New Security Challenges and EU Responses

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Editors: Atis Lejiņš, Antonio Missiroli

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Dr. ATIS LEJIŅŠ, Director, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga

As we say in Latvian: “Sveicināti Latvijā!” It means: Welcome to Latvia! My name is Atis Lejiņš, and I am extremely pleased to have you here in Riga and to have a seminar for the first time with the EU ISS in Paris.

I have just a few introductory remarks. If we are talking about hard and soft security today, you will have a plenty of examples from Latvian history. Look at this House of Blackheads built by the Baltic German traders in the 14th century and partly destroyed during the Second World War. The walls left standing were blown up by the Soviet occupation forces after the war. We rebuilt it recently. Outside you saw the statue of Roland – it’s a statue you’ll see almost in every German city in the middle of the town square. That was also destroyed and recently rebuilt. Along this side of the Daugava river facing the bridge you saw when entering this building the fledgling Latvian army of 10 000 badly equipped and ill-fed soldiers beat back 50.000 supposedly anti-communist German and some Russian soldiers on November 11th 1919 - Latvian independence was saved.

And, of course, just next to this house you can see the Occupation Museum, an ugly building that fails utterly to fit into the surrounding medieval setting but is a legacy of the soviet occupation. It was built to house the museum of the Latvian Red Riflemen – their monument still stands behind the museum, but today it is in memory of the Latvian Riflemen. To the Latvian regiments in the Czarist army who stopped for two years the advance of the Kaiser’s army, and then supported Lenin because only he, unlike short-lived democratic Russia under Kerensky and “White

Russia" during the Russian civil war, supported Latvian independence from the "prison house of nationalities." Unfortunately, the substance of this independence was not what the Latvian people wanted, but in 1917 that was the only offer on the table. One can add in parenthesis that nobody wanted Latvian independence in the West either – only the scourge of communism in Russia broke the hold of the Russian lobby in the western capitols against Baltic independence.

One wonders how Russia would look today if democratic Russia under Yeltsin had shown tact and sensitivity to the Chechens – the first Chechen war could well have been avoided and the secular nationalist movement that has been a characteristic feature of Russian history down through the ages would not have been transformed into a radical Islam manifestation against Russia in the form of terrorism. The Museum's building today has been left standing because it houses the history of Latvia under the Nazi and Soviet occupations.

The bottom line is that our eastern border today is exactly the same as it was drawn when the several separate Latvian nations, after a number of inconclusive battles with the Pope's Christian armies, made peace and, in effect, joined the Holy Roman Empire in the 13th century. That's something to reflect upon – despite the changing times, rulers, empires that came and went, wars and more wars, the Latvian nation, despite its small numbers, gained and regained its state in 1918 and 1991. But the eastern border remains exactly the same as in the 13th century!

We are going to look at global challenges – a lot of these things are not new to us as I have indicated in my glimpse of Latvia's history. Nor is it new for any other European country, but what is new is global warming. We never knew this to be a problem before. We can't find this in our history books. Only last Tuesday in the speech on CNN Tony Blair said he would make it the centrepiece of Britain's presidency of the G8. He said that violent weather conditions throughout the globe are created by the richest countries, but the poorest bear the brunt. I'm not so sure. Look at the damage now done in America - it seems to be hit by hurricanes every week. We know what the floods did in Germany and the Czech Republic not so long ago. Some experts say that the cost of building new flood control systems can financially ruin Europe. There was a comment yesterday on Latvian television to the effect that that maybe the war against terrorism doesn't really mean that much because everybody will be drowned anyway – including the terrorists. Since we cannot control the weather, global warming is perhaps the biggest threat facing us. Although both the USA and Europe agree that there is climate change, they disagree on the causes and hence mankind remains helpless.

Dr. ANTONIO MISSIROLI, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

This conference is not the first one we organise jointly with an Institute from one of the new EU member states. We actually have launched a programme, or at least a plan, an intention to do so with almost all the acceding – now full - member states. We started with a seminar last May in Prague, and some of the participants here were already there. This is the second one, and we plan a third and possibly fourth event in 2005. This is a mutual benefit exercise in which we come and talk to officials and experts of the host country, and at the same time we bring back feedback on your views and visions for European security.

One of the reasons why we decided to hold the second event in Latvia, apart from the friendship and long-time familiarity with Atis who is a frequent guest at our events, is the fact that Latvia today is the first and, as far as I know, the only country in the world with a "Green" Prime Minister, although I understand that Greens in Latvia are not exactly the same thing as Greens elsewhere in Europe from a purely political viewpoint, at least in terms of nuances and orientation. Yet the ecologist focus is present anyway, and there is high sensitivity in this country for these issues. This is one of the reasons also why we decided to centre at least a couple of sessions on what we call "soft" security challenges. We'll discuss this in depth later.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Dr. ANTONIO MISSIROLI, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

The Conference was the second event – after Prague last May – that the EUISS has organised in a new member State in collaboration with a local Institute. More will follow, possibly coupled with public events open to a wider audience.

The first and last parts of the Conference were mainly devoted to introducing the EU Security Strategy to the Baltic public and illustrating the kind of capabilities that would be necessary to live up to the challenges and ambitions enshrined in the Strategy. The general praise for Solana's paper was accompanied with invitations to the Union to implement it through more detailed action plans and a more coherent political behaviour.

The main focus of the Conference, however, was on I) whether the old distinction between "hard" and "soft" security challenges can still hold and, also, on II) the extent to which the "global challenges" listed in the Security Strategy have a specifically European dimension and relevance.

I. ***Beyond "hard" and "soft"***

On the first point, all the participants agreed that the distinction is outdated, misleading, even divisive: it is a cultural construction, it is often highly politicised, and it ends up splitting the West – sometimes involuntarily. Even in the case of Chechnya, it was noted, a trans-national war economy has taken root in which terrorism ("hard") generates and supports crime ("soft"), and vice-versa. In turn,

the cooperation agreements that the EU now signs with third countries include clauses on terrorism and WMD as well as human rights and migration.

In many ways, the notion of security has moved from "security for the State" to "safety for the citizen": but, as a participant asked, should we "negotiate" such security, as the EU tends to do most of the time, or should we "win it, or win it back", as the US instead clings to doing? Also, there are different "safety thresholds" across the West and across Europe itself: they are linked to varying geopolitical realities and perceptions as well as levels of acceptance/acceptability of *in*security - just another source of transatlantic mismatch, with the US keen on a search for invulnerability that is mostly foreign to Europeans.

The discussion also focussed on the capabilities that would strengthen the EU as a security actor, and tried i.a. to address the question of what could be a "post-modern" army and approach to warfare. It was said, for instance, that it should be based on 1) optimisation rather than maximisation of targets; 2) cultivation rather than destruction of infrastructure, 3) decentralisation rather than (re-)centralisation of decisions and operations. Still, it must be kept in mind that (*Iraq docet*) tactical victories do not translate automatically into strategic and political ones. Hence the need for a more comprehensive approach.

With the old distinction between "hard" and "soft" fading away, it was also argued that European security is now confronted with a broader set of threats: "actor-based" ones, such as attack by another (State or else), and "structural" threats, encompassing a) collapse of neighbouring systems (energy crises, pandemics, violent civil unrest), and b) severe domestic disturbances (accidents, riots, epidemics, loss of democratic values) – all with unpredictable potential cascading effects. Their "mediatisation", in turn, contributes to trans-nationalising the overall impact and may have political side-effects: Bush gained full endorsement as President of all Americans only after 9-11, whereas Aznar lost it in a sudden crisis. There is a new sphere between the primarily international and the essentially domestic dimensions of crisis management: and such an "inter-mestic" sphere is particularly relevant to the European Union. Also, public perceptions of insecurity drive decisions in the short-term, and "policy-making in these fields is increasingly dominated by *pace* rather than *space*". Yet we expect *more* effective governing with *less* government, and we also tend to out-source functions and services (vaccines, prisons, even warfare) that are crucial to that end.

II. ***The other "Ds": depletion, disease, disasters and disruptions***

On the second point, it was agreed that security in this new millennium is about protection not only from aggression but also from economic shocks, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and disease. But how exactly and to what extent do such "global challenges" (as mentioned also in the European Security Strategy) affect the EU?

Depletion, for instance, is not a direct challenge for Europe, although it may generate disruption and turmoil in the developing world and trigger conflict – requiring intervention – and also migration. This being said, EU countries can significantly improve their performance concerning multilateral and bilateral aid: the "millennium goal" of 0.7 % of GDP set by the UN, for instance, is currently met by only four member states (Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) despite the relative wealth of the Union.

Infectious *diseases* are on the rise again outside of Europe (especially AIDS and drug-resistant tubercolosis), but migrations and the sheer mobility of people are bringing them ever closer. The number of cases of HIV-infection is running out of control in Russia (due also to administrative chaos and lack of recognition of the problem) and spreading over into the Baltic States. DR-TB cases are on the increase in the Baltic States, again, but also in Denmark and Germany. Also, the SARS scare of last year – and possibly Avian Influenza (bird flu) this year – have shown how quickly new and unknown viruses can spread worldwide, with huge potential implications, practical and psychological, including public attitudes vis-à-vis migrants. It may even prove difficult to assess whether a given outbreak is natural or deliberate, although the effects – and the immediate response – would inevitably be the same. Finally, even though malaria is endemic to the poorest countries and virtually absent in the Northern hemisphere, global warming may change that picture, particularly in Southern Europe.

As for *climate change* proper, it was noted that human activity is definitely pushing up temperatures across the world – and especially in the industrialised world through greenhouse gas emissions – but that it remains extremely difficult to assess exactly how much and how fast the Earth is getting warmer, and what impact this will have both globally and locally. This major destabilisation of the geopolitical environment may also lead to new conflicts: a paper prepared for the Pentagon a few months ago hinted at a possible "ice age" in the North Atlantic area caused by a shut-down of the Gulf Stream as a consequence of global warming and the melting of the Artic ice pack. In the short term, however, the only certainty is that climate instability will impact on agriculture, especially in the developing world, and generate *disasters and disruptions* that will require ever more humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
On the policy side, the discussion dwelt upon the broader topic of *environmental governance*, an area dominated by a large set of specific conventions (up to 40 multilateral agreements) but all mostly based on "soft law" and very different rules and obligations, financial and implementation mechanisms, and participating states. There was some debate over whether to aim primarily at universal adherence, for reasons of effectiveness and consistency alike (the French proposal of a World Environmental Organisation was mentioned), or to try and keep some flexibility in order to entice some critical countries into compliance.

The *Kyoto Protocol* is a case in point, of course, and in particular *Russia*'s position: it was noted that the underlying mechanism is such that Russia may even make significant profits from adhering to the Protocol (thus allowing it to enter into

force) since its 1990 emissions levels were so high that cutting them down to Kyoto benchmarks would not only cost Moscow nothing – they already lie well below the Protocol targets - but even allow it to sell emission quotas to rich polluters. Also, Russia could trade its adhesion to Kyoto for its WTO entry, a step to which notably the European Union is crucial, given its objections to Russian domestic gas prices: a possible mutually beneficial deal - it was noted - could be struck here [and recent developments have confirmed this scenario, with the Russian government sending to the Duma for approval the papers required for adhering to the Protocol].
For their part, the *EU member states* should definitely improve on their current record on cutting down emissions: so far, only Germany has done so to a significant extent. It may become difficult to advocate multilateralism and compliance (Kyoto) when unilateral implementation leaves so much to be desired, although this is an area in which – as social scientists underline – there is no "first-mover advantage". Yet if the EU can demonstrate that it can live within the Kyoto limits, this may have some impact on other high-emission countries (US and Australia, perhaps also China and India).

Regarding the *United States*, it was argued that it is unlikely that Washington will join the Protocol in its current form and possibly denomination: even presidential candidate John F. Kerry has hinted at a possible adhesion only after a renegotiation. The problem is that powerful corporate interests (e.g. Exxon and Chevron, although not – ironically – Enron) have opposed the Protocol, making it necessary to build "counter-coalitions". To be influential, these should include at least some other US corporate interests, e.g. insurance companies, chemical industries (Dupont backed the Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer because it had developed CFCs substitutes), and possibly some US States (California, New England).

Yet it was also noted that:
a) most multilateral conventions in this arena, including Kyoto, were originally devised by American experts and activists and backed by the Clinton administration, while they were initially met with scepticism on the EU side;
b) Kyoto is only a small piece in a much broader context: its impact on global warming is short-term and very limited after all; and
c) issues related to climate change – including the environment-security "nexus" – are dealt with also in other arenas (e.g. ozone layer, toxic waste, disaster relief).

NEW GLOBAL CHALLENGES: THE "HARD" SIDE

Chair of the session: **Mr. GEDIMINAS VARVUOLIS, Head of Threat Analysis, Crisis Management and International Operations Division, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius**

Let's start our first session, and, first of all, let me introduce myself – I'm from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania - from the Security Policy Department, dealing specifically with the ESDP and other crisis management issues. Allow me also to apologize on behalf of Raimundas Lopata, the director of the Vilnius Institute of the International Relations who was invited to chair this session but couldn't come - he had to stay in Vilnius.

Our first session will be dedicated to the new global challenges – to the "hard" side of these global challenges, and everybody I guess is well aware of those hard global challenges. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, regional conflicts are those hard challenges – they were well analysed by the academical community, they also were well recorded, I would say, in all the strategic documents of recent years. The NATO strategic concept, adopted in 1999, already took note and actually referred to terrorism, proliferation and weapons of mass destruction as the major threats to the transatlantic community. We have also the European Security Strategy, which was adopted last year, and which is the most recent example of our common strategic understanding of these new challenges. And of course, our countries also have national security strategies, based on our common strategic thinking and reflecting the line adopted by the whole Euro-Atlantic community.

We have the strategies, but the problem is that we do not know yet what tactics we should adopt to deal with these challenges. Opinions differ on how we deal with

them: do we have to emphasize prevention, address the root causes or should we remain rather firm and limit ourselves to the tough line and use hard pressure in dealing with them? What place does international law have in all this international fight against terrorism? Are we prepared to cope with the consequence management of various attacks of new nature?

That is but one of many questions where opinions differ in the world, across the Atlantic, but across the Europe itself as well. Therefore, we are here – and we hope that some answers to these questions will be heard today.

Dr. GUSTAV LINDSTROM, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

First of all, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I'm very excited and look forward to a productive conference with a lively discussion. In this first session we are going to examine the new global security challenges – focusing on the "hard" side. To give you a brief overview of my presentation, I will be discussing four points today.

Overview of Presentation

1. Characterising the new global threats
2. The threats according to the European Security Strategy (ESS)
3. Conceptualising the global threats
4. EU options for dealing with the global threats

First, what are the new threats, what do they look like, how can we characterise them, and how should we think about them? Next, I will focus on the European Security Strategy and what it considers to be the threats of highest priority. I will then offer some thoughts for conceptualising the identified threats. Finally, what is the EU doing to handle these types of threats and challenges?

Today's threats can be characterised differently from the "traditional" threats. In this next slide, I've have introduced four different dimensions – there are more – to illustrate these changes.

The new global security threats are difficult to categorise

	Traditional threats	New threats
Origin	External	External / internal / electronic
Character	Primarily military	Military and non-military
Primary actor	State actors	State and non-state
Implications	Direct	Direct and indirect

Traditionally, we thought of threats that might be termed "hard" as external threats stemming outside our borders. Today, we have to be a little more careful: the new "hard" threats can originate either externally or internally. Within the EU, for example, terrorist acts can be traced to either external or internal sources. In addition, through the advent of globalisation, these threats can have an electronic origin which does not have a specific geographic anchor.

Traditionally, these types of threats were considered to be military in nature. Today, we see they can have either a military and/or non-military dimension. Again, terrorism can be used to illustrate the devastation that can be caused using non-military means. The implications of a threat may also differ. Traditional "hard" threats tended to result in fairly direct consequences, especially if they involved military means. Today, the effects can be indirect. For example, an attack on one critical infrastructure may produce cascading effects on other vital infrastructures.

The EU Security Strategy identifies the new global threats as multifacered

- “Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable.”
- “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.”
- “Large scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable.”

A Secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy 2003

The EU Security Strategy has picked up on this trend. It clearly states that global threats today are “more diverse, less visible, and less predictable. Dealing with these new threats requires new thinking and collaboration since “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.” At the same time, the possibility of “large scale aggressions” against EU member states seems remote.

Overall, 11 global threats are identified in EU Security

Threat Category	Highest priority	Important priority
Terrorism	✓	
WMD Proliferation	✓	
Regional Conflicts	✓	
State Failure	✓	
Organised Crime	✓	
Poverty		✓
Disease		✓
Population Growth		✓
Resource Dependency		✓
Limited Resources		✓
Global Warming		✓

If you read the EU Security Strategy carefully, you will come across eleven global threats. While you could argue that there is an additional or two in there, those listed in this slide are mentioned explicitly. They are listed in no particular order. It should be noted however, that the EU Security Strategy identifies five key threats. They are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

I have highlighted a couple of these threats in grey. Those are the ones which most likely would resemble our concept of a traditional threat: WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, and state failure. Terrorism, you could argue, was not traditionally viewed as a “hard” threat. For example, in Europe, it was traditionally viewed as an internal or domestic problem present in certain member states. Organised crime was probably perceived in a similar manner. Today, organised crime spills over boundaries and more closely resembles a strategic concern.

How might we conceptualise the hard threats in the context of the EU Security Strategy?



Now that we have considered these “hard” threats, how are we supposed to conceptualise them? I don’t think there is any easy or right way to conceptualise them. There are many different ways of looking at these threats, and I offer this slide as one of many ways of looking at it. We may want to revisit this slide during the discussion period at the end of this session. As you can see, I have placed the different threats in a pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid I have placed those threats most likely to be perceived as “soft” threats: global warming issues, diseases, poverty. These are challenges you deal with over time since there are no short-term solutions. If you think about it, they are also “hard” problems in their own right as there are no easy solutions. As you go up the pyramid towards the top, I have placed threats that manifest themselves more rapidly. As you move up the scale, you are

approach the threats that we have been referring to as the “hard” challenges. I have inserted tipping factors across the different levels of the pyramid to indicate that there is a relationship between the threats. For example, regional conflicts can feed into terrorism. While the tipping factors are pointing upwards, it should be noted that the relationship is not straightforward: elements from the top of the pyramid can contributed to types of challenges listed below them. The relationships are intricate and not as linear as they are portrayed here. However, this figure may help us think about the challenges in a different way.

What kinds of challenges are we facing?

Exterior Challenges	External and Internal Challenges
Iran, North Korea Potential WMD programs Afghanistan, Iraq Stabilisation and nation building Regional conflicts/tensions Sudan (Darfur) Caucasus Middle East peace process	Terrorist attacks in Europe or its vicinity Terrorist attacks using traditional methods Attacks using CBRN Attacks on critical information infrastructures (CII) or critical infrastructures (CI)

Lets turn our attention to what these challenges translate into. First of all, we face challenges associated with potential WMD programmes in countries such as Iran and North Korea. Stabilising Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another represents another important challenge. Whatever happens in those areas will impact the EU, so there is a need to keep it on the radar screen. We also have ongoing regional conflicts and tensions, as well as a struggling Middle East peace process to address. The challenges that have both an external and internal dimension are more difficult to grasp. One example is terrorism whose expression can take various shapes and forms. Terrorists can use traditional means – such as explosives – or attempt to use weapons of mass destruction such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear elements. The implications of the latter would be great. As the EU Security Strategy notes, “the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.” Besides attempting to use WMD, terrorists may attack vulnerable infrastructures, such as chemical plants, to achieve equivalent impacts. Targeting a critical infrastructure in order to achieve cascading effects on other infrastructures might have a similar effect. We have already seen the dramatic effects of power outages, including the possibility of affecting more than one country.

The EU Security Strategy links threats, & policies together to deal with new

OVERARCHING VISION: A world order based on clear and transparent international law		
GLOBAL THREATS	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Terrorism	Address the threats	Be more active
WMD proliferation	Secure “the neighbourhood”	Be more capable
Regional conflicts		Be more coherent
State failure	Promote international order	Be more multilateral
Organised crime		

Given these and other global challenges, what specifically does the EU Security Strategy call for to handle these challenges? First of all, the EU Security Strategy links the different threats with corresponding strategic objectives and policy implications. The overarching vision is to contribute towards a world order based on clear and transparent international law. Practical examples of such a vision include the use of multilateralism and working through international organisations. A key pillar is the policy implications pillar that I have highlighted. The EU Security Strategy acknowledges the need for a more active, capable, coherent, and multilateral union. How can we do this practically?

The strategy provides some indications. Most of you are probably familiar with the concepts of effective multilateralism and preventive engagement. While the terms are not defined precisely, they are associated with certain activities. For example, effective multilateralism refers to activities such as working with international partners, spreading good governance, and protecting human rights. Among others, these objectives can be pursued through assistance programmes, use of conditionality, and trade measures. In terms of preventive engagement, there are different levers such as monetary instruments, the use of civilian military capabilities, and exerting political pressure. The specifics for using these levers are not spelled out in the strategy, rightly so since a strategy should not necessarily delve with the specifics. It should demarcate a vision that is then followed up by follow-on sub-strategies providing more guidance on specific topics. Still, it is important to consider how we should go beyond the strategy and think about the practicalities. I think we will be focussing more on that during the afternoon session. Thank you for your attention.

Prof. CHRISTOPHER COKER, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

There is a marvellous passage in James Blinn’s novel *The Aardvark Goes To War* which came to mind when I was asked to say a few words about hard security. Should we differentiate between hard and soft security issues when the distinction is not always evident – at least, in the popular imagination.

“What am I afraid of”, asks one of the characters in the book:

> I am afraid of everything. You think war scares me? It does but so does nuclear winter, and fall out from Chernobyl, and Legionaire’s disease and killer bees.. and crude nuclear devices and strip mining, and the vanishing rain forest and AIDS .. and rising interest rates and falling interest rates and people with accents and Third World population growth .. and botulism and E Coli and unnamed Amazonian viruses and the little petro-skin floating on my coffee. I am afraid of my ignorance and things I can’t see. But the main thing that frightens me is fear. Fear of fear, that is what I am suffering from.”

Blinn’s hero is a product of our time. He’s frightened by everything, hard and soft issues alike. Indeed, he doesn’t distinguish between them. We do as we can see most recently in the US National Security Strategy (2002) and the EU Security Strategy last year. The question is, should we? For whether something is soft or

hard is largely a matter of perception, not objective reality and security today is based increasingly on subjective beliefs.

This is not to deny that all threats are subjective. You can't get a more hard security issue than nuclear deterrence in the Cold War during which we debated intensely and often acrimoniously the difference between capabilities and intentions. For the most part, the Americans tended to stress the first, hence the famous presidential debates about bomber gaps and missile gaps and first strike capabilities. For the most part, the Europeans debated the second. Nevertheless they were able to agree to disagree for the military balance was based, at least, on some form of actuarial accounting: the number of missiles, ships and tanks that made up what we used to call "the military balance". Today there is no actuarial basis for risk or threat assessment.

Take the issue of bioterrorism. If you project casualty figures on the basis of military stocks of weapons (such as those held by the Soviet Union in the 1980s) you will be particularly anxious. If you project them on non-military state stocks (i.e., most of which will be sub-kilogram) you may be much less anxious than in the Cold War. Indeed a global health emergency caused by a smallpox terrorist attack might be much more effectively dealt with than was the SARS outbreak last year.

The problem is that in our risk societies where the management of risk is the chief focus of politics as well as security the whole debate is inevitably *politicised*. So instead of identifying what I think are "hard" threats, or distinguishing between what the United States and Europe mean by the term, I think it better to discuss the frame of reference which encourages us to make some very dubious distinctions between the two. It is that distinction which is increasingly divisive when it comes to managing an alliance with two distinct political cultures and ways of looking at the world.

Let me begin by mentioning Freud who tells us there are three kinds of fear: fright, fear and anxiety. Often we use each as a synonym of the other but in fact they are quite distinct. So one way of distinguishing between hard and soft threats, for example, would be to suggest that we are more anxious about soft security issues and fearful about hard – such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Or take the case of disease. Here there are two kinds of threats: pathogens like HIV-AIDS, and the pathologies of political movements that might use smallpox in a bioterrorist attack. Are we more anxious about disease, and more fearful about terrorism? This distinction is certainly plausible when we encounter it for the first time, but I'm still not happy with the distinction between hard threats that are "real", "objective" and "immediate", and soft that are largely derivative of future actions or events.

In the end, is it all a matter of discourse? When academic specialists, or politicians, talk about HIV-AIDS as a security threat, are they merely engaging in different discourses? One discourse with which we are familiar is that of the World Health Organisation (WHO) under the presidency of Mrs Brundtland who saw the

HIV-AIDS problem as an economic risk and preferred to locate it in the discourse of macroeconomics. Richard Holbrook saw it largely in humanitarian terms, as a medical disaster. Some health workers and many security experts prefer to see it as a security threat, dwelling, for example, on its impact on UN peacekeeping. Why? Because they get more funding by engaging in this particular discourse. For its part, the World Bank's most recent report *Breaking the Conflict Trap* sees conflict and associated security issues such as HIV-AIDS as a failure of development. So we can see that the way in which we re-package security has political and financial implications.

So too does another soft issue – crime. We know that it accounts for about 8% of world GNP. We also know, setting money issues aside, that it accounts for about 20,000 deaths a year in the Schengen/NAFTA area, a far higher figure than the number of casualties produced by terrorism. The United States also differs from Europe in talking about a "war on crime", as it does in talking about a "war against terrorism". The EU prefers to see crime as a law enforcement issue. But interestingly, both are relegated to the soft category. The war on crime does not divide the West, as does the war on terrorism. And yet, where would terrorism be without crime? Weapons of mass destruction involve criminal organisations in transferring expertise, uranium etc. Terrorism is financed by transnational crime. Was the Beslan school tragedy, for example, paid for by Bin Laden? It's a question that has to be asked. Remember the incident in 1998 where he outbid a British company that offered $4m for the safe return of four of its employees. Even if Bin Laden is not involved, we cannot divorce the Beslan incident from the buoyant war economy that has grown up in the Caucasus, now a hub in the region for counterfeiting dollars, money-laundering and kidnapping, all of which finance insurgent movements. Put another way, crime both creates the demand for terrorism and supplies it at the same time.

And how can we debate whether an issue is hard or soft when different political cultures define it differently at different times. One example is afforded by the negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation about the future of the former Soviet nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the US moved from treating the issue as a strategic one to one of risk management, from one of hard to one of soft security concerns. It went from providing security to producing safety. Security, of course, was necessary in a world in which the Soviet Union might have had the intention to launch a missile strike on the United States. Safety is necessary when there is no such intention on the part of the Russian Federation, but there are real problems associated with "loose nukes"; badly maintained nuclear facilities and the possibilities of submarine collisions at sea.

In 1995 the US Defense Secretary William Perry formally abandoned the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and opted in its place for Mutually Assured Safety (MAS). Under MAS a new strategy emerged calling for the de-alerting and de-targeting of missiles. The US also promised to find alternative work for thousands of nuclear scientists and to help Russia build more secure storage

facilities while Russia, in turn, promised to produce a proper inventory of its stocks. Yet a few years later a new administration came to power which wished to go from MAS to a harder system of security: a missile shield which involved the abrogation of the ABM treaty, much to the distress of its European allies. Here is an excellent example of how hard and soft issues are difficult to distinguish when different political parties at different times perceive security issues very differently.

And this is not to mention the differences that Europe has encountered in its own Mediterranean dialogue with the South. In the absence of any hard security issues or threats to themselves from the region, the Europeans both in the NATO and EU contexts tend to produce a checklist of soft security issues from transnational crime, to drug trafficking, and from people smuggling to migration. In contrast, security for the North Africans and Arabs tends to mean hard security issues. Top of the list is the Middle East Peace Process, and particularly the fate of the Palestinians. Not far down is the WMD issue (but one that involves states including Israel, not only Iran and non state actors).

If this distinction then divides the EU in its debate with others no wonder it divides the EU in its debate with the United States. The real problem the Western alliance faces is the distinction between the two is both misleading and divisive at the same time. If we were to accept that there is no such division we might find greater scope for agreement on a *case by case basis*. But I am not optimistic. If the difference is one of cultural construction, as I believe it is, the fact that Europe and the United States are very different political and strategic cultures means that cultural constructions will continue to divide them.

Dr. THOMAS HAJNOCZI, Director for International Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna

Thank you so much for inviting me to come to Latvia. I think, as I will also say briefly later on, the Baltic States are already giving a particular impact and input to ESDP. Gustav started with a crisp presentation of the European Security Strategy in a nutshell. I think it was very nicely done, quite succinct and still containing all the main points. But I am the practitioner, so I ask myself: "What is the political significance?" And, I think, for one there is a clear significance because for the first time the EU has a strategy." There was always this famous saying by Kissinger: "Give me the number to call the EU", and there was also the second thought – "They don't even have a strategy". By the way, it is also interesting to compare both strategies – the European and the US. We don't have time to do this now, but as a reference document it is very important. Already the fact that it is there is important and, equally, the political process how it was done, how quickly it was done - without great pains and controversies. That was very indicative. It testifies to, as many want to state, how far after all we have, despite our shortcomings, progressed in sharing similar views. There were some questions, of course, that were more debated, for example, what about the reference to the United Nations Charter? Should it be a very clear and strict one and nothing can be done without the necessary decision of the Security Council? The second one was: should we now use the word pre-emptive or preventive? But all together, it went within a very short amount of time with very few changes – a very smooth process. That in itself, I think, is quite remarkable.

So, what will happen? Well, of course, it is a document. But after some years, let's say three years or so, they might adapt it and it will become some kind of a perennial

strategy paper. Secondly, I mean, you can always criticise it – there are not so many concrete things, it is not clear what should be done and so on. Well, in that regard it is noteworthy that it was decided to concentrate on a follow-up on four particular issues. One was, of course, weapons of mass destruction – there we have already a strategy in place – Middle East, Bosnia and effective multilateralism.

With this I want to turn to Christopher who very eloquently put a big question mark behind this division in hard and soft security challenges. I can agree with his view and would like to add that for me these dangers always come compounded. Just think, for example, of the Middle East – a typical region of conflict. But what about weapons of mass destruction? I mean, that's a region where they are according to most assessments. What about terrorism? I mean, it's one of the most important sources for terrorism worldwide and terrorist acts in Israel play a significant role in this conflict. Think of Afghanistan – failed state, terrorism, crime, drugs, poppy seeds, and even there is a link for me with weapons of mass destruction because this failed state is destabilising Pakistan and, God forbid, there would be a breakdown there with all the implications of having weapons of mass destruction, missiles and so on. So, I don't think we can say: "Well, here are five different main threats – they are hard, the others are soft." In my view they come compounded and that's just a reality. I think, also our answer has to reflect this. You remember this famous saying by NATO Secretary General Robertson: "If we don't go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us." In today's world all things are so much interrelated that it doesn't help a lot always to dissect and find different drawers where we can put those, and also our answers have to be multifaceted.

I've just mentioned Bosnia as one of the four areas on which we concentrate. You all know that ALTHEA will start by the beginning of December. This EU operation will take over NATO's military operation. It will be, by the way, the only military ESDP operation for the moment and it will be a large one. But it's not that simple because the EU has many other potentials in addition to just doing something on the military side. The EU is already there in six different incarnations, among them the Commission is there, EUMM (the military mission) is there, EUPM (the police mission). So, it is very important that we for once can realise what Gustav just said - this coherent approach, the coherent answer. In that regard, I think, the EU is uniquely positioned to be able to do such a thing. That's the strong potential that will be realized despite all the institutional problems.

Having mentioned now ALTHEA, I just want to raise a final issue on ESDP. We have now three civilian operations ongoing – EUPM (Police in Bosnia), Proxima (Police in Macedonia) and THEMIS (Rule of Law Mission in Georgia). The last one is a new kind of mission we are doing, and those countries who were behind the creation of this mission, who came with the idea, were the Baltic countries. I don't know how it was here, how much this was underlined in the news and in the press but for me it was a very clear signal of the added value of having Baltic States in the EU. There is a particular historic experience; obviously, they are in a better position to send public prosecutors that are fluent in Russian than Austria or Portugal.

Politically it's interesting because usually these kind of missions were done within the framework of the OSCE, and the OSCE means Russia included. And thereby Russia also would have some kind of veto. There are situations where this is a very good approach because on some things it's important to include Russia. In this case it was done without giving Russia a say in a civilian mission in a Caucasian Republic. There are different frameworks possible. And that leads me to the question where future ESDP missions are most likely: at present most missions concern countries on the Balkans. For the future we always talk about ESDP operations in Africa. There is the possibility for the EU to engage in Africa, even though the African Union should be seen as the natural organizational setting to run missions on the African continent. I see strong chances for future ESDP operations in what we call "the new neighbours" because, obviously, these countries are closer to Europe.

Perhaps still one comment. When we think of hard and soft it doesn't mean that also the response correlates – that to a hard threat you need a hard response. Concurrently talks on the nuclear programme in Iran are being held. That's definitely best handled in a diplomatic mode – talking – and not taking resort to very hard means. We do not always need the military to counter a hard security challenge. We are discussing now in the EU what should we do about Darfur? Of course, African ownership is very important and the EU's first task is to strengthen the AU's capacities to deal with the crisis in Darfur. But we are discussing also the option of deploying an EU police mission there that would control, monitor and advise the local police. We easily can agree that the use of police is not military, it's not so hard. But the security risk would be much harder for policemen in Darfur than, for example, for troops in Bosnia today. We are also discussing in the EU now what kind of input we could give in Iraq on the civilian side – training police, justice, elections and so on. Again, such an operation appears to me really hard due to the very harsh security situation. So, what is interesting is that the EU is very active on the civilian side because there it is in a rather unique position to do something and, for example, there is no competition with NATO. NATO doesn't want to do this. As it turns out, the structures within ESDP are not yet fully developed. On the military side we have this wonderful experience of 40 years of peace missions. In my country, Austria, more than 50.000 men have served in peace missions. The necessary structures are in place to recruit and deploy military forces quickly to missions abroad. On the civilian side we are still dealing with the problem how to commit the required number of policemen and send them abroad at short notice. Most ministers of interior answer to requests for larger numbers of policemen by saying : "Listen a moment, I need my people in the streets!" And then the yellow press will write : "Well, here we have these acts of criminality but our minister is sending them to Africa." For the military it's different obviously because they are always on readiness and, when there is an urgent need abroad, they can be sent there. So, here we have to do something about our structures.

A very last thought concerning Christopher's very thought-provoking presentation. We have moved more and more away from state security to what we as Austrians like to propagate as human security – it's the individual that has to be protected

from all kinds of security threats. And that’s about mines and small arms, but it goes on to human rights, it goes further to some basic economic and social rights. And that, of course, is closely related with this humanitarian challenge. What should we do if something is going on in a given country, where the population is suffering under their own government? The international community has not only a right, it has the obligation to protect, which, I think, is quite important, and that’s reflected in the controversial nature of this new thinking. So, the responsibility is now more and more perceived on the international level, not just to say: “Well, it’s a sovereign country and they can kill them as they like.” Something has to be done. And there again, I think, we have reached what Christopher just said, whether it’s now called hard or soft, it’s so much compounded, and so we have to find new answers that also pay tribute to the different nature of security threats today.

Thank you.

Prof. ESTHER BARBÉ, Director, Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona

I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to the organisers for the invitation to be here in Riga and participating in this seminar. When Antonio Missiroli told me to participate in this session as a discussant he asked me to focus on how the Spanish perception of security has changed in Spain after March 11. I’ll try to react to some of the comments said before but putting the emphasis on the Spanish particular case.

For the first time in democratic Spain the dimensions of foreign policy and security have influenced the electoral preferences. It was very clear in the last elections on March 14, three days after the terrorist attacks in Madrid. The victory of the Socialist Party has been considered directly related with the terrorist attacks and the security policy of the former government. In fact, there are three issues that can’t be separated.

First, the terrorist attacks in Madrid caused 200 deaths and over 1000 injuries. Second, the immediate perception of the Spanish people was that the attacks were caused by the foreign policy of Aznar’s government. In other words, the attitude of the Spanish government, who was supporting the American policy in Iraq, was the main cause of the attacks. According to opinion polls, 65% of Spaniards think that the terrorist attacks in Madrid were related with the backing given by Aznar to Bush in Iraq. It is interesting to recall that, after 9/11, only 5% of American people thought that the foreign policy of their country was related with the causes of the terrorist attacks. We can see a completely different approach in the case of Spain,

where many people see a direct relation between the foreign policy of the country and the terrorist attacks in Madrid.

Third, the election results of March 14. Christopher Coker mentioned earlier that terrorism can become, among other things, a threat to the political stability of a country. The Spanish case is interesting with regard to this point. Indeed, one thing immediately perceived by the Spaniards was, because the elections were going to take place only three days after the terrorist attacks, that perhaps the attacks could produce political instability in the country. In other words, domestic democracy could have problems because of the terrorist attacks coming from abroad. Indeed, the situation was very tense between the two main parties after the terrorist attacks and before the elections. However, we should recall that the positions of both parties before the terrorist attacks on foreign and security policy had already created a big gap between them. The Socialist Party, for instance, was running in the elections with a programme based on multilateralism and European orientation; its main platform was the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq. In other words, the Conservative and the Socialist parties had already opposite conceptions in terms of foreign and security policy before the terrorist attacks took place.

I would like to focus on how March 11 has changed the Spanish perception on security by underscoring three issues: perception of threats, security strategies to fight terrorism, and conceptions of international security and the international order. I will argue that in the Spanish case we are facing a clash between the government and public opinion in matters of international security.

I'm going to start with a quotation from an academic in international relations, Christopher Hill. He has written that "foreign policy choices are entangled with those of domestic society and both are sub-sets of some notion of a desirable world." I will argue that the because of the policy pursued by Aznar before March 11, Spanish society and the decision-makers were completely divorced from one another - in how the world should look like, in how security must be perceived, and which choices or strategies one must adopt to manage security.

Before discussing this divorce in terms of strategies and conceptions of security, I would like to make a remark on immediate security or perception of threats. What kind of international threats did the Spaniards perceive before March 11? If we take surveys published after 9/11 in the period between 2002 and 2004, we see that Spanish public opinion was - like any other opinion in Europe or in general in the Western world – affected by 9/11. One of the results of 9/11 attacks was that the Spaniards slightly modified their opinion concerning defence spending. Spanish people have been traditionally against increasing defence spending. In 1996, for instance, only 11% of the Spaniards thought that more money should be given to defence and 50% thought that defence spending should be reduced. After 9/11, in 2002, the figures changed in the sense that the percentage of Spaniards in favour of reducing money for defence diminished to 31% and the percentage in favour of increased defence spending rose to 18%.

Regarding threat perceptions, I have to point out that the threats perceived by Spaniards affecting their security have not changed after March 11. Before March 11, there were two threats clearly underlined by opinion polls – more than 50% of people thought that two international threats, immigration and international terrorism, could affect Spanish security. Other global threats, such as weapons of mass destruction or global warming, were not considered as threatening as in other European countries.

In December 2002, 80% of Spaniards thought that international immigration was a significant or very significant threat to national security. This is the highest percentage among the countries of the European Union. One comment must be made and this is related with the elite factor – the decision-makers – because the conservative government was continually stressing a direct link between immigration and international crime. The linkage was also perceived to be true by Spanish public opinion. We could thus say that immigration was clearly securitized on the Spanish political agenda.

A second comment pertains to the characteristics of Spanish society since it was a society sending migrants abroad in the 60's, 70's and even 80's, but in the last ten years the number of immigrants into the country has doubled, some people say it has even been multiplied by a factor of three. In 1994, Spain had one million foreigners living in the country. In 2003, the figures show something between 2.5 - 3 million people. That is about 7% of the whole population. We must underline that 15% of these immigrants come from Morocco, but there was not a negative reaction among Spanish population against Moroccan people after March 11 even though the people involved in the terrorist attack were Moroccan. However, this does create a neighbourhood problem for Spanish security.

The second threat perceived by Spaniards is terrorism. In the case of Spain, of course, terrorism was already on the political agenda - it was not necessary to have international terrorism to identify terrorism as an everyday threat; ETA terrorism has existed since the 70's. 9/11 changed Spanish perception in the sense that it introduced international terrorism, but terrorism, in general terms, was always there. After 9/11, 85% of Spaniards thought that international terrorism could be a threat for Spain but it was perceived as a low-intensity problem in comparison with other European countries. Spaniards were not really convinced that they were going to be affected by international terrorism but everything changed after the Iraqi war. Indeed, surveys taken in February of 2004 –i.e. just before March 11- showed that Spaniards were more worried than before concerning the possibility of international terrorist actions in the country, due to the high profile adopted by the Spanish government in the Iraq war.

At the same time, we should remember that one of the main goals of the Spanish government was fighting ETA terrorism, trying to defeat ETA terrorism in the country using local instruments and policies but also trying to involve the European Union in a broader policy against terrorism. In this sense, after 9/11, we could argue

that there was a change in the Spanish government in the sense that fighting ETA remained conceptually a local problem – but fighting it became a global policy. In other words, Bush's global strategy was used as an instrument to fight terrorism for local purposes. Thus there is a kind of intermixing between the two levels - international security concerns were used for domestic political strategies. This approach is still being used by the Socialist government that maintains that there is no difference between the two levels of terrorism. All terrorists are the same.

With regard to security strategies in fighting terrorism before March 11 there was a deep divide between the government strategy and the attitude of the Spaniards in fighting terrorism. Aznar's strategy can be considered a bandwagoning strategy, i.e. supporting the policy of the hegemon - the United States - in the international arena. This meant, among other things, that the Spanish government clearly supported the concept of a pre-emptive attack and unilateral military action that was being implemented against Iraq? Why?

We could say that there were two main reasons. First, one of the objectives of the Spanish conservative government was upgrading the role of the country in the world and, accordingly, gaining more autonomy in Europe, especially autonomy from France, through a special relationship with the United States. This became almost an obsession. The second reason was related with fighting ETA terrorism. In other words, the Spanish government thought that it was going to fight local terrorism at the same time that it was fighting international terrorism. Perhaps we could say the Spanish government was mixing pragmatism at some point and being hawkish at some other point.

Spanish public opinion was completely different - it clashed completely with this new Atlanticism. Spanish opinion even in May 2004 - after the March 11 attacks – was very much in the soft power dimension. 82% of Spaniards thought that economic power is much more important than military power in international relations. Soft power is in the conceptual centre of Spanish society - after March 11, 72% of Spaniards thought that war is never necessary no matter in what circumstances. This is a dovish society confronting a hawkish govern–ment.

More figures can help us to have a better idea of how Spanish public opinion viewed international order in the period 2002-2003: only 2% of Spaniards wanted to have strong American leadership in the world and only 2% of them thought that American leadership was positive. In the case of Europe the figure was 20%. Spanish opinion was obviously quite anti-American and anti-war in general. In December 2002 during the debate on how to act in Iraq – whether to involve the United Nations or not, etc. - 60% of the Spaniards did not support military action against Iraq even with a UN mandate. Only 24% of Spaniards accepted military action under a UN mandate. This reflected a complete clash between Spanish society and the decision-makers. Both sides occupy the most extreme positions in the European arena regarding if and how to intervene in Iraq.

Even after March 11, 85% of the Spaniards thought that the invasion of Iraq was negative for international security. If we think that one of the conditions for a successful foreign and security policy is consensus at home, I mean, support for the policy in the domestic context where it is generated, it's completely obvious that in the case of Spain - before March 11 - there was no consensus at all between decision-makers and society at large. The terrorist attacks helped to change what many observers thought was going to happen in the elections – the demise of the Conservatives. The coincidence between the Socialist programme in security matters and Spanish society was already there.

This brings me to the third issue - conceptions of international security and the international order. Here the European Union plays an important part. After March 11 Spanish public opinion hasn't changed its conception of international security. In May 2004, for instance, when Spaniards were asked what caused international terrorism they pointed to several causes. Three most important ones were: religious fanaticism; arrogance of American power; and poverty and social exclusion in the Arab world. Due to these three causes, the strategies to fight terrorism should be, according to the Spaniards, mostly in the global dimension - developing policies and co-operation with the Arab world, but also in joining the global and local dimensions – mainly controlling immigrants and mosques. We see that immigration gets involved once more, in this case, with international terrorism. Economic instruments, police work, and judicial instrument become the main tools to combat terrorism.

Concentrating on the external action of Spain, the three strategies especially underlined by the Spaniards are: co-operation policies with the Third World and humanitarian aid in crisis situations; gaining more influence in the European Union; and being more present in international organisations. In June 2004, 85% of Spaniards thought that the foreign policy priority should be relations with the European Union and only 2% thought that the priority should be relations with the United States. Quite symbolically, the present Foreign Affairs Minister has called Europe "the oxygen of Spain."

There was an obvious clash in terms of how the world should look like (options, preferences) between Spanish public opinion and the Conservative elite. The Spanish Conservative Party keeps on defending the military approach and the war in Iraq. Regarding the European Union the Aznar government was clearly reluctant to consider the European Union as a global actor thereby clashing with the Spanish society's vision of the world. The conception of the international order of the present Socialist government has created a new consensus in security policy affairs, not among the elites – we now have two elites in Spain in terms of foreign policy – but it has created a consensus between the government and Spanish public opinion. Moreover, there is a clear coincidence between the present Spanish government and the global European Union approach to security and world order. The European Security Strategy is clearly guiding the present Spanish government. If one reads the speeches of Miguel Angel Moratinos, the present Foreign Affairs

Minister for the last two months, one can confirm that they carry the “European idea of the international order and security.” He is focusing the present Spanish debate on notions that international security must be based on international institutions of governance, on the central role of the United Nations, on the central role of international law, on the multidimensional and interconnected perception of security, on environmental, human rights, and state building problem solving with multidimensional instruments, on the role of conflict prevention completely discarding the idea of unilateral military action, and on bringing peace to the Middle East since the Middle East conflict is a facilitating factor for Islamist terrorism. In Spanish present policy making peace in the Middle East becomes a strategic priority to fight terrorism. In other words, the present programme of the Spanish security policy is clearly based on the European Security Strategy. We also see that the role of individuals is important. Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, was previously the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. Some of the leading individuals in the present Spanish Foreign Ministry come from Brussels, mostly from the CFSP directorate.

I want to finish with two comments. One of them is an open question, regarding the fact that we presently have two completely different conceptions of security and world order between the Conservatives and the Socialists. What is going to happen if the Conservatives gain power again in the near future? It would certainly affect EU policies.

The other comment is that March 11 involved not the security of the state but the safety of the citizens. Indeed one of the main worries of the Spanish population now is not international terrorism itself but whether we can trust our government, our decision-makers, our intelligence services to protect us against international terrorism. The big question for Spaniards is how effectively police and intelligence services worked before March 11.

Thank you very much.

NEW GLOBAL CHALLENGES: THE “SOFT” SIDE

Chair of the session: **Mr. VILJAR VEEBEL, Lecturer of International Relations Theory, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Tartu**

Welcome to the second session! As we saw, to the draw line between the soft and hard side is not easy.

What we still have to do is not only draw the line as it will not have any value in itself but also start to think in terms of how to face the threats. Does the concept of soft and hard challenges matter here?

Here we can all see that soft threats may be in that sense a little bit different, that we may need to counter them a little bit earlier, and maybe the circle around the area will become a little bit bigger.

Soft threats are challenging in many aspects. First, they are connected and it is not reasonable to try to solve them separately or from the perspective of one country only. While global warming is feared in most countries, the Russian President Putin welcomes it as it provides a better agricultural environment and smaller heating costs, which leads also to lower levels of pollution.

The same problem appears in the context of diseases, population, rising living standards, lack of resources; there are problems which reinforce each other. For example if we would like to provide every Chinese the same living standard as in the EU, China will need more electricity than all of the world’s production today.

We have a new panel: Antonio Missiroli from EUISS, Bengt Sundelius from the Swedish National Defence College and two discussants: Friedemann Müller from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and Per Carlsen from Danish Institute for International Studies.

Dr. ANTONIO MISSIROLI, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

At the end of the first session we all basically agreed that security in this new millennium is not just about protection from aggression but also from disease, economic shocks, environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Of course, the risk is that, by blurring entirely the traditional dividing lines between "soft" and "hard", we may end up nowhere, without knowing really where to start from in policy terms. First of all, it could be useful to try and assess more in depth what exactly these new challenges are, and especially what specific impact they have on Europe. If you read the Security Strategy carefully - there is an extract of the page on "global challenges" in your folder - all these challenges are listed in no particular order, and there is no particular logical thread through and between them. We should try and go a little bit further in our analysis, in particular as far as a) their impact on Europe and b) policy responses are concerned. That is what I will try to do in my presentation.

More often than not, experts and officials tend to embellish their public presentations with catchy slogans and soundbites. Probably one of the most famous one was Madeleine Albright's "3 Ds" (no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling) as applied to ESDP in late 1998. I will focus on some *Ds* too.

I. The first one is, of course, *Depletion*.

One of the biggest problems in the world, one of the gravest global challenges is the amount of poverty and malnutrition that we still have. We all know that natural

resources are unevenly distributed across the world and that is a geological fact that is very difficult to change. But poverty and malnutrition are not just always (or simply) the product of scarce natural resources (e.g. food, water, strategic minerals). There are other factors – mostly man-made - that play a major role. International research has come to the conclusion that the three main factors explain the way in which resources relate to security and may turn into security issues: 1) most often, resources play a role in terms of scarcity, of course: droughts in Eastern Africa or elsewhere are a case in point; 2) occasionally, they are relevant in situations of great and concentrated abundance (e.g. diamonds in Sierra Leone or strategic minerals in Congo, not to mention energy), thus triggering conflict, war and fights over appropriation; 3) quite often, also, they play a role when effective or fair distribution is obstructed: famines are not just a natural phenomenon.

With the important exception of *energy*, most of these challenges do not affect Europe too much or too directly. They may affect it indirectly in that they could trigger big humanitarian crises that would require intervention as well as - more importantly - migrations. But on all the other issues Europe tends to act through multilateral channels: aid, basically, and to a lesser extent trade. As member states to the EU and its agencies: *EuropeAid* and *ECHO* that are the two main common bodies that deal with this. There are also bilateral policies with areas of interest to the member states that play a role. But we Europeans tend very often to boast of being – collectively, i.e. the 25 member states plus the European Union as such - the biggest aid donor in the world: which is true in absolute quantitative terms, of course, but if we disaggregate the figures the picture is slightly different, and especially individual member states as such - most of them at least - do not score very well. If we look at the Millennium Goal of 0.7% of GDP devoted to aid, only four countries in the European Union today qualify for that and meet the goal, namely Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (plus Norway and Switzerland, that are not part of the EU family proper but are still European countries). In spite of our wealth, in our words, we do not devote as much as we are expected to international aid. The EU average, actually, is 0.33%, which is quite lower than the Millennium Goal. Only in 2002, at the Monterrey Conference, did we agreed to raise our average performance to 0.39% by 2006, which is a very limited increase if measured against the potential that we have at our disposal. Our rhetoric should be matched by consistent facts and acts.

II. A second aspect that we might earmark with a "D" is *Disasters*.

By definition and by nature, these can be natural or man-made, although (as we will see) the distinction is not always easy or clear. I will not spend many words on those "new"or potential disasters that are connected to major disruptions of existing infra-structure, be they caused by terrorism or else. You may remember that last August a major electricity failure in New England basically brought New York State and environs to a halt: for a day or two nobody could say whether that was caused by a terrorist attack or just an accident. That is one of those disruptions that may well affect Europe too, and quite directly, but they are not necessarily relevant for

the analysis I'm trying to make here. Instead, one of the main elements linked to disasters (real, potential or expected) is what we normally label as "climate change" or "global warming". I just want to spend a few words on this by saying, first of all, that a) climate change *as such* is a constant natural phenomenon with significant variations occurred over long geological periods, and also that b) global warming *as such* has made the emergence of modern civilization possible: in other words, and in very general terms, the "greenhouse effect' has been a positive element in the history of mankind. This said, the increase in greenhouse gases, especially since the mid-19th century (industrial revolution) and most spectacularly since the turning point of 1980, is due to man, i.e. to the kind of emissions that increased human activity and increased population provoke in the atmosphere.

Over the last century global average temperatures have risen by 0.6% worldwide, but twice as much in Europe. A report delivered last month by the European Environmental Agency, based in Copenhagen, suggested that, on present trends, global average temperatures might rise by 1.4 to 5.8 °C by the end of this century. For Europe, the forecast increase is even higher: 2 to 6.3 °C. Between 2 and 6 degrees, of course, the fork is very wide, and the debate among scientists over the relative impact of global warming is still wide open too. The lack of decisive evidence makes it as much a judgement call as a case for bias and/or overt advocacy: given the existing instruments, in fact, it is extremely difficult to assess what is the prevailing trend. Interestingly, another report delivered recently to the Pentagon, which made the headlines a few months ago, tells that "a plausible, though not the most likely scenario" is one in which the "conveyor" comes to a halt as a result of global warming, because the melting of the ice pack in the Arctic and the desalinisation that comes after that could stop the Gulf Stream that flows from Florida to the North Atlantic and Western Europe. A paradoxical effect of such global warming would be a comprehensive freezing of the whole North Atlantic area. Such scenario is considered as a potential cause for conflict and major wars across the world.

The general consensus is that world temperatures keep rising and that human activities are directly related to that. But the respective relevance of all the factors and the actual impact that this is going to have, especially in the mid-term, is very difficult to assess: how much warmer the Earth will become? Which regions will be better (or worse) off as a consequence of global warming? Will there be more floods or more droughts? Will Continental Europe become more like Siberia or more like Thailand? Will the UK become more like Provence or more like Quebec? We do know that the Earth will adapt to this, and we do know that man can adapt to this too because it has done so over the past millennia - but at what price? And what should be the policy response to that? Climate instability is a certainty, and we already see it – take the floods in Central Europe two years ago, the heat all over Europe last year, the increased frequency of all sorts of disasters also on European soil. The biggest impact would be on agriculture, of course, and will be strongest in the developing world. We have to be aware of this with all the cascading effects this may trigger – it may disrupt entire societies, and create higher demand for

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And all this would have an impact also on European security and European security policy.

III. Finally, the last "D" I will bring into discussion is, of course, *Diseases*.

The most common distinction is between chronic disease and infectious disease. Chronic disease is caused by malfunctioning within the human body and is now considered under control: policies have improved enormous, and so have the instruments that we have at our disposal in that respect. Most importantly, chronic disease doesn't have a direct impact on security: this is something all analysts and experts agree upon, whereas the spread (or the renewed spread) of infectious disease may stage a comeback and may have bigger and direct implications on security.

One fourth to one third of deaths worldwide are due to infectious diseases, mostly in the developing countries and among children. The impact is *mainly* extra-European but *not exclusively* extra-European. The spread of infectious disease in the world today is influenced by many factors: for instance, changes in social behaviour and increased population movements play a major role. Analysts of the spread of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa say that the key factor in those societies is the so-called "three Ms" – "mobile men with money": they can be lorry drivers, seasonal workers, and also soldiers, including peacekeepers (African and other). And this, coupled with other phenomena that are quite common in those societies - especially regarding sexual behaviour and women's place - has an undeniable multiplier effect. Changing lifestyles, of course, play a role too, as do medical procedures: the excessive use of antibiotics, for example, has strengthened certain strains of infectious disease, in particular what is now called "drug-resistant" tuberculosis, that is extremely contagious and is spreading across the world, including *our* part of the world, especially in the Baltic States. Also land use is a factor, proximity to animals and plants: what happened last year with the SARS scare (and may be happening soon with avian flu) is also due to eating habits and proximity to animals, especially in Southern Asia. Last but not least, globalisation itself is a factor: increased mobility, commerce and travel have become a major and permanent feature of our societies. They contributed to making the SARS epidemics a worldwide scare in that, while its main centre was in Asia, cases registered in Toronto, Canada, brought the city to a virtual quarantine (and economic halt) for a couple of days - on the initiative of Kofi Annan and the WHO.

Such events (especially if and when "mediatised") can have a huge impact on our perceptions of security. Their actual impact on Europe is still limited if compared to other regions of the world, but it is growing both directly and indirectly. Let's take the three main infectious diseases. I already mentioned *tuberculosis*, which kills approximately 3 million people per year worldwide: close by, Russia is the main centre of worry since some forms of drug-resistant TBC are spreading across it. But in Denmark and Germany, too, cases of DR TBC have increased by 50% over the past few years. *AIDS* is stable in Europe: we have means to contain and, relatively

speaking, cure it. Yet one of the fastest-growing critical areas for the spread of AIDS - apart from India and China - is again Russia, although official figures mention "Russia and Central Asia" as a single broad category: allegedly, there are 1.3 million HIV-infected people in the whole area. And the fastest-growing area *inside the European Union*, once again, is in the Baltic States as a result of the presence and circulation of Russians in the area. A first major problem arises from the chaos in Russia: conflicts between departments and clinics, no agreed policies for testing and treatment, and no clear picture of how the disease is evolving. Secondly, the policies that are used to fight AIDS, for instance in Sub-Saharan Africa, are not applicable to Russia and environs: the traditional recipe by NGOs and by UN-AIDS - i.e. the so-called "ABC" rule (Abstain, Be faithful, use a Condom) - does not have much effect in this area because the main cause – 80% of HIV infections in Russia and in direct proximity areas - is intravenous drug use. Also, the fact that all this is not acknowledged as such by Russian authorities is an additional source of worry.

Finally, the third major infectious disease - *malaria* – still creates some three hundred million cases of illness and at least one million deaths per year worldwide. It is endemic to the poor and developing countries but, if global warming were to change landscape and climate in Europe (especially on its Southern rim), the disease could spread over - not to mention the potential role of migrants coming more or less legally to the EU from the South. The presence of our peacekeepers in those regions where malaria is endemic could become, in perspective, another problem. And, finally, where is exactly the dividing line between the natural outbreak of one of these infectious diseases and its deliberate release - biological warfare or a biological terrorist attack? Experts say that, sometimes, it could be extremely difficult to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a biological attack: at any rate, roughly the same defences are necessary in either case, as is reacting quickly and effectively.

IV. Are all these global issues, these new "three Ds", *directly* relevant to Europe?

Of course yes. To a certain extent, they also help us bridge once again the gap (or just distinction) between "soft" and "hard" security. They have an impact in terms of economic and social consequences, directly and indirectly. They have an impact in terms of risk management and management of uncontrolled scares. And, of course, they have an impact in terms of perceptions: perceptions of vulnerability (actual and/or imagined), but also perceptions of "foreigners" and migrants, be they from Russia or Mali, if public opinion perceives them as carriers of disease and, therefore, factors of mass disruption - rather than weapons of mass destruction.

Prof. BENGT SUNDELIUS, Crisis Management Research and Training, Swedish National Defence Follege, Stockholm

I'm happy to be here. Over the last five years I've been working at the Swedish National Defence College where I engage in training senior officers and those that hope to become generals. I come from the academic side of security studies and have no practical experience whatsoever, so you can take my comments from that perspective. I'm going to talk about three things. First one – in few words about security challenges. Second point will deal with some of those trends of contextual factors which impact upon the ability to make policy regarding these security challenges. My third theme is the evolving European societal security and how it is being organised in the European Union.

Figure 1. Security Challenges

Actor focused threats	**Examples:**
1. armed attach by another state	military invasion
2. armed attach by another	terrorists
3. attack by another state	trade/finance/energy
4. attack by another	information operations/critical infrastructures
Structural threats	**Examples:**
collapse of neighbouring systems	nuclear/energy/epidemics violent civil unrest
severe domestic disturbances	accidents/riots/epidemics loss of democratic values

First of all, in figure 1 we see a familiar picture. You see there is good old actor-focused threat - that is the armed attack by another state that we all grew up with. The armed attack coming across from the East that you can plan and prepare forcefully to meet this armed attack from the Soviet Union. That’s the guiding principle for much of security thinking over 50 years which is now in many ways collapsed in Europe.

The second item is the notion that in many ways have replaced this over the last three years - what I call “armed attack by another”. That is, you omit the term state and argue in terms of a possibility of an armed attack by another - another something, another anything, another network, another evil of some kind. Much of the mental orientation in security is focused on this, as we heard before the break. The point of this chart is to widen this perspective quite a bit and to show the great scope of security threats.

If we move down the figure, we see that in addition to the two conventional possibilities – armed attack by another state or by another – you still have the possibility of attack by another state. There are many coercive instruments other than armed attack that have been practiced through history and will, most likely, to continue to be practiced – psychological warfare, economic warfare, energy warfare and so forth. At least in this part of the world we have plenty historical experiences of those kinds of coercive instruments practiced by other states and this will continue.

Fourthly, attack by another. Prior to September 11, there was a considerable debate throughout security studies about the importance of so-called information operations - information operations that disappeared from the mental pictures of our security planers. By here you have the possibility of attacks by another. Not by another state but another something – another hacker, another criminal syndicate, another terrorist or maybe another major business trying to intrude in the banking system on Wall Street. At the moment of attack – that kind of information attack – you don’t really know what the source is. The most recent cases of information operations that have been experienced in Europe – we have been exposed to attacks by teenagers. The most recent was an 18-year old in Germany who caused havoc in the European system and shut down Swedish government agencies. Earlier, we had a teenager in Philippines also having fun. By the moment of attack when you need to respond, you don’t know where it comes from – it could be a crime syndicate, or terrorists. You don’t know but you have to respond.

The four items that I list are all actor-focused threats – the traditional focus of security studies. They are acts of ill will – and we have to plan for them, prepare for them and have the capacity to meet them.

Further down the list I refer to structural threats. That is not a matter of hard security or soft security rather structural threats in that sense that it is nobody’s fault. They are not acts of ill will. It’s rather like my teenage daughter tells me

when she breaks something: Shit happens, father! It is nobody’s fault. Just a bad thing happened. And the consequences are enormous, for example, a collapse of neighbouring systems. We all remember the Chernobyl accident of 1986. That was nobody’s fault in the individual sense – the whole system collapsed with enormous consequences for many European countries and not least for the most directly affected throughout Chernobyl. We have epidemics. We have the possibility of additional nuclear accidents throughout this region; we have the possibility of social, political, economic collapse in Kaliningrad. A considerable part of Swedish security planning is now focused on the future of Kaliningrad – what can be done, what should be done, what must be done before you have a collapse of some sort in Kaliningrad? What can we do about this? This is important part of the security challenge focused in Brussels.

Secondly, what I refer to as severe domestic disturbances, that is, things happened at home as well - accidents, riots, epidemics, severe infrastructure failures and so forth. Antonio Missiroli mentioned earlier the tremendous blackout in New York last year where a good part of upstate New York and New York City, and part of Canada collapsed. We had three or four energy blackouts in Europe last fall – in London, in southern Sweden, in Italy. The Italian one is particularly interesting as it turned out that its links to France was the culprit. You have a transnational dimension in this, and you can point fingers to those Frenchmen that don’t run electricity properly at the expense of Italians. The same thing with the Danish-Swedish collapse last September. Copenhagen Kastrup airport was severely affected but the problem was in Sweden which the Danes always remind us.

You see in the figure a pattern. You see a pattern over time where a predominant concern is not a territorial concern but rather over time an increasing concern what I call a “functionality of society”. That is – you are not that concerned whether the country is intact in the territorial sense; we’re not concerned about protecting our borders in Europe in the traditional sense. Rather the society must function, the infrastructure must function, and the information flow must function. We must avoid decapitation in the post-modern sense. In strategic thinking in the past there was a term “decapitation” - strategic coup - that is, when the Soviet Spetsnaz would take over the capital and cut the capital off from the surrounding territory. We have still the problem of decapitation but in different sense of functionality and that, I think, is shown very nicely in this flow-chart. What’s also interesting here is the combinational effect. Of course, all these things are important but you’ve got to set priorities. But of particular concern, to our thinking, are the combinations. You have structural threats or risks like collapse of neighbouring systems and in that context you open up opportunities for actor-focused threats. So, it’s not “either-or” but rather the combination of this wide menu of possible security challenges that you have to deal with, prepare for and plan for.

Now, to complicate things further, let me add a few trends that affect the way governments can deal with some other things, some patterns that I’ve picked from the

rich literature on these things. First item is what I call "a transboundary and real-time force". Chernobyl is really an example here – it's a transboundary thing. The threats, the challenges are not local – they can come from anywhere. The Sars example was mentioned earlier. It's a good example. Something happens somewhere in China: how does it concern me living in Toronto? Not really. Well, suddenly it did. Because of quick air traffic, suddenly this epidemic is moved as a local problem in parts of China to a national disaster in Canada. It shuts down the health system and has economic consequences. It was Toronto but it might be as well in Hamburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen.
In addition we are dealing with real-time flows. It's not the geopolitics that's important only. We focus much in strategic studies on geopolitics and importance of space, distance, geography, troops who are marching across territory. Now, it's not space but pace. Policy-making is pace-driven. The quickness, the real-time flows – something happens in China today and it has enormous consequences six hours later in Europe. We all remember 9/11 – it was a live event for all of us. It was far off in New York but it was a live event in Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg and Brussels. I remember it well myself and I'm sure you also did. On 9/11, the Swedish Air Force was put on alert and was up to protect the airspace of Stockholm live – in real time. To me, it was rather curious but the mental picture of the decision-makers, the policy-makers was such that we need also to protect our airspace right now. They went up on alert for some reason. Nothing happened, but this kind of immediate impact is something that is important and drives policy-makers. Pace rather than space.

Technological complexity. That is the interconnectedness of various sectors in system. Our engineers tell us that there are a number of tight couplings across sectors. Various infrastructures are interlinked – IT, electricity, phone systems and so forth. You have breakdown in one, and there is a spillover effect on the next one. We have network defence. Do we have network civil defence as well? And, if you build a new network defence, how is it linked to civilian networks of various kinds? Or is it kept apart through a wall or not? There is a risk here that through this technological complexity you build in vulnerabilities into reliable systems. Each system - each IT system, each energy system, each phone system may be very reliable on its own but because of the interconnectedness with other systems there may be little vulnerabilities that have ripple effects if something bad happens. It's very hard to comprehend those kind of ripple effects, those kind of consequences in the moment when something goes wrong.

Second and third order consequences – my third point. It's not the problem itself but rather the secondary consequences, the fall-out consequences. The "cascading effects" was a term used earlier today – the unpredictable cascading effects. It was not the power outage itself in New York that was a problem – it was all the ripple effects surrounding that and concerning other aspects of society and the way society can function, the way you run society.

One secondary consequence important to recognise for all of us is the political accountability - the so-called "blame game" after a disaster, a threat, a terrorist

attack. The blame game and the political accountability – something that Spanish Prime Minister certainly experienced; while, in contrast, President Bush experienced it in a very positive way. You may say that President Bush was appointed by the Supreme Court by a vote of 5 - 4 but on September 12 he became the President to the American people.

There was a positive fall-out from his ability to run the blame game in contrast to the Spanish Prime Minister. These cascading effects must be reckoned with as part of policy-making. You have to think through: what are the consequences that will hit me on Monday morning or next week? And you have got to do so, as you also deal with immediate challenges or threats.

Mediasation is important part of this, of course. Media set deadlines for all who get information and most importantly – they frame public impressions. The public impression, the view of a situation, of a threat, of a risk is then framed by the media and you have very little control over this. What becomes a crisis, a disaster, a threat and a risk is very much framed in the public mind through media. And this mediasation has a transnational coverage. As has been said with some exaggeration - when CNN decides that something is a crisis, it is a crisis. When CNN decides that Sudan is a crisis, it is a crisis. This increases pressures – pressures on government officials, public officials, politicians, and so forth, to do something or, if they are not doing something, to explain and advocate why it's not time to do something. You have to explain and give good reasons for not acting on certain items when this media pressure is on.

Governing versus government. The public expects effective governing but with less government over the last ten or fifteen years. European governments have outsourced a number of things and follow the ideology that we can do more with less. We have outsourcing of various facilities; we have "just-in-time" philosophy, including vaccine, by the way. Smallpox was talked about earlier here and, you know, vaccine production is outsourced, and in that sense the private enterprise has the available vaccines. Governments don't. The government does not command the resources that are generally needed to deal with these kinds of emergencies and threats that we talked about here today. You lack the resources, you lack the control of resources and often you lack the manpower to deal with things, and you also lack the public blind faith in that the government would do the right thing.

This leads then to the next item: public service versus private profit. You need some kind of partnership in order to deal with security threats between the public sector and various private actors. You see it in Iraq very clearly where the US military is very much dependent on private enterprises to run the country, to protect the prisoners and to engage in various paramilitary operations, protection and so forth. The question there is: is this a symmetrical relationship between the public service, public sector and private enterprise or are you building in some kind of asymmetrical relationship? Do you have a mutual dependency; what is a good balance between the public and the private, or is this one-side of vulnerabilities. And how do you

account for this? How do you provide accountability when you have these kinds of things? Almost everything can be outsourced, including war. So, partnership is a beautiful term but what's behind the soul of this public-private partnership?

Finally, multi-level and cross-sector institution building. European policy-makers are embedded in a large setting where linkage is across Europe. These countries are not isolated islands. The policy makers cannot deal with these on their own but rather they are often linked up in the EU. Because of that reason, the capacity to deal with these issues in Europe at large is evolving. When I say evolving, I don't think it's being built or created - it's evolving over time. My last theme is then to go through a little bit how I vision this evolving effort to build a European societal security system.

Figure 2. Concepts and Domains of European Societal Security

Objective	**Domain**	
	Domestic Sphere	**International Sphere**
State Security	Law and Order	National Defence
Human Safety	Rescue Services	International Disaster Assistance

If we begin with the traditional notion of how we deal with these issues in Europe - and I'm particularly inspired about how we do things in Sweden – you have traditionally two tracks really. You have a track of state security where in the domestic sphere there is law and order - the police. In the national sphere we have national defence which was focused on the evil enemy in the past. A certain profession, a certain doctrine, certain mindsets developed over long period of time in state security business and there was also separation between the domestic and international - those professions were not mixed either in many countries. Then you had another track – the human safety track where the focus was on rescue services – very distinct, very separate from the uniformed state security forces. Professional cultures have developed over a long time. Most people recognise that you need in certain situations co-operation, collaboration across those professional cultures and they also recognise that it's very difficult – that it requires training. This is part of the difficulty, the enormous task of the European Union now is to prepare these kinds of professions to work together on various international and domestic tasks in the crisis management area, to bring cultures together, because they've been trained separate in so many years.

Figure 3. Concepts and Domains of European Societal Security in the Making

Objective	**Domain**	
	Domestic Sphere	**International Sphere**
State Security	Law and Order	National Defence
Societal Security	**CM Capacity**	**International CM Capacity**
Human Safety	Rescue Services	International Disaster Assistance

Over the last five years or maybe ten years, we have developed something in the middle that is referred to as societal security - Americans call it homeland security – which is the bridge between, on the one hand, the focus on state security, protection of the state with all that emphasis on the idea of state, institutions of the state, home base of the state and, on the other hand – human safety. The safety and the survival of citizens is not only the survival of a state, a nation state, the kingdom of Sweden but the citizens of Sweden or the citizens of the US. And societal security - homeland security - provides for that kind of bridge between these two tracks but obviously is a very difficult thing to build because you then merge these kinds of very distinct objectives and missions. We see that in the domestic sphere Europe is trying to build some kind of crisis management (**CM**) capacity at home. In many of the European countries you build new institutions, new efforts, new resources to manage these things; emergency services of various kinds but in a broader sense. In the Scandinavian system, I noted already some five years ago, the Norwegians pioneered this with a big government commission, the Swedes followed, the Danes had a big commission – published in January - and the Finns are now starting to get their act together.

On the international side, the EU is developing its international crisis management capacity, which is a part of Pillar Two activities. For the past 10 years we've been building a lot in the Second Pillar, in the sense that we're trying to build homeland security on the Balkans or in the Congo, etc. The European Union has been active but has had some competition from the United Nations and also from NATO. There is an enormous scope of possibilities here – the difficult task facing us is to set priorities. We have to rethink what is it that we have to protect ourselves from. If all these things have been taken care of, what are the most important things to protect from? My previous picture: what kind of threat? You need a flexible threat analysis. Secondly, what is that we need to protect and safeguard here at home? What's so important that you have to protect it? You have to engage in vulnerability audits and make assessments of what's worth protecting. Thirdly, you have to build a capacity to cope and recover when something bad strikes. To cope and recover "when" – not "if" but "when".

Figure 4. Concepts and Domains of European Embedded Societal Security

Objective	Domain		
	Domestic Sphere	**Intermestic** Sphere	**International** Sphere
State security	Law & Order	**Counterterrorism**	National defence
Societal Security	CM Capacity	**Solidarity Clause**	Internat. CM Capacity
Human Safety	Rescue Services	**Civil Protection**	Internat. Disaster Asst.

Lately this has been expanded further through additional reforms in the European Union and elsewhere. I add a domain between the domestic and international – the so-called "intermestic" sphere. It's neither domestic policy nor international activity – it's right in between because that's what the European Union is all about. European Union is not something foreign out there and it's certainly not at home here, locally either. It's something in between that binds these things together. It's intermestic – international and domestic. And here you see a symbol of societal security at the intermestic domain – the EU Solidarity Clause. The solidarity clause being built into the new constitution symbolises this new commitment – the so-called "solidarity" to link concern for state security and concern for human safety. At the state security level you have the renewed effort dealing with counter-terrorism; new legislation, directives dealing with counter-terrorism – building capacities with Europol and others, particularly in Third Pillar activities. That follows the tradition, the professional culture of state security – law and order – but bridges national defence and domestic law and order issues, and bridges and complicates these kinds of relationships because the traditional distinction there is being blurred in the counter-terrorism effort.

At the same time, at the bottom - for the concern of human safety – you have civil protection. Civil protection has been with the European Union for some time but now is being upgraded and expanded. Here the responsibility is still primarily on the national levels but the European Union unit is responsible for bringing this together, and the solidarity clause, as you know, emphasises solidarity both for terrorist attacks, natural, and man-made disasters. It cuts across from state security to human safety. In order for civil protection to become a viable area within the domestic sphere, much work needs to be done, much capacity needs to be built up. A number of complications or concerns must be addressed.

To build a capacity for European societal security, you have to recognise that it has to be multi-sectoral, it has to cut across the various domains that I outlined. Both safety and security cooperation must be involved including health, financial, food

and transport sectors. The Union is built upon sectors through the Directorate-Generals. It has to be multi-level because many things are local, many are regional, most are national and a few are European-wide. It has to be multi-level in that sense. We talk about multi-level governance. I talk about multi-level crisis management as an important part for the European Union. It has to be multi-institutional. The Commission has a role, the European Council has a role, some other institutions in the European Union have a role, and NATO might have a role.
NATO is a European player. It has to be multi-national. We have to pull together 25 countries and national administrative systems, and national professional cultures, and doctrines, and legacies in a holistic sense. Without this we see a tremendous fragmentation in this picture. It will fall apart, it will crack apart. As in the US, where you have 50 different states, and if they are not held together somehow with some kind of glue focusing on homeland security, it will fall apart, fragment into some kind of puzzle. In the European Union, that's where we are, but we need to get some glue in order to build a shared capacity, a joint capacity, which is not easy to do with 25 nation states.

Finally, this kind of effort, in order to be successful, has to be multi-continental. The European Union is not an island of itself – it must link somehow to the US homeland security effort. The US homeland security effort is very much a trans-border effort involving the other side of the Atlantic and also Asia. What we are building in Europe has to be matched with what's being built in Washington. Similarly, it has to be linked to the Euro-Russian sphere. You cannot run this part of Europe without including the Russian part of Europe in order to be effective. So, it has to be multi-continental, and that's a tall order certainly. Since I am an academic and observe things, and point to problems, I would happily leave the practical issues for others to resolve at the policy-making level.

Dr. FRIEDEMANN MÜLLER, Head, Research Unit “Global Issues”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin

It’s rather difficult after this intellectual input to say anything new, and probably I will not. What I’ll try to do is to contribute to the discussion of categories, because sometimes categories can be inspiring or make you sensitive about how urgent some problems are. I will start with the pessimistic statement of Christopher Coker who said in the previous session about what is soft and what is hard as a question of perception, and it does more harm to make this distinction than it does good. I am certainly in agreement with the first part, not so much with the second part of this statement. I also want to draw your attention to one chart of Gustav Lindstrom - also in the previous session - where he showed two parallel arrows. The one was soft to hard and the other one was long-term to short-term, and these were parallel. That means – hard is short-term, soft is long-term, and, I think, this is an interesting idea: “Soft” or “hard” does not say anything about importance it just distinguishes about the window to act. This has to make you sensitive that, even if the short-term issues are extremely urgent, like terrorism currently, we should take into account that long-term issues could be even more urgent.

So, let me first just add to the categories we already heard, three others on soft issues. The first one is environment and resources. We have an extra session on climate change. I would love to contribute to this discussion, and I will do it certainly tomorrow. I just want to draw the attention on one issue – to identify the problem, to get the consensus on what is the problem is one side of the challenge; to get a governance structure to solve the problem is a totally different challenge because there are so many vested interests involved and it’s not just the energy industry that

has to invest into this or that direction - it is all the stakeholders behind it, pension funds and what have you. Finding a consensus on the governance in order to solve a problem like climate change is the most difficult part considering the available instruments, it is certainly more difficult than the analytic part of identifying the problem and finding a consensus on the urgency. We have other environmental and resource problems like water scarcity, which is a growing reason of concern, especially in some regions that are unstable already. We have the problem of distribution of energy and the energy security problem - I will come to this at the end of my contribution.

The second category is the effects of globalisation. Why this? We have a certain speed of globalisation that does not take into account whether the governance structure is keeping with this speed. So, we have different speeds, and that affects crises, like the International Finance Architecture does not hold the speed with the intensity of increasing financial integration. The Asia crisis, the Argentina crisis is an example for this. For the good which is the most sensitive one traded internationally - which is certainly oil – we have now a structure that is incoherent with a market-type construction requiring fair competition. We have an oil cartel for 30 years. Although sometimes we think it is a good idea to have a cartel, it creates instability in the long run. We have a lack of a judiciary system to fight all sorts of organised crime. One reason is that the governance structuring usually needs either unanimous voting among something like 200 states. This in most cases does not work, instead it ends up with a “coalition of willing” like in the case of the International Criminal Court or the Law of Seas, or the Kyoto Protocol, or the Energy Charter Treaty. The EU probably is the only model that creates an alternative to unanimous voting or coalition of the willing. But, as we have seen in the Asian case, the EU model cannot be copied in other regions of the world. But it is at least interesting that it started with unanimous voting and then built up high common standard platform, and from there it could switch from unanimous voting to sort of government with the commission and to deviation from unanimous voting, which makes governing more effective and more flexible to adjust to the requirements of globalisation. No comparable development can be identified in international relations beyond the EU.

This brings me to the third challenge, and that is weak states. So, my hypothesis is – weak states are more dangerous than powerful states. Talking about the failing states phenomenon, states that are unable to enforce the rule of law, to keep the monopoly on force, to protect its citizens against warlords; states that have no leverage to prevent organised crime, to prevent systematic violence, kidnapping and the need to bribe their own administration, or to participate in different sorts of corruption – these states are safe havens for all sorts of international illegal activities, be it drug trafficking, weapon smuggling or terrorism. The first victims of this are the citizens and the failing states themselves, but the transnational network of these illegal actors are dangerous for all countries.

Let me, as my last point, just bring up a problem that includes all these three categories – it is the problem of energy security. Energy is a scarce resource and the

main source of environmental problems. Secondly, the organisation of the world energy market cannot hold speed with globalisation, as the OPEC cartel shows, and all the members or most of the members of the cartel are not under the rule of WTO. While three fourth of the world’s states are members of WTO, most of the members of OPEC are not. So, it indicates the unwillingness to accept a minimum of global rules. And third, we have a weak state phenomenon in most of the energy exporting regions. Look at Saudi Arabia that paid all sorts of groups which threatened the Saudi regime, and thus it financed the major part of today’s terrorism. The problem is, looking at the oil market, that our own (OECD) production is declining; thus, the share of import dependence is increasing. More and more heavy weights are coming up on the demand side – I’m talking especially about China but also India and other Asian states. The world supply will concentrate more and more on the Persian Gulf. It is a myth that other regions, like Russia or Africa, will be able to raise their current market share with the rising demand for oil. So, there will be a concentration, according to all estimates of serious institutions like the International Energy Agency, on the Persian Gulf supply with oil. And this puts more stress on this region which is unstable anyway. I think, it is worth to give this challenge more attention and for our and the international energy security. Looking for alternatives in the long run to oil requires tremendous investment which will only be initiated by private companies if international agreements require it and that makes the international effort necessary.

Thank you.

Mr. PER CARLSEN, Director, The Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

The Latvian Institute of International Affairs, I think, has organized something like 50 conferences over the last ten years on how to become member of the two institutions, EU and NATO, and I thought that I would never be called back to Riga again, but now you are into the more theoretical discussions about European security, and that’s fun, and I am looking forward to see that develop over the next ten years. Let me also say that I agree very much with Christopher Coker; the lack of possibilities of talking about hard and soft security – I actually think it is good because, I think, that we have for long time deluded ourselves by saying that this organization takes care of hard security, and the other one – of soft security, and you cannot do that. So, let’s forget about it and get down to real business. And real business also means getting to Gustav Lindstrom and the European Security Strategy. I agree with you. I think it is a fantastic document. I think it was done very quickly – I would not have expected them to agree on it – but now, I think, comes the hard and the tough time when we will have to implement it. I mean, I am not especially happy about what is in it about our special role on Africa, but it’s in there. And how are we dealing with Darfur - that’s one of the issues. I don’t know if that’s hard or soft security, but it will be very important on deciding the way we are going to look at things. In my small country, we have peacekeepers who are ready to go to Darfur - but in which organization - because of our strange problems with the European Security and Defence Policy? But what are we doing on Darfur? It is the US telling it’s genocide - it is not us; and, I mean, labeling is not so interesting but doing something for the people who are looking at television, as Bengt said, seems to be and is very important. What I really would deal with therefore, is the

question about neighbours, namely EU Neighbourhood Policy. I think, it belongs to security, hard or soft, and, I think, that we have to do much more together. It is not a criticism of the institutions in Brussels - but you are welcome to come back on this – that we have to do much more together. We said ten years ago that we were not going to create new dividing lines in Europe. We have done so – you can travel 200 kilometers east and you will be in Pskov, and you can see the difference. Or, if you move to Vilnius and travel 200 kilometers to Minsk, you can definitely see that we have created new dividing lines, and the people living over there can testify that a border has come up, they cannot travel as they did, they cannot trade as they did. So, I think, we have a lot to do together in the EU to put some flesh on the bone of this Neighbourhood Policy. That goes for the northwest of Russia – just out here; it goes for Belarus – and that, of course, is a tough one; it goes for the big one on Ukraine, which is also not easy. But they are there. They are looking to us. They are sometimes knocking on our door, sometimes they don’t know if they want to knock on our door, and I cannot see that we are really giving responses to their knocks. I think we have a friend from Slovakia here. When there was a presidential election in Slovakia, we said to them: “If you choose that guy as president, we don’t like you. If you choose the other one, we will like you.” We don’t do the same things, for example, with Ukraine, as far as I can find out. At least Ukrainians cannot hear what we are saying. And somebody in this room talked about Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. We were not quite sure that they are neighbours. I think that they are neighbours and, I think, we have to deal with them. We said in Europe that we would be looking to the frozen crisis in Transdniester, in Abkhazia, in Ossetia, and in Nagorny-Karabakh. I don’t think we can solve them alone, but we should try to give some impetus to doing something together with the Russians, and that’s also not easy, but, I think, that we have to deal with the neighbours out here. Actually, I think, that the Americans are starting to do it - I see a lot of Americans coming to Kiev, a lot of Americans are running around in Georgia. I think, we should have a European policy also for these areas. That was all.

Thank you.

KYOTO, GLOBAL WARMING AND MULTILATERAL REGIMES

Chair of the session: **Dr. ATIS LEJIŅŠ, Director, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga**

Good morning and welcome back to the seminar! In this morning’s Latvian newspaper “Diena” on the front page there is a huge photograph – blue background and a bridge in the Gulf of Mexico near Pensacola. Whole sections of the bridge had collapsed! It was destroyed by Ivan. A huge bridge – tons of concrete and steel just ripped apart. We were talking yesterday about rich countries make the problems but the resultant damage is borne by the poor countries, and we suggested – maybe the rich countries have to pay also for environmental damage - and the destroyed bridge affirms this.

But the problem, of course, is that the European Union and America don’t see eye-to-eye on the big strategic environmental questions. In the middle of the Iraq war Tony Blair made a policy statement about the three big issues facing the world. One was relations with Islam (we can all agree with that), global poverty – of course, and the third was environmental questions - global warming. Imagine, in the middle of the Iraq war! Why would he be issuing such a statement? Just recently, as I mentioned in my introduction, he said again that during Great Britain’s presidency of the G8 he will take up the environmental issue.

We will also be doing that too now, for which we have a very distinguished panel with experts from America, Brussels, Geneva and Paris. Is it possible to bridge the gap between America and Europe on global warming? Work is being done - serious work is being done to resolve this issue. We look forward to your presentations.

Mr. WILLY KEMPEL, European Commission, DG RELEX, United Nations and Treaty Office, Brussels

Thank you very much and the pleasure is all mine to be here with you. I will build upon what Antonio Missiroli said yesterday, and, I think, it was a good lead-in to bring the environmental problems into discussion already yesterday. I'll try to make you travel from the shores of Riga to the United Nations 2005 Major Event in September next year. I will walk you through the main issues of global warming, environmental governance, and then come to effective multilateralism at large, and establish together with you how it all fits together, and what the overall global picture is.

I'll start with the obvious remark that ever since the IPCC was founded – ever since then we had the Climate Change Convention and then the Kyoto Protocol - the basis of taking international action was scientific evidence and its interpretation. On the European side, scientific evidence for us was and is sufficient to take action, to bring together phenomena of global warming, of emission levels with flooding, natural catastrophes and mutation even of livestock, and for elaborating other models looking into the future. To come back to the shores of Riga – a popular publication I've seen last week was a model that was anticipating 6% - 10% increase of temperature over the next 80 - 100 years leading to major floods in the Netherlands, large parts of Belgium and the Baltic States. This was not a scientific assumption, and a very watery perspective to look at. What is to be done and what can we as the European Union do so that we don't come even close to such reality?

First of all, if one looks at international environmental regimes and treaties, two clear understandings have emerged over the years and have been transformed

in international obligations: differentiated implementation of obligations among States Parties and at the same time a global consensus and therefore burden-sharing on a global level. The first link meant one looks both for an implementation by industrialized countries (the North) as well as by developing countries (the South). In that vein, looking at the Convention and the Protocol on the Protection of the Ozone Layer or the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, you find a common line in established global obligations, however, differentiated in time and subject to support for developing countries' implementation. In the case of the Climate Change Convention, this was not done. No obligations for the South are foreseen until 2012 when the international community will come back to the question.

The second issue that is treated differently both in the cases of the ozone layer as well as the hazardous waste is the lack of a global consensus in the case of climate change. Global means both in terms of political support as well as membership of the Convention, where major countries such as the USA, Russia and Australia are lacking among developed countries. Nevertheless, unlike in the other international regimes, the EU moved ahead. The European Union is implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, this means something new. The EU is obliging itself to move in the period 2008-2012 8% down from 1990 levels, which is quite an effort, and has not been conditioned with the implementation by others. Again to remind you: those others who are not yet in are major players in economic terms: United States and Australia, and we are hoping for Russia to join soon so that the 55% margin for entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol would be crossed.

Looking at the larger picture and leaving details to colleagues to go into more detail, we have some serious questions to tackle in the future. First, one has to look for a full use of flexible mechanisms that we and others might use. Second, we hope we will start in Buenos Aires in December 2004 to look how to deal with implementation issues for the period after 2012 meaning what kind of obligations all Parties will have to fulfill.

Let me just have one look at interrelationships between climate change and other topics on the international agenda. In 2005, the international community will gather in Kobe, Japan, in the framework of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. It is an occasion to look back over the last ten years of implementation of the Yokohama Strategy for Disaster Reduction - here is a close link with global warming and climate change, and the increasing number of natural catastrophes. This clearly means that global warming is not an issue that is only relevant in the Kyoto context but it is a much larger topic to be dealt with, especially when looking at various consequences. Let us therefore look further and pose the question how Kyoto interconnects with environmental governance as a whole?

By taking a look at international environmental agreements, I would like to take just four conventions as reference points, namely ozone, waste, regional seas and climate change and to keep also in mind the institutional arrangements established.

Global environmental conventions number around 40 as of today. Since 1972 a global institution has been established, namely, the UN Environmental Program. In the 80s, the Global Environmental Facility - a financing mechanism made up of UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank – was established; in 1992 the UNCED took place in Brazil, and the Commission for Sustainable Development was established. Other international fora dealing with environmental issues are ECOSOC, the UN General Assembly, annual ministerial meetings and meetings of state parties under existing international environmental agreements. Last but not least let me mention a French initiative to establish a World Environmental Organization.

Why are we doing all of this? We are doing all of this for two main reasons. First, we are confronted with a transboundary situation. Some of the conventions even carry the word ”transboundary” in their title such as the “Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal”. The same holds true for the agreements regarding regional seas, ozone and climate change. Furthermore, one looks at global solutions. Again, one might take climate change - it’s a global problem and needs a global answer. Still, the environmental governance of today is not in a state that allows us to comprehensively and decisively move forward on the environmental front. We have sectorial multilateral environmental agreements. In each of these - as there are different organization setting in the form of different meetings of states parties, scientific advisory board, financing mechanism, and implementation mechanisms – the overall coordination is somewhat lacking. In this light, it is very difficult to establish an overall analysis what the state of the global environment is. Furthermore, this compartmented approach leads to weak implementation because there is no central secretariat/organization and this leads to a kind of soft law implementation. This holds true for limitations to some extent, review clauses, and of course for differentiated North and the South obligations under the existing conventions.

On the positive side, we’re looking at universal adherence. In the environmental field, not to have universal adherence - and it’s not just the climate change I’m thinking about - does not make sense. The value-based international community that wants to secure the international heritage of environment and natural resources has to establish a global regime; even the sectoral regimes referred to are not enough. Non-compliance has to be strengthened. We are today faced with a too weak a regime, and if non-compliance does not lead to clear and possibly stringent consequences, we have in fact soft law obligations. We need, as I already said, co-ordination among the 40 or so multilateral environmental agreements. Again, one could bring them together in a World Environmental Organization allowing for establishing one central secretariat for all, allowing integrating the different scientific and other technical approaches, and thereby strengthening effectively international environmental governance. We are also looking at new convention models. That means, we might in the future look for a convention model that is from the very beginning putting together socio-economic and environmental requirements. In the EU context we are looking, of course, at mixed competence, meaning that the European Union and Member States are sharing competence in the field of the protection of the environment.

Let me move to the next layer - what does it mean for global governance? Let us take Kyoto as the subset, environmental governance as the next circle and then look at the global picture. What we need concerning global governance, the UN at large, is international treaties, international regimes, and implementation mechanisms. We need comprehensive membership and participation for, as I said, economic and competitive reasons, for implementation reasons both on the national, regional, global level, working through international and regional organizations, and for the reason to share the common risks. It cannot just be that one part of the world is implementing environmental agreements, while others are not. We need clear structures for rapid decision-making, planning and delivery of obligations. We need clear implementing structures, which means that we have to reform international settings; we need overall participation also in the elaboration of obligations; and, as I said, the European Commission supports very much the French initiative to look for a World Environmental Organization.

Let me now take you to the UN Major Event in New York in 2005 which will bring a large number of elements together. The year 2005 has various specific connotations for international global governance. First of all, the report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will be published in December 2004 and will be put forward to the international community together with comments by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Recommendations of the Panel will include political issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council. They are expected to also touch upon other aspects of global governance, possibly also coming up with distinct recommendations on environmental governance. Other aspects that are expected to be touched upon include crisis management in the United Nations context, improved inter-linkages between the UN Security Council, ECOSOC, the UN General Assembly, International Financial Institutions, UN Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes and UN Member States. Preparations for the 2005 Major Event have started. It will take place on the level of heads of states and governments in September 2005 in New York and will look at the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the Millennium Declaration and the report of the High-level Panel as mentioned. In other terms: the international community has roughly eight months to come to grips at the highest level on how to improve international governance and thereby to bring together a variety of different subject matters:

- Decide upon how the international community will reorganize itself in the latter part of the 21st century, meaning UN Security Council reform both in the large as well as in the narrow sense. To give an idea: a model recently mentioned might foresee a UN Security Council with five permanent members, six to seven semi-permanent members, and 15-20 rotating memberships, which would, in fact, represent a major change;

- Redefinition of the role of regional organizations, the European Union being one of them. In this context, one might look at the implementing as well as regulatory role regional organizations are playing be it in the field of environment, fight

against terrorism or other, as well as their increasing contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management;

- Redefinition or new setting in the field of international crisis management, whereby ideas include a standing subcommittee of the UN Security Council, strengthening of the role of the UN Secretary-General, or a redefinition of the functioning of ECOSOC and its relationship with the UN Security Council and other UN agencies.

- Interlinking humanitarian, development and security issues, whereby the environment constitutes an integral part of all three. This entails integrated planning for problem resolutions which means to integrate from the very beginning action and activities to be foreseen, including political and security solutions, humanitarian aid, technical support, development and reconstruction activities and, based on such a comprehensive assessment, to identify the overall mission planning whilst leaving the different aspects intact (e.g. humanitarian aid will not form part of a political framework but remain autonomous).

Let me close my remarks by saying that on the latter point – mission planning - we are now acting the other way round by first looking at the mission mandates and then having different missions going out, whilst quite often lacking the full picture. And this brings me to my final remark: a large sectoral issue as climate change to succeed needs global support and implementation; it also needs clear anchorage in the environmental framework; and environment necessitates its place in a well-structured setting of global governance. Therefore, the only answer that one can give from the European Union perspective is full engagement and support for UN reform, for allowing the international community to move beyond where we stand today in order to make the 21st century a success story for all of us. Thank you.

Mr. DAVID MICHEL, Senior Associate, Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC

Let me just preface my remarks by adding a point to what Willy Kempel just said. Actually, environmental diplomacy and multilateral institutions are even far more widespread than he indicated. He mentioned 40 multilateral environmental agreements, but a recent study by Ronald Mitchell – who maintains an environmental treaty database at the University of Oregon – counts 729 multilateral environmental agreements and 1040 bilateral agreements since the end of 19th century alone, the vast majority of those being concluded since the end of World War II. I'd also like to say something in the spirit of transatlantic environmental co-operation: the very first treaty ever signed by the United States – the new nation – was with a European power - with Britain. It was the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending America's War of Independence, and it included an environmental element concerning the use of natural resources. The United States demanded, as one of its conditions for peace, access to previously accustomed fishing grounds off of Newfoundland, and the British agreed to that as part of the resolution to the war.

Climate change is a very long-term problem, and I have a very short term in which to address it. I'd like to focus my statements on different conceptions of the relation between climate change and security, and then take up broader issues of global governance in the discussion period.

One of the interesting things about climate change is that it falls into the interstices of the main points that were raised yesterday. So, first, in between Bengt Sundelius analysis that mentioned, on the one hand, threats of intentional ill will and, on the other hand, "shit happens", climate change results neither from evil action by one entity against another, nor simply an accident. We are climate change. This microphone

running, the PowerPoint system running, all of us flying here – that all contributes to the sources of climate change. Human influences on the climate system result not from the aberrant or arbitrary decisions of the mighty or the few, but from the ordinary actions of countries, firms, and individuals, from the daily lives of everyone on Earth. Second, climate change is also integrated into the questions of "compounding" that Thomas Ries raised: the spread of disease; fragile states and weak institutions coping with environmental stresses – climate change plays into all of those.

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 appeared to thrust climate change onto the back burner of international and transatlantic relations. Many American officials, immediately afterwards, could be heard to say something to the effect that "now the Europeans will stop hassling us and hounding us about these trivial issues - we have something very important to deal with." But then the United States developed the logic of its response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism by advancing a particular argument - that of moving against gathering threats before they become truly dangerous. Europeans responded to that argument by adopting it to one of their concerns, maintain that it applied equally to climate change. Atis Lejins mentioned a speech by Tony Blair. Blair has actually made the same point on a number of occasions. He has made it speaking to the British Parliament about sustainable development. He has made it speaking to the US Congress, explicitly linking preventive action against the danger posed by Iraq with precautionary action against the danger posed by climate change. Javier Solana and recently Romano Prodi have also made the case that responding to climate change is an integral part of global security.

The climate-security nexus may appear then to be a new issue, or a novel re-framing of a relatively recent risk – climate change – seen from our post 9/11 perspective. But in fact, this isn't quite the case. Security is the original window of government concern about climate change. As scientific knowledge of climate change was developing in the pre-war period, many observers thought of global warming as a potential element of "human safety" - to raise a term that was thrown out yesterday - that the gradual warming of the climate could, if anything, prove a boon to agriculture and might even provide a defence against the ultimate return of the ice ages. Then, following World War II, the mathematician John von Neumann, who was using computers to model nuclear explosions, realized that the mathematical problems raised by simulating nuclear testing were the same as those raised by weather forecasting; they both consisted in finding non-linear solutions to fluid dynamics. Working at Princeton University, in 1950 von Neumann and his colleagues used the world's first computer – ENIAC – to develop the world's first weather forecasting models. They went on, supported by the United States military, to elaborate those models as a means not only of forecasting climate but of understanding climate mechanisms with the ultimate goal of purposely manipulating the weather as a potential weapon against the Soviet Union.

During the 1960s, as these studies went on, the modellers progressively realized that although intentional weather modification would be very difficult to achieve, inadvertent weather changes due to human influences - climate changes - were a real possibility. Climate researchers began to employ these models that had been originally funded by the American military to explore such problems as the potential climate change effects of supersonic transport. One of the very first international efforts to study climate change was the Climate Impact Assessments Programme organised by the United States but with participation from several countries – from France, the UK, Australia - to look at the potential effects of what were then projected to be very large fleets of supersonic transports travelling through the stratosphere. What effect would the emissions from their engines have on the atmosphere? How could this impact climate?

And those studies - largely revolving around the potential effects on agriculture - would turn out to be very timely. In the early 1970s unusually difficult weather struck many parts of the globe. The Middle East was suffering through its worst drought in 100 years. Central America struggled through its worst draught in half a century; Nicaragua alone lost 80% of its corn production and 20% of its wheat production. In Africa, Ethiopia endured a famine that killed 250 000 people; the Sahel was in its fifth straight year of draught. There was a real concern that climate change imperilled global food security. Henry Kissinger in his very first official act as the Secretary of State of the United States went before the United Nations to give a speech setting out America's vision of "A Just Consensus, a Stable Order, a Durable Peace". Kissinger called for a World Food Conference to discuss ways to secure the world's food supply. When he made the keynote speech at that conference in 1974, he advocated extensive international cooperation to counter hunger brought on by natural disasters. As you might imagine, Kissinger's concerns were not only humanitarian but also geopolitical. A CIA analysis conducted that year suggested climate change could cause severe food shortages, mass migrations, military conflict to secure resources, possibly even nuclear blackmail.

Also emerging at the same time in the 1970s was another issue, which appears to be cropping up again in force just since the Iraq war. This is the relation between climate change and energy security. During the first and the second oil crises, the response of many nations to the cut-off of the oil flow was to increase their reliance on and to experiment with developing synthetic fuels. As the possible risks of global warming had so recently been garnering greater attention, many environmentalists and scientists quickly pointed out that those fuels would actually contribute much more of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide to the atmosphere than oil and natural gas. Synthetic fuels in particular, they argued, posed dangers to the environment and to the global climate. Energy security and the environment have since remained linked through debates on the relative policy merits of increased energy efficiency and conservation versus increased production. Here the argument runs that increased drilling for oil not only brings environmental damages but that those damages can have security consequences when they contribute to political tensions as in Nigeria and Burma. Improving energy efficiency and conservation, on the other hand, not only lessens society's impact on the environment but also contributes to security by diminishing dependence on energy imports from volatile regions of the world.

Concerns about food security and environmental stresses on fragile states persisted throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s as well, on both sides of the Atlantic. Sir Crispin Tickell, later Britain's ambassador to the UN, while a Fellow at Harvard in the late 1970's wrote a paper on climate change in which he worried about the possible impacts of environmental refugees. In the 1980s, the US National Defence University and the President's Global 2000 Report fretted about climate change scenarios and decreasing crop yields contributing to political turmoil. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, went so far as to propose creation of an Environmental Security Council. In the 1990s, Al Gore famously alluded to environmental stresses as being behind the steady flow of refugees from Haiti coming to the United States, and to resource competition as a contributing factor to the horrible massacres in Rwanda. Not to be left behind, the academics and policy analysts at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, my colleagues across town at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington, and the International Social Science Council's Human Dimensions of Global Change Program, all began research projects in the field. Awareness of and attention to the environment-security nexus has been growing for quite some time. And it has now begun to be accepted as a legitimate factor in assuring the national and international welfare. We heard yesterday about how meeting the climate challenge is a component of the European Union Security Strategy of 2002. It also, believe it or not, figures in the famous American National Security Strategy of 2002 - the famous "Pre-emptive" Security Strategy. Responding to climate change is included in that document as one element that contributes to American security.

It is a real, live issue. The World Health Organisation estimates that 160 000 people a year now die from the effects of climate change, largely through increased incidence of malaria and increased disease stresses, and that figure could double by 2020. The International Red Cross calculates that in 1999, 25 million people – refugees, displaced people – that's 58% of all the world's refugees that year - were fleeing from environmental disasters. The UN Interagency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction figures that, between 1990 and 1999, 188 million people per year were affected by natural disasters – meaning they lost their home, livestock, crops, livelihoods, or health due to a natural disaster. That's six times more than the 31 million who were so affected by armed conflict. Of course, by no means all natural disasters are weather related. But climate change threatens to increase the number and severity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, etc.

No doubt, there is a real recognition out there of the relation between climate change, environmental stresses and security. But since the Iraq war particularly, there seem to be two different discourses developing on either side of the Atlantic. In Europe, there's a continuation of the logic of environmental degradation as a stressor contributing to the fragility of weak states, causing additional problems for fragile states with limited political or economic capacity to surmount them. This view emphasizes the potential for indirect effects on Europe, on the United States, on developed nations through the instability that those factors cause in the developing

world – migration, political turmoil which developed countries might need to respond to militarily or with police forces, or what have you. Also now, particularly since, I'd say, the heat waves of 2003, there's an increased apprehension of the real dangers to "human safety" or well being in Europe itself, not to mention other developed countries. There were 21 000 additional deaths due to the heat waves of 2003 in Europe. To be sure, not all – or even any one - of these deaths can be attributed directly to climate change. But climate change is expected to cause an increase in heat waves, and, statistically, prolonged high temperatures do lead to an increase in mortality in vulnerable populations – the elderly, children, the infirm, etc.

At the same time, some voices in Europe have also been picking up on another strand of the post-Iraq security argument, in addition to the failed state's dimension. This is the comparison of climate change to weapons of mass destruction - that the real weapon of mass destruction that is out there, or another weapon of mass destruction that's looming, is climate change. Most prominently expressed by Sir John Houghton, past co-chair of the Scientific Assessment working group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, this view focuses on the direct threat climate change poses to the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable populations, particularly in the developing countries – through sea-level rise, increases in extreme weather events, increased incidence of disease, etc

Now I'll go to the American side of the picture. The United States, as I was trying to convey in the brief historical development on the evolution of the security community's concern with climate change, has long recognised the relation of climate change, environmental degradation, environmental stresses, to security issues. In the post-Iraq period, though, there's been a veering off towards the energy security question. That's taken on a very particular flavour, positing that, if the United States could reduce its dependence on imported oil, this would reduce the flow of money to terrorists. Because, where does Al-Qaeda get the major source of its funds? It's Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. And if the United States were not so dependent on imported oil, not only would it not be so tied to that volatile region of world, but also there would be this very direct consequence that we would be cutting off the financial oxygen to those evildoers who threaten us. I think, there are problems with parts of the discourse on either side and potential meeting of the minds on another element of this transatlantic discussion.

On the European side, the weapons of mass destruction argument, although it is certainly noticeable - has impact, gets attention - it's not going to meet with a very friendly response from the United States. Underneath, the substance of the argument is in fact quite similar to the broader understanding of environmental security largely shared on both sides of the Atlantic – that climate change poses real risks to human well being. But the rhetoric of "weapons" of mass destruction is seen as over the top. It seems to move climate change much closer to the "ill intent" end of the spectrum that Bengt Sundelius evoked yesterday. It raises a question in sceptical American minds: why are you talking to us about climate change as weapons of mass destruction, when you, Europeans, are so hopeless and so unhelpful on Iran, North Korea,

on proliferation of real weapons of mass destruction. Without making any judgement about the consistency or the legitimacy of that argument, I'm just saying that's part of what goes on in some American minds.

On the United States side, I find the terrorism/energy security argument to be unconvincing, to say the least. One might argue that if the United States is finally willing to consider a gas tax for reasons of terrorism – then, all the better. And there certainly are voices who are willing to do so, not least some conservative commentators who have damned Kyoto because of the disastrous economic effects they believe it would have. For the sake of argument, let's take the lower end of the cost estimates emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol – 20 USD a ton of carbon. That corresponds to about a 5-cent per gallon gas tax. As climate policy, commentators like George Will, Charles Krauthammer - they will have absolutely none of that. That would be a cessation of American sovereignty and control over its energy future, ceding US energy policy to some unaccountable international bureaucrats, probably located in Brussels. But these same people will readily advocate gas taxes of 50 cents a dollar, two dollars, three dollars per gallon as part of the programme of reducing America's dependence on imported oil on the grounds that this would increase America's security.

But this logic depends on the conflation of the money that goes into our gas tanks – and to Saudi Arabia -, with the money that gets into the pockets of Al-Qaeda. Now, on the one hand, for American imports of oil - we're talking billions, billions, billions of dollars a year. On the other, terrorism is regrettably cheap. The 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks in the United States found that Al-Qaeda financed the 9/11 terrorist operations for 400 000 to 500 000 dollars. The attacks on the embassies in East Africa in 1988 were financed for 10 000 dollars. All of Al-Qaeda's annual budget, prior to 9/11, came to 30 million dollars for weapons, training camps, and operations, and that included a 10-20 million dollar payment to the Taliban. Hence, there is no hope of the United States being able to cut off that drop in the bucket through reducing its dependence on imported oil. And even the argument for doing so depends on the idea that the money that goes to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Gulf States for oil somehow goes from the oil companies into the pockets of Al-Qaeda. But the 9/11 Commission also found - one might debate how true this is – that the Saudi government, Saudi institutions, Saudi officials did not support Al-Qaeda financially.

Al-Qaeda's financing comes from donations – largely from Saudi Arabia, largely from the Gulf States, that's true, but from charities (some of them front organizations), mosques, and individuals. Moreover money is money, no matter how it is earned. Just choking off oil revenue alone to Saudi Arabia isn't going to get that terrorist financing, while somehow leaving the rest of the Saudi economy - and its citizens' money - hermetically sealed off from the terrorists. Only choking off all money to Saudi Arabia is going to stop the flow of money to the terrorists, if you assume the terrorists' financing comes through Saudi Arabia. So, programmes that are expressly dedicated and are announced politically as intended to reduce terrorist financing by cutting our dependence of imported oil, I think, are going to cause real political problems with the Gulf States and with Saudi Arabia who face significant problems of their own - development problems. Their growing population is largely under the age of 25. Unemployment adds to the ranks of what journalist Thomas Friedman calls "the problem of the sitting-around guys" in Saudi Arabia - those disaffected young men who don't have anything to do, making them vulnerable to recruitment into fundamentalist movements, or even into terrorist cells. It's going to take resources for the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia to address the problems so starkly revealed in the UNDP's recent Arab Development Reports. Not least of these is that they too must eventually make their own energy transition beyond the hydrocarbon economy. But if rather than helping them to make this transition, to ensure their own "sustainable development", we are instead embroiled with them in a Ricardian argument about who gets the rents from oil – if we tax oil, we receive the tax revenue; but the higher end cost to the consumer drives down demand, lowering the revenue received by the (Saudi) producer - then we are going to seem to be fighting against terrorism by choking off their resources. I don't think that approach is going to be particularly helpful in terms of either energy security or our security against terrorists.

Now, to the possible transatlantic meeting of the minds. Both the United States and the Europeans agree upon the logic of climate change as a contributing factor to failed states, fragile states, institutional, political, economic turmoil in developing countries. And there is, I think, scope for agreement that this is a real problem and that it should be an element of the way that we consider addressing climate change. However, there is also room for pessimism about whether that argument will really play out because there are so many other factors involved. Here we go to the compounding issue - state fragility, institutional fragility in weak, or failed, or failing states. Climate change is far from the only challenge faced by such countries. They are vulnerable to the effects of climate change in large measure precisely because of their weaknesses – lower institutional capacities, less economic resilience, poor infrastructure etc. We're talking about a whole spectrum of political and economic development issues. It's very difficult to have to say that our strategy for addressing the problem of environmental security will be to overcome the hurdles of economic and political development.

Moreover, climate change and environmental security are not the only policy problems that Europe and the US face either. Many policies that the United States and Europe pursue for other reasons – here I'm thinking, for instance, of the United States' support for authoritarian regimes in the fight against terror, or the transatlantic partners' taste for subsidies to their agricultural sectors at the expense of developing country producers - are probably not very helpful to our hopes for strengthening these states in the long run.

Although climate security, energy security, environmental security might all be an element of agreement between Europe and the United States, when those arguments come together through the objective of shoring up, repairing, avoiding failed states, there are so many other considerations involved that climate change policy alone might not be able to bear the burden. But it's at least a logical field for a shared recognition of a problem and a front for moving forward in agreement in the near term and, hopefully, in the long term.

Prof. URS LUTERBACHER, Chairman, Environmental Studies Unit, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

Since you addressed the question about China, let me give a quick response to it. Actually China's CO_2 emissions for some time now seem to be diminishing in absolute levels. And this is due to the fact that Chinese economy is probably undergoing slowly what your economy and the Soviet economy did at some point - scrapping the old socialist industrial apparatus of production, which was largely based on burning dirty coal, and passing on to a system of using more modern forms of production. And right now, I'm not saying that this will not change in the future, but right now, both China and even to some extent India are either stabilising or even perhaps diminishing their emissions in absolute levels. But this being said, there is no doubt in my mind, as the other speakers have said, that climate change is a huge problem both from the point of view of natural but also social catastrophes that have been already enumerated. So, let me perhaps address the more related question which is: how can we construct an effective co-operative climate regime? Undoubtedly in the end we will have to achieve collaboration between the US and the EU in this matter. The question is how to bring that about.

Let me make, since I'm also from Geneva, a quick analogy here with the evolution of the trade regime. Remember that it took about 50 years build an effective trade regime from the inception of GATT to the Uruguay Round. And one has to stress that building a trade regime has several advantages that building environmental and especially climate regimes do not have. First of all, in terms of trade you have what more theoretically-minded people call "no first-mover advantage" whereas in the environment, the problem is that it pays, as we've seen for the developing countries,

but also for the United States, to say we're not going to collaborate because you can take some kind of advantage out of that. The latest example of this is, of course, Russia which is holding back its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol because it tries to extort more and more advantages out of the European Union. So, these are examples and, therefore, what the previous speaker said about universal adherence, compliance mechanisms is absolutely essential because otherwise you generate these differences in competitivity that can be very damaging for the pursuit of a regime. Now, what happened here in terms of the trade situation? No first-mover advantage in this case because a protectionist move can easily be countered effectively by a retaliatory move. This is even easier now with the existence of big trading blocks like the EU. The EU can counter effectively any American move and vice versa, plus you have now the advent of big Asian economies and even some big Latin American economies like Brazil. So, together they can form effective coalitions at the international level.

More important perhaps, still at this stage, is to have a little discussion about the domestic level in this context. In trade, you've always had powerful domestic interests of low-productivity industries that are preferring to invest in the political process rather than into their own development, for instance, in order to block liberalisation. This is the case for trade, and the same exists, I would say, at the climate change level. You have powerful internal lobbies, especially in the United States: you have the coal lobby, you have some energy companies - I will come back to those - which have an interest in not having an effective climate change regime and, therefore, are going to try their utmost to block it. In the trade area, you have the countervailing element of powerful export lobbies, which together with some strong elements of public opinion, like consumer interests, has made over the years, despite many obstacles and many negotiations, the trade movement go forward. So, the conclusion from that is actually the following… and this is stressed by several theoretical papers including, for instance, a famous paper by the two economists - Grossman and Helpman - which is called "Protection for sale"… which means: if you want to advance and bring forward an effective international regime, you have to have a way of blocking these domestic coalitions, you have to find counter coalitions that are similarly strong.

Now, is this a totally hopeless task? I would say no and we can buttress this point of view by looking a bit at the history of both the climate change story and other global environmental accords. First of all, we have to remember the following: the climate change regime after some initial opposition from the US, remember the first Bush administration was also against strengthening the Rio Treaty finally got through but on a much weaker design. Under the Clinton administration, quite clearly, it was basically under American pressure that the whole thing got pushed forward. For instance, it was after all the US who accepted with other countries the Berlin Mandate, the first COP Conference (Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Treaty of Rio) that accepted the idea that only industrialised countries would actually have to have mandatory targets for CO_2 and other emissions. Finally, it was in Geneva at the second COP meeting that the American Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth pushed forward the idea of having mandatory and legally binding targets. So, that was basically at that point an American idea. This is also reflected a lot in the design

of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is full of ideas that have been elaborated by American intellectuals. This is the case, for instance, for the so-called flexible mechanisms, which were pushed, especially the notion of trading, by and in analogy to American attempts to do the same domestically. There is a well working sulphur dioxide market for emissions in the United States. Therefore, what we are dealing with here is basically for the moment an American-led design. Europeans were very reluctant at the beginning to accept the idea of trading. They have now taken it over, but it originally was an American idea.

Let's consider other elements here. For instance, perhaps the best analogy is to look at the history of another treaty, namely the Treaty of Vienna and then the subsequent Montreal Protocol on Banning Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Here you have an example of quite a different scenario in the sense that it was the US that took the lead in trying to implement this ban in the Treaty based upon a coalition of two powerful interests: first of all, US public opinion, largely favourable to the notion of banning substances that were depleting the ozone layer for a variety of reasons, but also a very powerful chemical industry, namely the *DuPont* corporation. Why was that? It was due to the fact that in the 1970s and 80s *DuPont* was the only company that had actually developed effective substitutes to the CFCs that were mostly responsible for depleting the ozone layer. Therefore, the Montreal Protocol gave *DuPont* for a while an effective monopoly in commercialising these non-CFC based substances, which was further enforced, for those of you who know the details of the Montreal Protocol through trade restricting clauses. And, of course, last minute attempts to block the Montreal Protocol, by some elements of the Republican Party, did not succeed within the Reagan administration because of this powerful coalition.

Now, what is the situation in terms of domestic interests in the US with respect to climate change? As I said before, the climate regime is based a lot on American ideas, but immediately also powerful interests in the United States organised against it. And we know, for instance, that at the level of public opinion, at least according to surveys, the US public seems to be favourable to measures against climate change. However, given the role money and fund raising for elections in US politics plays, public opinion is not enough. It is also essential to have some of the major players - industrial players - on board, and this is definitively not the case. In addition to the powerful coal interests that are against it and probably would suffer by any implementation of a climate change regime (if you look at the map of the last US election, there is one state that voted for Bush and which traditionally has voted democratic, West Virginia - one of the major coal producing states in the United States). So, you have to take such elements into account. However, it's not only the coal interests that are against it; it's also big US energy companies. Both *ExxonMobil* and *Chevron*, for instance, are against the Kyoto Protocol. This is very much unlike European-based energy companies like *BP* and *Shell* who have a much more favourable to neutral position vis-à-vis the Protocol, because they have figured out that it was better for them to be on board rather than not to be. So, in some sense what one has to do, if one wants to make climate regime work, is to build a coalition that, including in the US, will support efforts against climate change.

Here we have some leads: There are some insurance companies who are favourable to measures against climate change because they can incur losses as a result o unfavourable weather conditions. There are also surprisingly, (not in some sense), trading companies. I was just talking with my American counterpart and he confirmed that in some sense the *Enron* was problematic from the point of view of climate change mitigation because *Enron* was one of the few companies that had influence in the Bush administration and that was actually favourable to the Kyoto measures because it could benefit from trading emission certificates.

In that sense we can see that there are alternatives that do exist, and these alternatives have to be cultivated if one wants to reach something. In addition, there are other types of actors that could become a part of the coalition. There are some regional interests. American states, for instance, who have started to show willingness to pursue climate change mitigation measures. States of the North East of the United States, for instance, belong to that catgory but also and perhaps more importantly, California. So, if you start building an important coalition of American states, that could also be a help, and this has to be cultivated.

Finally, there are some of the elements that were evoked by my colleague previously – the oil dependence. I have a slight disagreement with him on this point. It is quite clear that it is important to see how one diminishes the dependence on oil by the United States on the Middle East. There are several problematic aspects that I will shortly mention about this. One has to remember here that it is basically unhealthy for Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states to have this dependence themselves on the oil rent. Economists have shown that this tends to choke off other industrial investments and make them unprofitable; therefore, the hope of having a vibrant Middle Eastern economy, if the oil rent continues, is problematic.
I should add here that unfortunately, what adds to the problem, is what is called the US seigniorage in terms of the dollar. Most petroleum prices are quoted in dollars and bills are settled in dollars. This gives the US, for the moment, unless, for instance, the OPEC countries switch to the euro, an additional incentive to buy foreign oil. We have actually calculated with a model that we have developed in Geneva that, even if the US reduced so slightly, even so slightly its dependence on foreign oil, it could save over the long run up to 9% of its GDP.

In addition, an important effect, and, I think, this was mentioned by my colleague here to the left, is the demonstration effect by the European Union - the fact that, if the European Union shows that it can live and even prosper within the constraints of the Kyoto Protocol, this can have a demonstration effect, also on American industry. After all, and I will finish with that, my own country – Switzerland - has an emission rate per capita that is about three times lower as the US rate and certainly everybody who has been there can see that we live probably just as well on the average if not better, than people in the US. There is hope, it seems to me, to build an effective climate regime.

Ms. ELISE LAUNAY, Chargée de mission pour les Affaires européennes, Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris

At the conference of the Ambassadors of France held in Paris last August, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Barnier started his speech by identifying environmental issues as the most important ones for France and Europe for the years to come. Though it is an important issue, there is no consensus on the importance of this threat. Yesterday we heard from Gustav that environmental issues were at the bottom of the pyramid of the threats. Then, professor Coker said that environmental issues were the "biggest security threat". And now we know from David that, if I understood correctly, environmental issues are envisaged as a state security stake by Americans, whereas the issue was identified by our Swedish college as a societal threat. And to conclude on this overview of the different statements we had on environmental treats so far, I would underline an interesting point in the presentation made by David which is that at no moment of his speech, he explicitly referred to the "Kyoto Protocol", which, I think, is significant.

Now, is the Protocol of Kyoto the adequate instrument? I understand from what was said by Willy, that it is a comprehensive tool including a coercive side with sanctions and financing support for developing countries. So, it's an adequate instrument, but what is its effectiveness and what can we expect from it if the United States do not ratify the protocol?

We've got some leverage. We can put pressure on Russia and use EU support for accession of Russia to the WTO to make Russia ratify the Protocol. That's one lev-

erage. We've got another one which is public opinion, and I understand that there are some debates in the United States, which might be encouraging. And then there's a last leverage which is exemplarity of the European Union - even if there is no first-mover bonus.

But what sort of alternatives are we left with if the Kyoto Protocol is not going to become an effective tool? Interestingly, no one around the table talked about nuclear energy. I read some interesting figures from a 2002 report of the Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, which I would like to share with you. The report mentions that in the countries of the OECD, the economy that was made through the use of nuclear energy represents about 1200 millions of tons of carbon dioxide which is around 10% of the total amount of emission of CO_2. Those are interesting figures which tend to prove that nuclear energy is a tool to reduce the emissions of CO_2.

But then we come back to the question of energy security. You can resolve the problem of climate change by using nuclear energy, but then you end up with another problem of energy security, state security and the problem of nuclear wastes. That's open for your reflection.

Thank you.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND EU RESPONSES

Chair of the session: **Dr. TOMAS RIES, Senior Researcher, Deparment of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence College, Helsinki**

Welcome to the final panel of this conference. I'll just start by thanking the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the EU Institute for Security Studies and, I think, the European Union, for enabling this conference.

The task of this final session is to look at EU responses to global challenges - the global challenges that we face. This is a timely topic. Globalised security includes five major areas. They are distinct but also increasingly closely interconnected. The basic issue is global ecology - the session that we just had. The next layer is the global, regional and national critical technical infrastructure on which our entire system depends. Then we have the transnational economy – on which we are also absolutely and critically dependent. Then we have the consequences of globalisation inside our societies, and by our societies I mean the rich countries of the world and especially the western European welfare states. Finally, at the top - most apparent, but only part of the whole complex - are political-military issues in a new guise, and that's essentially the relationship between the globalisers and the localisers and when it goes wrong, as in strategic terror.

How we deal with this new security environment? Willy Kempel mentioned, quite correctly, that we need integrated planning. However a precondition for this is a holistic security perspective. And this is something which we still are missing. On this basis one can then develop a comprehensive threat analysis and from that an integrated strategy. All this is still missing, and is a precondition for integrated planning.

Xavier Solana's strategy paper was a very important first step but still remains only a very first tentative step. We still lack a holistic overview of the new security environment. Our problem is our intellectual heritage from the modern era. This is partly the tendency still to see security in military terms, but on a deeper level our tendency is towards specialisation. Today we still need specialised knowledge, but increasingly this now also has to be complemented with – or directed by – a far broader perspective – what the Harvard biologist Edward Wilson has termed a "consilient" approach. A very broad integrative, synthetic intellectual approach. That's something we have to adopt now. And this is, I think, the coming challenge for our security institutes. This is also the challenge of this panel which is tasked with summing up how the EU is to respond to the new security environment?

To that end we have two principal speakers: Mr. György Tatar from the EU Council, who also heads the Task Force on Horizontal Security. Then we have Rob de Wijk, one of Europe's leading defence experts. He will be looking specifically at the EU's military response to the emerging environment. They are backed up by two discussants: Mr. Vladimir Bilcik, an analyst at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, and Dr. Jean-Yves Haine from the EU-ISS in Paris.

Mr. GYÖRGY TATAR, Head of Task Force, Horizontal Security Issues, Policy Unit of the General Secretariat of the EU, Brussels

The Strategy Paper of the European Union adopted last December identifies the global challenges and threats. Although the subject of threats was handled yesterday from various points of view - the hard and soft global threats were analyzed deeply - I would like to add very shortly some further details to the assessment of the challenges, why the key threats enlisted in the European Strategy Paper are considered as global threats?

The first threat mentioned in the document was the *proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*. It is potentially the greatest threat to the global security because on the one hand, there is a real possibility that WMD could be also acquired by hostile non-state actors and on the other hand, the attacks could be realized with chemical and radiological materials as well.

The second threat – *terrorism*. The terrorist organizations in different parts of the world are well resourced, connected by electronic network and are willing to use any means to achieve their goals. The worst-case scenario is when a terrorist group acquires WMD because it would mean that a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies.

The *regional conflicts* constitute the third global threat. Not a conflict itself but the results of a regional conflict, the proliferation of small arms, increase of organised crime, terrorism and extremist terrorism may easily lead to state failure and by that increase of insecurity and demand for WMD with all its consequences.

The next threat is *state failure*. It's an alarming phenomenon because it undermines global governance, forms a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism and affects the global values, promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation.

Finally, the threat of *organised crime*. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state, can have links with terrorism and has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migration and weapons. Coming from practical life, I would shortly brief you on what steps were taken by the EU institutions for implementing the Security Strategy. As you may know, the Irish presidency put the realization of the ESS in the focus of its activity. There were four fields - fight against terrorism, effective multilateralism, strategy towards the region of Middle East and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina - where the Presidency made considerable steps forward. If you allow me, I will take stock of these steps.

In the field of fight against terrorism, the main steps were the following: an EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator was appointed in the person of Mr. Gij de Vries. There were adopted directives on compensating victims of crime, a regulation into using new functions for the Schengen Information System, a decision establishing the Visa Information System, and an action plan the implementation of which will be reviewed twice a year. Cooperation was carried forward in the field of Europol and Eurojust agreement. A Counter-terrorism Task Force was established within Europol. And an agreement was concluded on exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences and on retention of communication data.

The next field of efforts made by the Irish Presidency was effective multilateralism. In view to contribute to the promotion of effectiveness of the multilateral system the European Union made a contribution to the United Nations High-Level Panel on Reforms and the EU is going to continue this cooperation with the UN hoping to make the activity and functioning of the UN more effective. During the Irish Presidency the implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management, adopted in the year 2003, was started. The intensification of cooperation with regional organisations was also started. In this regard in the first place I would mention the development of cooperation with the African Union but I could also note the cooperation with the Gulf countries, the Arab League and the MERCOSUR. To increase the effectiveness of the multilateral system the EU started a very intensive dialogue with its special partners, inter alia with the United States, Canada, China, Japan and India on the highest level. In the case of the United Nations and the US, I would like to note that the so-called desk-to-desk officer dialogue, which helps a lot in the field of the CFSP in order to plan our activity and identify the common objectives is already proceeding.

In the field of the strategic partnerships with the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East a strategy has been adopted this year aiming at promoting the development of common zones of peace, prosperity and progress in the Mediterranean and

in the Middle East. We are going to promote political reforms in these countries, develop their capabilities of conflict prevention and management, stimulate trade and economic cooperation. In this respect, may I revert to our discussion yesterday where we touched upon the subject of dialogue with Mediterranean countries, which was characterised as a dialogue aiming at resolving the Middle East peace process. I would like to underline that the final aim of this dialogue is not to resolve the Middle East peace process. The framework of the so called Euromed cooperation constitutes a special forum where the European Union tries to promote and strengthen the cooperation with them in the field of trade, economy, external policy and it gives the possibility for the Mediterranean partners to express their opinion on current issues and continue the dialogue among themselves. A new subject of future cooperation and dialogue will be the field of security.

The last field of activity where the Irish Presidency concentrated its efforts concerning the implementation of the European Security Strategy was the formulation of a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. As you know, Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a key challenge for the European Union because of several reasons: it is a country with a considerable EU engagement, the EU is planning an ESDP mission to follow on from the NATO-led SFOR mission and the EU will assume the political responsibilities as the transition from the Dayton–Paris agenda progresses to the European integration agenda.

In view of implementation the Dutch Presidency also set some priorities mainly directed to the continuation of the work started by the Irish Presidency. As examples, I would mention the objective to achieve progress towards the adoption of the Third Money Laundering Directive which relates to the suppression of terrorist financing, to push for successful continuation of the EU Police mission in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to reinforce the military and civilian capabilities by developing the Union's new military capabilities objective, the so-called Headline Goal 2010. The concept for rapidly deployable battle groups, which should be further developed also on the agenda. Particular attention is paid to EU-NATO coordination and cooperation on the basis of the Berlin Plus arrangements. A current issue is the promotion of decision-making and implementation with regard to peace facilitation in Africa. You may know that the Dutch presidency makes considerable efforts to achieve progress in resolving the problems and meeting the challenges the African nations face.

Beyond the abovementioned actions related directly to the implementation of the European Security Strategy I would point out that there are also some other measures taken by the EU during the last months to achieve the main objective of the European Security Strategy: to live in a more secured world. As an example, I could refer to the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is a framework for dialogue and cooperation with the Eastern neighbours of the European Union, and where Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia are going to be also involved. In the field of crisis management, as a practical measure, I could mention the two police operations underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; in the military field the operations in Macedonia and Congo. (Operation Artemis in Congo took place last year.)

It is evident that if the European Union would like to achieve further progress in the implementation of its Security Strategy and intends to become a global player it must be more capable and more coherent. In the field of developing the capabilities an important outcome of the EU efforts has been the establishment of the European Defence Agency and the civilian military planning cell in the framework of the General Secretariat of the Council. An other important step forward has been the adoption of the Battle Group Concept and the Headline Goal 2010, as well the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP. In the field of development of coherence among the results of the efforts could be mentioned the establishment of the function of the EU Foreign Minister and the European External Service. (Once the new EU constitution will be signed and ratified by the Member States.)

Finally I would bring up two elements which are important from the point of view of implementation. First, the EU is not able to achieve alone the objectives set in the Security Strategy. The implementation should take place also at a bilateral level, that means the Member States should make extra efforts while promoting their bilateral relations and a close cooperation with the United States is necessary. The second point - the last one in my introduction - is that, in my opinion, the new member states of the EU have been playing an important role in the implementation of the Security Strategy and I am sure they will positively contribute to strengthening the capabilities and coherence of the EU. My last year experiences in this respect were rather positive.

Thank you very much.

Prof. ROB DE WIJK, Director, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Breda

I will summarize a project completed by EU's Institute for Security Studies in Paris called "European Defence: A Proposal for the White Paper." A Task Group was called together after the decision of the Laeken summit at the end of 2001. It took almost two years to complete.

We produced a report which starts with a good overview of everything that has been done so far in the field of the ESDP. Furthermore, we tried to develop some scenarios, which are quite illustrative. These scenarios show what future contingencies could look like and how the Union could would deal with them. However, these scenarios are not necessarily predictions of the future. Instead, the scenarios are used to analyse en to draw conclusions about deficiencies. I will not explain the scenarios in detail, but simply outline them.

The first scenario is a large peace-keeping operation. This scenario is comparable to the type of operation NATO and the Union is already carrying out in the Balkans. The second one is a humanitarian intervention. It assumes a humanitarian crisis resulting in genocide, for example in Africa. Consequently, the Union intervenes with a special force of 10.000 troops. The third scenario is regional warfare. This is an important scenario, which is usually left out of discussions here in Europe. The First Gulf War of the early 1990s serves as an example. This is a war scenario aimed at protecting the common interests of the European Union. The fourth scenario is more or less similar to the on-going operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Special forces are used to hunt down weapons of mass destruction and to destroy

terrorists that are capable of using these weapons. The last scenario is homeland defence, which is becoming increasingly important.

We drew some conclusions based on these scenarios. Some of these are already known because it is conventional wisdom and confirms previous analysis and which have already resulted in the European Capabilities Action Plan. Nevertheless, we found that we could draw some new conclusions. As usual, there is good news and there is bad news. The good news is that the Union is able to mount large peace support or peace-keeping operations. Taking over the peace-keeping operation in the Balkans can be done. Furthermore, the Union is able to rapidly deploy 2.000 – 3.000 troops to distant places as operation *Artemis* in Congo has demonstrated. Finally, the Union is able to carry out combat operations on a rather large scale.

The bad news is that for the most demanding missions the Union must rely on external actors such as the United States. The Union simply lacks the capabilities for large-scale autonomous military operations. It lacks - and that's very important - the capabilities for quick military successes achieved with few friendly losses and acceptable levels of collateral damage. These are the things so called post-modern armed forces should do. But we don't have post-modern armed forces. Some people argue that the Union is a post-modern construct, whatever that may be: it's neither a state nor federation. Post-modern armed forces are able to achieve their objectives quickly, with few friendly losses and acceptable levels of collateral damage. The Americans are clearly moving into the direction. We are not. We are a post-modern system with a collection of national modern armed forces, and that is clearly a mismatch. If the Union deploys armed forces for combat missions it runs a high risk of casualties among engaged forces and too much collateral damage. The EU is simply not able to carry out Iraqi type operations or *Enduring Freedom* type of operations. *Iraqi Freedom* led to the rapid collapse of Sadam Hussein's government. That was a success. But after that, the stability operation was not a success.

We clearly must make a distinction between fighting and winning wars and winning the peace, which is completely different. It requires different doctrines. It could require similar military capabilities but it requires different doctrines and a different mind-set. Winning the peace is largely a political process, while winning wars is a military task. I would say that the Union is quite well equipped to win the peace because we, for a very long time, put much emphasis on soft power, as already discussed previously in this seminar. Let me then give a quick summary of our main findings and conclusions.

First finding: the Union lacks deployable combat forces. Calculations reveal that the Union is able to deploy and sustain some 40.000 to 50.000 troops. This is not impressive if one takes into account that the EU has 1,5 million men and women under arms. Most forces are old-fashioned in-place forces for national defence purposes. The key challenge is how to transform these outdated forces into deployable forces. Our Task Group recommends that up to 50% of all forces, instead of the present 10%, should be deployable and, as a first step, the Union must cre-

ate, according to our Task Group, a force of 60.000 combat forces. The present Headline Goal is not about 60.000 combat forces, because the present catalogue of more than 100.000 forces includes combat support and combat service support as well. Some 60.000 combat forces is what we need as a first step and. Based on those 60.000 combat forces we must calculate the number of combat support forces and combat service support forces needed.
Second finding: the Union has no agreed force packaging system. Such a system is absolutely vital for rapid deployment and to define the right mix between combat elements and support elements. We focus too much on combat elements but we should also focus on combat support elements. If we lack those elements one can't deploy combat forces. Hence, an agreed force packaging system is absolutely vital for rapid deployment. For planning purposes and for the most demanding missions, the Task Group proposed what we would call a European multinational corps of ground forces with 60,000 combat forces.

Again, this concept should guide force composition. Combat support and combat service support should be adequate to deploy these 60,000. This would be a completely new approach to the present EU Rapid Reaction Force. If we talk about force packaging systems, then, as a first step, the creation of battle groups, already mentioned, is very important, because that is the first step towards a force packaging system. This, together with the scenarios already mentioned, would give a much clearer picture of the actual capabilities of the European Union.

Third finding: there is a lack of expeditionary capabilities. The phrase "expeditionary" is not popular in quite a few countries because it is offensive and it is about occupation. As a matter of fact it is not. Expeditionary just means -and there was agreement in the Task Group- that you are able to deploy your troops quickly to distant places. You need expeditionary forces for peace support operations and for combat operations.

The key question is how to restructure armed forces into more usable ones. It requires, for example, measures to modernise our armed forces, so that we can reduce the risk of collateral damage and the loss of friendly forces. To analyse the problem, you will find that in our report we used the elements of what we called a "military capability." A military capability is composed of different elements; so-called essential operational capabilities. Using the scenarios as a point of departure, this system allowed us quite easily to define the most pressing deficiencies.

I will only briefly mention the most important ones. We lack sufficient number of special operations forces for covert and overt operations; we lack specialised forces, such as manoeuvre brigades; we lack intelligence, including human intelligence or technical means to gather intelligence, such as satellites; we lack a backbone of command and control elements for autonomous action; we lack technical and strategic lift; we lack precision-guided munitions to decrease the levels of collateral damage; we lack sufficient numbers of stand-off weaponry; we lack a secure and deployable command and control system; we lack suppression of enemy air defences; and we

lack NBC protection. It's a long list, and most of the deficiencies are included in the European Capabilities Action Programme. Basically, our analyses confirmed this, but we singled out three priorities.

The first priority is C4ISR which stands for command, control communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. C4ISR is extremely important. It forms the backbone of each and every military operation. Without C4ISR it is impossible to carry out an autonomous operation. During the Cold War, the US profiled this backbone. After the Cold War Europe simply didn't develop such a backbone. But it is of crucial importance. If you don't have it, you simply cannot carry out expeditionary operations. The second priority is capabilities that enhance rapid deployment and engagement: lift, special operations forces, specialised forces. The third priority is force protection.

The fourth finding is that there is no agreed concept for force transformation. This is a much neglected and extremely important element. Force transformation is just more than modernization. Modernization is about procurement of new assets, creating new capabilities. Force transformation is about new operational methods and innovative doctrines involving a fundamental shift from traditional platform-centric warfare or operations to network-centric operations permitting the integration of sensors and shooters.

The Americans experimented with the first forms of network-centric warfare and network-enabled operations during *Iraqi Freedom* and *Enduring Freedom*. And it clearly demonstrated the advantages of this development. They could units on the ground, sea and in the air; they could link and collect intelligence, such as RPVs. Units operate in a network, and this network enhances the effectiveness of military operations. The lesson learned is that winning wars can be done quickly, without too much collateral damage and without too many friendly casualties, if you carry out network-centric operations. This probably is the solution to our problem of a mismatch between the post-modern system and its modern armed forces. Innovative doctrines and network-centric operations connecting everything together is probably the way to go to create post-modern armed forces.

The problem is, of course, that there is a huge gap between the US and Europe. network-centric warfare - the American approach - actually requires full interoperability of each and every unit. This is something we simply cannot achieve in Europe. First, we don't have the money; second, it's all national units that have to be connected. Therefore we should try to do something different. And that something different starts with a commonly owned C4ISR backbone. Subsequently, we should plug in our national units into that backbone.

So, interoperability at the level of command and control and intelligence is extremely important. That is different from the American system but it allows at least some degree of interoperability within Europe and also with the Americans. This new thinking would also require harmonization of national doctrines in

Europe. We proposed that the European Defense College should bring together civilians and military to promote a common strategic culture that incorporates new doctrines and concepts. It will probably be a virtual one.

We must accept that we do things differently from the Americans, if we like it or not, and that has something to do with our experience with 50 years of integration. We think in other terms about military power. This is, of course, closely related to the famous Venus and Mars debate. It was a very good sign that very recently it was agreed that there will be something like a European Defense College.

Fifth finding: the Union contributes very little to homeland security or to the homeland challenge. Homeland defence or homeland security presents new military challenges. Military tasks are mostly in support of civil authorities. It calls for concrete measures to underpin or to create more solidarity in Europe. What we recommended is quite straightforward. We recommend that there should be European civilian units for disaster relief, commonly owned medical stockpiles and the post of a co-ordinator for homeland defence. These are the first steps towards enhancing the Union's stability to meet with this challenge.

Both homeland defence and the European security and defence policies, which is part of the external policy of the Union, require better capabilities for strategic decision-making and crisis management as well. For both homeland security and for the ESDP we need new mechanisms and technical means. Satellites will become more important.

As we cannot always rely on the US we must have our own capabilities for strategic decision-making, and this also requires a picture of what is going on in the world. Strategic decision-making would also require a standing strategic headquarters and it also requires deployable headquarters linked to the backbone mentioned above.

Last point. What to do? Governments, in our view, first should spell out their political ambitions. The following slide indicates that there are different political ambitions.

Political ambition	*Required force*	*Examples of required assets*
Low profile, low risk (5th tier).	No capabilities for expeditionary warfare; limited capabilities for stability operations	Light infantry for stability operations, lift.
Low profile, medium risks (4th tier)	Niche capabilities for expeditionary warfare	The aforementioned assets, plus niche capabilities such as mountain troops, special operations forces, medical units, NBC protection.
Medium profile, medium risk (3rd tier)	Focused toolbox for defensive expeditionary operations and (combat) support.	The aforementioned assets, plus niche capabilities such as air defenses, ballistic missile defenses, RPV, UAV, mine hunters.
Medium profile, high risk (2nd tier)	Focused toolbox for offensive expeditionary operations.	The aforementioned assets, plus frigates, fighters, submarines, initial entry forces such, air maneuverable brigades and marines and follow-on forces such as mechanized and infantry brigades and the capability to provide the backbone of a peace keeping operation.
High profile, high risks (1st tier)	Broad toolbox for expeditionary warfare	The aforementioned assets, plus the capability to provide the backbone of a combat operation at division plus level
Global responsibilities	Full spectrum expeditionary capabilities	The aforementioned assets, plus strategic assets such as satellites, strategic bombers and the means to provide the backbone for coalition operations at army corps level.

At each level of political ambition a particular force could be developed. If a government has very limited political ambitions, then it could say: let's focus on relatively risk-less peacekeeping operations. If you have high political ambitions, you might opt for a large toolbox of military units in order to carry out all missions ranging from peace-keeping, peace support operations, to combat operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum. There is a difference in this respect between force providers, and those countries that are able to lead others – framework or lead nations. This is very important. Most countries in Europe are just force providers. There are few nations that are able to act as a framework or lead nation. The UK, in the first place, and France are the best examples. For smaller contingencies countries such as the Netherlands, Spain and Italy could fulfil the role as lead nation or framework nation. Most others countries are force providers. So, governments must define their level of ambition and try to create a force that matches that level.

If all the force providers try to create big general purpose forces their contribution will not be very relevant. Niche capabilities are important. There is no other choice but to think in terms of the development of those capabilities through co-financing of national assets, the development of collective capabilities and role specialisation. But this, of course, requires further military integration in Europe. We must be certain of a country's willingness to contribute with niche capabilities. This is a big challenge, and it can only be met with more integration in the field of ESDP.

As the first step, we recommend that the effort should be harmonised through the new Defence Agency. If this is done, and if specific capabilities have been developed even smaller member states will have a credible, a meaningful contribution, and consequently have more political influence.

Thank you very much.

Mr. VLADIMIR BILCIK, Analyst, Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), Bratislava

Thank you for inviting me and getting me over here. When Antonio asked me a few days ago to act as a discussant on this panel, I did not know what I was going to say, and I am actually quite grateful that I didn't prepare too many comments prior to coming here because, I think, that the past couple of days have been real food for thought in terms of inspiration for commenting.

I'm going to pick up on one theme, which seems somewhat unifying, and actually Tomas Ries mentioned it in his introductory remarks. When we look at the challenges we face and the possible EU responses the word that springs to mind is holistic. We've talked a lot about challenges that are holistic in their nature and that make the distinction between soft and hard threats very difficult. But when we talk of our responses and focus on the response side, the actor, namely the European Union, is hardly holistic. The EU is able to act together on elements of some of these threats, such as co-operation in fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or collaboration in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It has had at best mixed results when it comes to addressing regional conflicts or failed states. One only has to look at the EU responses in the Western Balkans or at debates about the existing crisis in Sudan. So, whilst the Union may claim grand goals as its strategic objectives, there is hardly any guarantee - and, in fact, we should not expect – that such goals be matched with comparatively grand results. So, perhaps and as gloomy as it may sound, modest expectations are and should remain the name of the game when we search for feasible EU responses.

Let me illustrate that the EU, in terms of dealing with the external challenges, is increasingly running out of steam in those areas of external action that seemed to have worked well in the past. At the same time, while the Union is forging a certain strategic culture, it is still lacking the tools, the resources and many other important pieces to fulfil in practice its strategic goals.

Let me look at two aspects here. The first is enlargement as an example of perhaps the EU's most successful foreign policy tool. The most recent round of enlargement was in many respects very difficult and the EU itself has been consumed with this task perhaps more so than the 15 member states in the mid-1990s intended to be. Europe found itself in the state of permanent Intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) starting from Amsterdam in 1997 passing through Nice in 2000 culminating in Brussels this year. But although we have had three different IGCs, there is no guarantee that the institutional changes will be implemented in the end. Simultaneously, there is less money now for all 25 member states, and the budget is likely to decrease rather than increase in terms of the amount of the budget as a percentage of the EU's GDP. We are facing low public support for the most successful foreign policy tool of the Union. And difficulties with reaching consensus on many policy issues in the EU of 25 today are likely to make any future enlargements much harder than the last one was, and the prime example in this case is certainly Turkey. But also other regions, in particular the Western Balkans, are unlikely to integrate quickly. Ironically, while the Commission is going to treat the countries south-east of Slovenia as an integral part of the enlargement game, the region of the Western Balkans remains as much a primary testing ground for the success or failure of the European Security and defence policy (ESDP). So, I wonder how this sort of the mixed bag of states and problems is going to work itself out and in any case I doubt that enlargement for the whole of the Western Balkans – and beyond Croatia – will be the name of the game in the foreseeable future.

The second aspect is the EU's foreign and security policy. Yes, the EU has been quite good in putting on paper the strategic goals it wants to realise and we've seen a lot of developments on this front from the ESDP initiative in 1999 through the Solana paper and the institutional elements, which are in the Constitution. However, in terms of the actual question of capabilities, and that's been mentioned here over and over again, the EU is lacking and in some respects remains rudderless. There is the question of fulfilling the Helsinki Headline Goal, which keeps postponing itself. The Union found itself very divided on Iraq and the issue still resonates in discussions about its foreign policy role in the future, especially with respect to its engagement in the Wider Middle East. The Western Balkans are not an assured success thus far. Obviously, Bosnia will provide the testing grounds, but the outbreak of violence that occurred in Kosovo earlier this year can take place in Bosnia once the EU does enter. Perhaps most disappointingly - the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is hardly an example of a holistic engagement of a foreign policy actor that aspires to a certain strategic role in world affairs. I was quite struck by how last week in Paris Javier Solana

did not mention a single time the word "Ukraine" as a priority for the European Union during his speech at the annual conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies. The ENP is a topic of its own and we don't have the time to go into it. But I'd argue that it has been a rather disappointing initiative driven more by the Commission than the Council, thus indicating that many member states do not seem to be willing to push very far on Neighbourhood Policy. And, by lumping Ukraine and North Africa into the same bag of countries, it is not really sending a very clear message in terms of its future relationships with immediate surroundings and especially in terms of its real ability to foster closer ties with its eastern neighbours in the years to come.

So what are the implications for responses? I'm summing up. The EU should speak with one voice whenever it can and whenever it is able to work together and act as a holistic actor. Some examples of relevant policy areas have already been outlined: environment and trade and perhaps elements of development assistance. On other issues one can expect a wide range of coalitions of actors within the EU that can work on particular tasks. The example of the Baltic States working on justice and home affairs agenda in Georgia is poignant. Perhaps the neighbours of Ukraine with their respective individual approaches to a visa regime with Ukraine might foster a liberalising change in the visa policy for the whole of the EU once the "new" member states enter the Schengen regime. But I also accept that there are going to be many more single actors with varying interests and diversity of opinions within the EU. For the 10 new member states, which entered the European Union, this is the time of reflection in formulating their own foreign policy priorities after gaining both the EU and NATO membership. Each new member state is looking for its foreign policy niche. Often this leads to situations where such a grouping like the Visegrad Four is losing its practical meaning because the V-4 cannot agree on clear joint interests, joint priorities and joint action. Last but not least, the issue of conditionality was mentioned here and perhaps that's an area where the EU can try to do something more. The Union can define its strategic goals and have certain ways of its own strategic projection, but obviously any successful implementation of the Union's objectives depends on both supply and demand. The EU must be able to offer certain goods but it also needs to continue to cultivate the recipients of such goods. And, I think, one of the things that the EU has been good at is fostering demand in various countries for those kinds of policies that the EU and the co-operative frameworks of the EU provide. Conditionality cannot work, be it in the context of enlargement or even a close partnership, unless the EU has credible partners on the other side or actors with whom the Union can work together. For instance, conditionality wouldn't have worked in Slovakia unless there was a credible opposition to the government of Vladimir Meciar in the 1990s. The same applies to Ukraine or other neighbours. So, perhaps the Union should target some of the policy initiatives to the demand area and foster demand for its goods. It should therefore engage more at the micro-level of activities and design concrete projects with concrete people, looking at educational initiatives, specific development assistance projects and working with partners in the civil society in the near abroad but also

in areas that are and should be of the EU's strategic interest outside of its immediate neighbourhood.

Thank you!

Dr. JEAN-YVES HAINE, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

I just have three main points to make. The first one is, following what Rob said, about the lack of capacity for autonomous action in the Union. What is striking, I think, is the gap between the demanding nature of the global threats and what I call the inward-looking nature of the Union. On one hand, we've got security challenges like proliferation, Middle East, terrorism, climate change, and on the other, at least on the European agenda, what we have is ratification of the Constitution, enlargement to Turkey which are issues…by nature they are questioning *raison d'etre* of the Union itself. Its not a question of policy – it's a question of *raison d'etre*, which means that for the next couple of years this gap is likely to increase. The ratification process will be an occasion for critics of the European Union to voice their concern, and the defenders of the project will be on the defensive. So, the argument would be extremely difficult to make for continuation of the process of integration inside the EU. Meanwhile, the global threats are basically right, so this gap is, in the very short term… doomed to be wider.

The second point is on the Solana document itself. It set a very broad strategic framework. One of the sentences there is that the EU is *inevitably* a global security actor. And yet, the most direct impact of this paper is about process rather than output: process dealing with military capabilities, the battle group, the European Agency and with foreign policy itself - the diplomatic service, foreign minister. But, in the short term, the effect of the Solana paper is again dealing with the internal process rather than setting priorities in foreign policy. Yes, of course, there are actions planned, but it is still too early a time for implementation. On that issue, I

think that the most important issue for the European Union in the next year will be the Balkans again. Kosovo will likely be the highest priority in terms of security and intervention for the Union. And so again, that gap between a very global security framework and what the EU is actually doing will be wider.

The last point is about the US factor. It's too soon to tell who will be the next president but it's likely that transatlantic relations will remain difficult, to say the least. Iraq is still a matter of serious division inside the Union. And even more to the point - once you are mentioning US foreign policy, basically a CFSP ceases to exist. The US is not a matter of consensus inside the Union. And this is a very serious source of division inside the Union. NATO has ceased to function as a normal and effective alliance. As Rob has mentioned, even the capacity from the military point of view to work with the US is severely limited. And more to the point - we are still split on the use of force in international relations between Washington and Brussels. So, on this matter - on transatlantic co-operation - the worst-case scenario will be an increased isolationist America because Washington is stuck in Iraq and will be basically focused on that only. And a very weak Europe. This is a lethal combination. To conclude. There are some positive aspects now in the Union, the most important being that there is a rising consciousness that global threats demand the Union's response - you know, the right level of analysis is at the Union level not at the nation state level. The battle group, the foreign minister, I mean, all this indicates that that Union should take care of these issues, not nation states any more. But, on the negative side, the agenda of the Union itself – the ratification process and the enlargement to Turkey - will widen the gap between an inward-looking Union and the demanding nature of global threats. I will finish with that. Thank you.