997.

1.1. Lithuania and NATO/EU enlargement

The years 1995-1997 may be called the years of approaching NATO. However, despite intensive efforts this goal has still not been reached. Insufficient preparedness of the candidate countries was given as an official cause for not admitting the Baltic states to NATO. Perhaps this was formulated most clearly by William Perry, the US Defence Secretary, in September 1996. Speaking at the meeting of the NATO defence ministers in Bergen, he stated that the Baltic states were still not prepared for NATO membership because they were too weak from the military point of view.[5]

Nevertheless, the new political forces that became responsible for Lithuania's foreign policy after the 1996 election to the Seimas decided – in spite of the Bergen meeting and unfavorable news received on other occasions – to intensify efforts to gain Lithuania's admittance to NATO. The foreign policy of the new government, being in essence the creation of the Conservative leader Vytautas Landsbergis and the Christian Democratic leader Algirdas Saudargas, was implemented in such an intensive manner that even President Algirdas Brazauskas, the main constitutional architect of Lithuanian foreign policy, was left behind in the process.

The idea that at least one Baltic state should be admitted to NATO was the best card dealt by Lithuanian diplomacy and may be regarded as an answer of sorts to the Bergen statement. Its logic was based on the reasoning that even though the unpreparedness of all Baltic states was noted in Bergen, maybe at least one, the best prepared state could be invited. At the same time the West could demonstrate, in a symbolic way, that it is not going to leave the Baltic states to the mercy of fate. Finally, Russia's discontent would be

three times smaller than that caused by the admission of all three Baltic states. It was obvious for everybody that Lithuania was the most suitable candidate. Of all Baltic states, Lithuania has the largest army and the largest fleet, and it is the most active participant in the NATO's PfP programme. Finally, its historical and geopolitical situation as well as the population's national structure quite logically make it more suitable than the other two Baltic states.

Today, after the Madrid summit, one can question how realistic this plan of action was. It seems that it was not quite realistic, first of all because too little time was left. A half-year is too short a period for the politicians of NATO states, the US Senate, and public opinion to be prepared for such a decision. Russia's constant and consistent opposition to NATO's enlargement and particularly to the admission of the Baltic states was also of great importance. In any case, the efforts made by Lithuanian diplomacy did not yield the expected results. For the time being Lithuania has not succeeded in entering NATO earlier than the other Baltic states. Now one may only speculate on whether special activeness with respect to NATO will nevertheless bring certain dividends in the future.

However, losses may be evaluated right now. In spite of the statements made by Lithuanian politicians that both EU and NATO are Lithuania's foreign policy's priorities of equal significance, in reality NATO prevailed on the agenda of Lithuanian high politics in the first half of 1997. Unlike the policy of Estonia, Lithuanian policy towards the EU was not characterized by sufficient initiative. In the beginning, after signing the European Association agreement in 1995, the situation was complicated by the fact that the ratification of the agreement by the Parliament took almost a year. For the Association agreement to be able to be ratified, the Constitution had to be amended to allow land to be sold to foreigners. Due to the dragged out ratification process, no political consensus on the submission of the membership application was reached. The application was finally submitted in December 1995 with ratification still pending. Generally speaking, Lithuania-EU relations in the period of 1995–1996 were quite routine. The Lithuanian authorities dutifully and timely provided answers to the Commission's questionnaire in the summer of 1996, but showed no further political initiative or interest.

Though reforms of Lithuanian Euroinstitutions that have long been urgent were undertaken by the new government coming into power after the 1996 election, a special working group for the preparation of negotiations with EU was set up in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and a new ministry – the Ministry of European Affairs – was established. During the first half-year of 1997, Lithuanian politicians thought that there existed no essential differences between the Baltic states and that therefore it was hardly probable that accession negotiations could began at different times. Optimism was also fuelled by the country's economic figures for 1996. According to Gediminas Vagnorius, Prime Minister of Lithuania, Lithuania was ready for negotiations together with the first states, the more so as in 1997 it started to outdo some other Central European states according to such objective criteria as rate of inflation, unemployment levels, decreasing budget deficiency, faster increase in GDP, and improvements in customs operations and tax administration.[6]

The "cold shower" of the NATO summit meeting in Madrid, the European Commission's negative opinion on beginning negotiations with Lithuania, and, in particular, the Commission's decision that only Estonia should be invited for negotiations showed that the selection of priorities by Lithuanian diplomacy had been unsuccessful. Though this would never be recognized by any politician currently in power, who would assert that accession to EU and accession to NATO had always been and remained priorities of equal significance, it became obvious in the middle of 1997 that insufficient attention was devoted to EU matters and insufficient diplomatic initiative was shown on the high politics level. Though EU membership cannot provide such convincing security guarantees as NATO membership would, and though Lithuania would have to be satisfied with so-called *soft security*, the events of 1997 show that accession to EU for Lithuania, and the other Baltic states, is a more realistic prospect than NATO membership.

It goes without saying that after the Madrid resolutions on NATO's enlargement and the announcement of EU's *Agenda 2000* both the Lithuanian government and diplomats undertook all possible measures to rectify such an embarrassing situation and to influence EU member states in such a way that the Commission's negative opinion would not be the only one to serve as a basis for the final decision. The issue of EU membership became the most important issue in both Lithuania's foreign and domestic politics. Lithuania will try to prove to the governments of most of the member states that it also deserves being invited to start negotiations for EU membership in 1998.[7]

With this aim in view, it was decided first of all to noticeably enhance Lithuania's diplomatic activities in the European Union.

Lithuanian embassies in Portugal and Greece are to be established, and Lithuania's permanent mission to the EU is to be strengthened. The government also undertook to prepare an exhaustive study of the European Commission's opinion and the opinion of Lithuania itself; the latter will be presented to the governments of all EU member states. An intensive programme comprising visits by governmental officials to all EU countries was implemented. So far it is difficult to say whether this plan will yield expected results – this paper was written in September 1997.

1.2. Good neighbourhood relations and regional cooperation

1.2.1. The Baltic states

Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, both in the security area and in other matters, may be characterized as a phenomenon full of paradoxes. In 1995–1997, just as in earlier years, the principle of the usefulness of the Baltic states' solidarity and cooperation was never officially rejected by any politician of any Baltic state. Quite a lot of communiqués of presidential meetings and resolutions of the Baltic Assemblies could be gathered to prove this. In addition, the Baltic states are implementing joint military projects – BALTBAT, BALTRON, and BALTNET. Nevertheless, one may state that during the last two years Baltic cooperation found itself to be in deep crisis.

Actually, there exists only a very limited coordination of the foreign and security policies of the Baltic states. Even the military cooperation projects mentioned above could hardly have arisen without the recommendations and support of the Western countries. The question of forming a military union of the Baltic states is not even being discussed. It was mentioned in the press that during the meeting held in November 1995 in Jūrmala, the commanders of the Baltic state armies gave unofficial approval, to the concept of creating a military union.[8] It seems that the officers see no obstacles to the formation of a military union, but the political elite objects to this. Algirdas Saudargas stated immediately after the commanders' meeting in Jūrmala that "a separate defence union of the Baltic states could mean a wrong signal to the Western states." In his opinion, the intention to form such alliance is a "very dangerous political trend." As Saudargas was appointed Foreign Minister after the last election, this matter is no longer seriously considered. Nevertheless public opinion does not share this attitude unconditionally. The fact is that results of

a survey commissioned by the Baltic Assembly show that around 70 percent of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian population would approve of a military and political union of the Baltic states.[9]

However, it is not only the fear of "sending a wrong signal to the West" that impedes closer cooperation among the Baltic states in the area of security but also the status of these states' relations in other areas not directly related to security. To a large extent the Baltic states perceive each other not as partners but as a competitors. This induces certain Baltic states (Estonia) to try to stand out among the others, thus "sending the right signal to the West." It is well known that Estonia always was the most reserved as regards closer Baltic cooperation and was inclined to stress, whenever possible, its exclusiveness and advantage with respect to the other Baltic states. Estonia's attempts to stand out among the others became particularly strong in 1995 and manifested itself until mid-1996.

The matters of delimitation of territorial waters and trading areas constitute another problem which clearly contradicted the principle of Baltic solidarity. The years of 1995 and 1996 were in a certain sense years of Latvian-Lithuanian and Latvian-Estonian conflicts. Protests were issued, accusations of violation of sovereignty and even mutual insults by politicians were traded.[10] This was a particularly good time for sensation-hunting journalists. A Lithuanian daily *Respublika* even tried to assess, as a joke, the Lithuanian and Latvian defence capacity in case of a military conflict.[11] This is a complicated issue requiring separate discussion. We will just mention here that the conflict between Latvia and Estonia has already been settled, whereas delimitation of the Lithuanian and Latvian sea border still remains a matter of negotiation.[12]

These circumstances constituted important though not principal factors in effecting a shift in Lithuanian foreign policy priorities towards Central Europe. At the beginning of 1997, doubts about the meaningfulness of Baltic solidarity appeared for the first time on a high level in Lithuania, and not only in Estonia. According to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saudargas looking at the Baltic states as an integral space sometimes may be "not entirely useful" while seeking membership of EU and NATO.[13] "When a question is put why Lithuania or any other of these countries cannot be admitted to NATO, common drawbacks of the Baltic states are indicated." Therefore, according to Mr. Saudargas, it is only after the breaking of this stereotype of the "negative trinity" that one may expect formation of a positive attitude towards the

Baltic states. "Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should be evaluated separately, taking into account the achievements of each of them," said the Minister.[14]

Indeed, in a certain sense Lithuania's reorientation from the Baltic states to Central Europe as well as its more active propaganda of the idea that one country could be admitted to NATO may be interpreted also as a kind of reaction to the campaign conducted earlier by Estonian politicians to the effect that their country is more prepared to be admitted to EU than the other two Baltic states. However, despite the symptoms of a crisis in the Baltic states' cooperation it would be wrong to assert that the cooperation is already doomed and has no future. The negative attitude towards Baltic cooperation as expressed by some Lithuanian politicians do not meet with universal approval. Urgings not to turn away from the Baltic neighbours are voiced in Lithuania. Finally, a not-too-restrictive position on cooperation is approved by President Algirdas Brazauskas.

Vytautas Landsbergis, Speaker of the Seimas, who is quite active in the area of foreign policy, has also assumed a softer attitude. While in principle supporting the aim of strengthening Lithuania's relations with the Central European countries, particularly Poland, Landsbergis nevertheless considers that it is necessary to preserve both the work done and the institutions established within the framework of the Baltic states' cooperation. Speaking in the Estonian Parliament in January 1997, when a change in the tenets of Lithuanian foreign policy was already obvious, he pointed out that "NATO membership of one of the Baltic states would be of great use for the other ones as well – the blockade of diplomatic and political pressure would be broken through (...) Competition is a driving force for progress and not without reason it is stated in the resolution of the Baltic Assembly that any achievement of one of our states is the achievement of all."[15]

At the beginning of 1997, this "Landsbergis doctrine" was intended first of all to console the governments of the Baltic states as regards the change in Lithuanian foreign policy priorities and a possible earlier admission of Lithuania to NATO. However, when the European Commission announced its opinion on the candidate countries' preparedness for the admission negotiations evaluating among the Baltic states Estonia alone positively, the said doctrine became a kind of consolation prize for Lithuanian diplomacy.

1.2.2. Poland

In 1991–1992, there was considerable tension in Lithuania's relations with Poland. However, upon signing the Agreement on Friendship and Good Neighbourly Collaboration in 1994, relations started to improve quickly. In 1995–1997, the Governments of both states agreed on the formation of a joint military peacekeeping unit LITPOLBAT, and Poland donated to Lithuania large quantities of military equipment and ammunition. These relations, however, acquired a new quality after the last election to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania in the fall of 1996. A coalition of the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats came into power, whose leaders, as early as at the beginning of 1996, had criticized the Government of the LDDP for not exploiting opportunities provided by neighbouring Poland – an almost universally recognized candidate to NATO and the EU.

As early as in the spring of 1996, the then opposition leader Landsbergis asserted that it would be useful to stress more the fact that Lithuania belongs no less to the Central European region than to the Baltic region. Noting the sameness of Lithuania's and Poland's conditions and opportunities, he asked, at a press conference, "why could not the consideration of Lithuania's membership in NATO start together with that of Poland's."[16] According to Landsbergis, "Lithuania's and Poland's parallelism, cooperation with Poland, particularly in the security area, should be promoted as much as possible." He is of the opinion that "the attempts made both by our diplomats and the former exile community, aimed at Lithuania's approaching the first three candidates to NATO (the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) and at Lithuania's being the fourth country after these three, should not cease." Lithuania's conditions, in his opinion, correspond entirely to the geopolitical, border-related, and other conditions of Poland. Concerning Baltic cooperation he noted that coordination and solidarity with the other two Baltic neighbours are useful but should exclude separate moves.[17]

Indeed, though the LDDP governments that were in power in 1992–1996 did much to improve Lithuanian-Polish relations, later events showed that many opportunities nevertheless were not seized in time. Poland's rapprochement with the West practically secured its membership both in NATO and the EU, making it an important stabilizing factor for the whole region. Poland now could turn to the East and consolidate security and partnership ties with her neighbouring states. Poland's relations with Russia and the Ukraine are

being successfully developed; it is looking for forms of dialogue even with Belarus. As Dariusz Rosati, a Polish Foreign Minister, wrote in *Rzeczpospolita*, the policy in the East was intensified while maintaining good and close relations with both the western and southern neighbours. Rosati stressed that in this region Poland sought new foreign policy initiatives and methods.[18]

These changes in Polish foreign policy, as well as similar aspirations and interests, and also a certain amount of sentimentalism towards Lithuania opened in 1995–1996 a possibility for Lithuania to both normalize Polish-Lithuanian relations and to raise them to a qualitatively new level of cooperation. After the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Saudargas's visit to Warsaw in January 1997, Poland was called by him a strategic partner of Lithuania. "In the future, we will be neighbouring countries of the European Union, with almost no borders between us. Therefore Lithuania's path will be shorter through Poland." The Polish Foreign Minister Rosati, in his turn, confirmed this vision by noting that "Lithuania is a very important partner due both to its rich history and to the common aspirations. Therefore Poland will do its best to achieve that Lithuania will be in the first group of countries with which negotiations for admission to NATO and EU will start."[19]

In February, Speaker Landsbergis paid an official visit to Poland and proposed a Lithuanian-Polish interparliamentary institution to be established, which in his opinion would be beneficial to both countries. According to him, this would provide an opportunity for enhancing the historical role of both Lithuania and Poland. "We are a Central Baltic Europe. We are still not perceived as a key, though we are a key to the future of this still double-sided Europe," he said in the Polish Parliament.[20]

In June 1997, Poland and Lithuania established the Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly analogous to the Baltic Assembly. It is made up of 20 members each from the Lithuanian Seimas and the Polish Sejm.[21] At the first meeting of the Assembly in July 1997, the statute of the Assembly was adopted which stipulates that the Assembly may make statements and declarations containing obligations to carry out certain activities, appeals to international organizations, parliaments or governments, and other resolutions. The Assembly will be convened two times a year, in spring and in autumn.[22]

Further, there was a parallel institutionalization of cooperation of executive authorities in the summer of 1997. On June 19, during the

Lithuanian President's visit to Warsaw, Algirdas Brazauskas and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the President of Poland, signed an agreement on the setting up of a joint consultative committee of both Presidents. A joint declaration on the establishment of the Council for Cooperation of Lithuanian and Polish Governments was signed on June 30. The first meeting of the Council took place in September of 1997 in Vilnius. The Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz with the delegation headed by him and the Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius with the members of his Cabinet took part in the constituent meeting. The issues discussed at the meeting included bilateral cooperation in the areas of EU and NATO integration, economic ties, organized crime, education and science, protection of minorities' rights etc.[23]

Though an aspiration to get into the first wave of NATO enlargement was the primary motive that induced Lithuanian politicians to establish closer relations with Poland, the importance of the Lithuanian-Polish rapprochement did not disappear even after the announcement of Madrid declaration. Quite the reverse. Strategic partnership with the prospective NATO country will undoubtedly serve not only the development of economic and political relations but first of all the strengthening of Lithuania's security, and at the same time providing a sound basis for a possible membership of Lithuania in NATO. Thus, Lithuania would acquire a new geopolitical importance in the Baltic region. On the other hand, the role of a state promoting stability and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is undoubtedly very useful to Poland. According to the Polish Foreign Minister Rosati, Poland as a prospective NATO member intends to play a special role in Central and Eastern Europe and to assume exclusive responsibility for the region's security.[24]

The international conference *Coexistence of Nations and Good Neighbourly Relations – the Guarantee of Security and Stability in Europe*, which was held in Vilnius on September 5–6, 1997 on the initiative of the Lithuanian and Polish Presidents may be considered as one of the most prominent examples of the stabilizing effect produced by intensified Polish-Lithuanian cooperation. Apart from the two Presidents, the Presidents of Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and the Russian Prime Minister took part in the conference. The President of Finland arrived as a guest. Though no common document was adopted, the conference provided a forum for political and public figures of differ-

ent backgrounds for the discussion of problems connected with the co-existence of European nations.

1.2.3. Russia

When considering Lithuanian-Russian relations within the context of Lithuania's national security, one must admit that Russia is still perceived in Lithuania as one of the greatest threats to Lithuania's security. According to the data of *Vilmorus* Public Opinion Research Centre, at the end of 1996 – the beginning of 1997, 72 percent of Lithuanians and even 21 percent of Russians were of the opinion that the Russian state posed a threat to peace and Lithuania's security.[25] Though Russia is not directly identified as a threat in the BNS, the risks to national security include such factors which may be first of all related to the close proximity of Russia as a neighbour and the foreign policy pursued by Russia. The risks are as follows:

Political:
- political pressure and dictate, attempts to establish zones of special interest and ensure special rights, preventing Lithuania from obtaining international security guarantees;
- threats by foreign states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests; and
- attempts to impose upon Lithuania dangerous and discriminatory international agreements.

Military:
- military capability in close proximity to Lithuanian borders;
- military transit through Lithuania;
- overt aggression.[26]

On the other hand, Russia is not directly mentioned in the Law in order to avoid unnecessary provocation. The more so since the processes taking place in Russia cannot unequivocally be evaluated as negative ones. Hopes are inspired not only by Russian democracy that has been in existence for six years already but also by changes in Russian public opinion.

The Russian Centre for International Sociological Research has polled 4200 persons in Moscow, Murmansk, Tula, Kaluga, Ufa, Kazan, Novosibirsk, Yuzhnosakhalinsk, and Alexandrov with the aim to identify their attitudes towards Lithuania and Lithuanians. According to the *Izvestiya* daily, which published the survey results, the first result is the debunking of a myth that Russians do not like

Lithuanians because of their part in the attempted destruction of the Soviet Union. 40 percent of the respondents feel respect for Lithuanians, 24 percent sympathize with them, and only six percent are indifferent towards them. 61 percent of the respondents would like to visit Lithuania; no one, however, expressed a wish to live in Lithuania. 10 percent think that the improvement of relations between Russia and Lithuania is hindered by the "psychological consequences of separation of Lithuania and other Baltic countries." Those who consider Vilnius' aspirations to NATO membership to be an obstacle to better relations are very few.[27]

Lithuanian-Russian relations in terms of security may be analyzed from two perspectives: firstly, the condition of bilateral relations between Lithuania and Russia; secondly, the behaviour of Russia as a great power on the international stage. It has become an axiom to assert, when speaking about Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations, that among the Baltic states, Lithuania has the best relations with Russia.[28] Despite that, there still are numerous problems in Lithuania's relations with Russia, but only one is directly connected with national security. This is the Russian military transit to Kaliningrad. At the end of 1993, after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, transit issues were regulated by a separate agreement between the Governments of Lithuania and Russia, which was in effect until the close of 1994. Throughout 1994, Russia sought in her negotiations with Lithuania on the future status of the agreement to conclude a special political treaty with Lithuania under which it would have free military transit by rail, air and road across Lithuania. Meanwhile Lithuania drafted and adopted uniform regulations for transport of military and dangerous goods across its territory. Russia refused to comply with these regulations while Lithuania had no levers to make Russia accept the regulations. There was, of course, the possibility of a direct confrontation by banning Russian transit through Lithuania, but this was unrealistic. Instead, in January 1995, Lithuania proposed to prolong the effect of the 1993 agreement or so-called "German rules" on transit which was accepted by Russia.[29]

Today, with a hindsight of almost three years, the compromise reached with Moscow on military transit extending the so-called "German" regulations seems a fairly successful solution. Formally, the issue has remained unregulated, yet there were no major problems concerning Russia's military transit either in 1995, 1996, or 1997. On the one hand, Lithuania has not signed any political treaty

obliging it to grant special transit rights to Russia. On the other hand, in reaching an agreement with Russia, Lithuania has demonstrated that it was not in its interests to isolate the Kaliningrad region and confront the Russian Federation. Therefore one can hardly challenge the conclusion that the arrangement regarding Russia's transit across the territory of Lithuania is Lithuania's contribution to the security and stability of the Baltic region and all Europe.

After the issue of Russia's military transit to Kaliningrad was settled, Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations started to develop rather uniformly in line with the Western states' cautious attitude towards Russia. From the standpoint of Lithuania's strategic aims, it seemed more useful to demonstrate that there were no serious problems in the area of mutual relations, and that only technical matters remained unsettled, rather than to constantly stress unresolved issues that could eventually strain Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations.

This was the position taken by Lithuania during the border negotiations with Russia, which began in July 1993 and were concluded President Algirdas Brazauskas's visit to Moscow at the end of October. Agreement was reached on the state border crossing the Vištytis lake, the Nemunas mouth, the Kuršiai lagoon, and the Baltic Sea.

In 1995–1996, the LDDP government followed a consistent, pragmatic, and in a certain sense adaptive policy towards Russia, which undoubtedly served the normalization of bilateral relations and both national and regional security. However, the political forces that had governed Lithuania in the period from 1990 to 1992 were returned to power by the elections to the Seimas in October 1996. Many in Russia associate the period of the *Sajūdis* government and the role of Landsbergis in the then foreign policy with a strict, uncompromising, and even provocative attitude towards Russia. Therefore it might seem that the Conservative victory in the election and the return of Landsbergis would strain the Lithuanian-Russian relations. But the Conservatives, who probably understood this very well, started their activities in the area of foreign policy first of all with the destruction of their so-called "anti-Russian" image. In November 1996, they held a conference titled *Prospects of Further Promotion of Lithuanian-Russian Relations*, to which were invited democratically minded members of the Russian State Duma. Furthermore, the course of Lithuanian-Russian relations in 1997 showed that the new governing coalition of the Conservatives and

the Christian Democrats was not inclined to change anything in Lithuania's relations with Russia essentially.

In spite of the fact that Russian public opinion is favourable to Lithuania and that bilateral relations have taken a course of normal development, the national security situation in Lithuania is also affected by Russia's behavior on the international scene. First of all, the security policy pursued by Lithuania and other Baltic states is complicated by Russia's negative attitude to NATO's enlargement and particularly to eventual NATO membership for the Baltic countries. One must also bear in mind the so-called "Yalta syndrome," i.e. the fear that a too cautious and pragmatic attitude towards Russia assumed by the Western allies may lead to the Baltic countries' falling into the sphere of Russian influence again.

Here one should also mention the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). According to the revision of the CFE made in June 1996, Russia will be able to deploy much larger quantities of heavy armament near the borders of the Baltic states than previously. Under the revised agreement Russia is allowed to keep, for a period of three years, 600 armored vehicles instead of 180 as stipulated in the previous agreement. Of course, this changes little in the Baltic countries' security situation from the military point of view (for example, the Latvian army has only 12 armored vehicles).[30] But it worsens the political security situation of the Baltic countries, accentuates the problem of their defensibility, and complicates the prospects of NATO membership for them.

Another important event is the partnership agreement between Russia and NATO signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The agreement was received cautiously in Lithuania. While it was stressed that it would undoubtedly contribute to the stabilization of the international system, doubts were expressed as to whether this would not be done at the expense of the security of the Baltic states.

1.2.4. Belarus

Relations between Lithuania and Belarus are of great importance to Lithuania's security. The border with Belarus (about 650 km) accounts for the largest part of her land border. Minsk, the capital of Belarus, is the foreign capital closest to Vilnius. Finally, there are only thirty kilometers from Vilnius to the border with Belarus. However, despite the potential threat that Belarus poses due to its military capability (the size of the Belarus army is around 70 000–90 000 and it has 1800 tanks),[31] its relations with Lithuania have remained surpris-

ingly stable and good. They have not been affected either by the growing authoritarianism of the Belarus President Alexander Lukashenka or by the formation of the Belarus-Russian union.

Consolidation of an authoritarian regime in a neighboring state is not a pleasant fact if one thinks about the security of a state. However, no particularly dangerous trends have so far appeared in the Belarus policy towards Lithuania or any other states in the region. In February 1995, the President of Belarus, while on an official visit to Vilnius, signed four bilateral agreements, including the agreement on the Lithuanian-Belarus state border and good neighborly relations. In April 1996, this agreement was ratified, without any special debates, by both the Lithuanian and Belarus Parliaments. It seems that the Belarus government is inclined to cultivate economic relations rather than accentuate divergent politics in her relations with Lithuania and other neighboring countries. In 1995-1997, the prime ministers of Belarus visited Lithuania several times to discuss the possibility of using the Klaipeda seaport for Belarussian cargo transit.

The special significance of the Lithuanian-Belarus border agreement signed in 1995 lies in the fact that previously the Lithuanian border with Belarus had not been fixed in any interstate documents. Since 1940, this was an administrative border separating two Soviet republics, marked only in maps and readjusted several times. Demarcation that began in April 1997[32] was positively evaluated by EU experts who visited the border areas in July of 1997.[33]

In this context it should be noted, however, that the flow of illegal migrants from poor Asian states pouring through the Lithuanian-Belarus border poses an ever increasing threat to Lithuania's security. Illegal migration is usually dealt with by means of detention and deportation agencies established specially for this purpose. However, only rich countries can afford this. Lithuania, through lack of funds, is left with practically only one alternative – to attempt to prevent illegal migrants from entering the country, signing a readmission agreement with Belarus, which, however, has been delayed by Belarus.

Russia is keenly interested in the Lithuanian-Belarus readmission agreement talks and has proposed that trilateral negotiations for a Lithuanian-Belarus-Russian agreement on readmission be held. Belarus has also stressed that though matters of bilateral readmission are going to be discussed with Lithuania, "when the time comes for such agreement, it will be necessary to hold consultations with Russia, the Ukraine and other countries for which the problem of

illegal migration is urgent."[34] Readmission issues remain the most pressing problem in Lithuanian-Belarus relations, and most likely cannot be solved without Russia's participation.

2. Defense policy

Two main components – one international and one internal – of Lithuanian defense policy may be identified. The international dimension of defense policy, just as the main priorities of foreign policy and diplomatic activities, is orientated towards integration into both European and transatlantic defense structures, first of all NATO and WEU. The internal component of defense policy, on the other hand, represents the entirety of actions through which the principle of total and unconditional defense of Lithuania must be upheld.

Lithuania is not different from other states in this case and must solve the problem of combining these two aspects. What should be the relationship between the two aspects – which of them should be the principal one – constitutes a rather complex issue which has been discussed by the Parliament more than once. Some are of the opinion that internal preparedness for defense should have priority and should be given more attention and funds. For instance, Mr. Kestutis Gaška who was a member of the National Security Committee of the Seimas in 1992–1996, considers that Lithuania's participation in the peacekeeping forces has nothing in common with NATO, nor is Partnership for Peace a "foot-bridge to NATO."[35] Others, though, assert that ensuring security, military security in particular, is only possible provided Lithuania takes part in corresponding international structures, while domestic defense policy is of minor importance, since even Western states with relatively large resources are not able to defend themselves unless they are members of NATO. Radical supporters of this attitude even have proposed that Lithuania be a army-free state, with its security based solely on international guarantees, like Iceland.

The Basics of National Security document resolved the issue by determining that in the event of aggression Lithuania shall seek international assistance and simultaneously defend itself independently without waiting until such assistance is provided. Hence the armed forces and other national defense structures shall be developed for the defense of Lithuania as well as for interoperability with NATO.

2.1. International dimension

A strategic resolution on the combination of the internal and international dimensions of defense policy is undoubtedly very important for the everyday work of defense policy-makers. In practice, however, it is not always easy to achieve. Paradoxically, over the last two years the international dimension of defense has been developing much more effectively than the internal dimension. The main reason for this is Lithuania's efforts to join both European and transatlantic defense systems together with the generous assistance provided by the West.

Lithuania's participation in military international cooperation is dominated by its individual partnership programme with NATO. At the meeting of representatives of NATO's member countries and Lithuania on 28 March 1996 in Brussels, a new programme for individual partnership for 1996–1998 was adopted. Peacekeeping, development of air space control and communication systems, the teaching of English, and compatibility with NATO standards are the main areas of cooperation. Lithuania took part in more than 20 military exercises and in various conferences and seminars held under the 1996 programme. Lithuanian units participated also in IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. Special funds have been provided for in the Lithuanian state budget to finance participation in the activities organized under "Partnership for Peace." It was planned in 1997 that Lithuania will take part in as much as 145 events organized by NATO (PfP programme).[36]

Joint military projects launched with the other two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia, represent another manifestation of the international dimension of defense policy. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, assisted by Western countries, are currently implementing three major defense-related projects: formation of a joint peacekeeping battalion BALTBAT, formation of a trilateral navy squadron BALTRON, and implementation of a BALTNET system for joint regional air space surveillance.[37] A new element in international military cooperation and peacekeeping is the joint Lithuanian-Polish peacekeeping battalion LITPOLBAT. In June 1997, an agreement was signed which provided the legal basis for the battalion, which comprises 400 soldiers and should operative by 1 January 1999.

In bilateral military cooperation, the Nordic countries and Poland are particularly important for Lithuania's defense. Considerable military aid has come from the Nordics, including training of personnel

and financial assistance. Poland has donated five Mi-2 helicopters, ammunition, cannons, grenade launchers, field kitchens and bakeries, trucks, and nine patrol boats, etc.[38] All in all, developments in the international sphere of Lithuania's defense policy have been quite successful during the last two years. And although Lithuania did not find itself in the first NATO enlargement round, preparation for eventual membership is being carried out.

2.2. Domestic dimension

The development of the domestic dimension of defense policy has not been quite as good. Financial constraints are the main cause for this. It was at the end of 1995 that the mass media started to draw attention to the poor training of soldiers – during the period of service, a soldier was provided with a possibility to shoot a few times only.[39] According to the then Defense Minister Linas Linkevičius, this was quite natural because Lithuania was second from the last among European countries regarding share of GNP allotted to defense (0.56 percent). (Latvia was last on the list with 0.5 percent of GNP). Speaking at the Seimas in June 1996, Linkevičius impressed upon the deputies that "security also costs" and urged them to revise priorities of the Lithuanian state when determining budgetary allocations.[40]

Moreover, this upward trend is expected to be maintained in the nearest future. With the improvement of the Lithuanian economy expressed in a steady growth of the GDP and a decline of inflation, budgetary allocations for national defense have increased every year since 1995. In the Government's Action programme for the period of 1997–2000 the GDP grow is projected to reach five percent in 1997, eight percent in 1998, and six to seven percent in the period of 1999–2000. Also during 1996, the country witnessed an impressive decrease in the annual inflation level, from 35.7 percent in 1995 to 13.1 percent in 1996.[41] For 1997, defense spending reached 306.2 million LTL (=76.6 million USD) which is approximately 4.6 percent of the total budget expenditures, or 0.9 percent of GDP.[42]

In addition, the Lithuanian government could provide credit guarantees for the Ministry of National Defense amounting to almost USD nine million. Half of this amount – USD 4.7 million – was utilized for the purchase of *Carl Gustaf* light antitank robots, complying with NATO requirements, from Sweden. Another USD 1.5 million were used for the acquisition of ammunition. In December 1996, the Lithuanian army made one more purchase complying with NATO

requirements – almost a hundred *Land Rover* (Great Britain) cross-country vehicles.[43] President Algirdas Brazauskas, speaking at the meeting held to mark the 5th anniversary of *Geležinis Vilkas* (Iron Wolf) motorized infantry brigade on 6 May 1997, expressed the hope that Lithuania's economic situation would allow it to increase expenditure on national defense in the nearest future .

However, training of the army for defense is not the only aspect of defense policy. According to the Basics of National Security, the defense of Lithuania shall be based on the principle of total and unconditional defense, i.e., Lithuania shall resist an aggressor by all available means: military defense, guerrilla warfare, civil disobedience, non-collaboration, and other means.

The implementation of this provision of the Law depends much on the peace-time activities of the government in preparation for meeting possible aggression. The Law prescribes that:

> the system of citizen preparedness for civil resistance shall be raised to the national level and its functioning shall be organized by the government. The citizens shall be trained on a regular basis in different means of resistance and civil defense. The state shall provide them with the necessary technical means. Fostering of patriotism, instruction in the means of resistance, and training in the skills of resistance shall be a constituent part of the compulsory school education programme.[45]

At present, however, inadequate attention has been devoted to the realization of this provision. On one hand, this can be explained by the lack of funds, but on the other, there does exist a pronounced negative attitude in society toward civil defence training. When President Algirdas Brazauskas, in a meeting with Česlovas Stankevičius, the Minister of National Defense, and General Jonas Andriškevičius, the Army Chief, in March 1997 discussed mobilization, and announced that he supported military training in secondary schools,[46] this caused a very negative reaction both in the mass media and the public. *Lietuvos rytas*, the largest Lithuanian daily, for example, pointed out in its editorial that teaching military subjects at schools was prohibited by Article 26 of the Law on Education. Furthermore, according to the authors of the comment, "the nostalgia for the reanimation of the Soviet military training showed quite a peculiar understanding of the state defense problems both by the President of the state and the governing coalition. Instead of strengthening the professional army and allotting additional means for this purpose, the President and the rightists

expressed a wish to effectively scatter them among schools."[47] As a result, military training in schools was temporarily postponed – reminiscences of the former militarized educational system of the Soviet regime are still very strong in Lithuanian society. Under such circumstances, one may hardly expect that the provisions of the BNS with regard to the population's preparation for defense will be implemented soon. It seems that public opinion is more orientated towards a regular army and its effective interaction with both transatlantic and European defense systems it is than inclined to rely on a total and unconditional defense and to implement it enthusiastically.

Conclusion

The change of political power after the election that took place at the end of 1996 is one of the most important factors of the period under consideration. LDDP, which during four years governed Lithuania completely independently, found itself in opposition, giving up its place to the coalition of the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats. The change of government was significant first of all because new, and sometimes quite radical, diplomatic initiatives were taken, aimed at maximum mobilization of available political resources for the resolution of pressing problems. One should mention that one of the first laws adopted by the new Seimas was *the Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania* and its Annex *The Basics of National Security of Lithuania* in December 1996. The law, which had begun to be drafted in 1991 and which gave rise to lengthy debates, at last came into effect on 8 January 1997.

However, in spite of the new government's energy, the analysis of the efforts made towards Lithuania's admission to NATO and EU shows that in both cases Lithuania stepped up diplomatic activity too late, when only a half-year was left till the final decisions on the enlargement of the respective organizations. Usually in such cases, decisions already are in the stage of preparation and it is not always possible to change them, even if very serious and convincing arguments are presented. For instance, the idea raised by Lithuania at the beginning of 1997 that at least one Baltic state should be admitted to NATO, is a legitimate subject for debate, but it came too late. An analogous situation prevailed in the case of EU enlargement. Whatever will be the results of Lithuanian diplomatic activity in the autumn of 1997, one gets a feeling that this will also be too late.

Today Lithuania perhaps demonstrates a better economic posture than Estonia, but the Commission's opinion on Estonia is the echo of the latter's previous success and active efforts.

Lithuania's relations with the other two Baltic states, and Baltic cooperation in 1995–1997, could be characterized as a paradoxical phenomenon. On one hand, there were many declarations of solidarity. On the other hand, in many areas of security politics, including both NATO and EU enlargement, the Baltic countries acted not as partners but as competitors and in all possible ways attempted to stress their advantages as compared with those of their neighbours. Estonia was most successful in implementing the "Landsbergis doctrine," however. In 1997, Lithuania also turned in this direction in its rapprochement to Poland. To be sure, the principle of Baltic solidarity is not rejected but it is no longer among the first priorities. And everything that was done in the area of implementation of joint Baltic cooperation projects, like BALTBAT, was rather a result of Western and especially Scandinavian (Danish and Swedish in particular) influence and material assistance than an expression of the will of the Baltic states themselves.

Whereas the development of Lithuanian-Polish relations in 1995–1997 demonstrated that Lithuania did not utilize all opportunities provided by its geopolitical situation, the rapprochement to Poland was a significant achievement. Strategic partnership with a prospective NATO country will undoubtedly serve not only the development of economic and political relations but, first of all, the strengthening of Lithuania's security, both with regard to its chances of eventual NATO membership and in terms of regional stability in general.

In spite of the improved of Lithuanian-Russian relations during 1995–1997, Russia is still perceived in Lithuania as a very serious threat to its national security. This is determined both by still very fresh reminiscences of the occupation era and by certain of Russia's international policy attitudes. Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement, and especially to membership for the Baltic countries, may be considered to be one of the most important factors that complicates Lithuanian security. However, the policy against NATO enlargement pursued by Russia during the last two years constitutes only an indirect threat to Lithuania's security, first of all due to the fact that opinions unfavorable to the accession of the Baltic states are being formed in the West. Whereas Russia has not undertaken any official acts of threat against Lithuania or the other Baltic countries despite their open orientation towards NATO.

The state of Lithuanian-Belarus relations is of great importance to Lithuanian security for two reasons. Firstly, the border with Belarus is Lithuania's longest border with a foreign state. Secondly, this border is guarded poorly and illegal migrants destined for West Europe are pouring through it. A border agreement has been signed and border demarcation has begun, but a readmission agreement still remains to be negotiated.

Finally, when summarizing the development of Lithuania's defense policy in 1995–1997, one must recognize both a certain success in international military cooperation and improving defense structures. However, the mental preparedness of Lithuanian society for total and unconditional defense in case of aggression is still in an embryonic stage.

Notes

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ACTUAL AND FUTURE DANISH DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY

Bertel Heurlin

1. Introduction

Denmark is a small country. Not that small, however, since half of the countries of the world are smaller. By incorporating Greenland as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, it does look impressive on a map – especially in the Miercator-projection mode. In this way, Denmark is a great power. It is one of the richest countries in the world, measured objectively and subjectively, and adheres to what is now generally accepted global norms such as democracy, human rights/personal freedoms, market economy, and protection of the environment.

But as a small state Denmark is extremely vulnerable economically and in terms of national security. Despite being highly industrialised, Denmark has very limited natural resources making it extremely dependent on foreign trade and the financial markets; thus, Denmark is in an exposed economic position directly facing fluctuations in the European and international economies. In military terms, Denmark – due to its flat and small territory – is unable to defend itself: it must then rely on alliances. In political terms, Denmark is not vulnerable since its political landscape is marked by internal coherence, political consensus and common identity – in essence, political stability. Denmark is probably the most organised country in the world, scoring very high in percentages of membership in organisations such as political parties, trade unions, cultural groups, hobby/sports clubs, and grass root units. A sneaking vulnerability in political stability is however the growing politicisation of immigrants and refugees.

What does the words 'Danish' or 'Denmark' signal to a foreigner? One can claim it refers to four characteristics: abundance, freedom, style/innovation, and independence. First abundance; Denmark has for a long time been seen by the outside world as a tiny, rich industrious country attempting to live in peace in the shadow of great powers. It is no accident that Denmark is seldom on the front pages

of the international press. In spring 1988, when Denmark had one of its more serious quarrels with its protector state, the United States, regarding procedure for the use of Danish harbours for its warships which were or were not nuclear armed, a State Department spokesman was asked by a journalist who was aware of a new Danish-US crisis of how he considered the "Danish situation." The spokesman responded, presumably not prepared for such a question, as: "Danish for me is breakfast. Next question." While this could be interpreted as a metaphor of Denmark being politically insignificant internationally, it also refers to the fact that Denmark is characterised by material abundance.

The term 'Denmark' also gives other associations, namely freedom. 'Denmark' is the home of porn shop in New York or Washington. Denmark was one of the first countries in the world to legalise pornography, so the term 'Denmark' may signal personal/individual freedoms to a foreigner. Also, 'Danish' is internationally associated with design and architecture. Danish design, as it is commonly referred, has been equated with an unique style, quality, and craftsmanship which represent just some of Denmark's industrial abilities to adapt to a global market by creating quality products based on the concept of niche-production.

During the Cold War, 'Denmark' and 'Danishness' became associated with yet another concept: free-wheeling, or more specifically known as 'Denmarkisation.' This was a negative notion – much like 'Finlandisation.' But instead of the biased neutrality of Finlandisation, the term of Denmarkisation referred to the idea of a small state free-wheeling inside NATO. Denmark, according to this notion, was free-wheeling militarily, politically, and economically within NATO at the expense of all the other members. Denmark enjoyed protection, but it did not want to participate fully in the common strategy and common defence. It is not the purpose of this presentation to assess if it is a fair description or not of Denmark during the Cold War. It is a fact, however, that the term 'Denmarkisation' for a while was included in the general strategic NATO discourse. Now Denmarkisation is history.

In many ways one can speak of a completely new Denmark, in a completely new regional and international setting. No longer is Denmark free-wheeling. Instead, Denmark has abandoned its parochial image and is attempting to enter in an activist way the international scene in some way acting as a great power by using its smallness as a vehicle. Nobody will accuse this small state of imperialism or megalomania.

A comparison with Norway illustrates this difference in Danish foreign policy. Norway is in many ways referring to the world situation before and after 1989–91 as more or less the same. It considers its common border with Russia as a military threat and it is trying to press the US to renew and even widen its military reinforcement commitment. In addition, Norway still continues to emphasise, more than any other NATO member, NATO's role as a paragraph five organisation (paragraph five of the NATO treaty commits each member to collective defence; an attack on one state is an attack on the whole alliance). Denmark is emphasising quite the opposite: Russia is considered a partner. Denmark is certainly not asking for reinforcements. It actively participates in operations which reinforce security. By this Denmark is emphasising the concept of a new NATO in conjunction with other multilateral security related organisations and concepts such as Partnership for Peace (PfP), European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Common Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the Russia-NATO Founding Act. One of the main goals of these organisations are, in the Danish understanding, to reduce the military differences between PfP countries and NATO countries.

2. A new world, a new NATO, a new Denmark

Denmark has recognised the political necessity that along with a new world order, a new foreign policy is required. As a front-line state during the bipolar East-West conflict, Denmark enjoyed a unique geostrategical position which gave it a certain freedom of action. This implied the Danish insistence on the Nordic region as a low tension area. During the Cold War Denmark was as we have seen in the position to free-wheel on defence matters. Now the situation is completely different: the unique position has vanished. As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the number of independent states in Europe has almost doubled. Now there are many more Denmark's-like units. Therefore, in order not to be a loser or to fall to the wayside in the new international game (which will be more peaceful despite harder competition between states), Denmark has chosen a new activist security and defence policy.

The policy has thus evolved from an adaptive to an offensive active policy. From a free-wheeling policy, the policy is now a "hard work" policy set in the new international and regional environments. From a security and defence policy influenced by conflicting domestic policies, we now see a general domestic consensus around more and

active international contribution. The policy has changed from footnotes (in NATO) to footfall.

In addition, military integration has changed. During the Cold War Denmark was pursuing NATO-integration vis-à-vis Germany in the NATO-Command Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). This policy has continued, but has intensified and broadened. Now the goal is full European military integration, in the long run aiming at a general interoperability among the armed forces of as many European states as possible. To obtain this goal, Denmark is using activities like PfP (including enhanced PfP or PfP-plus) or bilateral agreements which are in the spirit of PfP. The CJTF is the model concept (to be explained later) since it has already demonstrated its abilities for organisational competence in the NATO missions in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR).

All in all Danish defence policy has changed from Denmark as a consumer of security to Denmark as a producer of security. In effect, Denmark has left its position as an adaptive small state passive pursuing the long-term hope of strengthening international law and order. Through its military activism, Denmark has now been acknowledged by the US and the UN as playing in some way a "world-policy" role. Now as a producer of security, not least with military means, Denmark has acquired a solid position internationally in regards to its active policy in such organisations as NATO, UN, and OSCE (Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe).

3. Goals and missions

What is then the specific content of the Danish Defence policy? In the Danish Defence Law of 1993, the new goals of Danish defence are articulated as the following:

- to prevent conflicts and war,
- to maintain the sovereignty of Denmark and secure the continual existence and integrity,
- and to further a peaceful development in the World with respect for human rights.

These goals are clearly reflecting the new international system signalling more than ever before an extended security concept. Graphically it is demonstrated by the fact that the traditional goals for a country maintaining and enhancing existence are placed in the centre. On top these goals are framed by the global perspective to prevent conflicts and war. As the bottom they are framed by the individual perspective: human rights and peaceful development which will benefit the individual.

In practice, the objectives of Danish defence are directed towards three layers. They are: (1) the local environment or the 'near abroad,' (2) the common and collective defence, and (3) the international dimension. Thus, Danish defence translated into concrete missions, shall carried out the following:

a) prevention of conflict,

b) crisis management,

c) demonstration of solidarity by using reaction forces according to the strategy of the NATO alliance,

d) defence of Danish and neighbouring areas in cooperation with allied forces,

e) finally, the Danish defence shall be able to carry out missions on a mandate from UN or OSCE.

4. Five foreign policy projects

These goals and missions are fully in accordance with the general policy tendencies such as increasing international engagement, increasing militarisation of security policy, increasing general activism, and increasing military integration for stability.

But how to assess the military policy in the context of Danish foreign policy?

Since the Second World War, Denmark has framed five different and often conflicting foreign policy projects: the Universal, the Atlantic, the West-European, the All-European, and the Nordic.

5. The universal project

The Universal project (closely conducted to the principles of the United Nations) is generally the superior project which legitimises Danish military intervention and presence outside Denmark. It is in accordance with the NATO treaty which also refers to the UN Charter, namely article 51 concerning collective defence. Denmark has always supported and upheld the rights of the Security Council to take action (as stated in article 24) on behalf of all members in matters concerning international peace and security. In vain Denmark has supported the idea of activating the UN Military Committee which has never functioned. By setting up a Danish International Brigade (DIB), for use in UN and NATO operations, by

taking the initiative in establishing SHIRBRIG, by substantial participation in the UN mandated missions in the ex-Yugoslavia, Denmark has demonstrated a high universal, international profile.

SHIRBRIG is the multinational UN Stand By High Readiness Brigade, which is expected to be operational in 1999. The planning element is located in Denmark, headed by a Danish general. The idea is to provide the UN with a well-prepared coherent military instrument, able to be brought into action with very short notice. But Denmark has many strings to its bow. Danish defence is heavily engaged in military "systems export" by teaching how to set up regionally based military units to be deployed as UN peacekeepers. Denmark specialises in exporting this knowledge to around the world. Involved are countries from Southern Africa, Central Asia, Central/Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states (BALTAP). Furthermore, Denmark continues to spend – relatively for its size – substantial financial resources for stability projecting activities. The parliament is committed to this by earmarking one a half per cent of Denmark's gross national product (GNP) toward international projects, developing countries, natural catastrophe victims, and environmental projects.

6. The Atlantic project

The Atlantic project is no less important. Danish relations to the United States, bilaterally and multilaterally through NATO, have increased considerably after the Cold War. There are many reasons. First, Denmark is still the only European country to have possessions as part of the North American continent – Greenland. The US is still the only country which has the ability to defend Greenland. Second, NATO has grown in importance, not least due to the fact that NATO as a consequence of the new structure of the international system with the US as the only remaining superpower, is in the process of covering all Europe. This is taking place through NATO enlargement, EAPC, PfP, CJTF, and Russia-NATO council. Domestically the situation has changed. Now almost 80 percent of the population supports Danish membership in NATO compared to less than 50 percent during the Cold War.

The Greenland issue has also changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. Greenland was a strategic centre in the defence of the free world; now it is geopolitically marginalised and regionalised. The resulting open situation within the new regional and global environment has left Greenland more on its own.

For Denmark proper, defence relations with the only superpower are still improving. It is no great exaggeration to claim that a new axis in Euro-Atlantic relations has emerged: Washington to the Baltic Sea Area via Copenhagen. It was certainly no accident that President Clinton in 1997 chose to visit Copenhagen among the Nordic countries and officially declare Denmark as one of the US's best and closest allies and friends.

7. The Western-European project

Danish defence and the Western European project have not coincided very well together. While Denmark became a member of the EC in 1973, most Danes considered its membership mainly as an economic arrangement – not a political arrangement. Parliament and the general population were against a "European fortress" like organisation based on common security and defence (with the worst case scenario being common defence). The European Political Cooperation, which deals with a common European foreign policy on certain issue areas, was accepted by the Danes. But the overwhelming opinion of the country was against the idea of Western Europe cooperating militarily which could then be perceived as challenging American engagement in Europe. Therefore, Denmark never became a member of the WEU, but it did and does participate in meetings as an observer. It is because of this past that no one should be surprised of Danish reservations towards the revitalisation of the WEU in 1983–84.

After the Cold War, the whole picture has changed. The Maastricht treaty and the formulation of the ESDI (European Seurity and Defence Identity) concept gave rise to some visions of an independent European defence policy. In reality, however, despite the absence of a Soviet threat the current situation in Europe has demonstrated that the US is now more than ever a European power. This situation has been accepted by all parties on both sides of the Atlantic. The WEU is now primarily the European pillar of NATO with most of the missions foreseen as future humanitarian military operations. Although the WEU has decided to establish a military committee, its role will still be subordinated and low key while leaving NATO to lead. To Denmark this is the best situation since it has optedout on some of the more significant elements in the Maastrict Treaty, particularly in dealing with a common European defence. Therefore, Denmark will continue to support and strengthen its NATO commitment and Atlantic project.

8. The All-European project

In Danish defence policy, the all-European project – the notion that Europe shall appear as an undivided unity – plays a crucial role. Any partition, be it between the old East European iron curtain and the West European silver curtain, must be avoided. That is why Denmark strongly supports the one regional organisation covering the whole continent: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Established as the CSCE in 1973, it was originally based on a Soviet initiative. Now it is an important instrument in dealing with security related issues such as conflict prevention, establishing democratic institutions, safeguarding human rights and minority rights, and furthering general cooperation among countries.

At the outset, the OSCE was foreseen as a 'hard' security organisation, able to project security in Europe. This has as we have seen, been reflected in the Danish Defence Law of 1993, which states that Danish forces can be brought into action in peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations on the request from the OSCE. In another way, the OSCE is 'hard' because of its responsibility for disarmament and arms control within the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE-Treaty) framework. Denmark is an active participant in this treaty and a small amount of its military equipment has thus been destroyed under the auspices of CFE. Given the latest developments with Eastern enlargement, it points in the direction of NATO taking over European security with that OSCE becoming marginal and peripheral despite its remaining importance.

All in all, Europe in security terms is now dominated by NATO, not by the OSCE. All of Europe is about to be NATO'ized on different levels, including Russia. Just as the EU begins functioning as a magnet on Central and Eastern Europe, having a direct economical and political stabilising, organising and disciplining effect, the same holds true with NATO on the political-military level. To Danish defence this state of affairs is ideal. Denmark has no crucial choices imposed by the international system to make. In the present unipolar situation there are no security alternatives only one choice: to strengthen the Danish position comprehensively (within hard competition) to have the best and most developed security relations to the only superpower, the United States. This is the core of the present Danish defence policy. There are no credible alternative defence alliances or security organisations. Also, neutrality has lost its attraction. Neutral countries like Austria and Finland are now seriously considering a possible membership of NATO, not least as a consequence of NATO slowly changing into a new NATO: less emphasis on paragraph 5 and collective defence but more emphasis on stability through military integration cooperation.

9. The Nordic project

The fifth project is the Nordic project. This project during the Cold War was associated with relations of shared identity and culture. The Nordic countries represented in this understanding a certain democratic community and a certain way of life, often referred to as the Nordic model. After the failed negotiations concerning a Nordic Defence Union in 1948–49, defence and security policy were more or less a taboo within the inter-Nordic relations. The only exception was cooperation on UN peacekeeping operations.

After the end of the Cold War the state of things has transformed. Security and defence policy is back among the agenda of the Nordic states in a new way via the independence of the Baltic states and Poland. Now with the Nordic area enlarged to the Baltic Sea area, the traditional Nordic countries are beginning to compete for the dominant role of regional power. This, thus, implies a declining coherence between the Nordic states.

During the Cold War the Nordic area was referred to as "low tension area," as a nuclear weapons free zone and as the Nordic welfare state area implying a third way of life between socialism/communism and capitalism/liberalism. Now, all these references are gone.

On the defence domain there still is Nordic cooperation in the sphere of peacekeeping. But to Denmark this cooperation is part of a broader cooperation with its new partners: those serving with Danish forces in SFOR in Bosnia particularly the Polish-Nordic Brigade. In addition, Denmark has begun to cooperate very closely with the three Baltic countries, integrating platoons from each Baltic state within Danish units. Denmark has concluded specific partnership agreements with Poland and Germany as preparation for the establishment of a coming multinational NATO corps, consisting of the 12th Polish, the 14th German and the Danish division. It is expected to be operational as soon as Poland enters NATO in 1999. At the NATO defence minister meeting in December 1997, it was decided – as part of the reorganisation and reduction of the NATO command structure system – that BALTAP (Baltic Approaches) shall be altered to the Joint Subregional North-East Command, which will be part of the new Regional North-

Command. This is an indication of the transforming role of the Baltic Sea region: instead of a command for the Baltic approaches, NATO has now chosen a command for the Baltic Sea region proper.

The general circumstances in this area are now the following: Germany is united, Poland is becoming a member of NATO and the EU, the Baltic countries have got a perspective for NATO membership, and EU negotiations with Estonia aiming at membership which positively will influence the position of the two other Baltic countries has begun. Sweden and Finland are approaching NATO in a positive way. All countries around the Baltic Sea are engaged in PfP operations or activities, or in activities 'in the spirit of PfP.' This also includes Russia which with two separated military districts, the Leningrad district around St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad enclave, is an important Baltic Sea state. Denmark will in 1998 carry out a few bilateral military activities as part of in the spirit of PfP arrangements with Russia. Compared to the other countries in the region the number of activities – counting several hundreds – the Russia-related activities are fairly low. Nevertheless, Denmark is considering military relations to Russia as extremely important. Russia has to be a vital part of the European security architecture. But Russia also has to recognise that it is a middle range military power, that the Soviet Union dissolved itself, and that Russia in many ways is an anti-Soviet Union with vital interests in cooperation with Europe and the United States.

As is indicated, Denmark has crucial interests in the new region. Denmark is aiming at becoming the centre for the coordination of military operations in this domain. One way is to influence the development in the NATO command structure. The immediate objective is to have included in the new Subregional North-East command officers from the PfP countries at the HQ on a permanent basis, 'inside the fence,' but not participating in the long-term paragraph five related planning. Also, Denmark is pleading most convincingly for including in the subregional HQ the new organisational element in NATO, namely the CJTF (Command Joint Task Forces). The CJTF is best exemplified by the present NATO military operation (SFOR) in Bosnia and Hercegovina, although the operation is not labelled CJTF. It is called combined since it includes several countries, and also countries inside and outside the NATO proper, joint for the inclusion of two or more military branches (army, navy, airforce, and other services), and task force for its objective to resolve limited problems with a selected military manner.

Until now the leading NATO countries have been sceptical towards the Danish proposals of extending the tasks and structures of the subregional HQ. The general NATO opinion is that PfP and CJTF are to be restricted to regional commands since the subregional HQs' level is too low to manage PfP and CJTF-issues. The Danish argument is that the North-East command is important and necessary as a subregional HQ precisely because the Baltic Sea region – due to its size and geopolitical and strategic position – is a region on its own merits with specific needs and possibilities. Here Denmark still receives limited support from the United States. The specific role of the region to the US is demonstrated by the signing of the US-Baltic Charter in January of 1998 by the presidents of the US and the three Baltic countries.

10. The convergence of the five projects

What can we conclude regarding Danish defence policy and the five competing foreign policy projects? To begin, the 'new' regionalisation in the international system has influenced the behaviour of the involved countries. There are two ways to conceive of regionalisation. First, the 'natural' geographically determined regionalisation, where closeness and communication possibilities define the region and where the boundaries regarding geographical environment and "otherness" are more or less permanently and objectively stated. For the Baltic area the objective determinant could be the watershed, i.e. where the drainage to the Baltic Sea begins. Second, is the "regions-as-constructions". The defining element in this interpretation is the superior organisation of the world system combined with the actual political situation. The superior structure of the international system provides the framework in which the dominating countries, so to say, can construct regions. Regions, like countries can shift. Poland is an example of this since it has been characterised as a nation on wheels; where the national identity is not necessarily closely associated to a certain territory.

The conditions for regionalisation have mainly been set with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of unipolarity. The United States – the unipole – now considers Europe as a super-region which is to be stabilised through military integration, primarily using NATO as the chief instrument. On the political and economical levels, the US supports integration through the European Union. Never before has the US to such a degree pushed Europe towards integration. Deputy

Secretary of State Strobe Talbot comments, "We encourage our friends and allies in Europe to embrace the broadest, most expansive, most outward-looking, most inclusive possible version of integration....The US encourages the European Union building bridges....The watchword of our era is integration" (May 6, 1997). Furthermore, the US now seems to be contemplating Europe not divided along the old Iron Curtain and north-south axis, but as appearing as a coherent region with three sub-regional inclinations: the Mediterranean area, the Baltic Sea area (Northern Europe), and in between Central Europe, from France to Russia vis-à-vis Germany and Poland.

Thus, this regionalisation has greatly impacted Denmark's situation, especially its defence policy. The bonds to the United States have been strengthened and Denmark is pursuing a policy of militarily activism.

This new security environment has generally affected all five of the competing projects, which are now fully integrated within one another. They have been therefore reduced to two main dimensions: the global and the regional. The global dimension is the universal project, now incorporating the revitalised international society concept in addition to taking care of extended 'soft' security as well as 'hard' security. Denmark's future international military engagements shall still only commence if sanctioned by the UN Security Council. A step in the direction of more emphasis on the US perception of the international society concept than on the actual position of the security council was tabled in Febuary 1998 where Denmark gave diplomatic and military support to the planned strike against Iraq. And as another extension of Danish defence, export of defense organisational concepts and systems (in the peacekeeping area) and support for military cooperation/ integration will continue. In the new World Order, with a working international society moving ever more closely toward globalisation and internationalisation, it will remain necessary even for a small state to contribute to the development of a peaceful regional and global environment. With the international intervention in ex-Yugoslavia, Denmark has realised the necessity of a close global and regional interrelationship.

Besides the global project, the Atlantic, West European, All-European, and Nordic projects have now more or less converged into one coherent dimension: a European dimension, with the United States the most important partner, which is directly involved in the European military integration through NATO and indirectly through increased push toward a wider political/economic integration of

Europe. An important part of this dimension is sub-regionalisation, which for Denmark is the Baltic Sea region. The Nordic project has dissolved and has thus been replaced with a new project which encompasses a broader region as part of a united Europe. To Denmark this means that its former free-wheeling policy and exploitation of its front-line position is definitely over. Denmark must now work hard – including using military means in unconventional way – in order to preserve its central position inside the regional (Baltic Sea area) and global dimensions.

11. The new dimensions and Danish defence

We have now identified the two new connected foreign policy dimensions: the international and the Euro-Atlantic dimensions. They have immediate influence upon Danish defence. Already we have analysed the international dimension, so regionally the actual official Danish defence priorities are the following:

1. Contribution to develop democratically controlled defence organisations in Central and East European countries;
2. Integration of Poland and the Baltic countries in Western defence structures;
3. Cooperation with Russia.

Official formulations like these are denoting the changing character of the purpose and mission of Danish defence. The fundamental aim remains, however, still the ability to fight. This is the vital rationale for having armed forces. The ability to go to war will thus be maintained – qualitatively and quantitatively – through intensive training. In 1996, the Danish armed forces stood at 155 800 personal: 60 000 army, 9500 navy, 18 300 air force, and 68 000 belonging to the homeguard. In addition, this force has the aim of establishing political stability within the regional environment. Through joint activities, meetings, seminars, and exercises, the Danish armed forces contribute to the transformation of the military establishments in the newly independent former Soviet dominated states into democratic, transparent, and open political systems. The main vehicle for this cooperation is no longer disarmament and arms control, but the new partnership-relation itself. The aim is the removal of secrecy, openness, and integration on all levels.

Military integration is crucial to European security. Without the attempts to establish military integration, the prospects for Europe's future are alarming. Imagine the new independent Central and East

European states establishing or re-establishing armed forces and defence organisations based on nationalistic, chauvinistic, and isolationistic concepts and ideas. A development like this would imply perceptions of mutual threat. The result would then be what is called a 'security dilemma.' Briefly, the security dilemma denotes the situation in which a country, by improving its military forces, will obtain an immediate increased security. This improved security will, however, not offset the insecurity which will emerge due to possible reactions implying rearmament at the nearby countries.

It is not difficult to argue that the actual situation in Europe in many ways is primed for conflict, even war. The atrocity scenario is the former Yugoslavia situation, but spread throughout Europe with hyper-nationalism challenging the existing national borders. The borders in Europe are only in few cases officially contested. Historically, however, there are deep wounds due to the establishment of entirely new borderlines after the two world wars. Also, with tide of change washing over Europe following the end of the Cold War, the fire of nationalism has re-emerged. In this context, Russia is one of the "wild cards," since there still exists strong extremist nationalistic forces in the Duma; part of these forces are claiming the re-establishment of the Soviet Union.

There are, however, serious reasons to argue that this will not happen. Basically, it is the objective interests of Russia to cooperate in the closest manner possible with Western Europe and the US. The US in particular has displayed a vital interest in maintaining stability in Europe demonstrated by its extremely visible presence of over 100 000 US soldiers still stationed in Europe. Under the auspices of American superpower overlay, now covering all of Europe, salient processes are taking place with military integration and cooperation to the degree as never before. The means of integration are joint exercises, command structures, common peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations, mutual visits, seminars, education and training. The processes are transnational and, hence, break down borderlines. As a result, this could be characterised as the most comprehensive set of activities aimed at promoting peace in Europe. Denmark is attempting to play a crucial role in these activities.

12. NATO

The most prominent instrument to achieve this development is NATO. With the end of the Cold War, the most crucial question now

facing this organisation is: will it endure? Since much of European security is relying on the United States, the answer lies on the future position of the United States as a superpower and its level of commitment toward Europe. How the trend of events evolve will severely influence Danish defence policy. Three factors must be assessed: 1) The Future of NATO, 2) The relationship between US and its European allies, 3) The extended notion of security.

Danish defence is probably now more dependent of NATO than ever before. To Denmark, therefore, the question of NATO's future is extremely sensitive. What are then the threats to NATO's existence?

First, among the most serious threats is the lack of a threat toward NATO. The main argument here is that the rationale behind NATO, the Soviet threat, no longer exists. So why should NATO survive? NATO during the Cold War and today has, however, always had other functions than just a common defence against the USSR. Its internal alliance functions have been just as important. Military integration as an intricate function of NATO has been key in solving not only the German problem (Germany as the old World War II enemy), but now the problem of incorporating Central and East European countries into the European military structure (the former Cold War enemies). To Denmark, military integration policy is a cornerstone of the defence policy.

Second, the increasing internationalisation and globalisation of soft and hard security can be seen as a threat to a geographically limited NATO. But other processes are at play. Regionalisation is now, as demonstrated above, playing a more important role in European politics. NATO is – according to Danish policy priorities – in the best way living up to the expectations of a regional alliance.

Third, the WEU and the visions of a fully independent common European defence, could be a serious threat to NATO. The present state of affairs seems, however, not to leave the WEU much space and freedom of action in the arena of defence policy in Europe. To Denmark, a pronounced increase in weight, importance, and independence attached to the WEU – a development which seems rather unlikely – could create problems to the Atlantic link which Denmark believes is most vital for European security.

Forth, the re-nationalisation of defence and defence policies of member states, and the imminent members to come, poses a serious threat to NATO. The aim of NATO is exactly to avoid nationalisation of the military forces and organisations. But tendencies to re-nationalise have emerged. In general, however, the military integration

process is moving forward, not least as a consequence of the enlargement on all the different levels. Danish defence policy is supporting almost any form of military integration under NATO auspices.

Fifth, the enlargement of NATO as such could be a threat to its very survival in the long run. The claim is that an intergovernmental, consensus-based organisation will be weakened and watered down with an increasing number of new members. NATO will then lose its coherence and sense of community. While one cannot deny this impact, one must take into account the fact that "widening" (more members) and "deepening" (more integration) can take place simultaneously. It all depends on the strength of the superior regional and international structure. As long as the US continues to be a strong leader of NATO, widening and deepening can succeed. To Denmark, enlargement is a logical consequence since it corresponds to the primary functions of NATO.

Sixth, the new NATO-Russian Founding Act, which establishes a common Russian-NATO council, could be considered a threat to NATO. The argument stands – with Henry Kissinger as one of the more vocal proponents to the idea – that Russia as a consequence of the new organisational structure has gained too much say and influence upon NATO decisions already. Nevertheless, as the situation looks now, nothing seems to indicate any dangerous influence from Russia; therefore, the agreement should be interpreted as an indication of benign Russian incentives to cope with its new position as a regional power, aiming at a future of cooperation with the rest of Europe and the US. To Denmark it is vital to have Russian cooperation, especially within a defence structure under NATO auspices.

Seventh, the possible decline of American capabilities and, thus, the disappearance of its position as the sole superpower must be considered a crucial development. This threat is probably the only real threat towards NATO. Since much of European security is dependent on the US, it is difficult to imagine a Europe without the engagement of the US, as the undisputed leader of NATO. So therefore, the whole construction of European security – based upon a strong NATO taking care of the military-political order and upon a European Union taking care of the economic-political order – is significantly dependent on the maintenance of the United States as the only and the superior superpower. However, nothing is pointing in the direction of a marked decline of US relative capabilities. If this assessment holds we will have the best of all worlds for Danish defence policy.

What then can we conclude? If unipolarity remains robust and lasts for a considerable span of time, NATO will continue to be an important and significant organisation. NATO will, therefore in my interpretation, develop into a softer, looser, and wider organisation, but still focused on its original purpose – collective defence with whatever means necessary. To be more specific, NATO will be softer because there will most likely be less, if any, paragraph five missions. NATO will focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement operations. It will become looser in that NATO will place a greater emphasis on the notion of "coalition of the willing": a concept entirely in accordance with the new CJTF-idea. And wider due to the already ongoing development within NATO to enlargement with new members and incorporate PfP-arrangements. But most important, NATO will remain "hard" in concert with the fact that NATO is not primarily a political but a military alliance, with little shifting in the foreseeable future. NATO's primary means will remain the use of military forces, military operations, integration of military organisations, and cooperation between military units.

13. The US-Europe relations

The relations between the US and its European allies are still determined by the fact that the US is the undisputed leader of the alliance. Even France, which earlier attempted to position itself as a future alternative leader of Europe's defence, has now recognised – irrespective of vast differences – that US military presence is still a vital prerequisite for European security. The US is a main contributor to European defence, but the burdens have to be shared by all. Therefore, the whole burdensharing problem – most controversial during the Cold War – remains vital. To Denmark, which during the Cold War was mostly considered in constant deficit on the burdensharing account, the situation has changed considerably. Denmark is now recognised as among the countries contributing most to the alliance. But still, the United States is the undisputed front runner on all areas such as defence expenditures, as percentage of GDP, almost four percent while the European average is less than two percent. Yet, burdensharing has a broader scope. Denmark has several times emphasised the fact that the EU per year is supporting Central and East European countries with $7 billion while the US-contribution is only $1 billion.

The coming general debate concerning the future of NATO will be no less problematic. Probably the US in the long run will perceive NATO as a central part of its global strategy. This could be the American point of departure for the game of burdensharing. Such an argument could be based upon the idea that since the US is taking care of European defence and security, Europe should therefore assist with managing global security. As a result, NATO must develop into a global organisation. To Denmark such an idea would be problematic despite its commitment to NATO. In fact, there is limited will in Denmark to support US-led intervention operations worldwide. The advantage and virtues of NATO, seen from a Danish point of view, is that NATO commits US to Europe. However, the NATO countries are not committed to a US-global strategy. For Denmark, only under conditions, such as if the assignment comes from the United Nations, will she be willing to support the US, for example, the Gulf war where the Danish naval ship Olfert Fischer participated – the first spectacular sign of Danish military activism.

There are, however, as already mentioned, indications of a more positive position towards the general US world order perception. In February 1998, Denmark, in a spectacular way placed itself as frontrunner in supporting the US in its preparations in attacking Iraq although the legal UN-status for the operation was disputed.

14. Defence and security concepts

The third problem is the security concept. Official Danish security policy after the Cold War focuses on a partly new security concept: the extended (or soft) security. Already, soft security factors were on the international agenda during the rather short period of détente during the early and mid-70s. Generally, however, the politisation of the hard security was the focus during the Cold War: military power, arms race, introduction of new weapons, arms-control, and disarmament proposals were the assets in the hard political struggle between East and West.

As the Cold War ended the situation changed completely. Soft security subordinated during most of the Cold War, became politicised with the disappearance of direct East-West military threats. Individual, societal, and global threats began to appear on the agenda such as international crime, environmental pollution, violations of human rights, refugees, famine, economic underdevelopment, lack of natural resources, catastrophes, and conflicts between producer and consumer. But at the same time nationalism, which has been suppressed by the overlay of the two Cold War superpowers, flamed up with the end of the Cold War; military aggression has risen and subregional and civil wars have broken out. Hard security needs have certainly not disappeared as the shape of conflict has changed; no longer do global military threats exist. Instead, small low intensity but bloody and brutal wars are threatening. Danish defence has accommodated to this new state of affairs.

Although it is official Danish policy that security, especially during the Cold War, is indivisible, one may claim the opposite: in the post Cold War era security has become divisible. No longer is international security imbedded amidst an East-West conflict, where the smallest attempt to use armed force had the potential to directly challenge destiny, and no longer are proxy wars tolerated as part of the East-West power game. Today security is divisible, resulting that limited but brutal wars can take place in the Balkans and in the Caucasus without any direct consequences for European security. Rather islands of conflict or strategic ghettos are now possible. This fact is crucial to the extremely high stability of European security, which acknowledges the reality that the centre for military-political security is Washington, while Brussels is the centre of economic-political stability in Europe. Denmark has recognised this, despite the continuing official use of the concept of the indivisibility of security. It is mostly used as a mantra to emphasise one of the main objectives of the Danish defence policy: with military means—soft as well as hard – to maintain and advance the stability in the Baltic Sea area. This includes military cooperation, military integration, democratisation, political transparency, and mutual trust through common activities.

15. Perspectives and conclusions

Danish defence policy has changed dramatically. Conditions and circumstances are new. The policy is activist and militaristic, taking into account the transformation of the superior organisation of the world from bipolarity to unipolarity. The United States is now the sole superpower. There is no combined balancing of the unipole. With this change, the tendency is for the aspiring superpowers – China, Russia, Japan, the European Union – to flock around the US rather than to balance the US or each other, if crucial questions concerning international peace and security are at play. In essence, this creates

a whole new set of conditions for the new world order: competition to be perhaps the US's closest ally. In this prognosis, there are no prospects for freewheeling. The world and Europe are then regionalised more according to American preferences than to European.

Here we see the explanation of the new Danish defence policy. During the Cold War, Denmark was restricted in its actions, but also protected due to the East-West conflict. Denmark had an exceptional position, except this is not the case anymore. Now all European states, especially the smaller ones like Denmark, must fight for the best possible position in today's international affairs in order to have some influence. To do this, Denmark is using its defence policy to obtain a better position, unlike it did during the Cold War. Now with unipolarity, Denmark's military forces have been wider political roles. Defence activities are directly providing stability in Europe through activities such as joint training. The purpose is no longer to maintain a delicate balance of terror, but on the one hand to establish stability in Europe through economic-political integration via the European Union, and on the other to reduce general chaos, local civil wars, and threatening uprisings through NATO, i.e. military integration. Such being done on three levels: first, on the superior level through the deterrent functions of an effective, coherent, and well equipped military alliance; second, on the practical level through limited and direct military operations; and third, on the organisational level to establish military integration founded on military alliance policy, partnership, and cooperative security among all countries of Europe.

Denmark has during the new world order moved towards ever closer cooperation and enhanced relations to the United States. Has Denmark placed itself as a satellite of the USA or as an American client state? Certainly not. Denmark has not reduced its freedom of action. But it has recognised that for now and in a foreseeable future, the US will be the only state, which through NATO, is able to guarantee the security of Denmark and Europe. Thus, it is very much the same situation as during the Cold War with the important exception that during the Cold War, only half of Europe was under such a guarantee. In an attempt to reduce the consequences of this partition of Europe during the Cold War, Denmark pursued a non-provocative policy towards the old potential enemy, the Soviet Union. Now Denmark can concentrate on improving it relations with the US and on the US-initiated and supported European Union, which is in essence maintaining the extremely important political and economical order in Europe.

Using catchwords in a schematic form, the situation determining Danish defence policy and the policy itself can be characterised in the following way:

COLD WAR	**AFTER THE COLD WAR**
General factors	
BIPOLARITY	UNIPOLARITY
SECURITY BASED ON BALANCE-OF-POWER	COOPERATIVE SECURITY
GLOBAL EAST-WEST CONFLICT	REGIONALISATION
CONCRETE THREAT	THREAT IS INSTABILITY AND CHAOS
CLOSED, NARROW SECURITY	OPEN, EXTENDED SECURITY
HARD SECURITY ON THE AGENDA	HARD SECURITY BECOMES SOFT
	SOFT SECURITY BECOMES HARD
GENERAL DETERRENCE	CONCRETE MILITARY ACTION
POLICY, NOT ACTION	
UNDIVIDED SECURITY	DIVIDED SECURITY
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE	COOPERATIVE DEFENCE
Specific factors and position/placement	
EXPOSED FRONT-LINE STATE	SECURE CENTRE STATE
"NORDEN" AS LOW TENSION AREA	THE BALTIC SEA AREA AS THE NEW REGION
SMALL STATE	"GREAT POWER"
CONSUMER OF SECURITY	PRODUCER OF SECURITY
THE BAD BOY IN THE NATO CLASS	BEST BOY IN THE NATO CLASS
Policy	
FREE-WHEELING	HARD WORK
ADAPTATION	ACTIVISM
DOMESTIC POLICY	INTERNATIONALISM
FOOTNOTES	FOOTFALL
MAINTAIN GLOBAL VALUES	PROMOTE GLOBAL VALUES
THE MILITARY NONPOLITICISED	MILITARISATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY

With this new defence policy one could from a political point of view ask for the need of a closer look at the background and for the further development, possibilities, and restraints of such a policy. Is it appropriate and necessary to reconsider the actual organisation, personal levels, and equipment – the purpose and missions of Danish defence in times of change? Which weapon systems, what training and education is necessary to meet the requirements of the new circumstances and conditions of new world order? The Danish Defence Commission of 1997 is attempting to answering just those fundamental questions in its analysis by presenting its suggestions for the future of Danish defence and Danish defence policy.

The commission is faced with some tough decisions. Serious considerations and analyses have to constitute the point of departure for these decisions. Some of the main issues yet to be resolved include: How will NATO develop? How is Denmark's future military role in the new Baltic Sea region to be analysed in the context of a stronger Germany and Poland, self-assured Baltic states, and ever present Russia looming about in the neighbourhood. And most important, how will the military cooperation, integration, and command structures evolve?

The future will always be insecure. With more individual freedom, economically as well as politically, this positive insecurity will increase. But, if the present international system will remains robust, the international, regional and national security will remain better than ever.

Denmark has set out on a defence policy journey based on activism and internationalisation. It is in full accordance with the present international system. The system may change; therefore, a defence policy has to keep the door open for worst cases.

FINNISH SECURITY POLICY AND BALTIC SECURITY IN THE LATE 1990'S

Pekka Sivonen

Introduction

The overall development of the Baltic security situation has been positive in recent years. The prevailing realities in the post-Cold War era are the end of bipolarity and ideological rivalry and an emphasis on economic and political cooperation. The West has argued the outdatedness of the concept of geopolitical spheres of interest.

As was expected, at the Madrid Summit the Baltic states were not invited to start accession talks in order to join NATO on the first wave of enlargement. However, NATO reaffirmed at the summit that it remains open to new members.

Russia is given no measure of veto power over NATO decisions. At the same time, however, NATO points out that further enlargement has to serve the political and strategic interests of the Alliance and enhance European security and stability. Being willing to join NATO, the Baltic states should ask themselves how they could reassure the Alliance on both these counts.

Finland accentuates in the Baltic context such factors as the policy of stabilization, military defence capabilities, enlargement of the European Union, the right of the countries in the region to choose their own security arrangements, and cooperative security arrangements. The Baltic states should develop a territorial defence capability in order to raise the deterrence threshold against attack, as well as increase their ability to meet hostile pressure in a prolonged international crisis.

The overall context

The current European situation provides significant possibilities to increase security by cooperative means within the already existing structures. The interdependence of security is characteristic of post-

Cold War Europe, despite the tensions between Russia and NATO regarding the role and future of the Alliance. Both Russia and the West has emphasized the importance of mutual understanding and open negotiations in their dealings with each other.

In spite of political tensions and friction in this relationship, no real animosity exists. Under the present regime, Russia has committed itself to the principles of a market economy, democracy and the rule of law, and even if the end result of all this is uncertain, this commitment has to be taken seriously. Russia has a long way to go, but its present relations with the allied West can be described as nothing less than a kind of "strategic partnership." This means that Russia and the West are jointly involved in shaping the security realities of the post-Cold War world, and for that purpose are negotiating, making agreements, and cooperating in international fora. The network of political, economic and societal ties between Russia and the West is becoming ever more complex..

All these considerations must be borne in mind, as we seek to define Finnish security policy and Baltic security in a larger context. In spite of all risks and unpredictabilities, the overall direction of development has been positive. Even the circumstances of NATO enlargement seem to prove this: we are witnessing a Russian *de facto* acquiescence in this development, even if this does not yet extend as far as to the Baltic states. Tensions have emerged and new ones will inevitably emerge, but they should not be exaggerated.

The architecture of European security has been developing in a complex way since the end of the Cold War. The dominant mood at the beginning of 1990s was certainly too optimistic. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the violence which has since erupted there were not widely anticipated. Nor was it commonly foreseen that Russia would soon give up her initial pro-Western foreign policy and adopt the policy she follows at the moment: emphasis on geopolitics, traditionally perceived power interests, and an anti-NATO stance presented with a high profile.

At the time, however, these developments were certainly predicted by many strategic analysts. After all, the whole direction of European security development has in recent years followed the basic tenets of mainstream strategic thinking. War in Bosnia had to be terminated by the use of military force, Russia reverted soon to her traditional geopolitical and power-oriented traditions, and NATO adopted the role of the most important reorganizer of European security architecture. By nature, these are power-political realities.

We should nevertheless beware of overemphasizing the power-political aspects of the all-European setting. In fact, NATO and the West in general are downplaying power politics, and NATO asserts that its enlargement is not power-politically motivated. In the final count, more important are the specific characteristics which constitute the prevailing realities in the post-Cold War era. These can, as already said, be described as the end of bipolarity and ideological rivalry, the outdatedness of the concept of geopolitical spheres of interest, and an emphasis on broadened economic and political cooperation. European integration is a very strong force, influencing heavily the current agenda and the future of Europe.

There exists a network of organizational arrangements and established practices which are building up an ever more favourable security cooperation structure in all-European, NATO-Russian and EU contexts. On the all-European level, there is the growing role of the OSCE. On the Nato-Russian level, there are the arrangements and practices established in the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed on 27 May 1997 in Paris.[1] In the EU context, there are the ever-improving economic and political relations between the European Union and its cooperation partners in the East, including Russia.

And, of course, NATO and the EU are also very actively engaged in cooperation arrangements on larger, virtually all-European fields. For NATO, the main activities are the whole Partnership for Peace development process and the SFOR operation in Bosnia, whereas the EU is investing much energy into the activity of cooperation with its partners in the East.

As a member of the European Union and as an active collaborating partner with NATO, Finland plays a new role in international security cooperation. Finland is no longer a neutral state, but defines her basic security policy orientation as military non-alignment and independent defence. Finland is an active participant in the efforts to formulate a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the European Union.

The Founding Act between NATO and Russia

Security cooperation between countries and organizations in the Baltic Sea region, as well as in Europe in general, should be strengthened. The agreement between Russia and NATO on the principles of their mutual relationship and on practical cooperation arrangements, is titled the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations,

Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation."[2] This pact constitutes a positive contribution to political and military stability in the Baltic area.

The document is first and foremost a political declaration, in which Russia is given no measure of veto power over NATO decisions. This is crucially important as far as the future of the Baltic Sea region is concerned. Russia has made it clear that she would like to prevent the entry of the three Baltic states, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, into NATO. NATO, however, has steadfastly refused to give such a veto power to Russia, and this is in fact restated both in the Madrid Declaration and in the NATO-Russian Founding Act.

The preservation of this freedom of action is important for the overall security of the Baltic Sea region. Any self-imposed limitations on the freedom of NATO to act would create a potentially dangerous imbalance in the region, an imbalance in political will and commitment. As a result, Russia would *de facto* count the Baltic states as belonging to her sphere of interest. For Russia, this seems to be a zero-sum game; any NATO retreat would be taken as a sign of weakness and utilized as an opportunity for Russia to advance.

In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia reconfirm their commitment to democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the development of free market economies. They further pledge, among other things, to refrain from the use of force against each other or other states, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of all states and the inviolability of borders, to settle disputes by peaceful means and to support (on a case-by-case basis) peacekeeping operations carried out under UN Security Council auspices. Furthermore, NATO and Russia have established the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. This is intended as "a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, (...) where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern."

In the Founding Act it is specifically stated that neither the Council nor anything in the Act will "provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action." In other words, NATO does not give up anything of its freedom to decide by itself whether and when the Baltic states are to enter NATO.

The comments of US officials have been very clear on this. Jeremy Rosner, the Special Assistant to the President for NATO Enlargement, has stated that the Founding Act does not imply any limitations on NATO's military policy from the outside. Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor to the President, has stated that in the Founding Act and "in all our discussions with the Russians" the United States has made it very clear that no nation is or should be excluded from potential membership in NATO if they meet the criteria and apply for membership.[3]

The Madrid Declaration of NATO

As already mentioned, at the Madrid Summit 8–9 July 1997 the Baltic states were not invited to start accession talks in order to join the Alliance on the first wave of NATO enlargement. However, NATO reaffirmed at the summit that it remains open to new members. Aspiring nations must be willing and able to assume the full responsibilities and obligations of membership, as defined in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. NATO would also have to determine whether the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and, in addition, enhance overall European security and stability.[4]

On the same occasion, NATO reaffirmed that the geographical location of countries willing to join is not a decisive issue if the other criteria have been met. Furthermore, after mentioning by name Romania and Slovenia as possible new members after the first wave of enlargement, the document recognizes the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring to membership. The Baltic states are implied here, without mentioning them.

In spite of these encouraging words for the Baltic states' aspirations, there is no timetable for NATO enlargement after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic having, as expected, achieved membership in 1999. Neither is it to be expected that such a timetable for a second wave would be decided upon in the near future. NATO must first gain experience from the accession of the first three new members, in order to redefine if necessary the requirements the second wave countries will have to meet.

NATO seems to be clearly willing to keep the door open. The possibility of a Russian veto is denied. At the same time, however, NATO points out that further enlargement has to serve the political and strategic interests of the Alliance and enhance European security and stability.[5] Obviously, the Baltic states have some reassuring to do in order to convince NATO on this.

What could this mean? The second part of the requirement, to "enhance European security and stability," is a self-evident requirement formulated on a general level. But what about the first requirement, to "serve the political and strategic interests of the Alliance"?

This has a more concrete analytic meaning. If NATO were to rely solely on the requirement that enlargement should enhance European security and stability, further enlargement would in fact require Russian consent for the simple reason that the Russian reaction to any further enlargement of NATO will have a great influence on European stability. This is where "the political and strategic interests of the Alliance" enter into the picture.

This formulation emphasizes the freedom of NATO to decide this issue on the basis of *its own* interests, and in this way balances the emphasis placed on the general consideration of European security and stability. Being willing to join NATO, the Baltic states should ask themselves how they could reassure the Alliance on both these counts.

The starting point is NATO's desire to underline how much its own rationale and functions have changed since the Cold War. NATO does not perceive Russia as an enemy but seeks a mutually beneficial and constructive relationship with her. NATO stresses its increasing role in the new all-European security architecture, including its crisis management tasks and its development into a more political (more than military) alliance.

The overall situation high-lights the importance of an enhanced Partnership for Peace programme for the Baltic states in the years ahead. A stronger, more operational partnership will evolve in step with the transformation of the Alliance itself.[6]

The enhanced PfP programme, together with the new European-Atlantic Partnership Council,[7] can contribute in important ways to regional security in the Baltic Sea region. The Nordic and Baltic states have common interests in helping to make these cooperation institutions successful. These countries also support other cooperative structures in Europe.

Finnish objectives in the Baltic Sea region

The following comprises an account of Finnish security policy objectives in the Baltic Sea region as I see them, especially as far as the three Baltic states are concerned.

Finland asserts the right of all countries in the Baltic Sea region to choose their own security arrangements, military alignment

included. This applies equally to the Baltic states. The mutually recognized right to choose security arrangements is characteristic of normal and stable relations between nations. In the long term, this right can, accordingly, be expected contribute to stability and deepening cooperation in the region.[8]

Finland underscores the importance of common responsibility in building international security. Security must be built on a foundation of both collective and national arrangements. As stated in the security and defence policy White Paper which the Finnish Government presented to Parliament on 17 March 1997, Finland supports the strengthening of stability and security in Northern Europe as prerequisite to the establishment of a common security system in Europe. "The channels through which Finland works are the OSCE, the EU in general, the cooperative arrangements with Sweden and the other Nordic countries and the developing relations between the Baltic states, regional cooperation fora, the cooperative framework with Russia, and the dialogue and cooperation with NATO and the United States. Finland's objectives are to intensify regional cooperation, increase the significance of the EU's northern dimension and manage the consequences of NATO enlargement in a manner that strengthens regional stability in Northern Europe."[9]

Through a policy of participation, Finland seeks to ensure that NATO enlargement will not lead to the emergence of dividing lines or spheres of interest that would diminish stability in Northern Europe.

The conventional military power of Russia has declined rapidly during the present decade. The separation of the Pskov region from the northern flank in the recently amended CFE treaty regulations, which allows Russia to deploy more equipment in the immediate vicinity of Estonia, does not alter the overall picture. Russia's capacity to carry out large-scale offensive operations has dramatically declined. Her Baltic Fleet is based in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and in Kaliningrad, which means that, in comparison with the Soviet era, Russia's naval defence has become much more coastal in character. These have been remarkable developments in the military realities of the Baltic Sea region.

The political threshold which Russia would have to cross to-day in deciding to actually attack the Baltic states is of course also very high. Russia would have to pay a heavy price for such a move, and she knows it.

There is nonetheless a great deal Russia could do to harm the three Baltic states without actually attacking them militarily, if ten-

sions in this relationship were to increase to the level of intense hostility and acute crisis. Political, economic and military pressure could be exerted in various ways.

The preservation of the Baltic states' independence and security is essential for stability and security in the region. These states should develop a territorial defence capability to raise the deterrence threshold against attack. This is of utmost importance, and fortunately the overall development is positive in this regard.

Finland has supported the development of the Estonian defence forces, although without actually exporting weapons to Estonia. The Finnish National Defence College has trained Estonian officers, and the National Defence Institute has trained Estonian NCOs. Since 1992 altogether more than 100 Estonian officers and NCOs have been trained in Finland. This cooperation continues, and Finland will also continue to support the development of the Baltic states' capabilities in the area of peacekeeping and crisis management.

The Finnish President and Prime Minister have again and again in their public appearances stressed that the security interests of the three Baltic states should be taken into consideration as NATO decides upon its own development.

It is also important for the Baltic states to be able to increase their ability to meet hostile pressure in a prolonged international crisis. By this I mean such political, economic and even military pressure which does not transform into actual military hostilities.

Preparedness for this requires not only actual military capabilities but also several other assets: the capability of the state, of society, and of the national economy to endure a prolonged crisis should be reinforced; the web of political, economic and societal connections with the other Western countries should be denser; the awareness of the international security of the Baltic situation, and loyalty to the Baltic cause, should be strengthened. Needless to say, membership in the European Union is a crucial objective for the Baltic states in this context.

As stated in the Finnish security and defence policy White Book, "the basic factors in Finnish security policy are: military nonalliance, an independent defence force, and membership of the European Union."[10] It is notable that membership in the EU is mentioned among these factors. Membership has increased Finland's opportunities to influence matters relating to her own interest, and has also broadened Finnish responsibilities for the Union's stability policy. It helps Finland to work for the strengthening of security in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region.

The European Union should take more interest in its northern dimension and adopt a more central role in the Baltic area. Finland supports the enlargement of the Union, and considers it important that the Baltic states will eventually acquire to membership. This would increase stability and security, forming an essential part of the future of the Baltic Sea region.[11]

It now seems clear that, of the three Baltic states, only Estonia would qualify for the next phase of EU enlargement. To my understanding, if this is what the European Union decides, Latvia and Lithuania will not be any the worse off. It is better that one Baltic State has the possibility to be a member in the next phase than that none should gain access.

Of course, Russia has to be an important partner in most kinds of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The relations between Russia and the Baltic states should be developed in accordance with the principles and obligations of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Finland, together with the other Nordic countries and the whole European Union, supports such a process. The resolution on open issues and disputes between Russia and the Baltic states will eventually contribute to the overall stability in the region. Russia has a crucial role in the OSCE, is a member of the Council of Europe, and has recently agreed upon cooperation principles and arrangements with NATO.[12]

However, local tensions between Russia and the Baltic states remain. For example, the border agreement between Estonia and Russia is, to my understanding, ready to be signed. However, the situation as I am writing this in October 1997 is that Russia has declined to do so.

Altogether, Finland emphasizes in the Baltic context the policy of stabilization, military defence capabilities, enlargement of the European Union, the right of the countries in the region to choose their own security arrangements, and constant improvement of cooperative security arrangements. There should be no more room for dividing lines or grey zones as far as security conditions in the region are concerned. And, since it is important for Russia to be able to play a central role in the relevant security cooperation arrangements and practices, she should not be allowed to isolate herself.

Notes

1. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," *NATO Review*, (July/Aug. 1997).

2. See "Founding Act...," note 1.
3. Cit. Mendelsohn, J., "The NATO-Russian Founding Act," *Arms Control Today*, (May 1997).
4. "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," *NATO Review*, (July/Aug. 1997).
5. See "Madrid Declaration...," note 4, p. 1.
6. Balanzino, S., "Deepening Partnership: The Key to Long-Term Stability in Europe," *NATO Review*, (July/Aug. 1997).
7. "The Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," *NATO Review*, (July/Aug. 1997).
8. *The European Security Development and Finnish Defense*, Report by the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March 1997 (Edita: Helsinki, 1997), p. 35.
9. See *The European Security...* (note 8), p. 36.
10. See *The European Security...* (note 8), p. 47.
11. See *The European Security...* (note 8), pp. 48–49.
12. See *The European Security...* (note 8), p. 35.

SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION: GERMANY AS A TRANSATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN ACTOR

Axel Krohn

I. Introduction

For decades, Germany's policy towards the Baltic Sea region could have been described rather as "non-policy." A special German Nordic or Baltic Sea region policy still does not exist. However, the political changes in Europe have had their impact on German politics and are bringing the region more into the focus of Bonn. Germany gets more involved in the Baltic Sea region and is increasing its military security cooperation with the countries in the region. Despite this growing engagement, Germany is still avoiding any action that might fuel the impression that she intends to take a leading role on "Baltic issues."

After the East-West confrontation came to an end, and the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic became an unexpected reality, Germany's security interests are basically directed towards two overriding foreign and security policy goals: first, to embed the unified Germany into the European order by an intensified integration process and, second, to strengthen the stabilization of the Central East European Countries (CEE) by enlarging the EU and NATO.[1]

As a result, Germany's political priorities are fundamentally determined by the process of European integration, by developments in Russia, by the transatlantic relations with the United States, and by the process of NATO enlargement, i.e. enlargement to the East by incorporating new members and enlargement to the West by the military reintegration of France. This is a very complex foreign policy setting.[2] For Germany, the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe are located geographically and conceptually between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow.[3]

The following article will analyze Germany's security policy activities in the Baltic Sea region by describing Germany's role as a transatlantic and a European actor in the region. At present, the Baltic Sea region shows a mixed security pattern, i.e. NATO-members, non-members and non-aligned countries. This political landscape will probably continue to exist for the next years.

Therefore, cooperation among the different states in the region will acquire even more importance than today, as cooperation provides for close relations among them, irrespective whether they are members of NATO or the EU. The article analyzes the German cooperation activities in the field of military security, showing that Germany is taking on more obligations and shows more interest in the region's development. Finally, a summary will draw the conclusion, that cooperation is among the basic security factors in the region. However, due to a tight financial budget and restrictions in manpower, Germany's cooperative activities will probably not be extended much further.

II. Germany as a Transatlantic and a European actor

If one should try to identify German foreign and security policy interest, it seems a rather difficult undertaking, as obviously Germany's foreign policy interests are not well defined. Instead, they remain somewhat vague. However, they are visible in the strong political support of the intensifying process of cooperation and integration in European affairs. Germany's support of a widening and deepening of the European Union is not only to be seen as an instrument to enlarge the European region of political, economic, and military stability, but should be also understood as a means to minimize perceptions of a Germany possibly developing into a hegemonical position in Europe.

After unification Germany showed no interest in taking the political lead in or around the Baltic Sea region. Instead, Germany seeks to avoid the impression of possibly developing into such a leadership role. As a result, German foreign and security policy is focusing on multilateralism – making clear that Germany is one partner among others – and showing cautiousness in engaging herself more in the Baltic states.

Elaborating on the reasons for Germany's low profile in foreign and security policy in the Baltic Sea region, the following seven reasons could help to explain Germany's policy or "non-policy" towards the region and particularly towards the Baltic states.

First, German interests generally seem to be strongly focused on domestic problems. A certain confinement to domestic issues seems to be an underlying factor for German politics. Public opinion polls by the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and the RAND Corporation showed that the political elite in Germany gives highest priority to economic and domestic problems, i.e. budgetary deficit, unemployment, and problems related to unification. When asked for the 15 most important policy fields, except for European integration, no foreign and security policy issue was ranked by the interviewed persons (with the exception of persons in the military and security community).[5]

Second, for decades German perspectives on the Baltic Sea region were much in line with the general Central European view on Northern Europe, i.e., until the beginning of the 1990s, the region hardly was on the political and economic map of the political elites in Brussels and Bonn. While Nordic integration and cooperation was a constant and important factor in Scandinavian politics in the Baltic Sea region, Germany's interests were not specifically directed towards Northern Europe or the Baltic Sea region.

Third, one has to understand that Germany's policy towards the Baltic Sea region is part of, and complementary to, the new "Ostpolitik" which is driven by the logic of security and economy.[6] As a result, Germany is a strong supporter of NATO's enlargement and the extension of the EU. However, within this new "Ostpolitik" the CEE region seems to be of comparably greater importance than the Baltic Sea region.

Fourth, Germany's primary interest was to support Poland to be among the first new NATO members. This was an overriding foreign policy goal, motivated by security logic and historical imperatives. Therefore, Germany did everything not to cause Russian irritation, like, for example, avoided to give strong support to the Baltic states.

Fifth, the political importance and weight of the long and well established German-Russian relations created a "Moscow-factor" in German foreign policy. This is obviously one of the main cause of the rather low profile of Germany's activities. This was particularly true during the first period after the Baltic states regained their independence.

However, Germany's position was not, and is not, easy. Up to a certain extent, Russian interests have to be recognized within German politics, leading to a complex and sometimes contradictory foreign policy setting. Without giving Russia a "droit de regard,"

German politics have to fulfil the difficult task of reassuring the CEE countries and the Baltic states while not putting off Russia.[7]

Sixth, Germany is reluctant to engage itself more in the Kaliningrad oblast and the Baltic states not only because of possible Russian irritation. But also to avoid any impression that there might be a special German interest in turning time back, i.e. "claiming territory" in the region. Instead, it is made clear that Germany sees no open territorial questions.

Seventh, even though a strong economic power, there are also limits to Germany's capacity for financial engagement. Germany became the major provider of Western assistance to the CEE countries.[8] Right now, Germany is supplying almost 50 per cent of the financial aid to the CEE countries. But the main task is still the economic reconstruction of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which is proving much more costly and more complicated than anticipated.

Additionally, the ongoing enlargement process of the European Union and NATO will require substantial financial engagement by Germany. The upcoming financial expenditures for the EU through the inclusion of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, and Poland are estimated to approx. 150 billion DM for the years 2000 to 2006. Germany will probably have to finance circa 30 percent of this amount.[9] The costs for the enlargement of the EU will therefore be much higher than for NATO's enlargement. At present, statements by the German foreign minister K. Kinkel and the minister of finance Th. Waigel indicate that Germany wants its financial burden reduced, which will only be possible after 1999. Even though Germany's demands for a reduced share are not unjustified, it seems unlikely that the European Union will find it easy to agree to since Germany benefits greatly from EU's enlargement and still is one of its economically strongest members.

Also the costs for the upcoming NATO enlargement will be substantial, even if we count with the more modest estimates calculating the expenditures as between 27 to 35 billion dollars up to the year 2007. In accordance with the established cost-sharing in NATO's military budget and security investment programme NISP, Germany will have to pay a share of 18.1 percent.[10]

As a result of the factors outlined above, Germany does neither have an interest nor the capacity to play "great power politics" in European or "Baltic" affairs. However, the Baltic Sea region as a link between the North European, the Central European, and the East European countries becomes more important in the fields of politics,

economy, and security policy. This is recognized especially by the North German "Länder" like Schleswig Holstein or Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

When analysing Germany's activities in the Baltic Sea region, one has to consider the German federal system, which diversifies the picture. Unlike the government in Bonn, the North German "Länder" has always taken a great interest in developing integration and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Not only because of geographic location but also because of intra-German dynamics.[11] The North German "Länder" are less successful in economic terms than those in Southern Germany. Therefore, it is necessary for them to find new trading partners and new markets in order to receive an economic impetus. Despite cultural identities, the "Hanse-Concept"[12] is also to be understood as a means to facilitate economic exchange and prosperity within Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

Whereas, for example, the Federal Government's attitude to the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was not very enthusiastic, the North German "Länder" were very positive already from the start. Schleswig Holstein was always supporting the establishment of a permanent secretariat, which the government in Bonn did not favour for a long time. As Gert Walter, the Minister of Justice, and of Federal and European Affairs of Schleswig Holstein stated, the final decision by the CBSS to establish a secretariat is an "encouraging signal" for the future development of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.[13]

Since security policy is determined by the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence in Bonn, Schleswig Holstein has little or no say on such issues. Still, the growing military cooperation with the other Baltic Sea states – in PfP exercises, for example – shows that also Bonn is beginning to recognize the importance of the Baltic Sea region.

Unlike Denmark, who always has stressed that the Baltic states should be among the first new members of NATO, Germany is not supporting any further extension to the East. Germany's official position is much in line with the general NATO view, i.e. for inclusion of the CEE countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and against inclusion of the Baltic states. As said above, an early NATO membership for Poland was the primary German policy goal in the region. This could only be realized, if the strong Russian objections to NATO enlargement were not fuelled further by visible support for the security interests of the Baltic states.

Russia's negative attitude to the independence of the Baltic states and the process of NATO enlargement might cause problems for a possible stronger German military engagement in the Baltic states. The future will show whether the new NATO (16 plus 1) can ease Russian misgivings. Still, even though NATO is constantly stressing that Russia has a voice but no veto, it seems rather obvious that the new Founding Act gives Russia a lot to say in NATO affairs. One has to consider the fact that 17 heads of state signed the document and that it was ratified by the Russian Duma – which gives it a substantial weight in international politics.

As already said, Germany was at first reluctant to offer any major military support to the newly independent countries in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic states complained about the German "stripping off" measures before delivering military systems.[14] However, each of the Baltic states received assistance in the field of "soft" security, i.e. to develop police forces, as well as support for the border control and the coast guard of the Baltic states. And at present, Germany has started to support the Baltic states also in the field of "hard" security, by delivering, for example, two mine hunting vessels, and military vehicles such as jeeps.

Also in the future it seems obvious that German foreign policy will have to anticipate possible Russian reactions and, in case of disagreement, might decide "pro" Russia at the expense of the Baltic states. However, Germany is using the dialogue with Russia to support the Baltic case, i.e. promoting good neighbourly relations, and explaining to Russia that EU membership for the Baltic states will have a positive impact on the future prosperity and stability in the whole region. It is important to make clear that economically prosperous Baltic countries could also have positive effects on Russia, for example by using the direct border with the EU.

When talking about NATO enlargement, the focus is of course on Eastern Europe. However, it is necessary also to elaborate a bit on NATO's enlargement to the West, i.e. the military reintegration of France. The French policy goals seem rather ambitious: Europe shall not only develop military security capabilities to assure stability on the continent but also to be able of a certain kind of global power projection. This seems to create a problem, as most of the other European countries do not share that vision, but rather stick to the well established original vision or try to follow neutralist traditions.

The general weight of the German-French friendship, and a growing German support of French positions in European security affairs,

could fuel suspicions that German politics might intensify German-French cooperation at the expense of the traditionally strong transatlantic ties. Particularly the countries in the Baltic Sea region, such as Denmark and Norway, perceive the United States to be vital not only to European security, but also to "counter weigh" the position of Germany. Additionally, it seems clear to most of the European countries that despite various political statements, a credible defence of Europe is, and will be, possible only with a substantial transatlantic link. The Europeans learned their lesson with the Iraq war and the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

At present, many voices are advocating stronger European efforts to develop a specifically European security system. In this context the WEU, the "oldest" European defence partnership, has been revived as a phoenix from the ashes. Even though Germany is a strong supporter of an increasing WEU activity and capability, the shortcomings of the WEU reduce the political and military credibility of the idea of the WEU becoming a viable "European pillar" for military security. Despite the fact that has NATO agreed to support the WEU.

In terms of military security, Germany is confronted with the dilemma that it wishes to preserve NATO as an Atlantic security community and at the same time wants to strengthen the EU's authority in foreign and security policy. "In order not to undermine NATO cohesion and effectiveness, it has been decided to establish the WEU both as an inner-European coordinator within NATO and as a defence arms of the EU."[15]

Germany assumed the presidency of the WEU on 1 July 1997 for a six month term. Germany is supporting steps to extend the WEU's ability to act in military matters particularly with a focus on the so-called "Petersberg tasks" – humanitarian tasks, rescue missions, peacekeeping, and combat missions. Germany sees an important force in the WEU's ability "to help to introduce the CEE countries to European and transatlantic security structures and provide a forum for a political dialogue with Russia and the Ukraine."[16]

In the future, the new concept of Combined Joint Task Forces will allow peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities without the US and within the WEU. As the NATO Council has still to give its approval, the WEU's dependence on NATO continues. Therefore, it seems a "terminological juggling" to try to distinguish between WEU capabilities and NATO. In fact, we are talking about NATO troops and material being possibly used by the WEU.

However, in the future commons operation under WEU auspices, could make an incorporation of Russia easier. During the Yugoslavian crisis, Russia was not willing to put its troops under SACEUR, i.e. NATO command. Instead, Russia preferred a bilateral agreement with the US. In fact, this did not make much of a difference, as Russia assigned its troops directly to the ACE who is the same person, i.e. SACEUR. It remains to be seen whether Russia is willing to accept a "WEU hat" in prospective common operations of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

So far the WEU is not very active in the Baltic Sea region. But in 1995, the WEU came up with the plan to establish a "Hanseatic Corps" in the Baltic Sea which should protect the region's maritime safety and security. This standing Baltic Sea Force should comprise Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as founding members. Until 1997, no concrete steps have been taken to implement such a force, however.

At present, the WEU obviously is not a viable actor in the Baltic Sea region. The great reluctance of most of the littoral countries to become members is a clear indicator. Only Germany is a full member of this organization, whereas the Baltic states have received "associated partnership."

Beside NATO, the EU is the other major integrative institution in Europe. While in Madrid only three countries managed to win the race for NATO membership, the others must feel left out. Particularly as there is no immediate interest in NATO to start another round of enlargement. Therefore, reform of the EU, making the organization ready for the enlargement, is of vital importance. To develop a concrete time schedule, particularly for the CEE countries is a precondition, if enlargement is to facilitate stability in Europe. There is no automatism for successful integration.

Germany is a strong supporter of a closer integration and further enlargement of the EU. The German Government believes that the two goals of deepening and widening of the EU can be achieved within the next decade. However, German domestic support for "grandiose visions of European integration is much weaker than some CDU leaders care to admit."[17] Particularly the European Monetary Union (EMU), which means giving up control over the Deutschmark, is under permanent discussion in domestic German politics, resulting even in a government crisis in Bonn during 1997. Still, there is no doubt that, irrespective of the outcome of the elections in October 1998, the next government will also support the implementation of the EMU.

The danger of a double rejection of the Baltic states, i.e. non-membership in NATO and non-membership in EU, is partly removed, as one country will be invited to join the EU. While Estonia is offered membership in the EU, the other two countries surely must feel disappointed. Statements by the Latvian Prime Minister Guntars Krasts, who said he fears that the cooperation of the Baltic states might collapse if Estonia is invited alone in the EU's expansion talks, have to be interpreted as such an "emotional" reaction.[18] Still, it seems not helpful to talk about jeopardizing cooperation among the Baltic states. Instead cooperation should be continued and increased. If Estonia becomes member of the European Union, the two others could benefit as well. Institutionalized and close cooperation would also reduce the risk that Russia might try to develop political pressure on Latvia and Lithuania.

The future will show, whether Russia is willing to accept the closer politico-economic integration of the Baltic states, or whether a negative attitude, similar to the objections against NATO enlargement, will prevail. The Russian diplomatic attitude towards Estonia gave reasons for concern.[19] Possibly also the EU might have to carry out its enlargement against Russian objections.

However, the inclusion of Estonia in the EU shows that all Baltic states are being considered as part of the West by the member countries of the European Union. The wider the zone of security in Europe becomes, and the more intensified the cooperation among the countries in the region gets, the less important it might be who is already member or a negotiating member of the EU. Already today the security of all Baltic states is clearly connected with the whole of Europe.[20]

III. Growing military cooperation

Even if we assume that there will be a second round of NATO enlargement it will probably require a rather lengthy waiting period. The causes can be described as follows: First, the whole process of enlargement might turn out to be more costly than even the present financial "worse case scenarios" indicate. Second, due to different infrastructures and political structures, the process of adaptation between the old and the three or five new members will require considerable time. NATO enlargement could therefore become a rather "endless" process. Third, if Russian objections cannot be totally removed within the new NATO-Russia Council, further enlargement

would burden the European-Russian relations for the next decades, certainly postponing the incorporation of other members.

Cooperation seems to be the only effective tool to handle this difficult situation. Because of such a time frame, political and military cooperation will build the basic military security network among all countries in Europe, members and non-members.

Here, also the German efforts at military cooperation in the Baltic Sea region comes into view. However, one of the major tasks will be the shaping of the German armed forces in accordance with future security tasks also outside the NATO area. As the European and the international community is expecting a larger portion of German participation, Germany's armed forces need to adapt to future needs. The budgetary pressures in Germany will also push the Government to move in the direction of smaller, professional armed forces. Even though the "citizens army" built on draft, is not yet questioned officially. The adaptation to present budgetary constraints and future security needs will certainly provide for another very controversial debate in German domestic politics.

The abilities of German naval forces for participation in operations for crisis prevention and crisis management are becoming more important.[21] The expanded role of the German navy means to be deployable wherever the political interests of Germany require. Besides continued operations in the North Sea and the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea is gaining more importance.

Still, the Northern region retains its security importance. This is partly due to developments in the Baltic Sea region. They have created opportunities for permanent partnership with the other littoral states. "More than any other maritime area the Baltic provides for the possibility to cooperate with navies of former Warsaw pact countries within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme."[22]

Meanwhile, a great variety of military activities in conjunction with all Baltic littoral countries developed, like, for example, the German-Danish-Polish and the French-German- Polish agreements on military cooperation, the multilateral cooperation within the framework of PfP, and the various bilateral activities between Germany and the CEE, the CIS and the Baltic states.

In 1995, Germany conducted 407 bilateral activities with different countries in the region. In 1996, the figure rose up to 600 single projects in 18 countries of the CEE, the CIS, and the Baltic area. However, half of them were devoted to Poland, the Czech Republic,

and Hungary. Still, taking into account the relatively small size of the armed forces in the Baltic states, German cooperation with those states must be regarded as substantial.

At present, training for peace keeping obviously is among the primary tasks. So far Germany is without the historical experiences of its Nordic neighbours. German participation in peacekeeping became additionally complicated by a complex domestic struggle within the political elites in Bonn. These difficulties have been overcome, and now there seems to be a wide consensus about Germany's participation in such operations.

Germany is a strong supporter of the Maritime Baltic Squadron (BALTRON) mentioned above, and is going to participate actively. The decision was taken to coordinate the establishment of a common naval unit by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. From 1998 on, the naval units concerned will participate in PfP activities.[23] The tasks will be to prevent smuggling and illegal migration and to perform mine sweeping in the Baltic Sea.[24]

Two German officers are serving as military advisors in Tallinn. They prepared for the delivery of two German mine sweepers, which were handed to Estonia in July and August 1997 and arrived in Tallinn in September 1997. The vessels "Olev" and "Kalev" which have been modernized and fully armed, will provide a basis for Baltic participation in the BALTRON.[25]

Particularly as the Baltic states will probably not become members of NATO within the foreseeable future, it is important to make clear that they are not peripheral to German security interests. Military cooperation is important in this context. Even though Poland is still the primary address for German assistance, cooperation with the Baltic states has expanded significantly.

Recently, two trilateral agreements were concluded which will have considerable impact on future military security developments in the Baltic Sea region. One is the German-French-Polish initiative on military cooperation. The 4th trilateral meeting of the German, French, and Polish ministers of defence took place in Warsaw on 2–3 February 1997. The ministers agreed on closer military cooperation in training and exercises and also discussed the question of intensified arms cooperation. This agreement adds to the so called "Weimar Triangle" of 1995.[26]

The other agreement was the trilateral partnership on military and security policy between Denmark, Germany, and Poland.[27] Among other activities, cooperation in peacekeeping is planned. An

expert group has been established on the topic of "Peacekeeping Cooperation" and is supposed to come up with suggestions for a yearly programme.[28] In August 1997, the three countries decided to establish a German-Danish-Polish army corps.[29] The corps is named the "Multinational Corps North-East" and is planned to be ready by 1999 when Poland becomes a NATO-member.

Obviously, the military cooperation is increasing among all Baltic littoral countries. Also Germany is becoming more involved in the intensified cooperative activities. However, there is growing opinion in Germany that the figure of 600 projects mentioned above represents the end of the German capabilities to take on more obligations. Financial and personal resources in the German armed forces are comparatively limited.[30] Consequently, German cooperation in various fields of military security will rather shift from "quantity" to "quality," so to speak. The present planning indicates a deepening but not a widening of cooperation.[31] The aim will rather be support for future "self reliance."

IV. Summing up

German security policy remains located somewhere between its transatlantic responsibilities and an emerging European identity.[32] To maintain and further develop both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union as complementary bodies always was, and still is, a primary goal.

A German contribution to a comprehensive security concept for the Baltic Sea region does not exist. Pragmatically Germany has reduced and redeployed its armed forces in the region in adaptation to the new political landscape in Europe, and as part of the ongoing cooperative process within the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

In this context, Germany is developing its activities in the Baltic Sea region. In this context, the German naval forces act as an important cooperation partner for the Baltic countries.

It is obvious that the new "Ostpolitik" will be continued in the future. But even though the Baltic Sea region is receiving more attention and cooperation from Germany, a fundamental shift in Germany's foreign policy orientation is not likely. Its Central and East European policy orientation will continue. This saves little energy to be directed towards the Baltic Sea region. Stabilization of the CEE is considered to be a key task, as the whole CEE region remains a "disputed area." If one describes it as a corridor, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, it appears to be both a new dividing line and an area of disputed political control between Russia on the one side, and the European countries and the United States on the other.

Much will depend on the manner in which Germany takes up its future responsibilities. In this context "partnership in leadership" means essentially "partnership in burden sharing." My prediction would be that Germany will have to play a bigger role, i.e. both sending out soldiers if required, which is a new dimension within the "burden sharing" and continuing to give a "pay cheque," which is the traditional part. However, this "cheque" will be considerably larger in the future, due to the costs of NATO and EU enlargement.

Mainly due to uncertainties regarding the future development of Russian domestic and foreign policy goals, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of USA and the European allies to take on new security engagements. This is certainly also true for Germany. Particularly the German-Russian relations might require special treatment in future conflicts. As C. Bildt said, the "Baltic question"[33] continues to be the litmus test, not only for Russia's foreign policy but also for Western politics. Germany has started to recognize this. The well established German-Russian relations might be useful for facilitating mediation and conciliation in disputes between Russia and its small Baltic neighbours.

Today, all Baltic Sea countries share an interest in stabilizing the region. The Baltic states should continue to cooperate with the present institutional structures, on all possible levels, be it political, economic, or military structures. The existing framework of bi- and multilateral institutions provide manifold opportunities to increase the integration of the Baltic states in Europe as a whole. Intensive and institutionalized cooperation will make clear that the independent status of the Baltic states is irreversible and that they are an integral part of Europe. The politics of the Baltic states show that they fully understand the value of such cooperative structures. For the foreseeable future, "networking" will be an important security provider in the region. Germany will continue to be major partner within this cooperation network.

Notes

1 See: Schmidt, P., "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen von EU, WEU und NATO," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 2 (1996), pp. 211–222.

2. Also if the French ideas of receiving a "bigger say" in European security affairs will not come true, the French interests might have considerable impact not only on future German-French relations but also on the general process of the "deepening" of Europe.
3. Werner, J., "Common Security in the Baltic Sea Region: The View from the German Länder, Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War," Report for the Olof Palme International Center Seminar, Stockholm, 18–20 March 1994, p. 182.
4. See: Bredow, W. v., "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Von der Globalisierung mitgerissen, von der Geschichte gebremst?" *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, no. 9 (1997), pp. 1071–1082.
5. Asmus, R. D., "Das Meinungsbild der deutschen Elite zur Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik," *Reader zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 8–9 (1996), p. 2.
6. See: Kurth, J., "Germany and the Re-emergence of Mitteleuropa," *Current History*, no. 94 (Nov. 1995), p. 384.
7. Krohn, A., "Germany," ed. Krohn, A., *The Baltic Sea Region, National and International Security Perspectives*, Baden-Baden (1996), p. 102.
8. Schmidt, P., "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen von EU, WEU und NATO," *Aussenpolitik*, no. 3 (1996), p. 214.
9. "EU-Osterweiterung kostet rund 150 Milliarden DM," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 July 1997, p. 13.
10. Erler, G., "Perspektiven der NATO-Osterweiterung," *Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik*, no. 9 (1997), p. 931.
11. See: Krohn (note 7), p. 99.
12. See for example: Wulff, R. and Kerner, M., "Die neue Hanse," *Arbeitspapiere des Instituts für Internationale Politik und Regionalstudien*, Berlin (1994).
13. Minister Walter quoted in: IHK (ed.),"Ostseesekretariat: Ermutigendes Signal für Zukunft der Ostseekooperation," *Wirtschaft zwischen Nord- und Ostsee*, (Aug. 1997), p. 28.
14. Besides rifles ammunition and other surplus material from former GDR stocks, merely no weaponry was delivered in the early days of Baltic independence.
15. Haftendorn, H., "Gulliver in the Centre of Europe," ed. Heurlin, B., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties* (London, New York, 1996), p. 98.
16. Priority issues in German foreign policy: The Western Euorpean Union (WEU). On the road to a common European Security and Defense Identity, Internet: http./ www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/specials/sp9/092201.html, 22 Sep. 1997
17. Geipel, G. L., "Germany and the Burden of Choice," *Current History*, no. 94 (Nov. 1995), p. 378.
18. See: "Collapse of Baltic Cooperation?" *Baltic Times*, 11–17 Sep. 1997, p. 7.
19. See also: Lange, P. H., "In wichtiger Transmissionsrolle für eine strukturierende Ostpolitik der EU," *Das Parlament*, no. 32, 1 Aug. 1997, p. 11.

20. See final report of the conference on *Baltic Security and Securing Democracy*, Riga, 25–26 July 1997; Neumann, T., "New security agenda – Common future destiny," *Baltic Times*, 31 July – 6 Aug. 1997, p. 1.
21. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Weißbuch 1994* (Bonn, 1994), paragraph 64, p. 120.
22. "Roles, mission and structure of the German navy," *Naval Forces Special Issue*, no. 5 (1996), p. 16.
23. "Bundeswehr-Hilfe für die Baltischen Staaten," *Kieler Nachrichten*, no. 64, 17 March 1997, p. 4.
24. Eneberg, K., "Baltron fortfarande i sin linda," *Dagens Nyheter*, 23 Feb. 1997, p. 8.
25. "Estland," *Marine Forum*, no. 9 (1997), p. 37.
26. This is a cooperation agreement between France, Germany, and the Czech Republic.
27. The trilateral agreement is the result of meetings between the ministers of defense in August 1995 in Aerö (Denmark) and February 1996 in Krakow and Zakopane (Poland). The trilateral cooperation agreement will officially be ratified in 1997.
28. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Deutsch-dänisch-polnische Zusammenarbeit im militärpolitischen und militärischen Bereich," BmVg online, http://www.bmvg.government. de /Presseforum-/Pressemappen/M2Q1.htm, 17 July 1996, p. 2,
29. Clement, R., "Doppelten Zurückweisungsschock abfedern. Mitglied oder nicht – die relativierte Frage," *Das Parlament*, no. 21, 16 May 1997, p 11.
30. The discussion on further cuts in the defense budget by 2 billion DM in 1997 underlined the tight budgetary situation. Such a cut could have endangered the Eurofighter project, as well as the prolongation of the SFOR commitment in former Yugoslavia.
31. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FÜS III, July 1996, appendix 1.
32. Schmidt (note 1), p. 217.
33. Lucas, H. D., "Die baltischen Staaten in Europe. Probleme und Perspektiven," *Aussenpolitik*, no. 2 (1997), p. 136.

THE PROSPECTS OF BALTIC SECURITY: A POLISH VIEW

Beata Kolecka

It is said that each state has its "5 minutes" of history that occur only once in several centuries. The recent years as well as the years to come are such "5 minutes" for Central and Eastern Europe, particularly for the Baltic states. Since 1991 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have regained independence in a peaceful manner, have established solid foundations for modern democratic states and market economies, and acquired their present position in the international community. Nowadays, the Baltic states play an important role in regional cooperation and security. They aspire to the European Union and NATO membership. Their activities aiming at strengthening their security, state structures and democracy are objects of support and sympathy from many states, including Poland. In fact, interest in the region is huge not only in Europe, but also in the US.

Although so much have been attained within such a short period of time, the process of defining the new position of the Baltic states on the European scene has not been completed, and there are still many problems both of internal and external nature that may hinder it.

When discussing security, it is necessary to define the factors that contribute to the security of a state and have impact on it.

The security of the Baltic states in the political sense is based on three pillars that relate to their foreign relations:

– good relations with all countries, particularly with neighbours;

– active participation in regional and international cooperation, including such structures as the UN, OSCE, CE, CBSS etc.;

– close cooperation with the EU, WEU and NATO with the aim of becoming members of these organizations in the near future;

These three pillars determine the priorities of the Baltic states' foreign policy.

Equally important for a state's security is the environment, the political and economic situation in its neighbourhood, in the region and on the continent.

Obviously, an adequate military capacity to cope with a potential aggressor in defence of its territory should be regarded as one of the essential security factors of a state.

On the other hand, it should be taken into consideration that nowadays it's not only military security that is decisive for the existence and well-being of a state. No less important is economic security and internal stability or exposure to other types of threats like environmental pollution or organized crime.

When these aspects of the security of the Baltic states are analyzed, one should remember at the same time that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia differentiate gradually both as their domestic development and their international position are concerned. In spite of similarities and Baltic cooperation, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are individual states and should be perceived as such.

Environment

Within the last eight years, the international environment of the Baltic states has undergone thorough changes and the process is still continuing. Having regained their independence, the Baltic states have been able to participate in the process of shaping the new European security architecture that is based on existing institutions and organizations, good neighbourly relations, and respect for the right of all countries to decide their own foreign and security policy. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have gradually gained respect and support in the international community for their independence, their progress in the implementation of their reform processes, and their ability to safeguard their position on the European scene.

Poland supported the independence of the Baltic states, the withdrawal of Russian troops from these countries, and other activities that strengthened the independence of the three countries. When EU and NATO enlargement were at stake, Poland supported the aspirations of the Baltic states and continues to do so. For broad political and security reasons Poland changed its position concerning the start of accession negotiations with the EU in 1996 – it now would like negotiations to start at the same time with all applicant countries, followed by differentiation afterwards depending on the readiness of each country to join the EU. Within its limited capabilities, Poland provides assistance to the Baltic states, mainly to Lithuania, but also Estonia and Latvia. The fact that in 1997 new mechanisms of close governmental, parliamentary, and presidential cooperation

between Poland and Lithuania were established does not exclude enhanced Polish-Estonian or Polish-Latvian cooperation and should not be regarded as an alternative to Baltic cooperation.

Nordic countries are the strongest supporters of the Baltic states. They supplied technical assistance to the Baltic states in their reform process as well as in the process of establishing state power. The Nordic countries, particularly Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, continue to promote the interests of the Baltic states in the international fora and advocate their European aspirations. When Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia gained within the EU two strong advocates of their interests and aspirations. Moreover, the EU has increased its interest in the Baltic region by establishing programmes to enhance coopera-tion with the countries of the Baltic Sea region and to support their reform process. A regular dialogue according to formula "5 plus 3" turned out to be an effective channel for Baltic-Nordic cooperation and an important means of Nordic assistance to the Baltic states.

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states have got Russia and Belarus as their neighbours. Although the reform process in the former Soviet Union resulted in the demise of the Empire and restoration of the independence of the Baltic states, Russian elites still appear to treat the Baltic states as a sphere of Russia's particular interests. Russia aspires to exert influence on its Baltic neighbours' domestic and foreign policy, justifying this by claiming the right to protect its own interests and the interests of Russians in Latvia and Estonia. Therefore, Russia opposes the aspirations of the Baltic states to join NATO. Instead it offers the Baltic states , which regard the period from 1940 to 1991 as a period of Soviet occupation, security guarantees and enhanced military cooperation. The offer was recently repeated by the Russian Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin at the international conference on Good Neighbourly Relations as Guarantee of Stability and Peace in Europe in Vilnius, 5 September 1997. Pretending to protect the rights of Russians in Latvia and Estonia, Russia attempts to picture the Baltic states as not respecting human and minority rights, and thereby being unfit to become members of the EU and NATO. Another way of exerting pressure on the Baltic states are border agreements that have not been signed yet with any of them. Since Latvia and Estonia have no further territorial claims against Russia it is hard to explain why border agreements with these countries

have still not been signed. Hopefully the declarations of Russia on the one hand and Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia on the other, on their willingness to bring the problem to a solution shall be followed by actions, and the border agreements soon concluded.

The situation and status of the Kaliningrad region has much influence on the security of adjacent Lithuania. Although no direct military threats are expected from Kaliningrad, its essentially military character and resultant problems probably affect adversely on the economic attractiveness of Lithuania, and to a lesser extent, Latvia. Nor has the concentration of Russian troops in the Pskov region a positive influence on at least the economic and environmental development in adjacent countries.

Belarus, which neighbours Lithuania and Latvia, is a source of concern for all democratic European countries. Although relations with Belarus are said to be good and its authorities declare willingness to cooperate, the scope of cooperation is limited and its development difficult to predict. Belarus that aspires to some kind of union with Russia follows the latter's foreign policy with regard to NATO and the NATO enlargement process.

In spite of the abovementioned problems it is of vital importance that Russia, although often hesitating and reluctant, is engaged in international and regional cooperation. For the Baltic states it is important to be able to cooperate with Russia on an equal footing on a multilateral level in such fora as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Partnership for Peace as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The negotiations on the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, which was signed 27 May 1997 in Paris, have given rise to much speculation whether the document would prejudice the future position of the Baltic states as well as that of other states of Central and Eastern Europe, by allowing Russia to interfere in NATO and applicant countries' relations. It is of essential importance that, as it is stated in the Final Communiquē of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, the Permanent Joint Council of NATO and Russia will conduct its activities upon the principles of reciprocity, transparency, and full respect for the interests of other states. The exclusive character of NATO's relations with Russia has been balanced by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine signed at the NATO Summit in Madrid 8 July, 1997.

The NATO enlargement process, which was announced at the Summit in Madrid and practically was initiated in the beginning of September 1997 when accession negotiations with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic started, has crucial significance for European security, including that of the Baltic states. Although not included in the first group of states invited to the NATO membership negotiations, the Baltic states form an important region for the Alliance, and the Baltic region in general was mentioned in the NATO Summit declaration. As it was declared in Madrid, NATO shall remain open for new members after the first enlargement. In the meantime, the Alliance offers all partner countries developed and differentiated opportunities of cooperation and consultations within the enhanced PfP and EAPC.

The NATO enlargement process together with the partnership relations between NATO and Russia put to an end the post-Yaltan order and the period of divisions in Europe that disadvantaged Central and Eastern Europe.

The European Union is one of the most important pillars of European cooperation and security. This organization proved successful in achieving its main aim, i.e. preventing conflicts on the European continent through development of economic and political cooperation. Its subsequent enlargements made the EU one of the world powers. Finland and Sweden, which joined the EU in 1995, admit that membership in the Union strengthened their security. EU is preparing both for further deepening of cooperation and for enlargement to the East.

The EU's involvement in the Baltic region is growing, which to a great extent should be attributed to the activeness of the Nordic states. Denmark, Sweden, and Finland strongly argued that the Baltic region be given high priority in EU external relations and assistance programmes. Recently, the Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponen, has called upon the EU to prepare and present at the EU Summit in Luxembourg a special cooperation programme for the Baltic and Barents Sea areas. The European Commission's recommendation that Estonia should be in the group of countries with which accession negotiations should start first, should be regarded as a clear signal that all three Baltic states have prospects to join the EU if they are determined to carry on further reforms and adaptation to EU standards (acquis communautaire) to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The presence of the EU in the region and its cooperation with Russia are certainly producing a stabilizing effect and promoting democratic and economic reform processes.

The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an important forum for security cooperation in Europe, and its role in the Baltic region is significant. Cooperation within the OSCE involves all countries of the region, including Russia, and also the US as well as the Western European countries. The Baltic states can contribute on an equal footing with Russia in the development of the system of cooperative security as well as the "human dimension" and construction of the "Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century." Poland, which is going to take over the presidency in 1998, has proposed considering the OSCE as a forum for confidence and security building measures in the Baltic region. While hard security measures should be considered by the OSCE (within the Forum for Security Cooperation, Baltic group), soft security measures should be, and in fact are, developed within the Council of the Baltic Sea states.

Both OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia, although proposed by the host countries to be cancelled or at least turned into regional OSCE offices, have done a good job. Their presence and activity enhanced adaptations of legal acts concerning non-citizens in these countries and provided the international community with objective information on the status of minorities, particularly the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia.

Since 1990, when the first meeting of prime ministers of the Baltic Sea region was held in Ronneby, and then in 1992, when the Council of the Baltic Sea states was established, regional cooperation has developed dynamically. Nowadays, it covers almost all areas that require cooperation on a practical level, including economic cooperation, cooperation on development of infrastructure, people-to-people contacts, education, environmental protection, and combating organized crime.

The Baltic Sea region is regarded as an area of rapid economic growth in the years to come. Hopefully, that growth will be sustainable and fast enough to gradually diminish the gaps in the economic development of the region's countries – gaps that might become sources of tensions in the future.

Pillars of states' political security

The Baltic states enjoy good relations with neighbouring countries as well as with other states of the North Atlantic area. The term "good neighbourly relations" does not exclude tensions which can arise even between closely cooperating states and should therefore be evaluated within the full spectrum of relations between countries.

For Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia relations with Russia are of vital importance. Although several problems still remain to be settled, for example, border disagreements and the status of Russian non-citizens, cooperation may be regarded as good. Both the Baltic states and Russia have expressed their will to develop mutually beneficial relations. It should be regarded as a great success for the Baltic states and the international community on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand, that the process of regaining independence by the three states generally proceeded in a peaceful way.

The cooperation of the Baltic states with other states, among them Poland, is very close as proved by the first meeting of the Presidents of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine in Tallinn, on 27 May this year, and then the meeting in a broader forum during the international conference on Good Neighbourly Relations as Guarantee of Stability and Peace in Europe that was held in Vilnius 5 – 6 September, 1997. Another very positive example is Baltic-Nordic cooperation. The cooperation of the three Baltic states (Baltic Council, Baltic Assembly) has proved that the voices of the three are better heard together than separately. Baltic cooperation is very important from the political and economic point of view. It brings the Baltic states closer to European integration as well as to membership in Euro-atlantic structures: consequently its disruption would have a negative impact on the international situation of the Baltic states. The security of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is a matter of interest for the US, which was reflected in a number of declarations, including the statement by Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, soon after the NATO Summit in Madrid. The Charter on cooperation with the Baltic states which the US plan to sign early next year is regarded as a sign of the significance of the three states for the US. The Baltics have several times expressed their disappointment in what they regard as insufficient support from Germany. Germany's assistance to the Baltic states, however, is certainly significant both in political and other – including military – terms although it seems not to meet the expectations of the Balts. Particularly Germany's position on EU and NATO enlargement is not in line with what they had expected.

The Baltic states participate actively in international cooperation as members of the UN, OSCE, CE, and CBSS. Hopefully we shall soon welcome the Baltic states as members of the WTO, and then the CEFTA. Poland supported the Baltic efforts to enter in close relations with the OECD with the aim of future membership.

As members of international organizations the Baltic states have the opportunity to influence developments in the region and participate in the construction of a new European cooperation and security architecture. Participation in international and regional economic cooperation should allow them to speed up the process of reforming the internal economic and legal system, thereby attracting foreign capital and other investments. This fosters economic security for the Baltic states.

The Baltic states are associated with the EU although the Association Agreements have not come into force yet. They are associated partners of the WEU and are actively participating in PfP and the EAPC. All three states have applied for membership in the EU and NATO. Poland respects and supports this policy.

With regard to EU enlargement, Poland takes the position that membership negotiations with all applicant countries that have received positive avis should start simultaneously in the beginning of 1998. Poland welcomed the EC recommendation that Estonia should be in the first group and hopes that both Lithuania and Latvia proceed with the necessary adaptations to join the first group as soon as possible. Poland has declared its readiness to exchange information and to consult with the Baltic states on all matters concerning integration with the EU. Accession negotiations should proceed individually, depending on the grade of readiness of applicant countries for membership. Including the Baltic states in the EU enlargement process shall have a positive impact on their security, as it will consolidate their place in Europe. Integration with the EU would speed up the processes of transformation in the Baltic states that would raise their well-being and security. It should also prevent Lithuania and Latvia from feeling the "double rejection effect" and problems resulting from it.

With regard to NATO, it was of vital importance that the invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary membership negotiations announced at the Madrid summit did not close the door to new members. The Baltic region, mentioned in the summit declaration, is of particular interest for NATO. The EAPC and the extended PfP should provide the applicant countries, including the Baltic states, an opportunity to develop very close cooperation with the Alliance that would enable them to prepare for future membership and enhance their security. This cooperation should not be regarded as a substitute for NATO membership. The mechanisms of cooperation in the EAPC that have been outlined in Sintra and then further elabo-

rated, seem to be quite advanced. If necessary they should be supplemented to meet expectations of the partner countries. On the other hand, it is up to the partner countries that these mechanisms are well used in the pursuit of their security policy

Military security and armed forces

The capacity to defend its territory is an essential aspect of a state's security, particularly when it is not member of any military alliance. The Baltic states have undertaken since they regained independence the very difficult and expensive task to build up a respectable military force. The assistance provided by the Western and Nordic countries as well as Poland has created a nucleus of national armed forces and made possible their participation in international peace keeping operations within military units the Nordic states, mainly Denmark.

Because the ability of the applicant country to contribute significantly to international stability and peace is a prerequisite for NATO membership, it is very important for the Baltic states to be able to prove that they can make such a contribution, and not only profit from security guarantees provided by the Alliance. It requires their presence in international peace keeping and peace enforcement operations. With the assistance of several donor countries including USA, Germany, the Nordic states and Poland, the Baltic states are preparing BALTBAT – a Baltic battalion for participation in international peace keeping operations. With joint efforts they pursue two other projects – BALTNET, i.e. the establishment of a regional Baltic air surveillance system, and BALTRON – the establishment of a Baltic unit of mine sweepers. Trilateral cooperation in military affairs and division of some tasks should allow the Baltic states to attain their aims more quickly and with less effort and less expense. Moreover, Poland and Lithuania are in the process of forming the Polish-Lithuanian Battalion. It should be ready to take part in international peace keeping operations by January 1999. The three Baltic states participate as guests in selected programmes of military cooperation pursued by Poland, Denmark, and Germany.

To develop a modern army is a very expensive, and particularly difficult to undertake for countries in transition with relatively low incomes. It is up to the Baltic national authorities to decide on the resources for build-up and modernization of their armies and their programmes, but close cooperation and coordination of tasks seem to be a wise way to reduce costs and increase effectiveness.

Other threats

Organized crime thrives in countries under transition, where law and authorities are slow to react to social and economic changes, where the police and courts are not effective enough to prosecute and punish criminals who often have at their disposal more sophisticated equipment than state institutions possess. Democracy, even sovereignty may be threatened when organized crime, particularly if controlled by groups from other states, gain influence in political and economic life. Criminal groups are not interested in a stable state because they take advantage of its ineffectiveness in prosecuting them. The problem of organized crime in the Baltic states is not imaginary, and their capacity to cope with it may turn out to be decisive for future developments in these countries.

The problem of organized crime in the Baltic Sea region certainly cannot be solved by a single country and requires close international cooperation. Fora for this cooperation are the Council of the Baltic Sea States and its Task Force set up by the prime ministers in Visby, and also the bodies for cooperation with the EU and other applicant countries in matters relating to the third pillar of the Union.

The economic situation of a state influences its security in many ways. It is decisive for the international position of the state and for its capacity to influence decisions taken in international fora. It also determines the military power of a state. Economic conditions and the policy of a government determine the attitude of foreign capital towards the country in question and its development prospects. The economic situation influences the behaviour of people when making political choices during parliamentary and local elections. The economies of all three Baltic states are recovering, although the degree of healthiness of the economy and the growth rates differ significantly. Inflation is under control, and other basic economic indicators seem to be satisfactory. On the other hand, the national income per capita in these states is about 15 percent of the EU average which implies that the economic growth rate should be twice of thrice that of the EU in order to reach the average income level in the EU countries within 30–40 years. It is a hard task, and it requires a thorough modernization of the economies and completion of the reform process. Membership in regional and international economic

cooperation structures as the CEFTA and WTO, together with cooperation with the OECD and particularly with the European Union, should foster attainment of these goals. Within the process of reorientation of economic links, the Baltic states should make use of their geographic position and profit from cooperation and trade with Russia.

Environmental pollution belongs to the mass of problems inherited from the former Soviet Union. Vast areas of land require recultivation, inland and coastal waters need cleaning. Industrial plants and the nuclear power plant in Ignalina still threaten the natural environment. Making use of EU assistance and Nordic programmes, the Baltic states have made some progress in this respect. But unless they cope successfully with the problem it will be difficult for them to develop tourism and profit from it.

Last, but not least, is the problem of non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia. They constitute a significant part of the population in both states, and are mainly Russians. As OSCE missions report, a lot has been done both in Latvia and in Estonia to settle the problem and grant these people non-discriminative conditions. The naturalization process has been initiated, but remarkably few are applying for citizenship. It seems to be in the interest of Latvia and Estonia to encourage naturalization and thus increase the number of – presumably loyal – citizens in their countries.

Poland's relations with the Baltic states

Poland attaches great importance to its relations with all three Baltic states. They are considered to be an important factor of stability in the region, and enjoy Polish support for their reforms as well as for their aspirations to membership in Euroatlantic and other regional and international structures. Poland is also assisting the armed forces of the three states, particularly Lithuania, in various ways.

Poland's relations with neighbouring Lithuania are the closest and most developed. This year the relationship became a "strategic partnership" which includes intensified intergovernmental, parliamentary, and interpresidential cooperation: the Parliamentary Assembly, the Consultative Committee of Presidents, and the Council for Intergovernmental Cooperation. All three fora are consultative and advisory in character. They should enhance cooperation in areas of mutual interest, for example, European integration and

security, military and economic cooperation, issues of national minorities, and culture, science, and education. The Council for Intergovernmental Cooperation has no precedence in Poland's relations with other countries, and it reflects the special character of Polish-Lithuanian relations. It is neither the intention of Poland nor of Lithuania, however, to deflect in any way the inter-Baltic cooperation or limit the scope of relations with Latvia and Estonia. Quite the opposite. All Baltic states remain important partners for Poland, and Poland will undertake efforts to further develop cooperation with Latvia and Estonia in the years to come.

Conclusions

The Baltic states have certainly a unique chance to have their rightful position in the international community secured. There are necessary preconditions, i.e. the favourable development of stability in the region and in Europe in general, and the ability of the Baltic states to pursue successfully their foreign policy objectives in areas that are essential for their security.

Although not all expectations of the Baltic states concerning integration with the EU and NATO have been met, both organizations are open to new members and have developed mechanisms of close cooperation with the applicant countries. Independent of the results of the Luxembourg EU Summit to be held in December 1997, all Baltic states, particularly Lithuania and Latvia, should make efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria required of them to start accession negotiations with the EU. There is no time to be wasted in either arguing with the EU on its decisions concerning accession negotiations or in seeking alternatives to integration with the EU and NATO. Progress in the internal reform process and active cooperation with the EU and NATO should convince the latter that the Baltic states meet the membership criteria. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia should resolve all problems that may hinder their accession to the European structures, particularly the border disagreements with Russia, the vast non-citizen problems (in Latvia and Estonia) and the issue of exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea. When coping with all these tasks they may count on the favourable attitude and assistance of most European countries and international organizations.

The shaping of a new, comprehensive, and cooperative security architecture in Europe is a step-by-step process that evolves on vari-

ous levels. There are certainly areas where this process seems too slow or even lagging, but it is important that it should gradually move forward and be based on common values, such as respect for democracy and the sovereignty of all states. It is important for the Baltic states to participate actively in this process in order to profit from it as much as possible.

CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND RUSSIA

Arkady Moshes

The end of the Cold War and global confrontation opened a way in principle towards the formation of stable and self-sufficient regional security systems that under certain circumstances could become building blocs for a wider Atlantic-Pacific security community. The Baltic Sea area has very good opportunities for establishing a precedent in the creation of such a regional security system thanks, first, to the fact that natural borders of this region can be rather easily determined, and, second, to the specific character of the region in the sphere of security which by definition makes the Baltic region as a whole less oriented towards security patterns of the past.

Nevertheless, the parameters of an emerging security order in the Baltic region are not clear. One basic reason for that is that it is a region "in-the-making." It did not exist as a region for at least several decades. The Baltic Sea was rather a link between the focal point of the East-West conflict in Central Europe, and the European North – the pole of détente. Even today, in the policies of Norway, Germany, Poland, and Russia, dimensions other than the Baltic one clearly prevail. In fact, it is not accidental that only Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the political jargon of today are associated with the term "the Baltic states." In this context, however, it is noteworthy that the creation of a regional security system would accelerate region-making and does not require such a process to be completed as a precondition.

Another important factor of uncertainty is the lack of understanding whether the regional security system will be all-inclusive or will be modelled along the motto of the past: "Against whom will we be friends?" In other words, behind this dilemma there is a question whether Russia is a security partner or a security problem.

No doubt, making Russia a cooperative security partner would be in the interests of all states of the Baltic Sea rim. There is only one way to achieve this goal: Russia's concerns of today should be taken fully into account in the mutual compromise-based process of security-building in the Baltic region.

This paper intends to analyze the present-day security situation in the Baltic area, as it is seen from Russia, and to contribute to the discussion on possible and probable solutions which could be offered for existing problems.

The security situation in the Baltic region

1. The most important characteristic of the present security situation in the Baltic region is, in my firm view, that no littoral country is under real or potential military threat.

One the one hand, the region witnessed unprecedented reductions of Russian military power (see table).[1] Russia is no longer in a position to launch an offensive operation against its neighbours. Its military presence even in still heavily militarized Kaliningrad has been downsized considerably. Remaining arsenals are in the *oblast* largely due to shortcomings of the CFE regime with its outdated flank principles (Kaliningrad belongs to the Central European zone). In fact, Russia is on the eve of the debate whether it has sufficient defensive capabilities for Kaliningrad.

Continuing reductions of Russian forces should be considered as a stabilizing factor of regional security.

Table 1.

Kaliningrad Group of Forces and the Baltic Sea Fleet

	1993	1995	1996
Ground Forces	103 000	24 000	24 000
Main Battle Tanks	750	870	850
Armoured Combat Vehicles	900	980	925
Artillery/MRL/mortars	600	410	426
Attack helicopters	48	52	50
Air Defence			
Fighters	35	28*	28*
Surface-to-air missiles	250	75	50
The Baltic Fleet			
Submarines	15	9	6
Cruisers	1	3	–
Destroyers	2	2	3
Frigates	24	18	28
Patrol/coastal comb.	140	65	42
Mine counter-measures	60	55	60
Amphibious	20	15	8
Support and miscellan.	110	102	118
Naval Aviation			
Combat aircraft	200	195	100
Armed helicopters	45	35	31
Naval Infantry			
Main Battle Tanks	40	25	25
Artillery/MRL	60	36	34
Coastal Defence			
Artillery	120	133	133

* Fighters belong to the Baltic Sea Fleet

Source: The Military Balance, 1993–94, 1995–96, 1996–97.

On the other hand, direct military threat to Russia is unlikely to emerge in the Baltic region either. All the first priority security challenges are concentrated on Russia's own south, and southward from its borders.

2. Prospects for NATO enlargement constitute a very important destabilizing factor for regional security:

A. Already the first wave of NATO enlargement worsens the military aspect of the situation around Kaliningrad; any further enlargement could make this enclave non-defensible by conventional weapons, something which would require Russia to rely on tactical nuclear weapons, not necessarily land-based, with their following deployment;

B. The prospective NATO enlargement generally changes the interpretation of PfP in Russia: it's no longer perceived as a vehicle of security partnership between NATO and non-NATO countries, but as a NATO waiting-room, a tool to bring aspirants closer to the Alliance; this creates an impression in Russia that the PfP, and especially an extended PfP, is mainly a method to increase NATO and NATO-centric military activity in non-NATO areas; it would be inconsistent for Russia, given its opposition in principle to NATO enlargement even after the Russia-NATO agreement was signed in May 1997, to participate in the PfP under these circumstances ; thus obstacles are created on the way towards establishing military interaction and coopera-

tion between Russia and other countries of the region, including the neutrals, which raises the following justified concerns:

C. Uncertainty about the outcome of NATO enlargement (whether and when there will be a "second wave" and how it will materialize) creates an additional important conflict item on the agenda of Russia's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia which clearly delays improvement of this relationship.

3. Other relevant security organizations do not for various reasons display any belief in the idea that regional security should not necessarily be NATO-centric. The OSCE potential has not yet been turned towards the Baltic region in general and, perhaps, OSCE's rather inflexible format is too large for Baltic security. The Council of Baltic Sea States and the "Visby process" obviously could not so far have acquired a full-fledged security dimension, which – though it was not one of their original tasks – may nevertheless occur in the future. As for the WEU, its formally logical refusal to consider the possibility of Russia's participation in its initiatives in the region (these initiatives are for members and partners) plays a counter-productive role with regard to Russia since it delays establishing the Russia-WEU dialogue and even strengthens perception that the Baltic security as part of an European security architecture is deliberately planned to be built without Russia.

4. A process, aimed at ensuring security for the Baltic states in conjunction with Western security structures, but outside of NATO, is taking place. A strategy, outlined in the often quoted RAND report, for strengthening US-Baltic interaction through "soft security" for the Balts (making Finland, Sweden and the EU primarily responsible for their security), and through the "Hanseatic Corps" (the WEU initiative to create a naval unit with Baltic participation, with border control and rescue functions) form the base for this conclusion. If this process could be completed with limited participation of Russia (see below), a very important foundation for an all-inclusive and stable regional security system would be laid down.

5. In the Baltic Sea region, there exist unique opportunities for creating a security system based on new approaches, and on pragmatic interests, something which is the result of the following factors:

A. The region's peripheral situation during the Cold War when security in the Baltic region was largely a function of the "Nordic Balance" with all its diversity and specifics; as a result, the region as a whole has a good deal of immunity against attempts to structure the security debate along ideology-dominated "black

and white" lines, and is more ready for pragmatic cooperation in the security sphere;

B. The existence of traditions of neutrality in the region, largely accounting for the fact that the Baltic region is so far the only *region* in Europe, where "NATOmania" has not become a prevailing trend;

C. Centuries-old traditions of good-neighbourliness and cooperation between Russia and several countries of the region which provide good chances for transferring positive bilateral experience into regional cooperation;

D. The progress in cooperation in the Barents/Euroarctic region, where Russia and its Nordic neighbours are establishing patterns of partnership, is at the same time a factor strengthening cooperation in the Baltic Sea.

E. The importance, sometimes vital, of economic cooperation with Russia for several countries of the region creates another factor of stability; in turn, Russia's economic interests here go far beyond volume of trade, although this is too an important consideration, taking into account the payments' reliability of countries of the Baltic Sea rim (unlike, for example, Russia's leading economic partners in the CIS): In this context we note that only in the Baltic Sea region Russia has a border with the EU, along the 1200 km long Russo-Finnish border; and also the significance of the Baltic Sea routes for transit of Russian exports which does not need to be emphasized, since Russia's ability to use another trade artery connecting it with Europe, the Black Sea, is limited by the Turkish position regarding the Mediterranean Straits.

F. The formation of a Baltic security model which, however, remains a long-term strategic goal, only to be reached in a rather distant future. Mid-term tasks, the solutions of which could become elements of a new system but also have autonomous dynamics and self-sufficient value in strengthening regional security, are stabilization of Russia's relations with the Baltic states, further demilitarization of Kaliningrad while preserving its security, and starting a new phase of arms control, possibly regional.

Imperatives and solutions for Russian security policy in the Baltic region

In order to make Russia a partner in strengthening regional security, Russia's concerns should be carefully taken into account in a way allowing Russia to solve its problems in the interests of all

Pushing Russia towards unilateralism would be not only counter-productive, but potentially dangerous.

Improving the Russian-Baltic relationship

The existing *modus vivendi* in Russia's relations with the Baltic states is a significant step forward as compared with the tense relations of the early 1990s.[2] Nowadays mutual economic interests create a reliable safeguard not only against a military conflict but also against the introduction of economic sanctions by Russia. This model is likely to work in the short- and mid-term perspective.

At the same time, it seams that despite the rhetoric, there are no influential political forces on either side advocating any further and dynamic improvement of the relations through mutual concessions. If this is the case, then some negative scenarios of destabilizing developments cannot be excluded. To stabilize the situation, Russia and the Baltic states should, mainly bilaterally, try to solve, or at least make progress, in the solution of three problems.

The improvement of the situation with the **Russian-speaking population** in Estonia and especially Latvia is a critical issue.[3] If progress is achieved here, compromises in other areas will quickly follow. Otherwise, possible positive developments will remain hostages to the stalemate over citizenship issues.

The Russian approach towards the issue of citizenship in Latvia and Estonia is that all those who were permanent residents at the moment when independence was "proclaimed" (official documents use this word) must have the right to citizenship as well as those who were born in these countries. In various official documents, Russia has expressed its concerns connected with the inequality of rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population regarding citizenship, state language, and education, and called for elimination of residency requirements and for reducing the language requirements. All these measures would facilitate absorption of those loyal to the respective states, which can be considered one of the aims of Russian policy.

However, until now, this policy has brought no significant results. Since, as was mentioned, economic sanctions are unlikely, or rather totally excluded, the prospects for success of the Russian unilateral course in the Russophone issue should be assessed with a great deal of scepticism.

It appears also that, despite its officially declared interest in engaging mechanisms of the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the Council

of Europe, Russia does not have much confidence in the abilities, or maybe the willingness, of international organizations to deal effectively with the problem; this is because so far involvement of the international organizations could produce only minor results in making Baltic legislation more favourable towards the merely Russian-speaking population, and in monitoring the general situation.

Therefore, improvement depends predominantly on changes in the Latvian approach and on further liberalization of the Estonian one. A powerful factor here will be the prospects for joining the EU, already highly realistic in the Estonian case and quite realistic in the Latvian one.

The absence of Russo-Latvian and Russo-Estonian **border treaties** remains an irritating factor, though it is becoming less important in reality. Thus, Latvia and Estonia have withdrawn territorial claims and an agreement with Latvia is almost concluded; and further, there exists a *de facto* working model which emerged mostly as a result of Russia's rigid stand on the issue and its unilateral demarcation of the border with Estonia in 1994.

Still, it will not be easy to find a legal solution, not to mention the problems of managing ratification on all sides. Russia tends to rely on the "package principle" on the matter of the border with Estonia, linking this issue and the one about the Russophones.

The task is to convince Russia that, by legally settling the dispute on the conditions it was putting forward from the very beginning, it would raise its own international prestige rather than remove obstacles from Estonia's way towards EU and NATO. Otherwise, a vicious circle can be created when absence of territorial claims will result in further rapprochement between the Baltic countries and the West, while Russia, being marginalized in this process, will return to "the Western bias" type of discussions, thus missing or wasting opportunities for establishing cooperative relations with the Baltic states and with the Western countries.

The start of an **autonomous security dialogue** between Russia and the three Baltic states seems to be necessary. It is possible since 1) there is a precedent in the form of the Russo-Lithuanian agreement on military transit and 2) Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia successfully cooperate in the sphere which gives them a well-coordinated position towards Russia in this respect.

The main idea with this dialogue should be the introduction of additional confidence-building measures, and a transition from threat perception to threat assessment, preferably *joint* threat

assessment. In the process of the dialogue the Baltic states would – hopefully – realize that Russia in the foreseeable future, for both military and political reasons, is unable to threaten them militarily. That could be a breakthrough, since now in the Baltic capitals threat perception is too often dominated by dark historical experience.

A security dialogue between Russia and the Baltic states could also open the way to security cooperation within the framework of multilateral organizations and initiatives, which is especially important for the security of the Baltic region.

Further demilitarization of Kaliningrad

It should to be admitted that Russia has done a lot unilaterally in downsizing its military potential in the Kaliningrad area. Russian military movement from the enclave exceeds that in the opposite direction.

However, the space for Russian unilateral measures with regard to the demilitarization of Kaliningrad is limited, given the following considerations:

A. The defence role of the Kaliningrad district concerning air- and sea-surveillance, air defence, and potential missile defence, and the fact that this is the only fully suitable naval base of the Baltic Fleet;

B. The role of Kaliningrad in the discussion of the whole issue of arms control in Europe, above all – the flank problem;

C. The uncertainty of the military outcomes of NATO enlargement (for example, how freedom of transit will be ensured in case there is "the a second wave") which raise concerns about the defensibility of the area and generate long-term worries about the future of Kaliningrad as Russian territory.

In this context, it appears that a solution for the Kaliningrad problem could be found and the level of defence sufficiency determined rather lowly if several preconditions could be met.

1. Without raising the issue of the present borders of Kaliningrad as part of the Russian Federation (which should be taken for granted), and outside of the NATO enlargement paradigm, Russia should be guaranteed free and unhindered land, sea and air transit between its mainland and its enclave by means of treaties between Russia and all other interested countries, first of all Finland and Estonia.[4] Passage through the territorial waters of these two countries in the Finnish Gulf may become necessary if problems emerge with land transit through Lithuania, in the case of further enlargement of

NATO. Procedures for international monitoring of the transit could be agreed upon.

2. Negotiations could be started with the agenda of introducing naval arms control measures, which per se would be a major breakthrough.

3. Russia and Poland, preferably under the auspices of some regional forum, or even the OSCE, could hold consultations on confidence-building measures aimed at linking a further reduction of Russian forces in the Kaliningrad district with the non-deployment or even withdrawal of Polish forces from certain agreed areas.

The steps proposed are well in line with the general goals of Russian security policy in the Baltic area, discussed below, and could contribute significantly to establishing a general climate of confidence in the region.

A security model for Russia

To ensure that the security model emerging in the Baltic region will be acceptable for Russia is, of course, a task for its own foreign policy. However, it seems that making Russia a security partner would be equally beneficial for every country. If Russia's interests are not taken into account in these days, the "unpredictability" of Russia may grow in the mid-term future; and in the long term, exclusion of Russia may push it towards becoming a "rogue" state.

Now Russia's interests with regards to security model in the Baltic region seem to be the following.

1. Making the Baltic Sea a zone of low military activity. That would be very stabilizing. There are no reasons why the military activity of the littoral states should grow. There are no security challenges in the region to be adequately met this way. Russia contributes to achieving this goal and cannot accept with understanding an increase of NATO-centric activity, if it reaches a considerable level.

2. Ensuring the security of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia outside of NATO.[5] This is the issue where the position of Russia and that of the three Baltic states are mutually exclusive since while Russia opposes NATO enlargement (but no general European security architecture), the Baltic states consider NATO as the leading European security organization, and are afraid that if they show readiness to accept security guarantees other than NATO membership, they will surely never become members. That is why this problem is not suitable for the bilateral Russian-Baltic format, whereas it could, for general reasons, be solved in the regional or a wider international con-

Undoubtedly, there are possibilities for ensuring the security of the Baltic states through the EU, and especially through WEU membership. Although obtaining full status in these organizations will clearly take the Baltic states many years, presumably even the associated partnership of today is a sufficient guarantee, since it cannot be imagined that current WEU members for political reasons would leave infringements on the security of partner countries unanswered.

Again, the same conclusion is fully applicable to the Scandinavian countries and the US. Although hard security guarantees in the form of alliances are virtually impossible, broadly-interpreted soft security guarantees (including bilateral defence cooperation) will be a powerful factor for the security of the Baltic states. A specific precedent of the kind can be found in US and British security guarantees given to Ukraine when it decided to go non-nuclear.[6]

As for NATO, precedents in the form of the Russia-NATO and Ukraine-NATO agreements, completely different in essence, constitutes examples to follow. An agreement between NATO and the Baltic states could contain a lot of security guarantees, but not the formal membership. This would not be ideal from the Russian point of view but could be acceptable.

Presumably, the search for analogous security models for the Baltic countries has been started by Western countries (the RAND report, the WEU Hanseatic Corps etc.). At the same time, at least in Estonia there seems to be a shift in favour of a "non-NATO" security model, should it be a transitional one. Russia apparently is ready to contribute to this process by providing necessary guarantees, if those can be accepted.

3. New phase of arms control. In addition to the measures proposed in other parts of this paper and highly valuable in themselves, an evolution of the overall arms control regime should be seriously considered as necessary, especially in the long run. The adaptation of the CFE treaty of 1990,[7] being an attempt to solve political problems by technical means, may prove to be insufficient, since it preserves the shortcomings of the CFE regime, like the limited number of parties. Later on new approaches may be required. In this context, negotiating a CFE-2 treaty for all OSCE member states, free from any legacy of the bloc structure, would be especially beneficial for the Baltic region in view of the following considerations:

A. Considerably lower ceilings would be an important stability factor for all countries, including Russia;

B. A repeal of the flank principle would first and foremost allow Russia to redeploy forces to the South, thus greatly facilitating the solution of the Kaliningrad problem. Norway's concerns with the amount of forces in the Russian North and, probably, Russia's apprehensions with regard to an evolution of the Norwegian security model should be a matter also for the bilateral dialogue; perhaps, agreement on this issue can be made a precondition for an overall agreement;

C. The Baltic states should join the system of European arms control. This would give them an equal say in the process, and could at the same time diminish Russia's possible concerns regarding "the free ride" the Baltic states might get in an emerging regime of European conventional arms control.

Taking into account that negotiating such a treaty would take a long period of time, the countries of the Baltic Sea region could start negotiations on a *regional* arms control agreement which later could either become an element of CFE-2 or continue to exist autonomously.

Conclusions

The current security situation in the Baltic Sea region is very promising. There is no real military threat, I suggest, to any country within the region. Russia's military capabilities have been reduced, its *policy* in the 1990s has demonstrated unwillingness to use force, or threat of force, in its relations with neighbours. Defence and security cooperation among the Baltic states, as well as between them and Western countries and security organizations, have formed an important safeguard against any attempts to undermine their independence and sovereignty.

However, in the region there is also a risk of destabilizing developments in the security sphere, primarily connected with the lack of clarity as regards the outcomes of NATO enlargement, and regarding the Russian response to an expansion of the Alliance in case there is a "second wave" to include the Baltic states. Another source of instability are the remaining problems of Russo-Baltic relations in a wider context.

At the same time, the Baltic Sea states have unique opportunities for the creation of a regional security system. The diversity of the security models of individual countries, traditions of neutrality, different patterns of cooperation with Russia and important mutual economic interests may combine to make unnecessary the emergence of a NATO-centric regional security system or, at least, to mitigate

the negative consequences of NATO enlargement, but above all to work out a mechanism of all-inclusive security.

Making Russia a security partner is within reach. To achieve this goal, Russian interests and apprehensions should be taken seriously into account. By ensuring the security of the Baltic states in cooperation with the West but outside of NATO, by improving the Russian-Baltic relations in a cooperative regional context, by defining acceptable parameters of defence sufficiency in Kaliningrad in an atmosphere of non-provocative developments around it, by starting a new phase of European and regional arms control with a great deal of reliance on bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures, Russia and other countries of the Baltic region could open a large window of opportunities. The significance of this could go far beyond the regional dimension.

Notes

1. The commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Egorov, pointed out in one of his interviews that in 1985–1995 the number of servicemen in the Fleet had been reduced by half, the number of ships by two thirds, naval aviation by 60 percent. After the withdrawal from the Baltic states, the Fleet lost 80 percent of its bases (where 50 percent of the ships and all the submarines used to be based), 30 percent of the airfields (bases for up to 25 percent of the Fleet's air force), 80 percent of the system for shore surveillance, 64 percent of the ship-repairing and ship-building facilities. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,* no. 6 (1995), p. 19.
2. Evidence of that can be i. a. found in significant changes in the language of Russian political declarations concerning the Baltic states during 1997. During his visit to Helsinki in March 1997 Russian President B. Yeltsin said that Russia should show good will to establish contacts with the Baltic states, to improve relations, not just to express complaints with regard to the treatment of the Russophones. Quoted in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* 25 March 1997. Even on the issue of the Baltic membership in NATO, Russian Vice-Prime Minister V.Serov, representing Russia at the Madrid summit of the Alliance, pointed out that Russia would do everything it could to create a climate of confidence in relations with the Baltic states in order to make a new wave of enlargement not necessary. *Segodnya,* 11 July 1997. These and similar statements are in deep contrast with those about "sanctions," "inadmissibility" etc., which could be heard earlier.
3. This chapter does not intend to analyze the problem itself which is redundant due to large amount of literature. (See, for ex., Stamers, G., "The Ethnic Issue in Baltic-Russian Relations," eds. Lejiņš, A. and Bleiere, D., *The Baltic states: Search for Security* (Riga, 1996), pp. 186–198; Stranga, A., "Baltic-Russian Relations: 1995 – Beginning of 1997," eds. Lejiņš, A. and Ozoliņa, Ž., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: the Baltic Perspective* (Riga, 1997) pp. 202–207). What is important to emphasize here is that neither side doubts that there is a problem, although the interpretations differ.
4. On this particular issue see Wellman, Ch., "Kalinigradsky anklav na pereputye" (Kaliningrad enclave at the Cross-roads), *Kalinigradskaya oblast – segodnya, zavtra.* Occasional papers of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, no. 5, pp. 50–81.
5. The issue of potential Baltic membership in NATO has attracted a much larger public attention in Russia as compared with any other single issue of the Russian-Baltic relations. See for ex., Maslov, I., "Baltiysky aspekt rasshirenia NATO" (The Baltic Aspect of NATO Enlargement), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* 16 Apr. 1997 and Kuchinskaya, M., "Ochered v NATO" (The Line to Join NATO), *Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie,* no. 12 (1997). On the official level Russia expressed satisfaction with the fact that at the Madrid summit the Baltic states had not been invited to NATO and that the problem had been postponed at least for a two-year period.
6. The difference is that the Baltic states are not willing to accept such security guarantees from Russia as Ukraine did in 1994. On the other hand, this could establish an outstanding precedent for including Russia into the mechanism of regional security cooperation.
7. For the Russian official approach to the issue see the article of Rear-Admiral V. Kuznetsov, Head of the Department of International Treaties at the Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Russian Defence Ministry: Kuznetsov, V., "Trudnye resheniya" (Hard Decisions), *Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie,* no. 24 (1997).

NO LOVE IS LOST – RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

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Introduction

Russian-Baltic relations are vital not only to the security of both sides but also to the neighbours around the Baltic Sea and in all Europe. Tension obviously hampers cooperation and economic growth, whereas relaxation promotes such developments. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's relations with the reborn Baltic states have – on the whole – slowly been normalized. A major event was the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania in 1993 and (with small exceptions) a year later from Estonia and Latvia, where they had been the main security concern until then. Thereafter several bilateral agreements in different fields were signed with Russia, and the exchange of official visits grew.

However, problems still remain due to divergent interests and goals. Since Russia is by far the biggest and most important actor in comparison with the Baltic states, this country deserves most attention here.

Russia's interests with regard to her small western neighbours must be seen against the backdrop of her general foreign policy. Judging from recent statements by President Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister since 1996, Yevgeny Primakov, Russia's main goals at present are: firstly, to have a multipolar world, which is not dominated by one power centre (read the United States) and in which Russia plays an important role; secondly, to strengthen her sphere of influence in the whole ex-Soviet space, promote integration there and keep other powers out of it.[1] The Baltic states fall into this zone.

However, different from all other ex-Soviet republics, they are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and are not considered to belong to the so-called "near abroad" as distinct from the "distant abroad." On the other hand, nor are they ascribed the same status as Finland or Central European states like Poland.[2]

The Baltic states are thus placed in a grey zone between the CIS and Europe, two areas of strategic concern for Russia.

This circumstance serves to explain why many analysts and politicians in both Russia and abroad find Russia's policy vis-à-vis the Baltic states inconsistent and call for a long-term conception.[3] Apparently to remedy this problem, President Yeltsin's press service in February 1997 issued what was called "new long-term policy guidelines," listing the following steps, by order of priority, to achieve friendly relations with the Baltic states:

1. Establishment of national security by preventing the Baltic states from joining NATO;
2. Protection of [Russian] compatriots' rights in the Baltic states;
3. Development of economic ties;
4. Legalization of Russian borders with the Baltic states;
5. Liquidation of criminal threats from Baltic territory;
6. Development of cultural and information exchange.[4]

Dropping the last two items, I will address these issues one by one, analysing the arguments for the Russian standpoint, the means that are applied or recommended to achieve the ends, and also the problems and restrictions which the Russians identify. This means that also the views and measures of the Baltic states will be expounded. The questions are intertwined and overlapping. An effort will be made to present both the official Russian standpoints and various views among the opposition and the researchers.

Keeping the Balts outside NATO

Russian stonewalling

The Baltic states first strove for a neutral status as a means to achieve independence from the crumbling Soviet Union. When that goal was reached, they more and more sought to bolster their security by becoming members of NATO and other Western security organizations. Lithuania taking the lead in January 1994, they officially asked for membership, as NATO geared up to a decision on admitting new members in Eastern Europe in July 1997.

If Russia since 1993 strongly opposed NATO's eastern "expansion" through the inclusion of ex-members of the defunct Warsaw Pact like Poland,[5] she even more vehemently opposed the ex-Soviet Baltic states joining NATO. According to the February 1997 Guidelines, this would become a "serious barrier between them and Russia and have a

most negative impact" on long-term cooperation in the region, and therefore the preservation of their non-bloc status was recommended.

Besides that NATO was perceived to encroach on traditional Russian territory, which obviously hurt the national pride and prestige, this opposition mainly stemmed from the perception that NATO still was a military threat to Russia. The official Military Doctrine of 1993, which has not been replaced yet, mentioned the extension of military blocks "to the detriment of the military security interests of the Russian Federation" among the sources of external war danger. The increase of military forces at the Russian borders to levels upsetting the balance, preparing them for attack on Russia, attacking objects at the Russian borders and restricting the functions of Russian strategic warning systems (like in Skrunda, Latvia until 1998), and moving foreign troops to neighbouring states – all these cases were said to be direct military threats to Russia.[6] This has a direct bearing on Baltic NATO membership and resembles the Russian arguments against NATO's eastern enlargement in general.

The Russian media closely monitored Baltic relations with NATO, especially the military contacts. Inter-Baltic military cooperation like the BALTBAT and the BALTRON units, weapons acquisitions in the West, and Partnership for Peace exercises – like the one in Estonia in July 1997 – were (largely correctly) seen as preparations for NATO membership.[7]

Russian military experts claimed that NATO might place a mobile force and a big fleet in the Baltic states.[8] Communist Party leader Zyuganov concluded that the Founding Act agreement with NATO did not give any guarantees against the deployment of nuclear weapons or NATO troops near Russia. The placing of tactical air forces from the USA and its allies in Poland and then in the Baltics would make the European part of Russia totally defenceless, and the fate of the Bosnian Serbs would be repeated.[9] This attitude was spread across the political spectrum. Not only Anton Surikov, a researcher at an obscure defence research institute and popular in national-patriotic circles, but even the sober-minded economist and *Izvestiya* editor Otto Latsis compared Baltic NATO membership with the placing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962.[10]

Special concern was felt for the plight of the Russian enclave Kaliningrad, which would be encircled by NATO if both Poland and Lithuania became members. Thus Russian Security Council secretary Ivan Rybkin, while visiting Kaliningrad in May 1997, assured that it would never become NATO territory. It would be impermissible to allow NATO superiority in the region and restrictions on the activities of the Russian Baltic Fleet, he said.[11]

In order to preclude Baltic NATO membership, Russia staged a diplomatic offensive vis-à-vis NATO, particularly the USA, not to accept them and even to get a guarantee against it.[12] Yeltsin threatened to reconsider relations with NATO and not to sign the Founding Act that was being negotiated in the spring of 1997.[13] In the end Russia signed it, but instead her leaders threatened to tear it up, if the Baltic states became members later.[14] The Baltic states were not admitted at NATO's Madrid summit in July, but Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was "alerted" by the fact that they were mentioned in the context of future enlargement.

Other Russian devices to prevent Baltic NATO membership were the constant talk of "discrimination" of the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia and the sudden refusal in late 1996 to sign border agreements. The resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts are conditions for prospective members of NATO.[15] Further, many threats were made to impose economic sanctions.(More on these moves in the following.)

There have been more ominous threats as well. On the official side, Deputy Foreign Minister Krylov in September 1995 warned of both political, economic and military steps like increasing forces at the borders, "which may cause various incidents." This was accompanied by large-scale military manoeuvres along the north-western border.[16] Especially Russian officers, communists and extreme nationalists have threatened with military measures and to reinforce Kaliningrad. The notorious Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky once told an Estonian newspaper that he accepted that Estonia joined NATO but warned that it would then be a territory, where NATO troops would fight Russian partisans.[17] Most extreme is the above-mentioned Surikov, who has suggested that Russia should attack the Baltic states, if they joined NATO.[18] He could not exclude the use of "pre-emptive force against militarized nationalist units" on ex-Soviet territory and advocated the creation of special mobile forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons.[19]

Russian concessions

This stiff Russian opposition to Baltic NATO membership has, however, been modified by concessions and compromises. There is a disparity between words and deeds, so that many threats have proved

empty.[20] For instance, the erection of a "serious barrier" between the Baltic states and Russia, which the February Guidelines cautioned about if the Balts joined NATO, is probably welcomed by most Balts.

Actually there seems to exist a growing realization in the ruling circles and the intellectual elite in Russia that threats and reprisals can be counterproductive and reinforce the Baltic desire to join NATO. Thus Russia signed the Founding Act with NATO even though it did not preclude NATO enlargement, but rather facilitated it. Yeltsin's academic Council for Foreign and Security Policy rejected reprisals and threats, underlined the strategic need of good relations with the West and advised an active rapprochement to the Baltic states disregarding unpleasant symptoms of "child disease" in them. The Council instead recommended Russia to support the resistance within NATO against eastern extension.[21] Following this cue, officials have pointed out that admitting the Baltic states would be an economic burden on NATO members.[22] Others argue that Baltic NATO membership is a risk to NATO itself, because if the states were attacked, they could only be defended with nuclear weapons.[23]

Officially, the Russian leaders reject the use of force against the Baltic states and now call for a dialogue with them. Foreign Minister Primakov in May 1997 declared that Russia had no intention to threaten or occupy the Baltic states, which had a right to security guarantees "with or without Russia, quite as they prefer." There would be no repetition of Czechoslovakia 1968, he said. Alluding to 1940, Yeltsin similarly declared willingness to guarantee the security of the Baltic states in order to dispel fears that Russia would repeat the injustice which Russia did to them some decades ago.[24]

Thus Russia has repeatedly offered non-aggression pacts and security agreements to the Baltic states – either to each or all together.[25] In September 1997 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin spelled out this idea by proposing confidence-building measures such as a military "hot line" between Kaliningrad and the Baltic states for air and sea security, advance information on military exercises (including units out-of area), exchange of naval visits, no-exercise areas in the Baltic Sea, a common air surveillance over the Baltic Sea area (including Poland, Finland and Scandinavia).[26] However, the Baltic states rejected all these proposals, partly because such pacts had been concluded before 1940 but were not honoured, partly because they preferred to be involved with Western states.

Another alternative to Baltic NATO membership, floated by Russia, was security guarantees together with NATO.[27] A rather sinister interpretation of this, which was advanced by a researcher, was the idea of creating a triangular NATO-Russia-Baltics military cooperation, which could lead not only to common peacekeeping and anti-terrorist forces, but also to common use of Baltic naval bases, etc.[28]

Furthermore, Russia did not object to the wish of the Baltic states to join the European Union or other European organizations. The Foreign Minister in July 1997 even accepted security guarantees only from the West – that is if it did not amount to NATO membership.[29]

Another alternative to Baltic NATO membership was to promote collective security. The main Russian idea is an all-European security system, based on the OSCE, in which Russia would have a veto power, or a European security charter. If NATO would be the basis of a European security system, the influential foreign policy expert Aleksey Pushkov concluded that it first would have to undergo serious changes and Russia become a virtual member. In that case Russia would more calmly regard NATO membership for states at her borders, he wrote.[30]

Regional solutions are also proposed. Yeltsin's security advisor Yury Baturin in April 1996 dusted off the old Soviet idea of a nuclear-free zone from the Baltics to the Black Sea, guaranteed by both NATO and Russia – with a reference to Olof Palme.[31] This idea was then picked up by the Belarussian President Lukashenka and endorsed by Yeltsin.

In October 1997, when Lithuanian President Brazauskas visited him, Yeltsin proposed either unilateral guarantees, international agreements with each or all Baltic states, multilateral agreements with major Western states, or a regional security zone, including the Nordic states.[32] The last point, apparently including neutral Sweden and Finland, was an innovation, which did not win favour with the latter. The Balts did not accept these alternatives to NATO membership either.

Russia also favours cooperation around the Baltic, e.g. in the Council of Baltic Sea States.[33] Non-allied Sweden and Finland are held up as models for the Baltic states, and Baltic cooperation with them is seen as preferable to NATO involvement. Yeltsin's decision to pay an official visit Sweden in December 1997 for the first time should be seen as a step to promote this idea.

The independent Russian defence expert Dmitry Trenin could even accept Scandinavian-Baltic ties in the military field, and

thought that regional ties around the Baltic were the best chance for Russia herself to integrate with the European Union.

Trenin further regretted that Russia had not yet found the correct tone in her relations with small neighbours, neglecting the "traumas" they had from the times of the Russian and Soviet empires.[34] Other liberal writers have stressed that if Russia ceased to oppose NATO enlargement so strongly and to see it as a potential enemy, the wish for enlargement would abate.[35] That is the crux of the matter.

Thus Russia has consistently resisted Baltic NATO membership and clearly intends to do so also in the future. But gradually the ruling elite has made concessions and compromises and begun to view other, less far-reaching Baltic agreements with the West in a more benevolent way. The fact that the Baltic states were not invited to become NATO members along with Poland, Czechia and Hungary in the first wave of extension may be interpreted as a Russian success and an opportunity for Russia to put more pressure so as to avoid the Baltics being considered for a second wave. But it can also give rise to relief and relaxation in Russia, facilitating the solution of other, less dramatic problems. To these we must now turn.

Supporting Russian "compatriots"

Criticism and demands

The situation of the Russians in Estonia and Latvia[36] is a paramount domestic problem in these states, which has been much exploited by Russia ever since they were re-established – as just mentioned – partly as a way to keep the states out of NATO.[37] In connection with the upsurge of nationalism, the cause of the "compatriots" (as they were often called) was first marshalled by Russian nationalists and Communists turned nationalists, but also officials and liberal groups climbed the bandwagon. The Western-oriented Foreign Minister Kozyrev, at a UN conference in February 1992, gave the question of Russians abroad a very high priority, and so did President Yeltsin in his speech to the Federal Assembly in March 1997, where he singled out Estonia and Latvia for special criticism.[38] Yeltsin has talked of "ethnic cleansing" there and Kozyrev warned of a new Yugoslavia.[39] Even the above-mentioned academic Council for Foreign Policy would "of course" never ignore violations of human rights in the Baltic states.[40]

Specifically, Russia criticized the Estonian and Latvian laws, which granted citizenship only to citizens (residents) of the pre-war states and their descendants, for discriminating hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Russians, making up one third of the populations, who were born or had lived there for a long time.[41] The Baltic argument that Russians through immigration were about to become majorities was discarded by stating that individuals who came there in Soviet times could not be blamed for the demographic changes.

Russia instead wanted the so-called "zero-option," i.e. citizenship for all residents, which was accepted in all ex-Soviet republics, including Lithuania, and also the possibility of double citizenship. Estonia and Latvia were also accused of violating agreements with Russia of January 1991, which guaranteed the right to keep or choose citizenship, even though the Russian parliament had not ratified them. Other common arguments were that the Baltic governments yielded to the nationalist radicals and helped the nationalists in Russia at the expense of the democrats.

The laws on acquiring citizenship through naturalization were lambasted, because the language requirements were set too high.[43] The states did not provide language education as promised, especially in Russian-dominated parts, and there was a lack of books, teachers etc. Private language education became a lucrative business.[44] Faults were also found with Latvia's original requirement of fifteen years residence, then the proposal of extremely low quotas every year, and the final decision in 1994 on gradual naturalization by age-groups. This all made the process very slow and spurred people to choose Russian citizenship instead.[45]

It was further observed that Russian non-citizens in Estonia could not participate in parliamentary or presidential elections, have high posts in the administration or judiciary, have military or police posts, or own land. In Latvia, 68 differences in rights between citizens and non-citizens were identified.[46]

Related points of criticism were the introduction of grey aliens passports for non-citizens in Estonia, which allegedly were not recognized in the world, the need to apply for time-limited residence permits, which was necessary for acquiring any passport and without which one could easily be deported, as well as the long delays in getting both. The abolition of internal Soviet passports (allegedly) deprived many people of rights such as to get unemployment grants, to get language tuition, to invite foreign relatives, and cross borders.

The latter especially affected the many Russians in the eastern parts involved in trade with Russia.[47]

Claiming that actually Russian was spoken by more people (also Balts and others), and that the Balts aimed at creating mono-linguistic states, the Russians criticized that Estonian and Latvian became the only state languages mandatory in administration and business, and that the use of Russian was penalized.[48] Secondary schools and gymnasia were also obliged to go over from Russian to Estonian/Latvian as the language of instruction.[49] National minorities enjoyed cultural autonomy only if they were citizens. The restitution of the Estonian Orthodox church with its property from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch in Moscow to Constantinople evoked sharp protests even from Russia's leadership.[50]

The aforementioned presidential Guidelines of February 1997 summarized the Russian demands as follows: Citizenship to all Russian-speaking permanent residents at the time of the declaration of sovereignty in Estonia and Latvia, the streamlining of naturalization processes, citizenship on the strength of birth, the right to family reunion, the end of oppression of the Orthodox congregation in Estonia.[51] As a way to solve the ethnic problems, Russia proposed joint working groups, but the Balts declined this as interference in internal affairs.[52]

But the Balts feared that Russia also has more far-reaching goals for her "compatriots." This fear was fomented by Yeltsin's human rights advisor Nikolay Monakhov, who at a visit to Tallinn stated that Russians in compact settlements in Estonia "have the right to self-determination and eventual statehood."[53] Such settlements are to be found not only in north-eastern Estonia and eastern Latvia but also in the capitals and other big towns. The Russians in Narva and other Russian-dominated places have demanded autonomy since Estonia became independent.

Monakhov's idea reminded a little of Zhirinovsky, who after his party won the December 1993 elections went so far as to say that Estonia should be included in Russia "because there are Russians there," and Latvia too, since "over half the population is Russian," whereas a smaller Lithuania could be maintained. Like-wise, Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov in 1996, after his party became the biggest in the Duma election of December 1995, threatened Estonia with the secession of the Russian-speaking Narva region via a referendum.[54]

Pressure from Russia

Both the national-patriotic opposition and official institutions have taken a row of measures to achieve their aims. One is to strengthen ties with the Russians in Estonia and Latvia. The Communist "Spiritual Heritage" foundation has chapters in the Baltic states. The nationalist party Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), where the popular General Alexander Lebed was figurehead in the election campaign of 1995, was most active in Estonia and included leading Russians there.[55]

The State Duma created a Council of Compatriots from Abroad, and official organs and action plans were worked out. For instance, the Foreign Ministry in February 1994 outlined a programme of measures, including radio stations, help to Russian enterprise, and evacuation plans (!).[56] A governmental programme of May 1996 set out to preserve the cultural independence (*samobytnost*) and manifold ties with Russia of the diasporas by offering financial aid, advice and monitoring of their situation.[57]

In February 1997 a decision was taken that emigration from the CIS and the Baltic states should not be facilitated and that the compatriots should stay as bearers of Russian influence in their countries and even promote the idea of territorial autonomy.[58] Another obvious reason for this decision is that Russia due to her economic crisis has little resources to receive more emigrants.

At the same time Russia helped all former Soviet citizens to become citizens of Russia and get Russian passports. The Russian embassy in Tallinn for example took care of this and sent out officials to other towns to facilitate the process. In 1997 Russia refused to recognize Latvian non-citizens passports, apparently to pressure the Russians to take Russian citizenship.[59] As a result, more Baltic Russians have become citizens in Russia than in Estonia and Latvia, and Estonia has more people with Russian citizenship than any state except Russia.[60] A minority of these Russians participated in the Duma elections and mostly voted for nationalist and communist parties, though Russia complained that Estonia obstructed these elections.[61]

Just as in the NATO question, Russian politicians further tried to influence the Estonian and Latvian authorities by threats and linkages in other fields. Zhirinovsky rejected the use of military force to protect the Russians in Estonia, but recommended an economic blockade, if the Russians in Estonia did not get the right to vote.[62]

Economic threats have often come from the Duma and the administration (more on this later). In January 1997 Foreign Minister Primakov both threatened with economic sanctions and spoke out against signing a border treaty with Estonia as measures against the discrimination of the Russians. The liberal *Nezavisimaya gazeta* found this step very useful both for the compatriots and Russia's prestige and did not expect the West to support the Estonians because of their weak arguments.[63]

Official Russia has often also resorted to military pressure. In June 1993, when the Estonia alien's law was taken, Yeltsin reminded of "geopolitical realities" and threatened with "all necessary steps." Troops were moved at the border, and the pullout of troops was stopped in both Estonia and Latvia.[64] The official military doctrine of November 1993 ranged suppression of citizens of Russia in other states among the sources of war danger. Even ex-Foreign Minister Kozyrev in April 1995 blamed Estonia and Latvia and said that all methods including force could be used to protect compatriots abroad.[65]

The presence of Russian troops in Estonia and Latvia (until September 1994) was also used for pressure. Russia demanded not only citizenship for military pensioners (which was partly granted) but also for all "Russian-speaking" residents as a condition for withdrawal.[66] The head of the Russian negotiations with Latvia still thinks the presence of Russian troops helped restraining the Latvians, claiming that no protection of the compatriots has been possible after that.[67]

Further, ever since 1992 Russia tried to influence the Balts indirectly by appealing to the West and international organizations, charging them of violating human rights. Foreign Ministry official Valery Loshchinin, for one, referred to the UN Declaration, according to which everybody has a right to citizenship, and nobody may be deprived of it. The presidential Guidelines assured that the enumerated demands rested on European human rights standards and were no interference in Baltic internal affairs. Russia was interested in the widest possible use of the cooperation mechanisms of the UN, EU; OSCE, and CBSS (Council of Baltic Sea States) to solve existing problems.

Indeed, many Western and international delegations visited Estonia and Latvia. The OSCE established missions to monitor human rights in Estonia and Latvia, and the CBSS decided to institute a minority rights ombudsman. Language instruction centres for Russians were supported by Western states like the USA, Sweden and Finland. Criticism was directed at Estonia and Latvia, which

was quoted with relish in Russia.[68] Latvia and Estonia have been told that a widening of the "naturalization window" may become a condition for EU membership.[69] Russia helped keep Latvia out of the Council of Europe until early 1995.

Restraining factors

This picture of harsh critique and constant pressure in the question of the Baltic Russians, however, has to be juxtaposed with an analysis of the countervailing factors. Just as with regard to the NATO question, threats and linkage tactics can be counterproductive for Russia. Thus, Latvia in 1994 with Western backing argued that the withdrawal of the Russian troops was a condition for improving the lot of the Russian-speaking inhabitants, and Russia eventually had to give in.[70]

Support from Russia for (often extreme) compatriots can also impair the situation for those Baltic Russians, who are already integrated into society or are in the process of being so. For example, Nikolay Maspanov, head of the "Russian Party" in Estonia and member of parliament, is quoted saying that economic sanctions like higher customs tariffs would only hurt small and medium-scale trade, which most of the Russian-speaking inhabitants are engaged in.[71] As a sign of such realization on the top level, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Serov softened Primakov's threat of sanctions against Estonia in January 1997 by explaining that Russia very rarely resorts to sanctions in the hope that her partners would use only civilized methods. Remarking that sanctions would hurt "ordinary people" the (Communist) Duma speaker Seleznev also preferred negotiations to solve the ethnic issue.[72]

Another problem is that of economic resources, which as mentioned are very scarce in Russia. Russian and other observers note that in practice very little money and effort is spent on supporting the compatriots in the Baltics.[73] Two random examples from the Moscow press: the Russian embassy in Tallinn has no department for work with the compatriots yet and is criticized for slow processing of documents.[74] The Russian schools in Estonia do not get books from a publishing house in Russia, even though the state has paid for them long ago, so Estonia has had to produce new ones translated from Estonian.[75] Thus the Russian complaints of insufficient Baltic funding are hollow.

Despite all talk of "discrimination" in Estonia and Latvia, officials in Russia were aware that the living conditions and prospects of the

Russians were better there than Russia, and noted that the numbers of Russians leaving Estonia and Latvia are infinitely lower than those leaving, for instance, the less democratic and stable Caucasian and Central Asian states.[76] As noted above, Russia did not advise the Baltic Russians to go home and has endorsed their wish to get citizenship in the Baltic states.[77] In fact, the Russian government's programme on supporting compatriots abroad aims first of all at facilitating their voluntary integration into the new states, while (*pri*) preserving their culture and ties with Russia.[78]

Still, the liberal economist Otto Latsis has suggested that Russia – just like Britain when her empire crumbled – should help those who want to move to Russia, which would alleviate her serious demographic problems (with sinking population figures) and be the best way to make the Balts take positive steps.[79]

Nor was the Russian human rights campaign in the West any clear success. The Baltic states could retort that under international law, they were not obliged to give citizenship to occupants, which the Russians, especially the military, indisputably were in Soviet times. Further, Estonia and Latvia themselves referred their laws to European organs for review and made modifications according to the criticism. Both states were after all admitted into the Council of Europe before Russia. Russian officials soon started to accuse the West of using double standards with relation to the Baltic Russians, and of giving preference to its geopolitical interest in the region.[80]

The independent analyst Dmitry Trenin, on the other hand, concluded that the demand of citizenship for all Baltic Russians is hardly realistic and that the possibilities for softening the immigrant legislation are practically non-existent. The sources of international pressure were also exhausted. Therefore he recommended Russia to move from general political accusations to presenting individual, but typical cases of law violations before courts so as to limit bureaucratic arbitrariness.[81] This is already being done to some extent.

Actually, the citizenship laws are rather liberal at least in comparison with some West European states, for example Germany. Foreign ministry official Loshchinin admitted that the Estonian and Latvian laws correspond to international standards at least when applied to persons from other countries.[82] Thus, Estonia allowed non-citizens to vote in local elections after five years' residence. In 1993 the Russian parties in fact won a majority in Russian-dominated parts, and almost half the seats in Tallinn were taken by Russians, since many Estonians abstained from voting. President Meri

assembled a Roundtable of non-citizens, and an Assembly representing the Russians was registered and promised a say on drafting laws affecting them. In Latvia, a similar Union of Non-Citizens was formed.

Further, the citizenship laws were not "ethnic" per se: about 100 000 Russians became citizens in Estonia since they or their ancestors had been citizens in 1940, and at least 300 000 Russians and other non-Letts became citizens in Latvia on the same ground. Thus ethnic Russians do participate in the political life, sit in parliament, and have their own political parties. Also other immigrated groups like Ukrainians, and even ethnic Balts, have difficulties in getting citizenship.

Concerning naturalization, Estonia made some exceptions for old people and children with regard to language requirements, and Latvia shortened the residence requirement from fifteen to five years. In Latvia, only a fraction of those few eligible to apply for citizenship actually did, citing reasons as lack of language skills, fear of military service, wish for easy travel to Russia. In 1994, both Latvia and Estonia granted residence permits to thousands of retired military personnel. Ethnic Russians are even allowed to remain in the police force, and in Russian-dominated parts the Russian language is still often spoken also in semi-official circumstances. There are still Russian newspapers, radio and TV programmes in Estonia and Latvia. Etc.[83]

Concerning the "Estonianization" of Russian schools, the press in Russia noted that at least the deadline was postponed from the year 2000 to 2007. The process was gradual depending on the number of Russian pupils and available financial resources. Primary schools were not yet affected, and every national group was free to open private schools. Indeed, smaller national groups tended to choose either Estonian or Russian instead of their own languages. State colleges have even started new groups with instruction in Russian. In Southeast Latvia, many Latvian children still attend Russian-spoken schools, the only schools in many places.[84] In Russia, however – the Russian press had to admit – hundreds of thousands of Balts scattered all over Russia since Soviet times have no national schools, newspapers etc.[85]

Finally, it should be noted that also the Russians have to bear some blame for their problems and the Baltic distrust against them. As observed by Peeter Volkonskiy, a poet apparently of mixed Estonian-Russian origin, a big people like the Russian cannot understand a small people's fear of extinction, as the Balts did at the end of the Soviet period, and their wish to restore an ethnic balance.[86] In

1991 they found it to hard to accept that they had suddenly become a minority in a small state instead of being a majority in a vast country. Russians further found it perfectly natural for others to learn their great language and were reluctant to learn the small Baltic languages and to adapt to their culture.[87] Indeed, besides being occupied by a foreign army for fifty years, all Balts were forced to learn Russian and were discriminated against as regards jobs, flats, schools, while the Russians were privileged. The solution to this problem now as suggested by Volkonskiy could be integration of Estonia into Europe, since not only the Estonians but also a considerable part of the Russians has a European orientation.[88]

Unfortunately, the awareness of these mental problems are not widespread in Russia, not even in the ruling circles. True, there are some signs of a more flexible and practical Russian approach to the question of compatriots in the Baltics besides those already cited. In spite of all problems, Andrey Fedorov, a member of Yeltsin's foreign policy council, has proposed regular summit meetings with the Baltic states like those with Finland, for example, and that a differentiated approach should be adopted to each of them.[89] Maybe Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's participation in a meeting of Central and East European states in Vilnius in August 1997 should be seen as a step in the same direction. At this meeting, President Meri praised Chernomyrdin for being so well informed and gave up his resistance to setting up a commission with Russia to discuss, among other things, the ethnic question.[90] The row over Orthodox church property in Estonia also seems to be coming to a close.[91]

On balance, however, the ethnic relations in Estonia and Latvia remain a big and very real problem which politicians in Russia will long be tempted to exploit both for internal reasons and as a means to keep the Balts out of NATO. The Balts are bound to remain extremely wary of this combined internal and external threat to their newly regained independence from the former occupant.

Developing economic relations

Business as usual

As the third most important goal in Russian policy toward the Baltic states, the presidential Guidelines mentioned the development of economic ties on the basis of mutual profitability, and advocated strengthened border area ties and more favourable transport conditions for Kaliningrad.[92] When he was in Vilnius, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin proposed trilateral investment activities by companies and banks from Russia, Baltic Sea states and the European Union for the development of the energy sector, ports, projects in modern technology, and the banking sector. The former chief negotiator Zotov suggested that Russia could offer not solely guaranteed orders for Latvian agricultural products but also preferential deliveries of tractors, fertilizers and automobiles.[93]

Appreciating the coincidence of economic reforms in Russia and the Baltics, Minister of Foreign Trade Oleg Davydov in 1996 noted that Russia remained the main trading partner of the Baltic states, accounting for about 30 percent of their total turnover, whereas their share of Russian foreign trade was 2.7 percent. Russia still was the main partner of Latvia and Lithuania.[94] Since 1994 the mutual trade had grown. Russia covered from 50 to 100 percent of the Baltic need of fuel, electric energy, metals, chemicals, wood, spare parts and special production lines,[95] whereas the Baltic states exported for example engines, foodstuff and computer technology to Russia. Thanks to their geographic location and developed transport system (ports, railways, roads, pipelines), they played an important role in transiting Russian export to Western Europe, something which gave them a large part of their currency income. With regard to Lithuania, Russia was specifically interested in stable supply for the Kaliningrad region, Davydov explained.[96]

Indeed, as Russia shifted export from the CIS to the West in order to earn hard currency at world market prices, oil export became her most important budget income, and transit through the Baltics grew, Ventspils accounting for 30 percent of the total.[97] Russian energy giants like Gazprom, Lukoil and Yukos also became more active in the Baltics, providing oil for the Lithuanian refinery at Mažeikiai, opening filling stations in Latvia and Lithuania, and engaging in the ports. Russian export through Klaipeda expanded at the expense of Kaliningrad.[98] Big Moscow banks established themselves in the Baltics, often linking up with local Russians there, sometimes in business of shady character. Also regions and republics in the Russian Federation signed agreements with the Baltic states.[99] The Baltic governments and business communities (Balts and Russians) thus are interested in trade with Russia, too. Estonia was the first to take away customs barriers for Russian transit export and, the Tallinn port was expanded.[100] Indeed, such economic interdependence or mutual profit and vulnerability is quite natural among neighbouring market economies.

Russian pressure and its consequences

There are, however, several problems hampering mutually beneficial economic relations. A major problem is the widespread belief in Russia that Baltic economic dependence on Russia could be used for political ends. As noted above, nationalists and Communists in the Duma were particularly inclined to such thinking. Zhirinovsky thought that without Russia's sources of energy and infrastructure, Estonia would be annihilated as a state, so therefore Russia would never use force. The Estonians would soon come begging to join Russia. Alternatively, if they could not pay their debts, Russia would annex Estonia as compensation for losses (!).[101]

The Russian government was more careful. For example, Foreign Ministry spokesman Loshchinin claimed that Russian transit cargo constituted 85 percent of Estonia's gross freight volume, which equalled 45 percent of its GDP, so if and when restrictions were to be imposed, the entire Estonian economy would be affected. He regretted that Russian regions had fallen prey to Estonian indirect approaches to them, unaware of their "discriminatory" legislation.[102] A favourite argument is that Estonia with little raw materials of her own has become the world's fifth exporter of non-ferrous metals.[103] The Balts were said to charge more for oil transit than Chechnya.[104] Ambassador Zotov maintained that 60–80 percent of the Baltic budget incomes derived from the transit and re-export of Russian cargo, and that the Latvian agricultural sector with the core Latvian population was extremely dependent on access to the Russian market. He observed the bank crisis in Latvia in 1995, and warned that when Russia again would become an economic power, she would not be indifferent to her compatriots there.[105]

More authoritatively, the February 1997 Guidelines complained that the opportunities of the transit and re-export of Russian goods, mainly fuels and non-ferrous metals, were often used by the Baltic states to the detriment of Russia, and drew the conclusion that state regulation and customs control had to be strengthened and transit channels to be diversified.[106]

As shown above, the Russian state has often used, or threatened with, economic sanctions for political purposes along these lines. When Estonia took her law on aliens, Russian gas deliveries were interrupted. Russia did not conclude (and to date has not concluded) a most-favoured-nation (MFN) agreement with Estonia, which meant that Estonian food export to Russia got double tariffs and shrank

considerably. An MFN agreement was signed with Latvia, but was not implemented, due to the citizenship question. The MFN agreement with Lithuania was not carried out until the latter accepted to prolong the old agreement on transit to Kaliningrad.[107]

In order to circumvent the Baltics, Russia decided to modernize her old ports and build new ones in the areas of Kaliningrad, Murmansk, and St Petersburg. An oil terminal was suggested for Primorsk in the Gulf of Finland. Furthermore, new transport links were arranged through Finland and Sweden, and suggestions were made to lay new railways, oil and gas pipelines directly from the Russian North to Finland and onwards. A new gas pipeline is already being built across Belarus.[108] (This can also be seen as a recognition of Baltic independence.) Further, Russia tried to play off the Baltic states against each other with regard to transit trade.[109]

However, as stated above, many sanctions were soon revoked and the threats of sanctions were often not carried out, because they were inefficient or backfired against Russia's interests and the Baltic Russians. They also undermined Russia's free trade principles. For example, the raising of rail tariffs for freight bound for Latvian and Estonian ports hurt Russian chemical industry most and did not help the Kaliningrad port. Estonia has the largest number of Russian banks and joint ventures, even though she has no MFN agreement with Russia.[110] The transit and re-export of Russian raw materials is mainly undertaken by companies from Russia and their local (often Russian) partners in the Baltics.

Further, building new ports in Russia costs a lot of scarce investment money and takes a long time, the ports of St Petersburg and Kaliningrad have to be modernized and reorganized, oil transport by land costs the double of sea transport, and road transport via Finland is also expensive.[111] That explains why Russian business in spite of everything has so far preferred the Baltic ports.

Most significant is the fact that Russian economic sanctions and redispositions strengthened the desire of the Baltic states to reorient their trade toward the West, to which they in all aspects wanted to belong. Amazing progress was attained. From above 90 percent of trade turnover with Russia in 1991, Estonia soon came down to below 20 percent, Latvia and Lithuania to 20–30 percent, and the process continues.[112] Estonian and Latvian leaders already in March 1994 declared that Russian sanctions did not worry them very much.[113] And even in 1990, when economic dependence was all but

total, Gorbachev's total embargo on Lithuania failed to make her abrogate the declaration of independence.

Estonia oriented itself chiefly toward her Nordic neighbours, Finland becoming her largest partner by far (18.4 percent of exports, 29.2 percent of imports in 1996), whereas Latvia and Lithuania shifted more toward EU states like Germany and Great Britain, and toward the USA. Inter-Baltic trade grew from close to nil – a typical pattern in Soviet times – to about ten per cent in some cases.[114] In 1994 the Baltics concluded a free trade agreement with the EU and actively strove for EU membership, which also has security political implications. Especially Estonia and Latvia – the countries with the worst ethnic problems – successfully implemented market economic reforms, which soon led to growth and increasing internal stability, despite frequent changes of governments. The EU Commission in July 1997 agreed that Estonia qualified for membership, and negotiations will start in 1998.[115]

In order to reduce their lingering dependence on Russian fuels and energy, the Baltic states started to import more and more from Arab states and Western Europe, and Western companies were invited to establish themselves. The Balts also made deals with republics in the Russian federation like oil-rich Tatarstan.[116] At home, at variance with previous environmental concerns in the late Soviet era, Estonia decided to go on exploiting its oil shells, Lithuania its nuclear-power station at Ignalina. Latvia and Lithuania renewed their interest in oil prospecting in the Baltic Sea, which led to economic border disputes. But they also started to build a common oil terminal at Butinge which could handle oil both from the West and Russia – with little Russian involvement. Energy consumption was also reduced by pricing and savings measures.[117]

Finally, Russian economic pressure was counteracted by the support the Western states gave to the Baltic states. As shown above they boosted trade with the latter, invested more money by far than Russia, and encouraged market reforms and inter-Baltic cooperation. A political reason for this probably is that many Western states prefer to integrate the Baltic states into the EU, which Russia officially accepts, rather than into NATO, at least at the outset.

On balance, Russian economic relations with the Baltic states are contradictory and often subjected to other considerations. Pressure tactics have proved inefficient or self-defeating. One can easily agree with Dmitry Trenin that Russia should learn not only to punish but also to reward the desired behaviour among the Balts, and that

regional ties with the Baltic states are the most promising.[118] Incidentally, this was in fact mentioned by the presidential Guidelines, as cited in the beginning of this subchapter, but then diluted or contradicted in action. The Baltics could also be an even better place than before for Russian tourists.[119]

Legalization of borders

Russia in defence of status quo

The fourth important goal of Russian foreign policy according to the presidential Guidelines, was the international legalization of the current Russian-Baltic borders. The most important problem was that Estonia and Latvia contested these borders, specifically the transfer of the Ivangorod-Petseri and the Abrene areas, respectively, to Soviet Russia in 1944 on the grounds that this took place after the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact and the following occupations and the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, which was not recognized by most Western states. When the Baltic states were restored, so were the borders of the inter-war republics as defined by the Tartu and Riga peace treaties of 1920, the Baltic states claimed. In these Soviet Russia had recognized their sovereignty and "voluntarily and for ever" given up all claims to their people and territory. This they wanted Russia to confirm again, something which would be another recognition of their independence.

Russia rejected these demands. Even though the Soviet People's Congress on Christmas Eve of 1989 had condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and Russian leaders occasionally deplored the illegal acts of Stalin's regime, Russia officially maintained that the incorporation of Estonia and Latvia and the following border changes had been legal, since the decisions had been taken by the parliaments, whereby the 1920 treaties were invalidated. The states had also recognized Russia's territorial integrity in an agreement with Yeltsin in January 1991 and in accepting the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 and other international agreements on the inviolability of borders. It was also emphasized that the contested areas now are totally dominated by Russians, which probably was one of the main reasons for the 1944 border changes in the first place.

The main rationale for the Russian standpoint, however, probably is that Russia faces border claims in other directions, so concessions

here could easily become precedents. For instance, Russia (the USSR) has long refused to cede four Kurile islands to Japan, even though this is a great power able to offer economic advantages.

Finally, there is a current practical consideration. The Baltic claims hindered the demarcation of the borders and thus also the control of the borders, across which so much Russian export went.[120] The afore-mentioned Guidelines perceived an increasing criminal threat from the Baltic states against Russia and wanted to pool efforts against illegal migration, organized crime and the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and strategic materials.[121] Several incidents have occurred, and blood has been shed.

Russia drove home her standpoint with various, sometimes rather brusque, methods. The Baltic claims were criticized in Western fora, but Baltic suggestions for the solving of the disputes by Western mediation or through the international court in the Hague were rejected. The claims were used as one of the pretexts for delaying the withdrawal of the Russian troops as long as they remained there. In July 1993, the Supreme Soviet, then in conflict with Yeltsin, renounced the Tartu peace treaty, which according to the Estonian foreign ministry meant that technically a state of war was proclaimed. In 1994 Yeltsin finally decided unilaterally to start demarcating the present border with Estonia. When visiting the Petseri region in November, he assured that not an inch of Russian land would be ceded and rejected negotiations about the border. It should become "a reliable shield" against foreign smugglers and foreign intelligence services.[122]

Russia's border problems with Lithuania are different from those with Estonia and Latvia. Although this state also restored the interwar republic, it did not dispute the borders that arose in connection with the Second World War. Stalin gave it the Vilna region back from Poland, when that state was divided with Hitler in 1939. As German East Prussia then was divided and the Königsberg region became part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR), Lithuania (then Soviet) regained the Memel (Klaipeda) region, which Hitler had seized in early 1939. Thus all Lithuanian governments recognized Russia's territorial integrity, and there only remained the problem of delimiting the border, especially on the Kuronian spit and the adjacent economic zone in the Baltic, where oil had been found.

However, ultra-nationalist Lithuanian groups claimed the Kaliningrad region, which they called "Lithuania Minor," on historic and

ethnic grounds. In connection with the pullout of Russian troops from Central Europe and the Baltic states via Kaliningrad, which enhanced the already strong military presence even further, the first President Vytautas Landsbergis demanded not only the demilitarization but also the "de-colonization" of the region. After he became leader of the nationalist opposition in 1992, he supported the autonomy strivings in the area and even talked of making it an independent state. Lithuanians also felt threatened by Russian military transit across the country, and the government, abetted by Landsbergis, imposed strict and costly controls.

Russia, of course, rejected all territorial demands and labelled the calls for demilitarization "interference in domestic affairs." The military and political importance of Kaliningrad as an integral part of Russia was stressed. But with time most Russian forces were transferred east, and the economic crisis hit the remaining forces, so that they could hardly be seen as a threat any more. The prospective expansion of NATO to include Poland and the Baltic states was instead seen as a menace to Kaliningrad.

Furthermore, military cargo to and from Kaliningrad went over to sea transport. In 1995 a compromise was reached on transit, acknowledging the Lithuanian right to control cargo and taking fees as before. The Kaliningrad region was a free economic zone from 1991. In 1996 a federal law transformed it into a Special Economic Zone under federal oversight but retaining some economic favours.[123]

Odnako (however)

However, both the Russian and the Baltic border policies are complex and undergoing change due to circumstances. The Russians did in fact make some demands. In 1990, Soviet President Gorbachev had demanded that if the Baltic states became independent, areas of compact national groups should be able to opt out by referenda.[124] As we have seen, Baltic Russians, nationalist opposition leaders in Russia like Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov and even some of Yeltsin advisors still talk of both autonomy, self-determination and return to Russia for the Russian-dominated parts, which surely amounts to border claims of sorts.

In fact, Russia did not quite spare Lithuania. When she declared her independence, Soviet Belarus with Moscow's blessing raised demands on the Vilnius region, and Russian nationalists questioned the transfer of Klaipeda from Kaliningrad to Lithuania. The border

agreement was not signed despite years of negotiations and small problems, and when it finally came close in 1997, not only extreme writers like Surikov but also the new Governor of the Kaliningrad region, Leonid Gorbenko, protested.[125]

Worse still, the majority of the Duma in October 1997 took a resolution promising not to ratify the agreement, arguing that since Lithuania renounced the 1940 annexation and (allegedly) all acts passed by the USSR after that as well, the transfer of Klaipeda was rejected too. The Duma recalled that Lithuanian politicians were still raising claims on the Kaliningrad region, and that Russian-speakers suffered from discrimination in Lithuania, too. Since Lithuania aspired to NATO membership, which could open airfields and the Klaipeda port for NATO use against Russia, the signing of the border agreement would remove one of the last obstacles to that.[126] The latter probably was the primary cause.

Concerning the question of transit across Lithuania, Russia wanted as free and cheap a passage as possible, sometimes talking of a "corridor." As noted earlier, Russia managed to get somewhat laxer rules of transit by employing economic blackmail; she also tried to play out Poland as an alternative, and incidents occurred from time to time.[127] The just-mentioned Duma address advised the President to link the border treaty to the transit, which cost too much, and to aim at a transit deal similar to what the Western powers once had with respect to West Berlin.[128] According to the Washington analyst Paul Goble, there is also a risk that Poland's accession to NATO may reinforce Russian demands for transit across Lithuania.[129]

In fairness to the Lithuanian ultra-nationalists, who raised demands on Russia, it must be added that they were very few, they rejected violence and had a long-term perspective. Landsbergis consistently denied that his demands actually amounted to territorial claims.

With regard to the more troublesome cases of Estonia and Latvia, it must be noted that most of their leaders of course realized that Russia would hardly yield territory to them. They understood that retrieving areas dominated by Russians would impair the states' ethnic balance even further, and also be an economic liability those areas being generally poorer than the average in Estonia and Latvia. Also Estonia and Latvia had an interest in border delimitation and stricter border controls, not least in relation to the Scandinavian states, which demanded the latter in return for granting visa-free travel. Moreover, unfixed borders were a problem for the Baltic border defence, which is the main military service being developed with Western assistance. Nor did the Western states support the Baltic claims.

After the withdrawal of the Russian troops in the summer of 1994, which the Balts in their turn had used as a condition for a compromise, the fear of Russia abated in the public opinion and the leaders began to talk of normalizing relations with Russia. Practical steps were taken to solve problems at the borders, first by Latvia. The Presidents more and more clearly renounced the territorial claims and only asked Russia to recognize the 1920 treaties as legal, thereby abrogating the incorporation of 1940. Alternatively, they accepted to put the question on ice.[130] At the end of 1996 and early 1997, first Tallinn, then Riga decided completely to drop the demand for mentioning the peace treaties. Border agreements with Russia seemed close.[131]

However, the most important reason for the growing wish in Estonia and Latvia to solve the border question probably was that this had become an obstacle to being invited as members into NATO and the EU, their chief foreign policy objectives. Precisely this became a good reason for Russia to stall the negotiations by raising technical problems and linking the border issue with the situation of the Russian-speakers.[132] The presidential Guidelines proffered an improvement of their lot as a condition for a border treaty with Estonia.

This change of positions was criticized by Russian "liberals" like Latsis and Trenin as harmful, first of all, for Russia's own interests. In the summer of 1997, when the Baltic states were not invited to become members of NATO, Russia seemed to change positions again. In connection with Chernomyrdin's visit to Vilnius the border negotiations were resumed.

In October 1997, Yeltsin and the (outgoing) Lithuanian President Brazauskas, who came to Moscow for the occasion, signed an agreement on the delimitation of the border including the economic zone in the Baltic, the first of its kind with any ex-Soviet republic.[133] The Lithuanians saw it as an historic event, showing that Russia for the first time recognized Lithuania as an independent state, and even Landsbergis, now the speaker of parliament, called the visit the beginning of a new stage.

The agreement signified that Russian claims to Klaipeda had been given up. Communist Duma Speaker Seleznev had to distance himself from his assembly's recent attempt at claiming the area. The

other Baltic states greeted the agreement as a breakthrough, which would pave the way for them, too.[134] Even if Estonia and Latvia represent more complicated cases, this now seems possible.

Indeed, Russia cannot for long hope to block Baltic membership by refusing to sign border agreements, because everybody can see that Estonia and Latvia now are eager to sign. Signing border treaties would be consistent with the recent Russian moves to appease the Balts by offering them security guarantees and economic cooperation. Moreover, concluding border treaties with Estonia and Latvia should be relatively easy, now that Russia in 1997 has proved able to make agreements both with Chechnya, NATO and Ukraine, and ought to be a good start to improving relations with these small neighbours.

On the other hand, Yeltsin could also increase pressure on Estonia and Latvia by exploiting Lithuania as a good example as regards both minority and border issues. Alternatively, he could let the border treaty with Lithuania remain empty, since the Duma vows not to ratify it.[135]

Some bottomlines

The above four subchapters show that Russian policy toward the Baltic states after 1991 has been rather incoherent, contradictory and inefficient. Russia has indulged in a counterproductive linkage policy across the board. As stated by Dmitry Trenin, Russia has so far given priority to geopolitics instead of "geoeconomics." By stressing the issue of NATO Eastern enlargement, progress in other, more promising areas has been blocked.[136] Russia has so far tended to use the stick rather than the carrot with regard to the Baltics.

It seems close at hand to explain this as typical great power behaviour, where relations with small neighbours are subordinated to grander schemes on the all-European or global level. Even highly-placed Russians still generally find it hard to understand why the Balts fear Russia and are looking west. Many also hold a special grudge to the Balts, because they played a major role in breaking up the Soviet Union.

Another explanation is that Russian foreign policy is an outflow of domestic political strife, reflecting the vicissitudes of internal power relations. There are often widely diverging views about policy goals, and especially about the means to achieve them, between nationalists and communists at the one end, and democrats and market

reformers at the other, between people in power and those in opposition. Even the presidential administration often seems split. Sometimes – as after the Duma elections in 1993 and before the presidential elections in mid-1996 – Yeltsin appeared to yield to the nationalists' pressure, and at other times seemed to resist.

Lastly, Russia's Baltic policy is to some extent also dictated by the conditions and policies of the states concerned, offering different types of opportunities and resistance. Thus, Russian policy to them is also varied, trying to play them out against each other.

For some years Russia has been "kindest" to Lithuania, partly because of her nationalities policy. Under the ex-Communist President Brazauskas, Lithuania has also been the slowest Baltic state at carrying out economic reforms and at reducing economic dependence on Russia, and apparently therefore also accepted compromises on the transit and border questions. It remains to be seen whether this will continue, when more conservative forces and persons associated with Landsbergis regain the political power.

Russia right now seems to be most critical of little Estonia. Usually led by nationalist-minded governments, this state has adopted a strict citizenship policy vis-à-vis the large Russian population, it has succeeded best economically, and has liberated itself most from economic dependence on Russia, and has until recently insisted on a border revision. On the other hand, Estonia now also offers the best opportunities for Russian business.

So far Russia appears to have been a bit more "benevolent" to Latvia despite the fact that her citizenship policy is stricter than that of Estonia. If this is correct, it may be attributed to the impression that the Latvian governments in general have conducted a slightly more cautious or non-confrontational policy than Estonia. It has remained somewhat more dependent or Russian trade and allows an expansion of transit oil export, which Russia is greatly dependent on. Or – more malignantly – do the big numbers of Russians there make Russia hope that they will sooner or later gain real influence?

All this said, however, this paper shows that there are also some positive signs in Russian Baltic policy recently, which should be seen in a wider context. After his re-election as President, Yeltsin stopped the war against Chechnya and signed a friendship agreement with Ukraine, which meant that Russian pretensions to Sevastopol were given up. Russia signed the Founding Act with NATO, which gave her a say but did not stop the Madrid decision on NATO enlargement. Simultaneously, Russian proposals on security

"Baltikum stötesten," *Dagens nyheter*, 25 May; 23 March 1997, respectively.

25. "Russia ready to sign defense agreements," *Baltic Independent*, 16–22 Sep. 1994, Sergounin (note 18), p. 236.
26. Kubu, M., "Gränsfrågan på väg lösas," *Dagens nyheter*, 13 Sep. 1997.
27. Stranga (note 1), p. 230.
28. Maslov (note 23).
29. *BBC, SU/2971 B/6*, 15 July 1997.
30. Pushkov, A., "A Compromise with NATO?", *International Affairs*, no. 3 (1997), pp. 19 f.
31. Baturin, Y., "Bezyadernaya zona of Baltiki do Chernogo morya," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 Apr. 1996.
32. "Jeltsin utlovar säkerhet," *Dagens nyheter*, 25 Oct. 1997. Yeltsin specifically called Russia "the guarantor of the security" of Lithuania and promised that "if you are threatened by danger, this will mean having to deal with Russia," which sounds a bit ambiguous, 24 Oct. 1997 (www.bns.ee/news/bve)
33. Loshchinin, V. V.,"Trust and Security in the Baltic Sea Area," eds. Grönick, R. et al., *St Petersburg, the Baltic Sea and European Security*, (Nordic forum for Security Policy: Helsinki, 1997), pp. 10 ff.
34. Trenin, D., "Baltiyskaya kontseptsiya Rossii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11 March 1997; *Dagens nyheter*, 6 May 1997.
35. Yusin, M., "V Talline sozdaetsya "Baltiysko-chernomorskiy blok," *Izvestiya*, 28 May 1997.
36. In 1989 they made up 30.5 percent, 475 000, of the 1.56 million population in Estonia, and 34 percent, 906 000 out of 2.6 million in Latvia. Lithuania had only nine percent Russians, and its minority policy was acceptable to Russia.
37. For general background, see Oldberg, I., "Security problems in the Baltic states" (unpublished manuscript, finished in April 1994, available on request), pp. 10 ff; Blakkisrud, H., *De russiske minoritetene i Estland og Latvia*, NUPI-rapport, no. 194 (Oslo, 1995), pp. 26 ff, Westerholm, A., *När cirklar inte bryts* (Försvarets forskningsanstalt: Stockholm, 1997), s 25 ff.
38. Sergounin (note 18), p. 341; *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 7 March, 1997.
39. Westerholm (note 37), p. 25, Malek (note 19), 457 ff.
40. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 June 1995.
41. Only 190 000 Russians got citizenship in Estonia according to Reutov, A., "Vladimir Lukin o polozhenii russikh v Estonii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 Aug. 1996. According to a EU report, 650 000 persons do not have Latvian citizenship ("Making progress on the road to EU," *Baltic Times*, no 74, 1997). Children did not automatically become citizens in Estonia, even if the parents were naturalized (Westerholm (note 37), p. 29)
42. "The Baltic States: The Situation Is Often Discouraging" (interview with Foreign Ministry official V. Loshinin), *International Affairs*, no. 3 (1996), p. 50.

43. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 Nov. 1996. Estonia in 1992 required residence since 1990 and one year's waiting, since 1995 five years, Latvia first fifteen years, then five years. Both states also required a loyalty oath and excluded people, who had worked for the Soviet army or security services. Russians also disliked the fact that children did not automatically get citizenship, if parents were naturalized. (Westerholm (note 37), pp. 23 ff)
44. Nikiforov, I., "Yevropa rekommenduet Tallinu vvesti russkiy yazyk kak vtoroy gosudarstvennyy," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 Aug. 1997.
45. In Estonia only 75 000 out of 430 000 were naturalized up to 1996 (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 Nov. 1996, Girnius, S., "Resentment and Restraint from the Baltic States," *Transition*, 15 Nov. 1996, p. 18) In Latvia only 3400 until February 1997, 560 persons in 1996. (Stranga (note 1), p. 206.)
46. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 Aug. 1997; Westerholm (note 37), pp. 27 ff.
47. Alekhin, S., "Pochemu bolit golova u russkikh v Estonii," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 25 June 1997; Morozova, V., "Sut barkhatnoy deportatsii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 Nov. 1996, Vinogradov, B., "U russkikh v Estoniy teper ne budet dazhe pasporta," *Izvestiya*, 8 May 1997.
48. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 Aug. 1997.
49. Nikiforov, I., "Russkie shkoly mogut deystvovat do 2007 goda," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 12 Sep. 1997, Smirnova, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 Aug. 1997.
50. Girnius, S., "Estonia: Relations with Russia Turn Bitter," *Transition*, 31 May 1996, pp. 43 f.
51. *BBC, SU/2842 B/10*, 13 Feb. 1997.
52. Tammerk, T., "Wrangle over rights continues," *Baltic Times*, no. 40, 1996.
53. Berzins, V., "Latvia and the Beast," *Baltic Times*, 17 Apr. 1997.
54. Stranga (note 1), p. 204.
55. Stranga (note 1), p. 202 ff.
56. Stranga (note 1), p. 203 f; *Baltic Independent*, 18 Feb.; *Izvestiya*, 17 Feb. 1994.
57. "Programma mer po podderzhke sootechestvennikov za rubezhom," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 May 1996.
58. Stranga (note 1), p. 224.
59. Kahar, A., "The pitfalls of selling Latvian citizenship," *Baltic Times*, no. 61, 1997.
60. 65 000 in Latvia according to Kahar, 130 000 in Estonia according to *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 25 June 1997. Stranga (note 1), p. 206, Girnius (note 1), p. 18. Their motives for taking Russian citizenship have been that it is easier, hope for help from Russia, and wish to participate. Westerholm (note 37), p. 56.).
61. Westerholm (note 37), pp. 45 f.
62. Morrison, J. W., *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. An assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist*, McNair paper 30 (National Defense University: Washington D.C., 1994), p. 108 f.

63. Chernogorskiy, D., "Rossiyskaya diplomatiya vybiraet rezkuyu tonalnost," *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 11 Jan. 1997; Blomgren, J., "Relation med Nato hotas av balter," *Svenska dagbladet,* 23 mars 1997.
64. Sheehy, A., "The Estonian Law on Aliens," *RFE/RL Research Report,* no. 2 (24 Sep. 1993,) p. 9 f.
65. "Russia's Kozyrev Threatens the Baltics," *Baltic Observer,* 20 Apr. 1995.
66. See Oldberg (note 37), pp. 11, Blakkisrud (note 37), p. 43 ff, 65 f.
67. Smirnova, M., "Vtoraya godovshchina vyvoda voysk" (interview with S. Zotov), *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 30 Aug. 1997.
68. *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 14 Aug. 1997, "Making progress on the road to EU," *Baltic Times,* no, 74, 1997.
69. Stranga, A., "The Baltic States in the European Security Architecture,"eds. Lejiņš, A. and Ozoliņa, Ž., *Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective* (Latvian Institute of International Affairs: Riga, 1997), p. 37.
70. *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 30 Aug. 1997. Latvia's Foreign Minister Birkavs has also proposed EU membership first, then integration of non-citizens. (Stranga, (note 69), p. 37.)
71. *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 11 Jan. 1997.
72. Ayrapetova, N., "Sposob ne proigrat v novom peredele mira" (interview), *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 1 Feb. 1997; *RFE/RL Newsline,* 16 Sep 1997.
73. *Segodnya,* 6 July 1994. According to Stranga (note 1), p. 202 ff, two million dollars in 1996.
74. *Rossiyskaya gazeta,* 25 June 1997.
75. Maloveryan, Y., "Russkie shkoly v Estonii," *Segodnya,* 4 Apr. 1996.
76. Tregubova, Y., "Zashchita 'etnicheskikh rossiyan' trebuet deneg," *Segodnya,* 6 July, 1994.
77. Up to 80 percent of the Russians in Estonia wanted Estonian citizenship first. (*Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 29 Nov. 1996). Russian citizenship did not endanger their staying and acquiring it could also be a means of pressure to get the Estonian one.
78. *Rossiyskaya gazeta,* 30 May 1996.
79. *Izvestiya,* 25 March 1997.
80. *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 30 Aug. 1997.
81. *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 11 March 1997.
82. "The Baltic States..." (note 42), p. 50.
83. Westerholm (note 37), p. 43; Oldberg (note 37), pp. 15 f; *Moscow News,* no. 2, 1994; *Rossiyskie vesti,* 1 July 1993; Kubu, M., "I gränsland," *Dagens nyheter,* 12 Oct. 1997, Kahar (note 59).
84. *Segodnya,* 4 Apr. 1996; *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 19 Sep. 1997, *RFE/RL Newsline*; 26 Sep. 1997; Kahar (note 59).
85. *Izvestiya,* 18 Feb. 1993; *Segodnya,* 6 July 1997.
86. In Estonia, the indigenous share of the population fell from 92 percent in 1934 to 61.5 percent in 1989, in Latvia from 73 to 52 percent.

Russians came to dominate most of the big towns as a result of war and occupation, deportation of Balts and import of Russian and Slav industrial workers, military and officials, and higher nativity rates. In Narva: 96 percent Russians.

87. Volkonskiy, P., "Integratsiya russkikh v Estonii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 21 Feb. 1996. In Latvia, only 22 percent of non-Latvians knew Latvian in 1989. The Baltic Russians preferred to learn English to the local languages.
88. For example, an organization called Russians of the West has been founded in Riga. See Kahar (note 59).
89. *Rossiyskaya gazeta,* 15 July 1997.
90. Kubu, M., "Gränsfråga på väg lösas," *Svenska dagbladet,* 13 Sep. 1997.
91. "Breach between churches has three Estonian businessmen busy," *Baltic Times,* no. 74, 1997.
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103. Jonson (note 2), p. 313.
104. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 29 Aug. 1997. A headline announced that the transit was costlier than the oil.
105. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 Aug. 1996.
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BALTIC SECURITY IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT

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Introduction

The start of the European Union and NATO enlargement processes is a watershed for Latvia as well as the other Baltic states. The stage has been set where, although the main strategic priorities remain the same, their political will to join the EU and NATO is not enough alone. Financial and human resources together with a clear view of the enlargement process and prospects for membership are now even more important. Different forms of cooperation have been created which facilitate preparation for NATO and EU membership as well as other Europe security institutions. But much will now depend on the ability to utilize the means available with maximum efficiency.

It should be taken into account that the accession process is becoming increasingly individualized, especially in the case of EU enlargement. The decision to start negotiations with Estonia first was important for the Baltic states from the security point of view, as it was a clear sign that they would not be left entirely alone even if their chances to become NATO members is not an issue in the short or medium term future. However, if during the previous stages the Baltic states moved towards the EU at the same pace (signing of free trade agreements and association agreements with the EU), now each country sets its own pace. The screening procedure (evaluation of legislative progress as well as selection of main topics for negotiations of each country with EU) will be different for the first six countries with which negotiations will start earlier (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) than for the remaining five associated countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia).[1] This fact alone shows that it will take much effort on the part of Latvia and Lithuania to catch up with Estonia. The EU in its enlargement strategy is taking into account different considerations. Internal problems of the Union, the preferences of different EU countries, and global politics do play a role. However, the performance of particular candidate countries becomes increasingly important, in addition to their ability to "advertise" themselves.

This is less transparent with NATO enlargement. The signing of the US-Baltic Charter shows that the Baltic states still are looked upon as a geopolitical entity. Although individual ability to undertake the obligations of NATO membership and to attain compatibility is important, the decisive factor is the development of NATO-Russian relations and NATO member countries' readiness to assume risks involved in admitting the Baltic states to the Alliance. From the military point of view the Baltic states form an entity. However, there could be political considerations and special preferences by particular NATO member countries as well.

The new situation calls for more flexible foreign policies and a revision of relations with different groupings of states as well as with particular countries. In particular, this applies to the Baltic states policies vis-à-vis the Central European countries, especially the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, whose membership in NATO is already secured and which have the best prospects for entering the EU in a few years.

With these countries joining the EU and NATO, the geopolitical situation in Central Europe will change immensely. They would obtain not only the "hard" guarantees of NATO's Article 5, but also the "soft" guarantees of political and economic stability that come with EU membership. It can be expected that their economic and social development will become more rapid, even though their integration into the EU will not be easy because of the immense structural problems of their economies. As NATO and EU members they will obtain decisionmaking powers in those organizations. Of course, they will be weaker members, but the principles for which these organizations stand will guarantee some measure of equality regardless of the size or the political and economic influence of member states.

Until recently the Central European countries were for the Baltic states fellow travellers and competitors on the way to a common goal. They were also brothers-in-arms in their fight against communist regimes and have similar problems now, in the transition period. The relationship, however, is becoming more complicated. As integration with the EU will take some time, and Latvia and Lithuania, at least theoretically, have a chance to outstrip some of the countries named by the European Commission, it is expected that in some aspects the

competitive relationship will become more acute. At the same time, the three Central European countries will have a say on further NATO enlargement and their position on this issue is very important for the Baltic states.

In addition, there is the problem of development of relations with the other Central and East European countries. On the one hand, there are those countries that have association agreements with the EU and will be involved in the accession process alongside with the Baltic states. Some of those countries, Romania and Slovenia in particular, have a good chance to be included in the second wave of NATO enlargement if it will take place in the near future.

On the other hand, the enlargement process will considerably influence also Ukraine and other countries that at present are not aspiring to NATO and EU membership. Ukraine is gradually becoming more important. Her intentions in developing relations with NATO are among the key factors that would influence the Alliance's further enlargement strategy. At the same time, economic development and social stability in Ukraine are decisive for the successful development of Central and Eastern Europe on the whole.

"Contemporary history: developments in 1991 – 1996

In general, we can speak of two stages in the development of the Baltic states' relations with the Central European post-Communist countries prior to 1997. First, the Baltics tried to overcome the fairly significant differences that existed between them and the Central European states in the early 1990s and to prove that they were similar to the latter in terms of political development and thus equally eligible for adaptation by the EU and NATO.[2] With the signing of the free trade and, especially, the association agreements with the EU, and the apparent success in the internationalization of Baltic security issues that compelled the West to consider the Balts in the NATO enlargement debate, this goal was reached.

The second stage has been an effort to prove that accession talks to EU should be started with all associated countries simultaneously and that the Baltic states should be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. However, as the beginning of both enlargement processes came closer, uneasiness over a possibility that the Baltic countries could be left out of these processes because of their geostrategic position found an outward expression in Lithuania's

endeavours to join NATO with the help of increased cooperation with Poland, and in Estonia to claim that in the EU accession process each country should be looked upon individually; if one country is invited to start negotiations it would be in the interests of all Baltic countries. Vytautas Landsbergis summed it up as follows: "Lithuania wants to be considered as an individual country, not as a mushroom in a common basket that is known as the 'Baltic states'."[3]

At this stage, the political as well as the economic gap between the Baltic and the leading Central European countries was reduced to a very great extent. The overall political relations were very good. There were a series of the highest level visits by the Central European statesmen to the Baltic countries and *vice versa*.

Lithuania and Poland managed to overcome their legacy and to establish excellent interstate relations. Of course, the healing of wounds inflicted by history as well as the solution of present-day problems will take a long time. Differences with regard to the Polish minority in Lithuania and the Lithuanian minority in Poland do exist. These came to the fore at the Polish-Lithuanian Parliamentary Assembly in January 1998. The controversial decision of the Vilnius district municipality that the official languages in the district, apart from Lithuanian, are Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Tartar "and other languages"[4] did not help. Nevertheless, the determination of the political elites in both countries to overcome differences is the decisive factor.

Trade has been constantly expanding. Bilateral free trade agreements have been reached with most Central European states. However, except for Lithuanian-Polish political cooperation, relations generally developed more slowly than with the West, especially the Scandinavian countries. Although the interest of each Baltic state to improve relations with Central Europe has been different, with Lithuania being the most inclined to do so and Estonia the least enthusiastic, the practical results in terms of bilateral agreements, economic relations, etc. are rather similar. Perhaps, this shows that factors that do not depend on political will alone are at work.

Similarity and solidarity

Two words are used very often when speaking about the development of Central and Eastern European relations: similarity and solidarity. "Solidarity," perhaps, is the most popular word in the political dictionary of Central and Eastern European countries. It is said that

they should express solidarity to each other because of their common past under communist regimes and the similarities that arise from their present transitional processes and their common foreign policy strategies. Solidarity really exists, but it is not backed by structural conditions.

In fact, although there is a rather high level of congruence in behaviour on the international scene between the Central and Eastern European countries, it depends mostly on common foreign policy strategy and shared aims, less on efforts to coordinate their actions. Of course, the similar external situation and the similar domestic transitional problems help to define a common understanding. From this point of view, similarities have a positive role. However, in other aspects similarities can work against solidarity. Similar economic structure increases competition among transitional economies as do similar needs for investment and foreign aid.

The main trend for the Baltic as well as the Central European countries has been integration with the Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures. This has helped to a very great extent to develop cooperation between the transition countries, because the ability to cooperate and to overcome interstate conflicts inherited from the past are regarded by the West as a test of their ability to enter Western institutions. Poland's efforts at improving relations with Lithuania and Ukraine, progress in the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian and Hungarian-Slovakian disagreements etc., as well as an overall improvement of political cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe have to a significant degree benefited from the understanding that such improvements are a condition for entry into the EU and NATO.

However, there is also another side of the coin. The Central and Eastern European countries do not have enough financial and human resources to expand their diplomatic and economic activities in all directions. It is particularly true with regard to the Baltic states, but also the more prosperous and larger Central European countries are not able to cover all directions and must concentrate in the first place on the most strategic ones.

The Central and Eastern European countries were also aware that enhanced cooperation among the post-Communist countries could be a trap that could hamper their integration into EU and NATO. This is especially true for those countries that considered themselves fittest for early admittance to NATO and the EU. They did not want to enter into any relations that would "link" them to the development of the slowest neighbours. Regional political and security cooperation was looked upon with certain suspiciousness in this regard. Although there have been various proposals for regional political, security, or economic cooperation between Central and Eastern European post-Communist countries, none have amounted to much. There are several reasons for this: 1) Central European countries have been afraid that successful regional cooperation might be interpreted by the West as an alternative to NATO and EU membership; 2) a kind of political or security cooperation between Central and East European countries in which Russia does not participate could be interpreted by Moscow as directed against it, and this could aggravate the security situation in the region; 3) the participation of Russia in regional security arrangements has aroused fears in former Soviet satellite countries that Moscow would seek to dominate the arrangements, thus seeking to preserve the old Russian sphere of influence; 4) the economic, financial, and military resources of the Central and Eastern European countries are insufficient to make such cooperation effective. Perhaps, the Baltic states' cooperation is the only exception from this rule, but in this case psychological and historical reasons, as well as the awareness that their security situation is much more vulnerable than that of the Central European countries, have played a significant role as well as pressure from the West. However, as was pointed out previously, even in the Baltic states the enlargement gave rise to fears that they as a geopolitical entity could be left out of Euro-Atlantic structures. Due to such reservations about regional cooperation, their political and military cooperation developed almost entirely on a bilateral basis.

Such success as there was in expansion of economic ties is in the form of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). This is the only regional cooperation structure that involves exclusively the post-Communist countries. It owes its success to the fact that the goals of the Agreement are clearcut and limited (establishment of a free trade zone) and subordinate to EU integration. Although Lithuania aims at becoming a CEFTA member, it still has a way to go.[5] Estonia has not shown any considerable interest in this organization while Latvia's position is not as yet clearly defined. In other cases of successful regional cooperation, such as the Council of Baltic Sea States, the involvement of the EU, as well as of other Western countries which have an interest in developing regional cooperation and have at their disposal adequate financial resources, was instrumental for the success of these endeavours.

Reservations have also been evident in the development of mutual relations between the CEE states due to apprehension that transition processes in some countries could be reversed. Developments in Slovakia, and to a much more serious degree in Belarus, proved that democratization is not an immediate and almost automatic result of liberation from communism. It was not easy for the Baltic countries nor for the other CEE countries to formulate their position in those cases.

In the case of Belarus, the problem is most acute for Latvia and Lithuania as they border with Belarus and have considerable trade with this country. The question of whether the Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenka should be invited to the Vilnius summit in September 1997 showed that the Baltic, Polish, and Ukrainian politicians viewed the political isolation of Belarus as not the best option, because it could lead to increased anti-democratic, and authoritarian policies on the part of the Belarussian leadership. However, Baltic, Polish, and Ukrainian leaders have on several occasions expressed their concern over Lukashenka's policies.

In general, one can agree that "there had been various kinds of divisions among and inside the former Warsaw Pact countries [...] which remain to be overcome."[6] However, since the early 1990s, the picture has become more complicated as new lines of division appear as results of domestic peculiarities and of economic and political developments in each particular country. The attitude towards integration with the EU and NATO, and progress in relations with those organizations, are decisive in this regard. At the same time, seven years is too short a period of time to make safe predictions about long-term economic and political trends. Furthermore, the position of a particular state relative to the other CEE countries can change considerably in years to come.

In spite of common political strategy goals, the CEE countries' performance on the international stage depends very much on the immediate external environment of particular countries as well as on their relative strength in the international community. Voting practices in the UN in 1996 are just one example of dissimilarities in the CEE countries' attitude to different questions (see Table 1). Since the early 1990s, the voting behaviour of the Central European and the Baltic states has fallen into line with those of the European Union countries. As is characteristic of the EU countries, in 70–80 percent of cases the voting patterns of the Central European and the Baltic states are identical with those of the United States.[7] The table shows

Table 1

Voting on some issues in the United Nations in 1996 by different countries

	Cz	Hun	Pol	Sk	Sl	Est	Lat	Lit	US	Ger	Fr	It	UK	Den	Fin	Sw	Nor
1.U.S. Embargo of Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2.Eliminating Coercive Economic Measure	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
3.Middle East Peace Proces	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
4.Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons	N	N	N	N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	A	A	Y	A
5.Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6.Palestinian Self-determination	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
7.Human Rights in Irak	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8.Human Right in Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9.Human Rights in Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
10.Human Rights in Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
11.Human Rights in Parts ofFormer Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12.Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Source: *Voting practices in the United Nations 1996. Report to Congress Submitted Pursuant to Public Law, 101-167.* United States Department of State: March 31, 1997, pp. 135 – 214.
Symbols: Y=yes; A=abstained; N=no; X=absent.
Countries: Bul=Bulgaria; Cz=Czech Republic; Den=Denmark; Est=Estonia; Fin=Finland; Fr=France; Ger=Germania; Hun=Hungary; It=Italy; Lat=Latvia; Lit=Lithuania; Nor=Norway; Pol=Poland; Rom=Romania; Sk=Slovakia; Sl=Slovenia; Sw=Sweden.

that there does exist a high level of congruence in the voting behaviour of the Baltic states on one side, and the Central European countries on the other side. It does not imply that they always have worked out a common position, although often there may be consultations, or at least concern, about the position of their neighbours. At the same time, the Baltic states' voting pattern is clearly distinctive from that of the Central European countries in cases where there are differences between the US and the EU, or between particular Western countries or regional groupings (for example, Scandinavian countries). If the Central European countries sided with the European Union, the Baltics tried to manoeuvre between the US, the EU, and the Scandinavian countries. The United States are an important factor in the policies of all CEE countries, however, and the Baltic states' efforts to maintain equilibrium between all external actors which are important for them reflect their relative geopolitical vulnerability in comparison with the Central European countries.

Apart from this consideration, it should be pointed out that cooperation between the CEE countries and especially, Baltic – Central European cooperation, is influenced by their differing geostrategic situation and differing regional interests. Poland is a big country, and its geopolitical situation as well as its historical links call forth involvement in different regional relationships: in the Baltic Sea region, with Ukraine, in South-Eastern Europe, and, of course, with Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic in Central Europe, and Russia.[8] Hungary's interests, obviously, are directed more to South and South-Eastern Europe. It participates in the Central European Initiative, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative, and in Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian and Austrian-Romanian-Hungarian trilateral cooperation. As regards the Czech Republic, its literally Central European position and closeness to Germany are to a very great degree influencing her priorities.

From the economic point of view, the Baltic states' relations with Central Europe had to be built almost from scratch. The Baltic states' foreign trade with the Central European countries during the Soviet era was very small, and even this was organized mainly through Moscow. After regaining their independence, they had to build economic ties with this region anew on different principles from those existing in the COMECON. An overall economic decline in CEE in the early 1990s also contributed to a disruption of economic ties. However, since the mid-1990s the amount of trade of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia with the Central European countries has constantly increased. For example, in January – November of 1997 Latvian exports to Poland increased by 7.5 percent, but imports from Poland by 59 percent in comparison with the same period in 1996. At the same time, the trade deficit was increasing with tremendous speed. If in the first eleven months of 1996 Latvian imports from Poland exceeded exports 2.82 times, in the same period in 1997 they were already 4.17 times larger.[9] The trade deficit with the Central European countries is a problem of all three Baltic states, although the amount and significance of this trade for each country is different. As in other spheres, Lithuania is developing its trade relations with Central Europe more rapidly than Latvia and Estonia.

Perhaps the development of the relations of the Baltic states with Central Europe depended to some extent on the fact that the legacy of pre-Second World War relations helped very little. The pre-war pattern of relations was rather complicated and was determined very much by the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Czechoslovakian conflicts. Lithuania's cooperation with Czechoslovakia was developed exactly because her relations with Poland were hostile. Estonian and Latvian relations with Czechoslovakia were dependent mostly on their attitude to Poland. In general, "relations among the countries [in Central and Eastern Europe] were [...] worsened by various conflicts in their midst, and there was never any real convergence of interests among the countries."[10] Today the pattern of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe is absolutely different from that of the 1920s and 1930s. Although historical examples of political cooperation are often cited – such as Latvian and Estonian relations with Poland, and Lithuanian relations with Czechoslovakia – the Baltic states have actually no historical pattern to fall back on.

Prospects after the start of the enlargement processes

Four problems related to the Central European countries are particularly important for the Baltic states in the enlargement context:

1) Czech, Hungarian, and Polish support for Baltic membership in NATO;

2) Military cooperation with the Central European countries within the framework of Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, etc. on a multilateral as well as a bilateral level;

3) Exchange of experiences and consultations on EU pre-accession problems;

4) Development of cooperation with Central Europe in the economic sphere, as well on the Maastricht second and third pillar issues.

An immediate result of the start of the enlargement processes is an increasing interest in mutual CEE cooperation. The beginning of the enlargement processes give a free hand for those countries admitted to the first wave of expansion to pay more attention to the development of relations with their neighbours since they are no longer afraid that this cooperation could delay their membership in NATO and the EU. It has also led to increasing interest from other candidate countries for cooperation with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, as well as with Central and Eastern Europe on the whole.

Already in December 1997, the foreign ministers of Poland and the Czech Republic agreed that "their countries will jointly and swiftly react to any moves that are intended to delay their accession to NATO."[11] Parallel to such political cooperation joint actions on practical military matters are under way. For example, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian defence ministers agreed on 30 January 1998 to form a joint consultative group to coordinate military infrastructures along NATO lines and cooperate in the upgrading of equipment.[12]

Political cooperation has increased also in Central and Eastern Europe on the whole. The joint meeting of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Polish presidents on 27 May 1997 in Tallinn was the beginning. It is expected that similar meetings will take place. The second important event was the Vilnius conference *Good Neighbourly Relations as Guarantee of Stability and Peace in Europe* on 5 – 6 September 1997. In both cases there was a "turn to the East" – towards cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, and towards closer observation of developments in Belarus.

Suggestions for the improvement of Russo-Baltic relations submitted by the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Vilnius, latter appeared in the form of President Yeltsin's proposal of a Baltic stability pact which was received rather warily by Baltic politicians: the proposal was linked to a very basic condition – the Baltic states must renounce their goal of joining NATO. However, some aspects, e.g. on confidence building measures, were constructive and are being considered seriously. Of course, it can not be expected that such multilateral fora as the Vilnius conference can influence the Russian position on Baltic membership in NATO, nevertheless they help the confidence building that is essential for Russo-Baltic relations, as well as help the identifying of common interests.

The participation of Ukraine in the Tallinn meeting demonstrated the awareness of the Baltic states and Poland that Ukraine is the corner-stone of stability in Central and Eastern Europe at present. The involvement of Ukraine in different regional initiatives in Central Europe as well as in Black Sea cooperation is beneficial to regional stability as well as to the raising of the country's international profile.

Although the practical results of the Tallinn and Vilnius meetings may seem modest, nevertheless a very important result is that they happened at all which would have been impossible only a couple of years ago. Still, the main problem is to convert common understanding and ideas exchanged at meetings into practical cooperation.

It may be predicted that Baltic economic cooperation with the Central European countries will increase. However, it is unlikely that there will be any dramatic changes. The Central European countries, as well as the Baltic states, have insufficient economic and financial resources to expand economic cooperation in all directions. For Latvia and Estonia, Germany and the Scandinavian countries as well as Russia, will remain the major economic partners. Probably Lithuanian cooperation with Poland will increase considerably, but Vilnius' main attention seems to be focused in the same direction as that of Latvia and Estonia.

Consultations between the CEE candidate countries on the EU enlargement problems are a pressing issue. So far there have not been such consultations on a regular basis. The role of non-governmental activities, such as possible consultations between CEE right-of-centre parties as discussed in July 1997 during the visit of the Chairman of the Czech Parliamentary Defence and Foreign Relations Committee to Tallinn may be expected to grow.[13]

When we discuss Baltic relations with the Central European countries in the context of NATO enlargement, we must separate two aspects of the issue. The first is cooperation in various frameworks that are meant to help candidate countries come closer to NATO (Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, etc.) as well as on bilateral cooperation. The second one is support from the Central European countries for Baltic membership in NATO.

Since the Madrid summit the Central European countries have promised that they will enhance cooperation with those countries in the region which are not in the first group of states to be invited to

begin membership negotiations. However, we should take into account several limiting factors. The interests of the Central European countries in the Central and Eastern European region are not limited to the Baltic states. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have expressed first of all their interest in Romanian and Slovenian NATO membership. Although they support the Baltic states' membership in the Alliance, their position probably will depend mainly on what the older members say. It must be expected, furthermore, that their resources will be scarce and their influence within the alliance limited, at least for some time.

One can also doubt the ability of the Baltic states to take advantage of all opportunities available. In addition to building up their military capabilities, the Baltic states need to intensify their political activity, and in particular to lobby for their interests not only in Brussels and Western capitals but in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw as well. However, once again, they are confronted with the problem of scarce resources.

From the Baltic point of view, Poland plays a special role in the region. It is a Central European and Baltic Sea country at the same time; it is the biggest country in the region and has considerable political, military, and economic potential. Poland may end up playing a very active role in the region, and this indeed has been expected by the Baltic states. Poland, however, has a wide range of interests also in Central and Eastern Europe as mentioned earlier. We should take into account that relations with the Baltic states cannot be an exclusive priority in Polish foreign policy. But it could be also argued that the integration of Poland (as well as the Czech Republic and Hungary) into NATO and the EU will increase the already existing asymmetry with the Baltic states.

The Polish-Lithuanian strategic partnership is very important as it stabilizes the relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to the development of stability in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. On the other hand, there may also be negative implications for Baltic cooperation. There is a fear that Lithuania will abandon Baltic cooperation in favour of a Central European orientation in order to seek earlier admission to the EU and NATO with Poland's support. However, Estonia's probable integration into the EU and the developing regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region will work to equalize this tendency. Still, an enhanced partnership with Poland is of major interest not only to Lithuania but also to Latvia and Estonia. Cooperation with Poland is a natural extension

of Baltic cooperation, although there is a problem of resources and political will on all sides.

It should be expected that bilateral cooperation will remain the leading form of political, economic, and military cooperation. It seems that regional cooperation will develop most successfully within the already existing regional patterns, i.e. Baltic Sea, Central European, South-East European, and Black Sea cooperation. Perhaps a link should be created to connect these regions. If such projects should enjoy support from European and Transatlantic institutions, and if they prove to be of practical importance the CEE countries, then they will develop and grow. Linkages already mentioned would be the connecting of CEE countries' electrical grids, and the Baltic air surveillance system BALTNET with the analogous system in Central Europe.

As regards the possibility for the Baltic states to become CEFTA members, it must be admitted that CEFTA's future is rather cloudy. At the Portoroz (Slovenia) summit of CEFTA countries in Autumn 1997, it was decided to start talks on Bulgarian accession and a plan was adopted that will help Ukraine to join CEFTA. However, nothing definite was said about CEFTA's future. There have been declarations that CEFTA ought to play a role in the preparation of candidate countries for EU membership. Four of the six actual CEFTA members – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – will, however, have to terminate their membership in CEFTA as soon as they become members of the EU. If CEFTA is to survive as a separate free-trade entity, it must take in new members or be transformed into a different kind of organization. We must remember, of course, that the EU integration process for the first candidate states will take some time, and for the time being CEFTA can continue to play its present role. Still, the possibility that CEFTA's importance may diminish may reduce the interest of the Baltic states for this organization.

In a recent study on the effects of enlargement on bilateral relations in CEE, it was highlighted that "protection of the EU's external borders and visa regimes may present serious problems for the development of relations between 'ins' and 'outs'."[14] It could be expected that existing visa-free regimes of the Baltic states with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland could create difficulties for those countries to enter the Shengen agreement. However, it seems that this problem could be solved comparatively easy. At present the Baltic states are rapidly expanding a network of visa-free regimes with EU as well as non-EU countries. Expanding cooperation on the "third pillar" issues will help to overcome possible difficulties in this aspect.

Already border control cooperation is increasing, especially in the Baltic Sea region. On 28 May 1997, the first meeting of border guard chiefs from eleven Baltic Sea states took place in Helsinki. It was acknowledged that "the countries bordering the Baltic Sea have different border guard systems, but this is not seen as a barrier to cooperation."[15] In June 1997, there was a meeting in Tallinn of heads of the custom services of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea in which it was decided to step up regional cooperation and an agreement on joint action was reached. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation of CEE countries on the "third pillar" issues is likely to develop rapidly.

In conclusion, we must agree once again with the Hungarian scholar Andras Inotai who pointed out that successful regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe must be seen as a consequence of successful integration into the world economy, not as a precondition for doing so.[16] This notion is true also with regard to political and security cooperation. Thus EU and NATO integration creates the necessary conditions for establishing closer relationship between the Baltic and the Central European countries even though competition in the race to join the EU and the possibility that Baltic NATO membership may be delayed also create conditions for rivalry. Although there is a political will on all sides to collaborate more effectively, a more integrated relationship cannot be achieved in the short or even medium term.

In order to raise the level of integration of the Baltic states with the Central European countries several developments are necessary:

1. The Baltic states must catch up with the countries now about to enter the EU and NATO in economic and political development in order to minimize the asymmetry that exists in the economic, political, and military spheres.

2. Some form of cultural integration is indispensable. Even for Lithuania, which has closer historical and cultural ties with Central Europe, would be hard put to find much in common with, for example, Slovenia. The Estonian and Latvian historical and cultural orientation is towards the Nordic states and Germany. The Austro-Hungarian heritage has little appeal for them. Perhaps the common experience under Communist regimes is the most important unifying factor; however, it is a transient one. It seems that cultural integration is possible only through "Europeanization," through consciousness of their being bearers of a common European cultural heritage, since there is no helpful historical background for the building of a CEE identity.

3. An integrated system can not be built from above solely. A multilayered network of bilateral as well as multilateral relations on interstate as well as on local level, and on an interinstitutional and interpersonal level, is indispensable to achieve regional or subregional cooperation. Such a system is already being formed in the Baltic littoral.

The Baltic as well as the Central European countries need only time, financial and human resources, and determination to do this.

Notes

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7. It should be pointed out that voting of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus also increasingly coincides with this of the US, however, the percentage is lower that in the Central European and the Baltic states.
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REMOVING THE LAST WALL : RETHINKING THE BALTIC SECURITY CONCEPT

Lewis J. Carrafiello & Nico Vertongen

Introduction

It is the responsibility of every state to take measures to insure its own survival and that of its citizens. The measures taken are what we term a *security policy,* the motivating philosophy behind them we call a *security concept.* With their regained independence the Baltic states are not only confronted with formulating a security policy but also – and more importantly – establishing a security concept. For it is from the foundation of a concept that a policy is built.

This article then addresses the issue of a security concept for the Baltic Sea region. We do not have the pretension of designing a security policy, that is the task of the respective decision-makers. What we endeavour to do is to stimulate a discussion concerning the security concept of the Baltic Sea region and therefore, hopefully, lead to the rethinking of said security concept. A step that we feel is essential, bearing in mind the geopolitical changes of the Baltic Sea region and the changing nature of security in general since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For us the nation-state still remains the key actor in todayís security environment, but it now finds itself confronted with a new security agenda on which the security issues and their respective importance has been thoroughly reshuffled. In order to insure the security needs of today and tomorrow, states will find it beneficial to increase, broaden and deepen their interaction and cooperation with each other. Thus the old concept of security which relied heavy on a military approach will have to make way for a new approach which encompasses all the aspects of security today. This will, of course, require a change in the mind. And this is particularly evident in the Baltic Sea region.

1. The Baltic Sea region

Since we purport that the security issues of each of the Baltic Sea region states/provinces are intertwined and thus cannot be viewed separately from one another, security in this area must be addressed at the regional level. Hence, the Baltic Sea region, in our view, is a security complex.[1] And therefore, it behooves us first to define the Baltic Sea region. The term itself implies the need for two definitions: firstly, what is a region and secondly, what is the Baltic Sea region. In the concept of a region two dimensions of interaction of and between regions can be distinguished: internal – taking place within the traditional boundaries of the nation-state (i.e. federalism) – and external[2] — taking place at the transnation-state level. In the case of Baltic Sea region we are namely concerned with external regionalism, in the first place: interaction between the three Baltic states themselves and second interaction between all the members that constitute the Baltic Sea region.

Having defined external regionalism as our realm of concern it now becomes necessary to determine the conditional attributes which constitute regionalism. We have chosen to take what might be called the minimalist school approach. Thus in order to state that regionalism is present in a given area, three conditions have to be met: general geographic proximity, a regularity of interaction, and a shared perception within (to a lesser extent outside) the area in question as a distinct theater of operations.[3] This implies a willingness to integrate and participate in the regional cooperation, a feeling of communality, i.e. a we-feeling.

What one notices, currently, is an increasing amount of regard being given to regions and the concept of regionalism in the field of international relations. With greater attention now being given to the security dimension of regionalism. Owing in part to the stabilizing effects that regionalism – at the macro level – had on Western Europe after World War II. And to the cessation of the Cold War, which afforded the regions within the various nation-states the opportunity to profile themselves more aggressively. This new found security dimension of regions is of particular importance, since it can be used as means to security issue problem solving in the Baltic Sea region. Theoretically speaking, a region – in security theory – is strictly a level of analysis between the state and the system levels of security interdependence. In which a region is merely defined as a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations existing among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.[4]

What then is the Baltic Sea region? On the one hand, it has been broadly defined as consisting of all the countries boarding on the Baltic Sea.[5] In such a definition the entire Russian Federation would be included with its 150 million inhabitants, along with Germany and its 80 million, Poland and its 40 million not to mention the Nordic countries and the Baltic states. Clearly one has to question if this can be termed a region. It would be extremely difficult to find a common regional identity in a region that ranges from the Arctic Circle to Euro-Asia. On the other hand, it has been narrowly defined as consisting of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. We therefore have chosen to define the Baltic Sea region somewhere in between the two. Accordingly the Baltic Sea region includes Denmark, Sweden (excluding the Arctic provinces of Västerbotten and Norrbotten), Finland (excluding the Arctic provinces of Oulu and Lapland), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the *oblasty* (districts) of St Petersburg and Kaliningrad (Russia), the Länders of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), and the *vojvoidships* of Szczecin, Kozalin, Slupsk, Gdansk, Elblang, Olstyn and Suwalki (Poland).[6] There are approximately 35 million inhabitants within this area.[7]

That there exists a reflex among some to call this definition of the Baltic Sea region too encompassing, bears proof to the influence that the Cold War has had on our perception of the Baltic Sea region. The Iron Curtain divided the region into three units: an eastern (the Warsaw Pact countries), western (the NATO countries) and northern (the neutral countries). As a result of this division and the Bloc antithesis of the time, only a limited amount of cross-border contact existed for fifty years. The regional development of the Baltic remained latent under the overlay of the Cold War. It is only since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that one witnesses the rebirth – with the three units reunited – of the Baltic Sea region and the importance of it in the changing European security architecture. One only needs to look beyond the Cold War to find historical proof of prosperous regional cooperation around the Baltic Sea area. The Hanseatic League,[8] for instance, is one example that comes to mind.[9] The question then is, if we know that the Cold War image of the Baltic Sea region was faulty – in the broader historical sense –, why did the tri-subunit view prevail? The answer can in part be found in the Cold War security concept.

2. The Cold War security concept

When one thinks of the Cold War period, some of the first things that come to mind are terms such as: missile counting, Kremlin watchers, doves and hawks, NATO, and MAD, to name but a few. During this period security was achieved through a *balance of power*, not in the classical[10] sense, but rather through two superpowers whose security policies incorporated that of their respective align "partners." Furthermore the advent of nuclear weapons gave balance of power a completely new dimension: the *balance of terror*. It is therefore not surprising that security, taken to mean the protection of a stateís physical boundaries, its territory, and its people from aggression by armed force, rested predominantly on a military foundation after World War II. One could term it a military overlay[11] in security thinking. The resulting pattern of behavior between the two superpowers and their blocs was one of distrust and confrontation. Flexibility ceased to exist, in part due to the nature of bipolarity, but to a larger extent because the Cold War became a zero-sum game.[12]

This view of the international order which characterized the stances of the two Cold War adversaries was both derived from and reinforced by *the realist school* of international relations.13 Realism views the nation-state as the primary actor in an anarchical world in which a worst-case scenario is always assumed. The only means, according to Realism, in which the nation-state can cope with an anarchic and conflict-prone system is through self-help and the competitive pursuit of power. Cooperation is very difficult to achieve and sustain because states do not trust each other and because a competitive setting makes them concerned with relative as opposed to absolute gains.[14] States therefore rely on their own resources to provide for security, unless forced to do otherwise. According to the realists, states have two principal means of providing security in an anarchic setting: balancing against others through domestic mobilization (self-help) or, when necessary, balancing through the formation of temporary alliances. Even though states cannot escape from the Hobessian world, balancing behavior – at least in theory – allows states to keep pace with each other, maintaining a balance of power that deters aggression. Deterrence operates because states confront each other with relatively equal military capability. Stability is thus the product of antagonism and confrontation, as was the case in the Cold War security order. In the East-West antithesis there was no room for the concept of *common security*.[15] The Cold War seemed irreversible and

so too our traditional security paradigm. When he was secretary of state, Henry Kissinger warned his countrymen that "today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the (communist) challenge is unending."[16] The Helsinki process of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also embodied this thinking perfectly. It recognized spheres of influence, and closed borders, albeit with the inclusion of human rights, as if the Cold War would last forever. Turning the security variables of the Cold War into constants. In a sense this preoccupation with the military aspect of security was somewhat understandable since the advent of nuclear weapons confronted man for the first time with the idea of mass destruction. Until this point war was always seen as controllable.

The reality of international politics has never totally corresponded to the realist model. Even during the Cold War not all security matters were purely of a military nature. Viewed closely one can find evidence of a multi-dimensional security policy. The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, for instance emphasized as early as the 1950ís the role of economic welfare to national security. The later establishment and expansion (both vertical and horizontal) of the then European Community further illustrates this point. By working jointly on a wide range of soft security issues the Community increased its overall security.[17] The oil crisis in the early 1970s heightened the dimension of natural resources in security planning and demonstrated to all that security was no longer exclusively a military issue.

The transformation of the Soviet Union's society from a largely peasant society into an industrial country with the emergence of a civil society also had security ramifications. Yet few Kremlin Watchers placed emphasis on this important sociological aspect of security.[18] Largely due to the fact that the realist school does not take into account long-term societal changes. According to realism, the world order is based on the sovereignty of states, not the sovereignty of peoples.[19] Another neglected factor was nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Under the Soviet hegemony nationalistic and ethnic conflicts remained latent for half a century. The Warsaw Pact countries were therefore portrayed as a monolith bloc, with no diversity of opinion and all having one and the same political values. The reality was quite different, as the events of the late 1980s made very clear.

Still not many researchers went beyond the Cold War security paradigm. An exception was Karl W. Deutsch who in 1966 wrote an arti-

cle entitled *The Future of World Politics* in which he focused on the transformation of global society, a process he saw taking place because of the growth of literacy and urbanization, diminishing income inequalities, and the increasing involvement of the masses in politics. From these trends he forecasted that autocrats would find it more difficult to govern, that the costs of intervention in foreign countries would mount, that threats would carry less and less credibility, that nationalism would erode ideological blocs, that economic influence would become more important than military force and that, in the end, a more mature condition of international society would develop than the one that had existed throughout most of the twentieth century.[20]

The developments of the late 1980s and the early 1990s proved this vision. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the thinking about security has finally changed. Scholars are now willing to leave the military focus and have started identifying security as a multi-dimensional concept.[21] The end of the Cold War became year zero for international politics, the point were all questions and answers have changed. The prior security concept was highly militarized, confrontational and national, the current is multi-dimensional, cooperative and transnational.

3. The "new" multi-dimensional security

Security has changed profoundly, both the game itself and the actors. And as the game alters, nation-states are finding that they no longer have a monopoly on security matters. Nor possess the ability to operate effectively at all its levels. This is in part due to the world transformation taking place and in part to the new found awareness of the multi-dimensional aspects of security.

Security has changed, because the world has changed. Security does not exist in a vacuum, it is affected and altered by the world in which it exists. Hence it is not a constant. The concept of security has changed throughout time – the fortress security of the middle ages was rendered obsolete in the nuclear age. Security therefore is always linked to the world and its evolution. The geopolitical landscape of the Baltic Sea region illustrates one aspect of this transformation. Poland, for example, is now since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union bordered by completely new land bound neighbors. A reunited Germany lies to her west, the new Czech and Slovak Republics to her south, the newly re-independent Baltic states to her Northeast, a Russia exclave (Kaliningrad) to her

north and an independent Ukraine and Belarus to her east. And even though her farther northern neighbors have remained the same in name, they too have been modified. Finland has shed itself in part from *Finlandization* and has become, along with Sweden, a member of the European Union. In addition the former East bloc countries have moved from autocratic government and a state run economy to a directly elected government and a free market economy. In short the political character of the Baltic Sea region has experienced an outright metamorphous.

The world transformation does not end with the nation-state however. It is more profound, for the nation-state centered world no longer dominates all areas of interaction. New players – multinationals, non government organizations, regions and region states – have entered the arena and more often than not their actions have an indirect if not direct effect on the nation state. Which in turn erodes the authority of the state. The state can no longer control all the domains which affect the well-being and security of its citizens. One of the consequences of the nation-stateís inability and transnationalism is that the loyalties of the individual are not always given to the state. A trend which left unchecked, in its extreme, could lead to separatist movements more often than not along ethnic lines. All of this serves to undermine the classical national sovereignty and creates an authority crisis.

As the world changes so too does our concept of security. The "new" societal, political, economic, environmental and individual dimensions of security have all added to the difficulty of obtaining security for the state. Military means alone are no longer sufficient to guarantee security. Even if such means were abundant, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare could cancel out the advantage offered in former times by numerically larger forces, space and distance to enemy. Furthermore the transnational nature of, in particular, the economic and environmental dimensions proves that no state – no matter how large or small – can remain isolated. And under such circumstances, states will have to learn to develop a more cooperative approach to security issues. Figure 1 illustrates the various levels and dimensions of security.

While the levels of security are fairly self evident, we would – before proceeding – briefly like to define the dimensions of multi-dimensional security.

Military security deals with the ability of the state to defend itself against armed aggression, to protect the life of its citizens, to ensure

Figure 1

Levels		Dimensions				
Global	individual	political	societal	economic	military	environ-mental
Trans-national	societal	individual	political	military	environ-mental	economic
regional	political	societal	individual	environ-mental	economic	military
state	military	economic	environ-mental	individual	societal	individual
sub-state	economic	environ-mental	military	political	individual	societal
human	mental	economic	political			
environ-	military	societal	individual			

the integrity of its borders and to guarantee the sovereignty of the nation-state. Military security is therefore often the synonym of national security. It still remains the core of security today, but the accent has changed since the end of the Cold War. Military security is no longer seen purely in a reactive role, it is now perceived to have a more active and engaging role in areas of conflict prevention, the prevention of conflict escalation, the support of humanitarian aid operations (i.e. Albania) and peace keeping (i.e. IFOR and SFOR in former Yugoslavia).

Economic security at the state level is ensuring that the state has access to the resources, finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.[22] Built into the free market economic model, however, is a certain degree of insecurity. Especially at the individual level, as either groups or individuals become the victim of a liberalized market. Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, individual insecurity will run high during the transition period from state run economies to the free market economies and the problems inherent in that transition. While in Western Europe one notices economic anxiety as due to its confrontation with the post modern society and the economic ramifications that accompany it. Such as, the displacement of labor intense jobs to areas where the labor force is cheaper has created tension between the individual, various labor organization and the government. The nation-state failure to protect the laborer, its inability to affect multinationals policy making has brought its authority into question. The decision of a multinational to relocate has often enormous consequences for the nation-state. Not only does the state loose a source of revenue, corporate taxes, but the multinational departure spills over into other areas. At the human level, individuals who were once gamely employed are now unemployed. They no longer contribute to the state, i.e. taxes, but they take from the state, i.e. unemployment benefits. Various other enterprises which make their living from the multinational, such as the local printer, will be negatively affected. Job security and job creation (through retraining programmes, early retirement incentives, etc.) have become highly sensitive issues. They have in turn brought into question the statesí social security policy.

Other intruders in the traditional nation-state economic security realm are the transnational capital movers. This includes banks, investment houses, and money brokers engaged in the distribution of capital. These transnational actors frequently transfer huge financial investments in and out of countries to take advantage of demand shifts and in anticipation of currency devaluations or revaluations by particular countries. The tremendous amount of money flowing around in these transactions of currency speculation changes hands so fast that the whole thrust of a countryís domestic economic policy can be derailed overnight.[23] Moreover, the spread of mass communications (television, telephone, e-mail, internet, tourism, student exchange programmes, and other instruments of mobilization) have led to the so-called "skill revolution" and to a dramatic internationalization of all economic affairs.[24]

Political security refers to survival of the state institutions. The very essence being the legitimacy of the government and its institutions. In Europe, for example, one notices two tends taking place. First in Central and Eastern Europe the various nation-state are building new institutions after years of either Soviet rule or dominance. It is a painstaking process and certainly not all of the countries in this area have obtained political security. Some have fallen short and have settled into a quasi democracy. Unsuccessful democracies are a threat to stability, not only for the country itself but also for the region as a whole. Meanwhile in Western Europe the old state institutions are coming increasingly under attack due to alienation, corruption, disillusion and a lost of confidence in the political leaders. This is apparent in the rise of extreme voting, single issue parties and an increased political disengagement. A clear example of this trend is the recent events that have transpired in Belgium.[25]

Societal security refers to the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions, the substance of such security being identity.[26] It is what one may term their "way of life,"

meaning their set of beliefs, folkways, language, art forms and religious views. The enormous technological advancement coupled with the skill revolution is threatening many traditional communities today. Some cultures, in particular that of the West (the increased use of English as the international language of transaction is just one small example), seem to be more dominant or at least appealing than others. Societal security also refers to the standard of living that the nation-state provides for its citizens. Russiaís society, for example, is presently at risk. The birth rate has dropped off considerably and has been surpassed by the death rate. The life expectancy for men has fallen to 58 years of age since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scientists calculate that Russia is loosing one million citizens every year due to the decrease in living conditions, the rise of crime and the abuse of alcohol. The consequences of this trend are profound because they affect every level of security.

Environmental security concerns any threat to the well-being of a given society and its population from internal or external sources to the quality of environment itself and the supply of various natural resources.[27] It includes, among others, soil quality, grazing lands, forest, water supply, fisheries and air quality. The environmental regulations that each of the countries, in the region, have in place affects the other countries and the quality of life of its citizens. The calibre of the water of the Baltic Sea is of importance for every country in the region. Pollutants that various industries emit into the atmosphere do not remain confined to their country of origin. An estimated annual loss of agricultural production due to air pollution is 2.7 billion dollars in Poland and 4.7 billion dollars in Germany.[28]

Individual security refers to dignity and the quality of life. It includes such things as housing, food, water supply, education, literacy, crime, migration, health and healthcare. An acute problem is the growing differences among the haves and the have nots. A wide gap between the rich and the poor is an extremely dangerous element in a society. As the chances to escape poverty become diminished, the poor are likely to become resentful. Such resentfulness could be transformed into an extreme right-wing orientation and/or a turn towards criminal activities. In either case, a negative effect for society as a whole.

With all these dimensions the internal measures taken or not taken here have an external effect. An effect that is felt at the various levels of the world system. What we now risk however, in our need to be all encompassing, is security overkill. Where everything including your next cup of coffee becomes a security issue. Moderation is therefore advisable.

Before we can analyze what effect this new multi-dimensional security has had on the Baltic Sea region, however, we have to first take a look back at the security measures the three Baltic states have taken since their regained independence.

4. The bid for security and the security dilemma in the Eastern Baltics

Analyzing the security complex – the interdependency of security relations – in the Baltic Sea region one notices the existence of antagonistic security policies between the three Baltic states and Russia. On the one hand, Estonia's, Latvia's, and Lithuania's antagonism is rooted in their feeling of insecurity towards Russia. While on the other hand Russia's antagonistic policy is based on an old geopolitical style, only guised in a different terminology of the "near abroad."

The point of departure for the Baltic policies vis-à-vis Russia is a strong *feeling of insecurity*. A feeling of insecurity or subjective insecurity, in contrast to objective insecurity, does not deal with concrete threats, i.e. military intervention, border violations, but is part of the personal affective repertoire and must be viewed as a socio-psychological phenomenon. These beliefs are formed on the basis of personal experiences, pre-existing knowledge and available information.[29] It is the fear of Russia and the asymmetrical security relationship between them that drives Baltic foreign policy. This feeling of weakness, powerlessness versus a big revanchist neighboring power is a central factor in decision making. The self-fulfilling logic of insecurity feeling is that when you feel insecure – no matter if you are objectively secure – you actually become it as well. A feeling of insecurity is always real in its consequences, no matter the (in)correctness of the feeling. If you feel insecure, then you are insecure. This is the key problem of Baltic relations with Russia.

Since their regained independence the three Baltic countries' foreign and security policies priority has been the protection of their new found freedom. Strengthening of independence became almost synonymous with foreign policy. In doing so, Baltic sovereignty was exclusively set against Russia (viewed as being one and the same as the former repressor the Soviet Union), which was seen as the only and overwhelming threat to Baltic independence. An underlying fear

of Russian revanchism, based on their shared traumatic historical experience, has made the Baltic states feel that Moscow never would except their independence and, due to natural Russian geopolitical conditions, would strive to re-conquer the Baltic coastline.[30] Hence, the Baltic states declared themselves threatened by Russia and Russian expansionism. A fear which was further amplified by the presence of a large Russian minority in the Baltics, which was viewed as potentially becoming a so-called "fifth column" in support for Russia, which was further reinforced by the presence – until 1994 – of Russian troops in the Baltics.

This feeling of antagonism marks a drastic change in attitude, for in the period 1987–1991, both Russians and Balts had been partners in the struggle against the Soviet power. Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Soviet Republic was struggling against the Soviet centre and its president Michail Gorbachev, sought political allies in the regions. He pleaded for a policy of regional autonomy and called upon the regions to accumulate as much power from the centre as they possible could. In defiance of the centre, he went so far as to order Russian troops to disobey Moscow's orders and not to use force in the Baltic Republics. Yeltsin, therefore, was among the first to recognize Baltic sovereignty. Since independence, however, the mutual feeling of interest disappeared and Balts and Russians became adversaries. Yeltsin no longer acting as a periphery figure but as a power holder of the centre himself, became an advocate of the interests of the political centre in the Russian Federation. On the one hand he resisted the deepening of regional autonomy, i.e. Tatarstan, and vigorously challenged regional independence, i.e. Chechnya. On the other hand he began promoting – due to pressure from the nationalist/right wing parties in the Russian parliament and the public opinion – for the rights of the Russians living in the former Soviet Republics. What was to become known as Russia's "near abroad." In developing a "special" relationship with the former Soviet Republics, Russia is trying to make the transition from a former empire (Soviet Union) to an informal sphere of influence.[31] Hence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania fear becoming "finlandized," which would mean not being completely free from Russia in the orientation of their foreign and security policies. This feeling of insecurity feeds the *security dilemma*, in which measures taken by one party to increase its security, simultaneously decrease the security of the other party.[32] The Baltic countries for their part declared themselves as belonging to the West, the Western nations, in deep contrast with Russia which was regarded to

be the East. They emphasized the existence of a "cultural curtain" – that of the West – which ends on their respective Eastern borders.[33] Therefore, they wanted nothing to do with the Commonwealth of Independent States and sought security guarantees and cooperation with the Western Europe, i.e. NATO, (W)EU. The foremost being NATO membership. The logic being that once members, the security problems of the Baltic states would automatically become those of the West. In doing so the Balts underlined the belief that there was no other policy option other than one based on an antagonistic approach in dealing with Russia.

This approach, obviously played a part in Russian Foreign Minister Primakov's request for guarantees from NATO that it would not extend membership offers to the Baltic countries, stating that Russia would otherwise be obliged to reassess its relationship with NATO. This leads one to question if Russia will ever respect the complete sovereignty, as defined by international law, of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And also why Russia fears NATO membership for the Baltics. What remains a fact though is: the more that the Baltic states search for security in the West, at the expense of Russia, the more Russia will feel threatened. This will in turn intensify the Russian priorities in the Baltics and will increase the Baltic feeling of insecurity. Resulting in a vicious circle of insecurity. The only beneficiary of an antagonistic security relationship would be the hard right in Russia.

Neither the Baltic peoples nor the Russians can win this zero-sum game. This being the case it is then certainly wiser to play a different game. Since in our opinion, the issue is largely psychological, the solution lies in a mental change. We have to remove the wall in our mind and stop thinking about East versus West, we versus them, good versus bad. The new security paradigm requires a different attitude, one more geared to the future and more focused on cooperation.[34] The Baltic people should therefore strive for good neighbourly relations with the Russian regions of Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov as well as with the city of St. Petersburg. After all, the regions are not the centre and one notices within Russia a move towards regionalism, which means that the regions will profile themselves according to their own needs. Regional interests therefore will not always correspond with those of Moscow. In the Baltic Region of the Russian Federation there exists a Baltic feeling of willingness for cooperation. Naturally this new security for the Sea region also implies a strong Scandinavian involvement

region. Sweden and Finland can no longer hide behind their status of neutrality and should openly discuss their security policies with their Baltic neighbours. The connection between Nordic and Baltic security has to be made. Finally, Germany and Poland should also deepen their commitment to the Baltic Sea region, through developing their Baltic identity and policies, thus becoming real actors in the region. After all, every country in the region is affected by the post Cold War security realities.[35] The realities of today demand a comprehensive, transnational, cooperative approach to security.

5. Cooperative security

In contrast to the antagonistic approach to security, *cooperative security* as the term itself implies, encourages an open and constructive mindset, one less likely to be inhibited by the familiar disciplinary boundaries and the traditional state-centred security thinking. The term tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.[36] Within the cooperative security system, states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all.[37]

One of the first steps towards cooperative security is the establishment of a *security regime* in which principle, rules, and norms permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept requires norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation that goes beyond short term self-interest.[38] In order to obtain this state five conditions have to be met:

1) the participating nation-state must want it, that is to say, they have to prefer a regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically. This also requires that a subjective we-feeling among the member of the regime exists;
2) all the active members of the regime must believe and trust that the other members share the same high level of value that they place on mutual security and cooperation. In an atmosphere of distrust the members of the regime will find themselves in the classic *prisoner's dilemma*, and thus revert back to decision-making mode based on self interest;
3) all of the actors of the regime must view security as multi-dimensional. That security issues can spill over, can turn from soft to hard issues;
4) in order to have a security regime none of the active members can believe that their security is best served through expansion. By conducting a policy of security through expansion the states risk becoming victims of the security dilemma; and,

5) all of the regime member states have to believe that war and the individualistic approach to security is too costly. Otherwise they will not be inclined to cooperate in the said regime.

In the Baltic Sea region today, these conditions for regime building do not exist. Two facts must be remembered though: firstly, these conditions are of a high standard and therefore extremely demanding and secondly, cooperative security and regime building are not over night processes. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have just only recently regained their independence. Since that time they have been primarily pre-occupied with the establishment of their national identities and the nation-state building process. The resulting consequence is that there exists only a low level of interaction between the three Baltic states and an overreliance on a bilateral approach to policy making. This individualistic approach runs counter to conditions one and five and is not conducive for the creation of a we-feeling in the Baltic. Finally there exists a clear level of distrust – varying from state to state – between the three Baltic states and Russia. This obviously runs counter to condition two.

Looking beyond the Baltic states and to the Baltic Sea region, one has to take the Council of Baltic Sea states (CBSS) into account. Founded in 1992, the CBSS is a regional entity which consists of eleven participating countries – the five Nordic countries, the three Baltic countries, Germany, Poland, the Russian Federation and the European Commission. The main areas of cooperation are assistance to democratic institutions, economic cooperation and environmental issues including nuclear and radiation safety. Still, the Nordic member states, Germany and Poland have not developed a strong affinity with the region and the CBSS as of yet, preferring instead the traditional bilateral approach to diplomacy. For this reason the CBSS remains a rather weak organization.

Russia's willingness presently to cooperate in a regional security regime can be questioned. It is still struggling with its transition from an empire to a federation. Russia still wants to be perceived as a great power and enjoy all the trappings that come with it, i.e. a sphere of influence. This holds especially true for the territories that once belonged to the former Soviet Union. This posture naturally creates distrust in those countries which fall under what Russia views as her "near abroad." It also decreases the level of willingness to cooperate. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (27 May 1997)

concluded largely to appease Russia's resistance to NATO enlargement only serves to indirectly decrease Russia's cooperative posture. In essence, it recognizes, de facto, a Russian sphere of influence in the area that Russia perceives to be its "near abroad." The limited enlargement – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – of the Alliance as determined at the NATO Madrid Summit (8–9 July 1997) will divide Europe into NATO members and non members. It will fragment not integrate the European continent. While it may increase the security of the new members, it will certainly decrease that of those nations left out. In this sense it is not a true cooperative security policy. NATO offers security through membership – article 5 – however, obtaining this membership is a rather paradoxical process. Candidacy revolves around the concepts of a *security consumer* and a *security producer*. NATO is only willing to give membership to states that pose no security risks, security producers, and unwilling to extend membership to those who do pose a risk, security consumers. In other words NATO will only extend article 5 to those states to which it is certain will never have to make use of it. For the Baltic states, helas, they do not belong to this group. And this is in no small part due to the antagonistic security relationship with Russia. Regime building, unlike that of NATO, offers security through a long gradual building process and is thus more durable. Another paradox in the NATO membership debate is the budgetary question. In a time when most western countries are decreasing military spending (the Netherlands and Belgium have combined their navies, for example), the NATO is asking its new candidate members to increase their military budgets. The question remains whether these countries would not be better of applying these funds for more social purposes as they make the changeover to a free market economy.

Some suggestions for regime building can be found in confidence building measures. For instance, President Yeltsin's statement, that the Russian Federation never would attack the Baltic states, after the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, should be formalized and made official by a decree from the Russian State Duma. This implies, of course, the recognition of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania over their territories. It also involves the resolvement of the existing border disputes, the negotiations should be strictly limited to the issue of the borders and not broaden to include of non-border related issues. Estonia and Latvia have already taken positive steps by renouncing their territorial claims from the Peace Treaties of 1920, Russia on the other hand has to drop its insistence on

including Russian minority rights in the new treaty. The minority issues belongs and requires a different approach.

The status of the Russian minority population in the Baltics has received a great deal of attention in the recent years. Organizations such as the OSCE, especially the High Commissioner for National Minorities, Council of Europe, European Union (Stability Pact), and even the NATO have addressed the problem of the minorities in the Baltics. Progress has been made in the integration a process. Immediately after the Baltic independence the condition was extremely rigid, but since it has become more flexible. Both the state and the minorities themselves have seen and taken into account the others position. It is a positive development which in the future could be built upon. For instance the Russian minorities could serve as bridge building function between the Baltics and Russia. The introduction of visa-free travel for people living in the border areas, could be a first step in this process. The Russian minorities would then be allowed to travel freely back and forth to Russia but still remained tied their land of residency. This integration process would be beneficial to all: it would lessen Russian fears of the treatment of Russian minorities and it would enhance the state loyalty of the Russian minorities for their state of residence. The resulting effects of this measures could lay the foundation for a formal treaty on the mutual recognition of sovereignty and rights between the Baltics and Russia, to be recognized by the international community.

Another regime building measure, the military transparency of Russian armed forces in the Russian Baltic Sea region, should diminish the fear of a Russian military attack. This is particularly important for the Kaliningrad Oblast. Thus, military manoeuvres in this area must be of a defensive nature only, a command should be opened up between the oblast and the three Baltic military commands, the establishment of a joint military airspace control zone also involving Germany, Poland and the Scandinavian countries, and the exchange of fleet visits between those countries and Russia too. At the same time the Baltic countries themselves have to make a realistic assessment of the Russian military capabilities. For several reasons a Russian military attack in the region is highly unlikely: Russia cannot not afford to loose international support, such and attack would result in it; military occupation by Russian forces was proven in Chechnya to be very in effective and highly unpopular and Russia's real security priorities lie in the south. Furthermore the security problems of the three Baltic countries do not lie predominantly at the military dimension.

Not only military transparency, but the diversification of the use of the armed forces of the countries in the region, engaged in more humanitarian operations, would serve to enhance regional cooperation and the establishment of a regime. Within the frame work of the Partnership for Peace, the possibility to involve all the states of the Baltic Sea region exists. It is an opportunity that should not be missed.

Cooperative security needs a strong economic impetus. The Baltic Sea region should be looked upon as an economic region state with common transnational development priorities.[39] In order to establish itself as an economic region state the core members of the Baltic Sea region – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have to develop and deepen their economic ties. In many ways like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg did when forming the BENELUX. This entails the establishment of a free trade and custom union, in close cooperation with the immediate regional members, which in itself implies the Euro-pean Union since four of the regional actors in the Baltic Sea region are also members of the EU. Furthermore, the EU has signed "Europe Agreements" with Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which established bilateral associations between each of the countries and the EU. In July 1997, the EU-Commission decided to deepen the EU's commitment to the Baltic Sea region by initiating the process for membership negotiations with Poland and Estonia. The involvement of the EU will therefore increase in the near future. Within the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States the EU has launched the "Baltic Sea Initiative." Three areas of priority are addressed in order to enhance regional cooperation. First, strengthening democracy and stability (building civil society, promoting human rights, fighting organized crime). The second priority is regional economic development. The goal of the EU is to become the motor in activating bilateral trade amongst all regional partners to the level they have established bilaterally with the EU. The alignment of practices, rules, legislation and standards throughout the region should be a priority, especially in relation with the Russian Federation. An example of a regional infrastructure initiative which has the interest of the EU is the Via Baltica project. Finally, the Baltic Sea Initiative aims to strengthen the environment through various concrete programmes. The involvement of the EU in the regional cooperation around the Baltic Sea could be an important factor in the increase of transnational contacts and the promotion of a regional identity.

All these confidence building measures should lead to the incremental development of a security regime. A security regime being

those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. It promotes cooperation between states, the non-violent management of their disputes and hence limits the chances of falling prey to the security dilemma. An example of such an incremental step which has already been taken toward the process of a security regime is the so-called "Spirit of Vilnius." Where the leaders of eleven of the regions countries committed themselves to overcoming the differences between East and West.[40] This proves, although it will require a great deal of time and good will that, the development of a security regime is an attainable goal for the Baltic Sea region.

Conclusion

If conclusions can be drawn, then the following can be said: we have attempted to show that the old Cold War concept of security is outdated and no longer corresponds to today's multi-dimensional security needs; that in such a security environment the best way to obtain security is through an regional approach to the security issues active in the said regional. This therefore demands a cooperative approach – in order to avoid a security dilemma – to security, with the ultimate goal being the establishment of a security regime.

Looking specifically at the Baltic Sea region, we noticed a rather weak commitment towards the concept of regional security, with more reliance being placed on the traditional bilateral approach to diplomacy. Together with a strong preference for institutional security options. While initiatives and institutions exist in which the regional approach can be extended and deepen, they remain for the moment underdeveloped. More striking, however, is the antagonistic position between Russia and the three Baltic states and visa-versa. A posture which greatly hinders the overall security improvement in the Baltic Sea region. A readjustment in security policies, especially those of the three Baltic countries and Russia, is desirable. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cannot escape their asymmetrical geographic relations vis-à-vis Russia, but an antagonistic security policy will not enhance their own security. It will decrease it, by making the Baltic states less appealing, security consumers not producers, to the partners they are courting in the West. Hence it is in Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's own interest to under take the initiative to install an cooperative security policy approach.

Notes

1. A security complex is a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. See Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 190.
2. Here we use the term "external" to cover all forms of regionalism that occurs beyond the state borders, i.e. border regions, supra-regions et alii.
3. See Thompson, W. R., "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Prepositional Inventory," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 89–117, and Russett, B. M.,"Declining International Regions," ed. Singer, J. D., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (Free Press: New York, 1968) pp. 317–352. For a more maximalist approach see: Cappellin, R., "Interregional Cooperation in Europe. An Introduction," eds. Cappellin, R., Batey, P. W. J., Regional Networks, Border Regions and European Integration (Pion Limited: London, 1993), p.2.
4. See Buzan (note 1).
5. Kirby, D., *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period. The Baltic World 1492–1772.* (Longman: London, 1990). and also Kirby, D., *The Baltic World 1772-1993. Europe's Northern Periphery in an age of change* (Longman: London, 1995).
6. This definition differs from the one given by Der Ministerpräsident des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, *The Baltic Sea – Region of the Future. Data and Facts* (Denkfabrik: Kiel, 1991) in that it does not include the complete territories of Sweden and Finland. Another study: Third Conference of Ministers for Spatial Planning: Tallinn, December 7–8, 1994, *Vision and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region 2010. Towards a Framework for Spatial Development in the Baltic Sea Region*, expands the Baltic Region to include the complete territory of Poland (not just the five vojvodships included in the Denfabrik definition) and also the complete territories of Norway and Belarus.
7. Pedersen, J. S., "The Baltic Region and the New Europe" see Cappellin (note 2), p. 136. One could argue that Belarus certainly belongs to the Baltic Sea region when one is addressing security issues, we too would share this view. But because there is significant reasons to doubt whether or not Belarus actually conducts an independent policy we have chosen not to incorporate it into our definition of the Baltic Sea region.
8. The Hanseatic League was a commercial and political formation centred on Northern German towns that flourished from the 12th to the 15th century. Our reference to The Hansa League here is two-fold: it illustrates transnational and non-state cooperation simultaneously.
9. Other more recent examples include: the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Baltic Ports Organization.

10. Which refers to a multipolar system in which the participating countries follow a set of established rules of the game. For example Europe in the nineteenth century.
11. Generally overlay refers to the direct pressure of outside powers in a region that is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. See Buzan (note 4), p. 198.
12. NSC-68 (National Security Council Document) is one illustration of this view being transformed into government policy.
13. See Gaddis, J. L., "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), pp. 5–58. See also Baldwin, D. A., "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics*, vol. 48 (Oct. 1995), pp 117–147.
14. Grieco, J., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485–508.
15. A concept in which security is viewed as a non zero-sum game, it was introduced by the Palme Commission in 1982. See: Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (Pan Books: London, 1982).
16. Quote in Fukuyama, F., *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press: New York, 1992), p. 8.
17. This was done of course by including the then defeated enemy (Germany) in plans for the rebuilding of Europe, not by excluding.
18. See Steele, J., *Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and the Mirage of Democracy* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1994).
19. Nye, J. S., *Understanding International Conflicts* (Harper Collins: New York, 1993).
20. Deutsch, K. W., "The Future of World Politics," *Political Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 7 (Jan.–March 1966), pp. 9–32.
21. See Buzan (note 1), pp.13–14; eds. Klare, M. T. and Tomas, D. C., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1994). See also Renner, M., *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity* (Norton: New York, 1996).
22. See Buzan (note 1), pp. 230–261.
23. Brown, S., "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security," eds. Klare and Tomas (note 21).
24. See Rosenau, J., "Security in a Turbulent World," *Current History*, vol. 94, no. 592 (May 1995), p. 194.
25. The crisis began in 1995 with the so-called Agusta affair, in which not only highly placed ministers but also the political parties themselves were involved in criminal activities such as: corruption, bribes, and illegal financing measures. In addition the ineffectiveness of the judicial system and the police forces in the missing girls cases compounded the citizens disillusion in the state. Said disillusion was voiced in a "White March" in October 1996 in which the people openly demanded a change in the Belgium political culture.

26. Soerensen, G., "Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the principal Problem," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 371–386.
27. Porter, G., "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," *Current History* (note 23), pp. 218–222.
28. See United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Human Development Report 1994, cited in *Current History* (note 23), pp. 229–236.
29. See Bar-Tal, D., Jacobson, D., and Freund, T., "Security Feelings among Jewish Settlers in the Occupied Territories. A Study of communal and personal antecedents," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 1995), pp. 353–377.
30. See Holoboff, E. M., "National Security in the Baltic States: Rolling Back the Bridgehead," ed. Parrott, B., *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The International Politics of Eurasia*, vol. 5 (M.E.Sharp: New York, 1995). See also: Lejiņš, A., "Latvia in Post-Cold War Europe," eds. Snider, D. M., and Brundtland, A. D., *Nordic-Baltic Security. An International Perspective* (The Center For Strategic and International Studies: Washington DC, 1994), pp. 31–55.
31. In our opinion this sphere of influence not only includes the Commonwealth of Independent States but also the three Baltic countries.
32. Jervis, R., "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* (1977-1978), pp. 167–214.
33. For a more in-depth analysis of the idea of cultural differences see: Huntington, S. P., *The Clash of Civilizations And the remaking of World Order* (Simon & Shuster: New York, 1996).
34. We are not making light of the traumatic Baltic past, but in order to create a non-antagonistic security approach, the Baltic people have to come to terms with it, as the Belgian people did with the Germans after Two World Wars. Thus, emotions cannot be allowed to dominate security issues.
35. For example the problem of illegal migration through the Baltics towards Northern Europe, see International Organization for Migration, *The Baltic Route: The Trafficking of Migrants Through Lithuania* (January 1997).
36. Evans, G., "Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, no. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 3–20.
37. Wendt, A., "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 400.
38. Jervis, R., "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, vol. 36, no 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357–378.
39. See Ohmae, K., *The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies* (Harper Collins: London, 1995).
40. The meeting, 5–6 September 1997, was organized by the leaders of Poland and Lithuania, and attracted the presidents of Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and the Ukraine, as well as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

LAI. The Latvian Institute of International Affairs

The Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) was established on May 20, 1992 in Riga as a non-profit foundation charged with the task of providing the people of Latvia with information about international events and Baltic security issues. The LIIA is an independent public service institution that organizes lectures, seminars, exchange programmes, issues publications, maintains a specialized library, and conducts research relevant to Baltic security interests.

In 1993–1996 LIIA has concluded two research projects: The Baltic Security Project and The Security of Small States in a Turbulent Environment.

The current research program is called The First Round Enlargements — Implications for Baltic Security to be concluded by the end of 1998.

English language publications of the LIIA:

- The Baltic States on their Way to the EU (Security Aspects). Conference proceedings. Eds. A. Lejiņš and P. Apinis, 1995;
- The Baltic States: Search for Security. Eds. A. Lejiņš and D. Bleiere, 1996;
- NATO and EU enlargement: The Case of the Baltic States. Conference proceedings. Eds. A. Lejiņš and P. Apinis, 1996;
- The Baltic Dimension of European Integration. Conference proceedings. Eds. O. Grobel and A. Lejiņš, 1996;
- NATO and the Baltic States: Quo Vadis? Conference proceedings. Eds. P. Apinis and A. Lejiņš;
- Small States in a Turbulent Environment: The Baltic Perspective. Eds. A. Lejiņš and Z. Ozolina, 1997.

The Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defence College of Sweden

(Strategiska institutionen vid Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm)

The Department is charged with the task of teaching strategy, security policy, and military history at the College (which is the highest national institution for the education of officers for senior posts). The Department is also a national centre for research in the same fields. The director is Professor Bo Huldt.

The research Program "Security in the Baltic Sea Region"

The Department's research is organized in five programs: Svenskt försvar och säkerhetspolitik (SFS, Swedish Defence and Security Policy); Security in the Baltic Sea Region (BSS); European Security and Transatlantic Relations; Russia and the CIS; War and the Future Use of Force. The BSS program, which is headed by Professor Gunnar Artéus, involves about 50 researchers from the Baltic Sea region in several projects. Research is directed primarily towards two fields: (1) the permanent and changing nature and conditions of security and insecurity in the BS region after 1989/1991, and (2) the present and future security policies of the BS states. The program's plan of publications (not counting articles and reports) for the period 1997-99 lists at present some ten titles. In close integration with its research work, the program also arranges international conferences and open seminars.

Previous publications from the research program SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION (BSS) at the Department of Strategic Studies of the National Defence College of Sweden:

- Gunnar Artéus & Jukka Nevakivi (eds.), Security and insecurity. Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish defence and foreign policy. 1997. (Försvarshögskolans Acta B3).

- Joachim Isacsson, Östersjöns framtida betydelse för Sverige. 1997 (Försvarshögskolan. Strategiska institutionens rapporter. Serie R:3).

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